Indian Strategic Studies: 11/01/24

1 November 2024

India’s QUAD Strategy

Aagya Gupta

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, known as the Quad, has undergone a significant transformation in recent years, becoming a central pillar of India’s foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific. Initially established to coordinate disaster relief following the 2004 tsunami, the Quad—comprising the United States, Japan, Australia, and India—has evolved into a strategic partnership focused on ensuring regional security and stability, particularly in response to China’s growing influence. As the Quad continues to expand its scope, recent developments at the 2024 Quad Summit and India’s well- negotiated disengagement with China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) illustrate how New Delhi must adeptly balance its national interests.

In its early years, the Quad functioned as a diplomatic forum with limited practical implementation. However, since its revival in 2017, driven by shared concerns over China’s assertiveness, the Quad has shifted towards more concrete initiatives that directly address regional challenges. At the 2024 Quad Summit, new initiatives were announced that demonstrate the grouping’s commitment to reshaping the strategic and economic landscape of the Indo-Pacific. One of the key outcomes was the Quad Ports of the Future Partnership, aimed at developing sustainable and resilient port infrastructure in the region. This initiative serves as a counterpoint to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has been instrumental in expanding Beijing’s influence through the financing of infrastructure projects across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. India’s role in this project is crucial, as it will host the inaugural Regional Ports and Transportation Conference in Mumbai in 2025. This positioning reflects India’s increasing importance in regional connectivity and maritime security, aligning with its “Security and Growth for All in the Region” (SAGAR) vision.

Game Theory and Non-Alignment: India’s Position in the Russia-Ukraine War

Smriti Kolar

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, NATO and its allies condemned the offensive as a “brutal and unprovoked war of aggression” and called for an immediate ceasefire.[1] The attack was seen as a violation of international norms. In response, NATO imposed sanctions on the Russian economy, banned Russia from the SWIFT banking system, and provided Ukraine with arms to counter the invasion.[2] NATO also urged other countries to join in condemning Russia’s actions.[3] However, several countries in the Global South chose a ‘non-aligned’ stance. Thirty-two countries abstained from voting on the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution condemning Russia’s aggression.[4] Major economies like India and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) maintained neutrality, citing concerns of inflation, energy and food security, and disruptions to global supply chains.[5] This paper uses game theory to analyze the factors that inform India’s non-aligned position, including domestic energy needs, supply chain challenges, military dependencies, diplomatic ties, and regional security concerns.

Game theory helps study strategic scenarios where the actions of one player affect the payoffs of all others, shaping the outcome of the game itself. In this context, a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) model is useful. An SPNE model is applicable when players make sequential moves based on the strategies and preferences of other players.[6]

India-China border agreement: Five reasons to be cautiously optimistic

Manoj Kewalramani

Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri’s announcement of an agreement between India and China on patrolling arrangements along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) indicates the beginning of a new round of high-stakes diplomacy between the two Asian giants. Addressing the media on Monday, Misri said that the agreement had led to disengagement and a resolution of the issues that had arisen in 2020. He added: “We will be taking the next steps on this.” Subsequently, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar underscored the significance of the deal, stating that “we have gone back to the 2020 position” and that “disengagement with China has been completed.” While the agreement seems to be a positive outcome, details are sketchy. One must, therefore, maintain a sense of cautious optimism.

First, China’s Foreign Ministry acknowledged that “the two sides have reached a solution to the relevant issues.” It added that “China positively evaluates this”, and will be working with India to implement the solution that has been agreed. There is little that this reveals, other than the fact that there has been no implementation of the deal on the ground so far. Second, it is unclear whether the current agreement implies that the buffer zones created over the past four years across several friction points will cease to exist. Some reporting has indicated that this is the logical conclusion of an agreement that restores patrolling rights. However, a formal clarification from the government would be useful in this regard. Third, there needs to be greater clarity on whether patrolling will take place based on earlier standard operating procedures or whether there is a new SOP under this agreement.

India’s waning interest in Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

Amit Kumar & Vanshika Saraf

Contrary to many expectations, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s decision to skip the 2024 Head of Government Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit held in Pakistan is not surprising. While an invitation was extended, Modi typically attends the Head of State summits, nominating either the External Affairs Minister or Defence Minister to represent India at the Head of Government meetings. However, India’s decision to hold the 2023 Head of State Summit virtually, combined with Modi’s absence from this July’s Head of State Summit, highlights the SCO’s declining strategic significance for India.

India, along with Pakistan, became a full member of the SCO in 2017. Apart from the grouping’s mandate that underlined cooperation on counter-terrorism and deradicalisation efforts in the region, the forum promised several geopolitical opportunities. First, in the post-Doklam crisis period, the platform was believed to offer a new forum to broaden IndiaChina cooperation. Second, it appealed to India, given Russia did not want the forum to be Beijing-dominated. Third, the SCO offered India a platform to engage Central Asian Republics, which had otherwise proven difficult owing to the constraints of geography. Fourth, despite the suspended India-Pakistan dialogue in the aftermath of the Pathankot terrorist attacks, the forum provided the two countries with a less controversial means to hold talks on the summit’s sidelines. Fifth, with the Afghanistan question burning and still uncertain, it made strategic sense for India to join SCO, given the grouping had all the major stakeholders as members. In this sense, India did not want to be left out of the high table deliberating the Afghan question. Last but not least, by joining SCO, India wished to demonstrate its strategic autonomy and its ability to work with all sides based on interests.

India’s Island Neighbours: Assessing Ties with Maldives and Sri Lanka

Anushka Saxena

I. Introduction

India’s neighbourhood is marred with dynamically evolving politics and geopolitics. Its relations with its smaller neighbours often witness a crest and trough of cooperation and contestation. The latter is especially true considering that such countries adopt a policy of hedging and bandwagoning between two Asian major powers – India and China. Internally, too, India’s neighbours have complex political systems functioning on the spectrum between quiescence and upheaval, with each state having varied implications for their relations with India. Most recently, from the Indian perspective, this is demonstrated by the shift from a stable relationship with Bangladesh to an uncertain and queasy one, in the aftermath of Sheikh Hasina’s renunciation of power at the height of student protests in the country.

This brief paper assesses India’s contemporary ties with its two island neighbours – the Maldives and Sri Lanka. It looks at the China factor and its consistent implications for Malé-Delhi relations, and suggests a pathway for the two neighbours to revive relations, emphasising tourism, people-to-people ties, and India’s role as a ‘first responder’. With Sri Lanka, the paper assesses more historical issues central to tensions in the bilateral relationship, including fishery disputes, Kachchatheevu islet-related disputes, and the issue of how IOTs are treated in Sri Lanka. The paper makes a case for expanding economic and business cooperation with Colombo, and dealing with the abovementioned historical issues either through ground-actor negotiations or a hands-off approach.

'India-China Ties Will Be Deeply Strained'

ARCHANA MASIH

"The events of 2020 added greater impetus to India's deepening engagement with the US, Japan, France, and Australia. The evolution of the Quad since April 2020 is a case in point. So while Beijing did somewhat gain tactically, it seems to have lost ground strategically," points out Manoj Kewalramani, author of Smokeless War - China's Quest for Geopolitical Dominance and a leading Indian observer of Chinese politics, foreign policy and approaches to new technologies.

"Competition and volatility have become the defining characteristics of the India-China relationship, and this state of affairs is likely to persist for some time to come," he says in the concluding part of his interview with Rediff.com's Archana Masih on what lies ahead for India-China ties.

What did China intend to gain by initiating the military standoff in Ladakh in 2020? And has it achieved anything?

That's a really difficult question to answer because Beijing has never really clarified its objectives. I think one obvious goal was to retard the development of Indian infrastructure.

If you recall, immediately after the Galwan Valley clash, the Chinese side accused (external link) the Indian side of 'unilaterally and continuously' building roads, bridges and other facilities. It had added that China had 'lodged representations and protests on multiple occasions but India has gone even further to cross the LAC and made provocations.'

Rupee internationalisation is no cakewalk

Anisree Suresh

India and Myanmar are discussing a full-fledged adoption of a local currency trade settlement mechanism using the Indian Rupee and the Myanmar Kyat to enhance the trade relations between the neighbouring countries. It was discussed during the 8th meeting of the India-Myanmar Joint Trade Committee on September 27th and a meeting between Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal and Kan Zaw, Myanmar's Minister of Investment and Foreign Economic Relations, on the sidelines of the 12th East Asia Summit Economic Ministers' Meeting at Vientiane, Laos.

While the Rupee-Kyat trade settlement mechanism can potentially enhance trade relations between India and Myanmar, its success hinges on addressing significant challenges such as infrastructure deficits, trade volume, and the formalisation of existing trade practices.

Strategic dimension

India-Myanmar relations and the wide use of the Rupee-Kyat mechanism need to be analysed from the perspective of the potential benefits and challenges framework. Myanmar is strategically important to India's "Act East" policy, which aims to strengthen economic ties with Southeast Asia. Promoting the Rupee-Kyat mechanism would demonstrate India's commitment to enhancing trade and economic cooperation with Myanmar, potentially leading to deeper integration with the Southeast Asian region.

The Young and the Westless

Samir Puri

They came from different sides of the world and were meeting for the first time. For everyone’s sake, we hoped they’d be on speaking terms by the time they arrived at our event. Because if their countries ever truly fell out, this incongruous pair could end up taking us closer to World War III.

It was June 2022 and U.S.-China relations had plunged to a new low. Our guests were meeting in Singapore, the Switzerland of the modern era: a neutral place to meet at a time of tension. I had moved to Singapore two years previously to join the small team that ran the Shangri-La Dialogue, a big annual security summit. After a lull in face-to-face diplomacy caused by the pandemic, we were finally up and running.

China can back out of LAC agreement. India shouldn’t be lulled into a false sense of security - Opinion

Gen MM Naravane (Retd)

The 16th annual BRICS summit was held in Kazan, Russia, from 22 to 24 October 2024. This was the first BRICS summit to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates as members following their accession to the organisation at the previous summit.

In the run-up to the event, there was much speculation about whether there would be a one-on-one meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the Summit. On 21 October, there were a flurry of statements by the Ministry of External Affairs regarding an agreement on patrolling along the Line of Actual Control. The timing of the announcement did indeed suggest that it was to create a conducive atmosphere for a Xi-Modi meeting. After formal confirmation from both sides, the meeting was held on 23 October, the first such meeting in five years and more importantly, the first meeting post the 2020 crisis in Eastern Ladakh.

The stage was set when Vikram Misri, the Foreign Secretary, made the announcement regarding the restoration of patrolling rights in the Depsang Plains and the Demchok area. These two areas have been a bone of contention ever since the failed attempt by the Chinese to unilaterally change the status quo in the first half of 2020. That the two sticking points now seem to have been mutually settled is a welcome development and is indicative of our resolve.

Bangladesh’s Student Politics: Storied History, Brutal Violence

Saqlain Rizve

On September 19, the administration of the University of Dhaka decided to ban all kinds of student-teacher-staff politics on campus. Since the ouster of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s autocratic regime through a mass uprising led by students, 33 higher education institutes have banned student politics. Among them are 18 government universities, four government colleges, and 10 government medical colleges.

Following this, on October 23, the government banned the Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL), the 76-year-old pro-Awami League (AL) student wing, under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2009. The decision came after allegations of the BCL’s violent role in the last regime and in suppressing student-led protests, including attacks during the July 2024 Movement.

Student politics have long played a significant role in the Indian subcontinent, including their contribution to ending 200 years of British rule. After the Partition in 1947, East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) was totally controlled by West Pakistan. The imposition of Urdu as the state language for Bengali-speaking East Pakistan sparked protests, led largely by students. On February 21, 1952, several students were killed during these protests, a day now celebrated globally as International Mother Language Day. Following this, students continued to be at the forefront of political upheavals in Bangladesh, including the Liberation War of 1971.

The Global Security Initiative: China’s International Policing Activities

Erik Green, Meia Nouwens & Veerle Nouwens

China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI) was first proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Boao Forum for Asia in April 2022. It was one of Three Major Initiatives (三大倡议) announced between 2021 and 2023 – the others being the Global Development Initiative (GDI) and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI). The GSI also enveloped the aims of the Global Data Security Initiative (GDSI) that was announced in 2020. Together these initiatives form part of China’s proposal for a reformed world order and have since been incorporated into its vision for a Community of Common Destiny for Mankind (人类命运共同体). This represents China’s proposed alternative to the existing world order, which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) claims has failed to solve global challenges and endangered world peace. China’s global vision is deliberately defined along its critique of the United States’ hegemonism and unilateralism.

The GSI Concept Paper promotes several security and diplomatic activities that would help China achieve its global security ambitions. It centralises China’s position as a major world power, within the reform process of global-security approaches and mechanisms for security. The GSI reaffirms the role of multilateral organisations, including the United Nations and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and promotes their adoption of Chinese security norms and operational practices. These norms also feature in the GSI’s establishment of Chinese initiatives and dialogue platforms as the central place for discussing global security issues, such as the China–Africa Peace and Security Forum, Lancang–Mekong Cooperation frameworks and BRICS+. These security ties help China directly protect its citizens and businesses that are conducting more strategically important activities abroad. The GSI thus advances China’s proposed reform of global security, which in turn helps protect its overseas interests.

30 Years of Israel-Jordan Relations

David Schenker

Earlier this month, Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi urged the European Union and the United Nations to sanction and embargo arms transfers to Israel. Last week, Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood—which controls the largest bloc in parliament—claimed that two jihadis who crossed the border to kill Israelis in solidarity with Hamas were members of the organization. All told, this has been an inauspicious run-up to the thirtieth anniversary of the 1994 Jordan-Israel peace agreement.

Since its signing on October 26, 1994, the Wadi Araba Treaty has seen ups and downs. In March 1997, a Jordanian soldier murdered seven Israeli schoolgirls visiting a park on the border known as the Island of Peace. Later that year, several Mossad agents were captured in Amman while attempting to assassinate Hamas leader Khaled Mashal. Since then, on multiple occasions, both Amman and Jerusalem have withdrawn their ambassadors to protest one perceived offense or another. Notwithstanding significant adversity, however, the treaty has endured, and quiet bilateral security cooperation proceeds earnestly.

But the year-long Israel-Hamas war has stressed the relationship considerably. Nearly 60 percent of the kingdom’s population—including Queen Rania—is of Palestinian origin, so it is not surprising that events in Gaza and the West Bank resonate deeply in Jordan. Since October 7, there have been continuous sizable protests in Amman in support of Hamas and a rising popularity of Islamists demanding the cancellation of the peace treaty. During the September parliamentary elections, the Muslim Brotherhood secured thirty-one seats or twenty-two percent of the lower house.

Taking the War to Hezbollah: What It Might, and Might Not, Achieve

Matthew Levitt

In the wake of the Israeli military’s lackluster performance in its last war with Hezbollah, back in 2006, an official Israeli commission of inquiry documented both the shortcomings of the Israel Defense Force’s (IDF’s) tactical performance during the war as well as the “weakness in strategic thinking” that went into the decision to go to war and the development of unclear and unachievable war goals. Named for its chairman, the Winograd commission concluded that the IDF not only went into the 2006 war ill prepared from an intelligence perspective, it then failed to alert the political decision-makers to discrepancies between what it hoped to achieve and what measures policymakers authorized the military to employ on the battlefield.

Fast-forward 18 years, and the IDF is back in southern Lebanon. But this time, Israeli military and intelligence planners are benefiting from years of intelligence collection and the production of an entirely new operational framework, based on an “in-depth critical learning process” directed by IDF Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi during his tenure from 2019 to 2023. The IDF has clearly implemented lessons-learned when it comes to battlefield tactics targeting Hezbollah. What remains to be seen, however, is whether Israel also remedied the strategic shortcomings of its last war with Hezbollah. While Israel has made remarkable tactical gains in recent weeks, converting these into strategic benefits will be challenging. The Israeli government is eyeing two sets of strategic goals: The first, ensuring that Iran’s primary proxy remains too weak to pose a serious threat to Israeli security, is nonnegotiable. The second, reining in Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanese politics, is largely aspirational. The lessons of the last war can help inform how Israel might achieve these goals and what is beyond the control of Israeli policy.

Memorandum on Advancing the United States’ Leadership in Artificial Intelligence; Harnessing Artificial Intelligence to Fulfill National Security Objectives; and Fostering the Safety, Security, and Trustworthiness of Artificial Intelligence

Section 1. Policy. (a) This memorandum fulfills the directive set forth in subsection 4.8 of Executive Order 14110 of October 30, 2023 (Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence). This memorandum provides further direction on appropriately harnessing artificial intelligence (AI) models and AI-enabled technologies in the United States Government, especially in the context of national security systems (NSS), while protecting human rights, civil rights, civil liberties, privacy, and safety in AI-enabled national security activities. A classified annex to this memorandum addresses additional sensitive national security issues, including countering adversary use of AI that poses risks to United States national security.

(b) United States national security institutions have historically triumphed during eras of technological transition. To meet changing times, they developed new capabilities, from submarines and aircraft to space systems and cyber tools. To gain a decisive edge and protect national security, they pioneered technologies such as radar, the Global Positioning System, and nuclear propulsion, and unleashed these hard-won breakthroughs on the battlefield. With each paradigm shift, they also developed new systems for tracking and countering adversaries’ attempts to wield cutting-edge technology for their own advantage.

Droned Lives, from Gaza to the World

Toni Čerkez

In 2023, Banksy, the most famous unknown artist in the world, set up a new mural in South London (Banksy 2023). Painted over a traffic stop sign, the mural depicts three military unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones (presumably, Reaper class). As in most of Banksy’s art, the message is clear: Stop the war. What is striking about the artwork is not that it was a Banksy or even that it was stolen merely hours after it had been put up. Instead, it calls our attention to an unusual subject that has become normalized (Pong 2022) but is not really discussed in public: military and surveillance drones.

The issue of drone warfare has had academics and policymakers of various kins preoccupied for over two decades now (Enemark 2021). Drones are both hailed for their ability to execute targeted ‘precision’ or ‘surgical’ attacks, thus ostensibly minimizing unnecessary deaths in conflict. Others argue that this raises ethical issues. Namely, precision attacks are rarely, if ever, precise (Benjamin 2013, Pitch Interactive 2022). Furthermore, many question if it is legal or ethical to kill using drones (including important campaigns and NGOs such as Stop Killer Robots and Reprieve), largely because they are used outside of sovereign territories to execute extrajudicial kills. Put simply, extrajudicial kills are those where there was no due process involved in sentencing the target. However, we see increasing numbers of drones on our streets, in the air around us and in military deployments. What does all that mean for the ordinary citizen?

How new White House AI memo impacts, and restricts, the Pentagon

Sydney J. Freedberg Jr.

A landmark National Security Memorandum recently signed by President Joe Biden requires human oversight, safety testing and other safeguards for many military and intelligence applications of artificial intelligence. The memo also launches a sweeping review of how the Pentagon and intelligence agencies acquire AI, with recommendations for regulatory changes and other reforms due back next year.

However, neither the memo itself nor the accompanying Risk Management Framework [PDF] impose significant new restrictions on AI-controlled drones, munitions and other “autonomous weapons,” the chief concern of many arms control activists around the world. Instead, the RMF largely defers on that issue to existing Pentagon policy, DoD Directive 3000.09 [PDF], which was extensively revised last year to restrict, but not prohibit, autonomous weapons (some of which already exist in the form of computer-controlled anti-aircraft and missile defenses). The new policy documents, by contrast, focus on AI used to analyze information and make decisions — including about the use of lethal force.

That said, the memo does mention “a classified annex” that “addresses additional sensitive national security issues, including countering adversary use of AI that poses risks to United States national security.” The published documents do not specify what kind of “adversary use” the annex covers nor what other “sensitive” issues it might address.

Biden-⁠Harris Administration Outlines Coordinated Approach to Harness Power of AI for U.S. National SecurityHome

Today, President Biden is issuing the first-ever National Security Memorandum (NSM) on Artificial Intelligence (AI). The NSM’s fundamental premise is that advances at the frontier of AI will have significant implications for national security and foreign policy in the near future. The NSM builds on key steps the President and Vice President have taken to drive the safe, secure, and trustworthy development of AI, including President Biden’s landmark Executive Order to ensure that America leads the way in seizing the promise and managing the risks of AI.

The NSM directs the U.S. Government to implement concrete and impactful steps to (1) ensure that the United States leads the world’s development of safe, secure, and trustworthy AI; (2) harness cutting-edge AI technologies to advance the U.S. Government’s national security mission; and (3) advance international consensus and governance around AI.

The NSM is designed to galvanize federal government adoption of AI to advance the national security mission, including by ensuring that such adoption reflects democratic values and protects human rights, civil rights, civil liberties and privacy. In addition, the NSM seeks to shape international norms around AI use to reflect those same democratic values, and directs actions to track and counter adversary development and use of AI for national security purposes.

The shifting sands within global supply chains Premium

Lokendra Sharma & Pranay Kotasthane

Global supply chains are at an inflection point. While the COVID-19 pandemic shifted the focus from efficiency (just in time) to resilience (just in case), two developments in September 2024 indicate that another shift is underway in how supply chains are envisioned and operationalised — this time towards security (just to be secure).

Moves by the U.S. and Israel’s pager attack

On September 23, the United States Department of Commerce proposed rules which, if accepted “would prohibit the import or sale of certain connected vehicle systems designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by entities with a sufficient nexus to the PRC or Russia”. The proposed rules target both the software and hardware associated with vehicle connectivity systems as well as automated driving systems. While the 100% tariffs on Chinese EVs announced by the U.S. earlier this year stemmed from competition concerns aimed at reducing their sale in the domestic market, the newly proposed rules, which stem from national security concerns, would effectively ban their sale in the U.S.

The U.S. case against Chinese connected car tech is that both hardware and software components in cars employing some form of external communication capabilities can be potentially misused. The idea is that cars with connected car tech are essentially mobile listening posts, and that malicious actors can use their cameras and sensors for espionage purposes. Worse, these cars may even be disabled or hijacked — especially those level 3 and above on the Society of Automotive Engineers’ levels of driving automation. For security hawks, handing over such control to a state with which you may be in a future conflict simply carries overwhelming risks.

The Danger of Unfatal Wounds

George Friedman

“If you must wound someone, it is better to kill him.”

I’ve encountered some version of this missive throughout the course of my career. And like any good quote, this one’s precise origin is unimportant, but its meaning is instructive: If you need to hurt your enemy, hurt them so badly that they can’t or won’t seek revenge. An unfatal wound, conversely, is the worst course of action because it would fail to end the conflict and would almost certainly provoke a response, which could be immediate or delivered at a time most harmful to the original attacker. The original attacker might retaliate in kind, responding at the worst possible time to inflict the most pain on the original victim. In the long run, an unfatal wound would engender extreme actions from both sides, resulting in action that is much more serious than the original wound. Both sides would content themselves by preparing for the next round and causing more wounds that accelerate violence without bringing it to a close. In all this, rage fuels more suffering and more wounds. Rather than a missive of malice, the quote argues that killing the enemy is both kinder and more effective than wounding them – kinder in that killing one enemy early on obviates the need for future, wider conflict. The original attacker wins, the loser dies, and resentments are forestalled.

Forget Gaza and Ukraine, East Asia’s brewing war will matter more

Richard Javad Heydarian

All major global powers are flexing muscles in East Asian waters, with the US, China and even Russia conducting major drills across the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia in recent days. While global attention focuses on the potential for a major conflagration in the Middle East, great powers are sleepwalking toward conflict in Asia.

Last week, the US destroyer USS Dewey (DDG-105) and Royal Australian Navy frigate HMAS Stuart (FFH153) conducted bilateral operations in the Strait of Malacca, a show of joint force in a crucial maritime chokepoint. China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy responded by deploying its Dongdiao class surveillance ships to the East and South China Sea.

Beyond naval deployments, Washington and Beijing have also been fortifying their military presence in the area. The US will likely retain the Typhon missile system in the Philippines for the foreseeable future after its controversial deployment ahead of the Balikatan annual exercises earlier this year.

‘De-risking’ vs. ‘Strategic Decoupling’: Understanding Harris’ and Trump’s Approaches to Economic Security

Kazuo Waki

The comparison between “strategic decoupling” and “de-risking” provides a framework for analyzing how each candidate of the upcoming U.S. presidential election approaches economic security policies. De-risking, a key concept used by U.S. officials since 2023, characterizes the Biden-Harris administration’s approach to economic security. On the contrary, strategic decoupling is a term favored by Republican policymakers and those close to former President Donald Trump.

In short, these two terms represent the conceptual foundations of each candidate’s economic security policies. But what do they actually mean?

Distinctive Difference in Approaching Tariffs

The difference between de-risking and strategic decoupling manifests itself most notably in the field of tariffs. While both concepts recognize the necessity of tariffs, the rationale behind policies differ.

The Biden-Harris administration’s de-risking approach has resorted to tariffs, as the administration has upheld most of the tariffs imposed on China during the Trump administration, and they implemented new tariffs “to counter China’s unfair trade practices” in May 2024. It should be noted that de-risking selectively resorts to tariffs only in “carefully targeted strategic sectors.” The primary purpose of these tariffs is to mitigate reliance on China’s “excessive concentration in the market” with a focus on strategically significant sectors. In other words, de-risking-based policies are driven by the recognition of the threat posed by China, and they aim to prepare the United States for China’s potential weaponization of economic dependence.

The Impact of the European Defence Fund on Cooperation with Third-country Entities

Tim Lawrenson & Ester Sabatino

The European Defence Fund (EDF) is the European Union’s flagship defence-industrial instrument. Launched in 2021, the EDF is intended to support European defence R&D by providing funding to EU companies and research organisations (‘legal entities’) that assemble in multinational consortia to cooperate on capability-development projects.

It provides significant funding. The EDF’s EUR8bn budget over the period 2021–27 accounts for around 15% of all EU defence R&D spending, which means that the European Commission is the third-largest funder of defence R&D in the EU, with only France and Germany spending more.

When the EDF’s rules were being developed, the most contentious issue was how to deal with the participation of non-EU or ‘third country’ entities in EDF projects. Ultimately, it was decided that the EDF should allow some third-country involvement, but only if strict rules and conditions were met.

However, IISS research indicates that while there has been some participation in the EDF by EU-based companies owned by entities in third countries, there is no cooperation with entities located outside the EU (the latter being referred to as ‘true third-country entities’ throughout this study).

Opinion – The Concept of Soft Power and AI

Daniele Carminati

Soft power is a term that is notoriously difficult to grasp resulting in being often misinterpreted and misused. The concept is often equated to cultural power, as the appeal of a country to foreign audiences in the form of lifestyle, cuisine, fashion, music, movies, and more. Although reductive, this interpretation gets to the general public. More precisely, Joseph Nye, the scholar who coined the term, describes it as “the ability to obtain preferred outcomes by attraction rather than coercion or payment.” This is hardly straightforward, and it may also be an overly positive way to understand dynamics surrounding the power of attraction. Soft power is not inherently good or bad, it is still a form of power that can be misused and abused. How does AI – as large language models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT – understand soft power? And why this question is more meaningful than it first appears.

These models rely on the information that is ‘out there’ (i.e., the Internet), hence they generally combine and summarize already available knowledge, but they are currently less effective in creating new ideas. However, when pushed beyond parroting definitions found in the literature, they can reveal insightful patterns resulting from the discourse surrounding the term, as a form of ‘collective knowledge’ and understanding of this elusive concept. In other words, LLMs can quickly connect the dots, and the results, as this article aims to show, can be as insightful as concerning.

Review – Cyber Sovereignty

Pnina Shuker

Cyber Sovereignty is highly relevant to current geopolitical dynamics, addressing pressing issues such as cyber warfare, mis/disinformation, and the role of technology in international power struggles. Lev Topor’s analysis provides valuable insights into how states navigate the complexities of the digital age and the implications for global security and stability. Beyond the technical and political analysis, Topor raises important ethical and philosophical questions about sovereignty, free speech, and the balance between security and liberty in cyberspace. The book examines the complex and evolving landscape of cyberspace and its implications for international relations, security, and governance. Toper provides a comprehensive analysis of how nation-states increasingly assert control over their digital domains, crafting tailored versions of the internet that align with their political, religious, cultural, and security agendas.

Following Chapter 1, on the methodology, arguments, and findings of the study, Topor provides a historical overview of the Internet’s development from its origins as an American defense project (ARPANET) to its current status as a global communication network. This context is crucial for understanding the geopolitical power struggles around cyberspace. Topor argues that the internet, initially perceived as a tool for global unity, has become a contested space where states battle for control and influence.

Practice of Theory & Theory of Practice

Anushka Saxena

Military theory and combat work have, in the past few years, always been central to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s reform process. More recently, however, two back-to-back events have re-settled focus on these themes, amid a busy, foreign policy-oriented month for China.

The first is the Military Theory Work Conference (MTWC for convenience going forward), which took place in Beijing on October 14 and 15. This Conference is like another leg of military work conferences that take place through the year, and one of the first legs was the Military Political Work Conference that took place in June 2024.

At the MTWC, Xi Jinping gave a speech that covered the length and breadth of why technological revolution in the PLA matters, and how accompanying talent must be built.

From the Chinese perspective, there are three stages to the complete technological modernization of a military: mechanization (integrating machines to help humans), informatization (using the internet to connect machines and humans), and intelligentisation (making machines ‘intelligent’ and autonomous to relieve humans). These rather non-linear stages are critical to the making of a “world-class armed force” that can fight and win “short-duration, high-intensity, localized” wars. Clearly, technological advancement is at the center of each of these stages and war goals.

Spectrum-Sharing and the Military

Dean Bubley

An important trend in U.S. spectrum management is the deepening collaboration between the Department of Defense (DoD) and other stakeholders in enabling shared access to wireless frequencies. Rather than outright transfer of federal spectrum to private-sector users, the future is likely to build on the model of the Citizens Broadband Radio Service (CBRS), applying ever-more sophisticated sharing techniques to give optimal outcomes for both national security and commercial or societal interests.

The military controls large amounts of radio spectrum, using it for a diverse and growing set of applications. Realtime communications are central to terrestrial, airborne, naval and space forces. Multiple sensing functions – notably radar, but also signals intelligence and monitoring – are also used extensively in connection with domestic security. As recently as July, military radar systems detected Russian and Chinese violation of U.S. airspace which necessitated the scrambling of U.S. fighter jets.

In the past, rapid demand growth has fueled the continued transfer of spectrum from state to private users, but now everyone wants more spectrum. National cellular operators (also called carriers) point to 5G and future 6G demand. Wi-Fi advocates focus on enterprise and in-home consumer needs for access to broadband and cloud services. Satellite users point to rapid growth of both supply and demand for space-based communications, sensing and new LEO (Low Earth Orbit) constellations.