Indian Strategic Studies: 10/24/24

24 October 2024

The India-Canada-US Triangle Merits An Honest Political Dialogue – OpEd

M.K. Bhadrakumar

The rift between India and Canada over the killing of Khalistani activist Hardeep Singh Nijjar has deepened into a first-rate diplomatic crisis with the ‘tit-for-tat’ expulsion of senior diplomats, including the heads of missions.

That this happened on a day when an Indian team of officials was heading to Washington for talks relating to the alleged plot to kill a US citizen in New York City may be a coincidence, but the coordinated moves by Canada and the US is an open secret.

Meanwhile, the broader question of alleged Indian interference in the internal affairs of the two North American countries is becoming the leitmotif. It hurts. A Reuters commentary hit the nail on the head: “For a developing country courting overseas investment, seeking to embed itself into the world’s supply chains, and encouraging its companies to go global, it is unhelpful, to say the least, to be dubbed by a rich country as the second-most significant “foreign interference” threat after China…

“Canada is home to some of the world’s big global investors, from Brookfield to the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board and Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan. Their leaders, who between them manage some $1.7 trillion in assets may suddenly, for example, find it awkward to travel and negotiate deals in India if their government is effectively persona non grata in the emerging market.”

The BRICS Effect

BRAHMA CHELLANEY

A new age of international relations is dawning. With the West accounting for a declining share of global GDP, and the world becoming increasingly multipolar, countries are jostling to establish their positions in the emerging order. This includes both the emerging economies – represented by the recently expanded BRICS grouping – that seek a leading role in writing the rules of the new order, and the smaller countries attempting to cultivate relationships that can safeguard their interests.

The BRICS Still Don’t Matter

JIM O'NEILL

This month, Russian President Vladimir Putin will host the 2024 BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) summit. It will be the first annual meeting to include the four new members – Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates – that joined last year, and many other countries also reportedly will participate. But what will come of it?

The BRICs were originally an acronym that I used (in 2001) to describe what I saw as the world’s key emerging economies. But former Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and his Brazilian counterpart, Celso Lafer, had the idea of building on my coinage, and the BRICs turned themselves into a political club, adding South Africa in 2009.

Putin undoubtedly will use this year’s summit to signal to the world that he is not as isolated as Western governments want him to be. It is an ideal occasion for him and other leaders to promote a vision of a world that the United States does not lead. But it is worth noting that two other countries that were expected to join the expanded BRICS have not done so. After originally accepting the invitation, Argentina reversed course following Javier Milei’s election as president in 2023; and Saudi Arabia still has not decided what it will do.

One can guess why the Kingdom would be reluctant to join. It still prizes its defense and security alliance with the US, and those ties will grow even stronger if it ever normalizes relations with Israel. More to the point, it is not clear what the Saudis, or any others, stand to gain from BRICS membership.

India has a China problem, not just a border problem

Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan

It’s not just the border. India has a deeper problem with China, and it looks like it’s part of the same problem that other countries have with China: the country has become much more aggressive.

Indian policymakers and commentators routinely assume that if New Delhi could only resolve the dispute over the line of the Himalayan border, other issues would fall into place. In fact, there’s not much reason to believe that. Just look further afield to the Western Pacific or Ukraine.

For the past several years, New Delhi has said there can be no progress in other aspects of the relationship as long as China refuses to concede on the border problem. This was initially an effort at pushing the border problem to the centre, presumably in the hope that China would not want to risk the entire relationship over it. But China has not budged and does indeed seem willing to risk the relationship instead.

There has been some recent speculation that India and China are on their way to resolving their standoff at the border, where military confrontations have sometimes become violent. India’s External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar said last month that 75 percent of the disengagement problems had been resolved. The holding of a round of Sino-Indian border talks in August and a meeting between Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi also added to hope. But Jaishankar has since clarified that his reference was only to disengagement, not to issues of militarisation of the border or the larger state of relations.

Is BRICS De-Dollarization Program a Step Too Far for India? - Opinion

Mark S. Cogan

While at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar commented that New Delhi will not decouple from the US dollar, noting that it was not in his country’s economic interests. While noting that New Delhi was pursuing other means as well, he said: “[India has] never actively targeted the dollar. That’s not part of our economic, political, or strategic policy. Some others may have done so. What I will say is that we have a natural concern.”

Even if the US dollar’s retreat is based on economics and global trade concerns, India can’t escape the fact that the endorsement of de-dollarization by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping risks impacting India’s growth and strengthening China’s grip across the globe.

When the 2024 BRICS Summit is held from October 22-24 in the Russian city of Kazan, India now has no choice but to join Vladimir Putin in welcoming Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) into the fold.

Defenders of BRICS expansion have suggested that India’s association would ultimately benefit New Delhi in the long-term, but that is suspect. For example, India signed a deal to develop the Chabahar Port, which could have the benefit of pumping as much as $1 trillion of Indian exports into the Gulf region and Central Asia. However, the project has no direct association with BRICS and was achieved bilaterally. Second, BRICS-related trade growth is lopsided in China’s favor, as China’s size and foreign policy aggression signal it intends to influence other BRICS members rather than be more cooperative with its regional rival.

Cyber criminals are increasingly helping Russia and China target the US and allies, Microsoft says

DAVID KLEPPER

Russia, China and Iran are increasingly relying on criminal networks to lead cyberespionage and hacking operations against adversaries like the U.S., according to a report on digital threats published Tuesday by Microsoft.

The growing collaboration between authoritarian governments and criminal hackers has alarmed national security officials and cybersecurity experts who say it represents the increasingly blurred lines between actions directed by Beijing or the Kremlin aimed at undermining rivals and the illicit activities of groups typically more interested in financial gain.

In one example, Microsoft’s analysts found that a criminal hacking group with links to Iran infiltrated an Israeli dating site and then tried to sell or ransom the personal information it obtained. Microsoft concluded the hackers had two motives: to embarrass Israelis and make money.

In another, investigators identified a Russian criminal network that infiltrated more than 50 electronic devices used by the Ukrainian military in June, apparently seeking access and information that could aid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. There was no obvious financial motive for the group, aside from any payment they may have received from Russia.

The China-Decline Narrative Gets It All Wrong - Opinion

Diana Choyleva

About the author: Diana Choyleva is chief economist at Enodo Economics and a senior fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis.

Beijing has just fired an economic salvo that’s reverberating through global markets. Make no mistake, this is not your garden-variety stimulus package. China is fundamentally realigning its growth strategy. That demands the undivided attention of every serious investor.

The prevailing China narrative in the West has been one of inevitable decline. The sense that we were witnessing “peak China” has given way to the notion that “China is the next Japan.” But those writing off the world’s second-largest economy may soon find themselves on the wrong side of the story. Beijing began to roll out stimulus measures in late September. These bold move aims to tackle deflation and anemic consumer demand head-on, while simultaneously countering the headwinds of continued U.S. decoupling pressures.

The sheer scale of this economic overhaul is notable. With more fiscal firepower on the way, the overall size of the stimulus package is likely to range from 4 trillion to 12 trillion yuan. That’s equivalent to about $561 billion to $1.7 trillion, or a whopping 3.2% to 9.5% of China’s gross domestic product. But here’s the kicker: the real game-changer lies in the intangible effects this stimulus will have on consumer and business confidence, and on the system’s renewed capacity for innovation. These factors, while hard to quantify, could be the rocket fuel that propels China’s economy to new heights.

The Future Of Great Power Competition: Trajectories, Transitions, And Prospects For Catastrophic War – Analysis

Thomas F. Lynch III

The dominant geostrategic framework of international relations today is that of a Great Power competition (GPC) among three rivalrous, globally dominant states: the United States, Russia, and China. After more than two decades of mainly cooperation and collaboration, they drifted into de facto competition at the end of the 2000s.1 By the middle of the 2010s, their undeclared but obvious rivalry intensified.2 Fully acknowledged GPC arrived in late 2017 when the United States published its National Security Strategy and declared a formal end to the 25-year era of U.S.-led globalization and active American democratization initiatives.3

This article focuses on the vital interactions of the three contemporary Great Powers. How will their relative power evolve? Where will they compete, and how will this impact geostrategic norms, institutions, and interstate alignments? Finally, will their competition spark direct—and likely catastrophic—armed conflict anytime soon?

Predicting the future always is a fraught endeavor. It is an increasingly difficult task if one defines the future in terms of decades or generations. As a result, this article analyzes the future of contemporary Great Power competition for the remainder of the 2020s. It does so with frequent explicit references to his- torical patterns—touchpoints—associated with past multistate GPCs during the nation-state period that began in 1648 with the Treaty of Westphalia.

The U.S. Is Caught in an Escalation Spiral in the Middle East | Opinion

Rosemary Kelanic

Right now, the U.S. is in real danger of being drawn into a conflict with Iran against its own national interests. National security advisor Jake Sullivan confirmed earlier this month that the U.S. will work with Israel to ensure Iran suffers "severe consequences" for its missile attack this month, which resulted in no casualties. Hawks are already picking out targets—perhaps Iran's oil industry, perhaps its nuclear facilities—for a coordinated retaliatory strike.

Escalation would be madness, but as risks go, it's hardly unprecedented.

What's happening now is a classic problem of alliances, called the chain-ganging effect. The interests of allies sometimes diverge, and problems arise when one ally wants to do something in its own perceived interest that hurts the interests of the other—or even drags it into conflict, as is the case now with Israel and the United States.

A major Israeli war in Lebanon is not in U.S. interests at all, because it would unleash escalatory pressures that could be very difficult to resist. Already, pressure is mounting on the U.S. to go on offense with airstrikes against Iran after Tehran's strike on Israel.

A Better Way to Counter the Houthis

Allison Minor

The latest round of U.S. strikes on Yemen in October have brought back to the fore an inconvenient truth for Washington and its allies: the Houthi threat is not going away any time soon. Instead, the Yemeni rebel group has continued to assert itself as the vanguard of Iran’s “axis of resistance,” a role left open by the death of Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, in September.

Syria At Risk Of Being Dragged Into Regional War – OpEd

Dr. Majid Rafizadeh

The ongoing Israeli war on Hezbollah in Lebanon poses a critical question: Will Syria be drawn into this conflict as it escalates? As the violence intensifies, the geographical proximity of Syria to Lebanon makes it almost inevitable that events in the latter will affect the former. Historically, Lebanon and Syria appear to have had intertwined fates, politically, economically and socially, due to their shared border and cultural ties. This raises concerns that the current conflict in Lebanon could spread across the border, especially given the complex alliances and rivalries in the region, which involve not just local actors but also global powers like Iran, the US and Russia.

Conflicts in Syria and Lebanon have often spilled over from one to the other, especially during times of civil strife. The Syrian civil war, for instance, had devastating effects on Lebanon, causing severe economic strain and altering the social fabric.

Over the past decade, Lebanon has absorbed nearly 1.5 million Syrian refugees, placing enormous strain on its infrastructure and public services. Now, as violence erupts in Lebanon, the reverse could happen, with refugees flooding into Syria, further destabilizing this already fragile country. The social, economic and political ramifications of this are vast and Syria is unlikely to escape the fallout if this conflict worsens.

Iran and Hezbollah’s Savior and Achilles’ Hee

Natasha Hall

As the Netanyahu government engages in wars throughout the Middle East to degrade Iran and its allied militias, Biden administration officials are reportedly calling these military victories a “history-defining moment.” But is this moment history-defining in the way that White House officials seem to hope it is? Without a political solution that accommodates the millions yearning for peace and justice in the Middle East including Palestinians, Lebanese, and Syrians, it’s likely not. Israel’s tactical victories and Iran’s losses will be ephemeral.

Regardless of how hard Israel pummels its adversaries in the Middle East, both Iran and Hezbollah have hundreds of miles of territory sweeping from the Mediterranean to Iran to recuperate in. Hezbollah and Iran also play the long game when others, like the United States, are too impatient. This tenacity has allowed them to entrench their control in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and, of course, Lebanon. Though Iran and Hezbollah are beaten down now, they have proven to be resilient in the face of tactical losses by being able to maneuver in conflict-affected and fragile states, where others have given up.

Syria is a case in point. Hezbollah and Iran’s interventions in Syria since the start of the civil war have proven to be an advantage and disadvantage at certain moments. For example, recent reporting has suggested that their intervention in Syria has made them vulnerable to U.S. and Israeli intelligence gathering and targeting. However, this is not the first time Hezbollah and Iran have suffered due to their role in the war but stayed the course for longer-term strategic resilience.

How Hezbollah was fooled into purchasing explosive pagers

Maya Gebeily, James Pearson and David Gauthier-Villars

The batteries inside the weaponized pagers that arrived in Lebanon at the start of the year, part of an alleged Israeli plot to decimate Hezbollah, had powerfully deceptive features and an Achilles’ heel.

The agents who built the pagers designed a battery that concealed a small but potent charge of plastic explosive and a novel detonator that was invisible to X-ray, according to a Lebanese source with first-hand knowledge of the pagers, and teardown photos of the battery pack seen by Reuters.

To overcome the weakness – the absence of a plausible backstory for the bulky new product – they created fake online stores, pages and posts that could deceive Hezbollah due diligence, a Reuters review of web archives shows.

The stealthy design of the pager bomb and the battery’s carefully constructed cover story, both described here for the first time, shed light on the execution of a years-long operation that has struck unprecedented blows against Israel’s Iran-backed Lebanese foe.

A thin, square sheet with six grams of white pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN) plastic explosive was squeezed between two rectangular battery cells, according to the Lebanese source and photos.

The Real Purpose of a U.S.-Saudi Security Agreement

Michael Singh

Earlier this year, the United States and Saudi Arabia were close to sealing a bilateral defense treaty. The agreement’s terms are largely agreed upon, but its formal signing was postponed amid the present conflict in the Middle East. Analysts have frequently viewed this deal as but a piece of a larger puzzle. As conflict has racked the Middle East since Hamas’s heinous October 7 terrorist attack, the potential treaty tends to be characterized as one element of a “megadeal” aimed at pacifying the region: a cease-fire in Gaza would set the stage for the Saudis to normalize relations with Israel in return for a U.S. security guarantee and strengthened American and Israeli commitments to Palestinian statehood.

But that is the wrong way to look at a U.S.-Saudi treaty. In reality, the impetus for such a treaty preceded the conflict in Gaza. If signed, the agreement will not merely be another transaction in which the United States pays for an Arab state to normalize ties with Israel. The strategic context for it is global, not regional: If successful, a U.S.-Saudi treaty will pave the way for better security integration of U.S. partners in the Middle East and less direct American intervention there. In the long run, it will not tie the United States down in the region but help free Washington to act with greater latitude elsewhere. And the deal will draw Washington’s most capable friends in the Middle East deeper into efforts to address global challenges, including that posed by the rise of China.

Is Israeli Intelligence Back on Top?

David V. Gioe, Elena Grossfeld, and Marc Polymeropoulos

The aura of Israeli intelligence prior to Oct. 7, 2023, was unquestioned, with many of its dramatic operations becoming the stuff of legend in the national security world and even being dramatized in Hollywood movies. Israel’s spies enjoyed admiration from their friends and a fearsome reputation among their enemies for their bold operations, their long reach, and their even longer memory.

That reputation was destroyed last year. Israel’s intelligence leaders are trying to rebuild it. But while spectacular intelligence operations make for captivating headlines, it’s not clear whether Israel’s spies are also providing best-in-the-business support for diplomacy or strategy.

Hamas leader’s killing won’t end or ease Gaza war

Ian Parmeter

The death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, one of the masterminds behind the group’s horrific October 7, 2023 attack on southern Israel, is no doubt a consequential moment in Israel’s year-long war against Hamas.

But is it a turning point? Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Sinwar’s killing – long a major objective of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) – would signal the “beginning of the end” of the war. But he made clear the war is not over.

In fact, Benny Gantz, a former defense minister and member of the war cabinet, said the IDF would continue to operate in Gaza “for years to come.” So, what exactly will be the impact of Sinwar’s death?

Sinwar’s death does change at least one aspect of the war. He was an iconic figure, for better or worse, for Palestinians. He was seen as someone who was taking the fight to Israel. With Sinwar still alive and Hamas hitting back at Israel’s war in Gaza, the group was actually increasing in popularity.

Opinion polling in late May showed support for Hamas among Palestinians in the Occupied Territories had reached 40%, a six-point increase from three months earlier. Support for the Palestinian Authority, which controls the West Bank, was about half that.

Army aims for final draft of software mega-contract by Nov. 7

Sydney J. Freedberg Jr.

The Army’s massive and much-debated “modern software development” contract is headed for a third and final revision due out next month, officials told a standing-room-only audience here at the Association of the US Army conference Wednesday.

Officially called the Multiple Award Indefinite Quantity Indefinite Delivery Contract for Modern Software Development, the proposal is now on its second major revision, incorporating significant changes suggested by contractors. Comment on this draft closes on Oct. 25, so service officials can try to get a final version ready for an industry day tentatively scheduled for Nov. 7. But if the draft isn’t ready, they’ll push the industry day back “because it doesn’t make sense to have it without the last draft out,” said deputy assistant secretary for software Jennifer Swanson.

“Please, please, give us feedback,” she told the contractors packing the room. “We are absolutely reviewing all of it, and I think you’ve seen probably some significant changes between the first draft and the second draft [already].”

What Does Yahya Sinwar’s Death Mean

Jon B. Alterman

The Israeli government announced today that its soldiers had killed Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in a firefight in southern Gaza. Sinwar had led Hamas in Gaza since 2017, and he was elected the chairman of the Hamas political bureau in August 2024. Sinwar was a hardliner who felt Palestinians were too conciliatory toward Israel. He was the mastermind of Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack on Israel, and he was thought to have been hiding underground for much of the time since.

Q1: Does Yahya Sinwar’s death mean the end of the war in Gaza?

A1: The war in Gaza is not over, but it has moved to a new phase. Hamas will be fractured as a fighting force, and some groups within Hamas are likely to want to double down on violence while others may seek to preserve options for the future. For security reasons, Sinwar was not directing daily operations, so we shouldn’t expect Hamas’s capacity to quickly degrade. Sinwar seemed strongly opposed to compromise, so his death makes some sort of settlement more possible. At the same time, the lack of a single credible Hamas leader means it will be hard to push some parts of the organization toward a ceasefire. Overall, levels of fighting against Israel are likely to diminish in the coming days. Still, we are likely to see some sort of leadership struggle within Hamas. That could turn the group’s violence inward for a time, and comprehensively ending the war in Gaza is likely some way off.

Who Was Hamas Leader Yahya Sinwar? – Analysis

Kian Sharifi

Yahya Sinwar, the leader of the U.S.- and EU-designated Palestinian terrorist group Hamas, is dead, according to Israel.

Foreign Minister Israel Katz announced on October 17 that Sinwar was killed during a military operation in the Gaza Strip. Hamas has not yet commented.

The 62-year-old was the alleged architect of the deadly October 7, 2023, attack on Israel. The unprecedented assault triggered Israel’s ongoing war in the Palestinian enclave.

Sinwar became Hamas’s top leader soon after Israel’s suspected assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, the group’s political chief, in Tehran on July 31.

Sinwar, the head of Hamas’s military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, was not considered the favorite to succeed Haniyeh, who lived in Qatar.

Khaled Meshaal, a former political chief of Hamas, and Khalil al-Hayya, a prominent figure within the political wing, were seen as frontrunners.

Canada-U.S. Defence Relations in a Turbulent Time

Vincent Rigby

Canada and the United States have arguably the closest and most comprehensive defense relationship of any two countries in the world. They share in the defense of the North American continent, particularly through NORAD, and work together to support international peace and security through myriad alliances and partnerships, including NATO and the Five Eyes. While the direct relationship between the U.S. and Canadian militaries remains close, political strains have emerged lately between Ottawa and Washington over a perceived lack of political commitment on the Canadian side to sustain and improve defense capability in the face of seismic shifts in the geostrategic landscape.

The United States and Canada will both face elections in the coming year, creating challenges and opportunities in setting expectations in defense spending. While it is difficult to predict whether recent steps by the Canadian government to increase defense spending and enhance military capabilities will impress the United States and other allies, there is little doubt that Washington will expect Canada to follow through on these commitments and likely do even more. The focus in Canada is currently on the possible implications of a Trump administration, especially given recent comments by the former president that he would refuse to protect NATO allies which do not meet the 2 percent defense spending target. For the United States, allied defense spending and capability, as well as a willingness to deploy troops to trouble spots in support of Western interests, will be a major litmus test. And for those that fail to respond, there will be a price to pay, including in other policy areas such as trade.

Why Are African States Joining BRICS? – OpEd

Kester Kenn Klomegah

Geopolitical changes and the reconfiguration of economic architecture towards the Global South, under the rapidly-growing influence of BRICS+ (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) on the global stage are driving majority of African States to move away the United States draconic hegemony, its hidden ambiguity and obscurity, as well as rules-based political order combined with authoritarianism.

Without much doubts, African States are increasingly showing skyline interest in BRICS+, primarily due to its distinctive-focused objectives including global peace, the strategic development paradigms, food and energy security directions in the 21st century and beyond.

Ultimately, African States are shrugging off relations with the Western and European world, alternatively settling for better beneficial economic cooperation and targeting to tap existing opportunities with countries in the Global South. Researchers and policy experts have argued that the main aim within the association is to create conditions for the sustainable development for BRICS+ member countries and their people. There are other several factors or reasons, but for Africa the central question remains what concretely these countries wanted to gain from BRICS+ association. This article explores some of the driving reasons:

Hamas leader Sinwar killed by Israeli troops in Gaza, Netanyahu says war will go on

James Mackenzie, Nidal Al-Mughrabi and Samia Nakhoul

Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, a mastermind of the Oct. 7, 2023, attack that triggered the Gaza war, has been killed by Israeli forces in the Palestinian enclave, Israel said on Thursday.

His killing marks a huge success for Israel and a pivotal event in the year-long conflict. Western leaders said his death offered an opportunity for the war to end, but Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said it would go on.

The Israeli military said it had killed Sinwar in an operation in the southern Gaza Strip on Wednesday.

"After completing the process of identifying the body, it can be confirmed that Yahya Sinwar was eliminated," it said.

There was no immediate comment from Hamas, but sources in the militant group said that indications from Gaza suggested Sinwar had been killed in an Israeli operation.

In Israel, families of hostages held by Hamas in Gaza said they hoped for a ceasefire now to bring home the captives but also feared their loved ones were in greater danger.

Mystery drone swarm over Langley base has Air Force scrambling for cover

Mike Glenn

Langley Air Force Base officials are in the market for special anti-drone nets to protect their tactical aircraft from prying eyes, including F-22 Raptor stealth fighters. The move comes about a year after waves of still-unexplained uncrewed aerial vehicles buzzed the base.

The air base near Norfolk, Virginia, earlier this month put out a contract bid seeking information from vendors about supplying enough drone netting to cover up to 42 aircraft shelters on the flight line.

“The intention of the netting is to deter and ultimately prevent the intrusion of [drones] near airmen and aircraft,” the Air Force said in its bid.

For more than two weeks in December 2023, a dozen or more drones overflew the airfield at Langley Air Force Base. The incident was first reported earlier this year by The War Zone, a website that covers military issues.

On Tuesday, a Pentagon official said the base had been targeted by a swarm of uncrewed aircraft systems. The number of aerial incursions fluctuated on any given day.

The Starship revolution in space

Malcolm Davis

SpaceX took a big step towards full reusability of space launchers on 13 October, a step towards a transformation in accessing space far more cheaply, frequently and with big payloads.

The remarkably successful fifth test flight of the Starship launcher on that day saw a spectacular recovery of the rocket’s 300-ton first stage, Super Heavy, into the arms of the launch pad gantry. The second stage, also called Starship, meanwhile climbed and accelerated to almost orbital velocity and splashed down precisely in the targeted Indian Ocean location off Western Australia. This took the company closer to landing second stages for re-use.

The full reusability of Starship will dramatically reduce launch costs. That means it’s possible to consider new types of activity in space that simply were not viable technologically or were too expensive with past launch architecture.

Most of the envisaged applications are civilian, but possible military applications include launching surveillance and other satellites far more cheaply, and therefore in greater numbers, and even urgent delivery of large payloads across Earth with suborbital flights.

Once SpaceX achieves the capability for one Starship to take fuel from others in orbit, a single mission will be able to deliver up to 100 metric tons or 100 people to the Moon, to Mars and potentially beyond.

The Army’s dream of vastly simplified networking is starting to come true

LAUREN C. WILLIAMS

Upgrades are making the Army’s battle network easier for soldiers to use, but it’s still not exactly what they’re asking for.

“It's really good, but it is extremely complicated and…it's better than what we had before,” Col. James Stultz, who leads the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, said of the nascent Integrated Tactical Network. “I'm not complaining, but it's a waypoint, it's not the end state.”

Today, the Army uses a myriad of means to transmit and receive voice calls and other data in the field: radios, satellite terminals, cell phones, and more. The ITN is an effort to combine the service’s existing gear with off-the-shelf products to improve connectivity and mission command.

Service leaders have been working to make that web more reliable, secure, and capable. Radio mesh networks, which are foundational to ITN, are good for calls or texts, and sending location data from Android Tactical Assault Kit, or ATAK. Satellite networks can handle large amounts of data, like a drone’s video feed, and are often used when a military unit is not in range of a cell tower. But threading it all together is tricky, so the Army selected units to test out network upgrades.

Subscribe to: Posts (Atom)