India and the US 2024 Election

Andrew Latham and Will Kochel

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Former President Donald Trump and Vice President Kamala Harris offer two distinct visions for U.S. foreign policy: Trump’s “America First” approach and Harris’s commitment to liberal internationalism. But here’s the rub – neither vision is likely to result in a significant enhancement of the India-U.S. strategic relationship.

On the one hand, Trump’s transactional diplomacy and tolerance of India’s ties with Russia, as well as its membership in the anti-U.S., counter-hegemonic BRICS coalition, may avoid immediate conflict, but will fail to elevate the partnership to a more strategic level. On the other hand, Harris’s focus on human rights and a tougher stance on India’s relationship with Russia and BRICS could create friction, particularly given India’s insistence on maintaining its strategic autonomy.

Both candidates, however, have one thing in common. They overlook the deeper structural issues – from ongoing trade disputes to India’s domestic political trajectory – that continue to impede a more meaningful and enduring India-U.S. alliance.

Why India and Canada Expelled Each Other’s Top Diplomats

Rishi Iyengar and Amy Mackinnon

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A long-simmering diplomatic spat between India and Canada escalated dramatically on Monday as Ottawa expelled six Indian officials, including the country’s top diplomat, implicating them in the killing of a Sikh separatist who was fatally shot outside a temple in British Columbia last year.

India, which has rejected the allegations, responded in kind by ejecting six Canadian diplomats, including the country’s acting high commissioner.

Latest Taiwan drills show off PLA deterrence

Jeff Pao

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The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) launched and completed the Joint Sword-2024B Exercise near Taiwan on Monday with a strong focus on deterring the United States from intervening in any possible battles in the Taiwan Strait.

The Eastern Theater Command of the PLA said Monday it had deployed the Liaoning aircraft carrier group to conduct exercises, along with its army, navy, air force and rocket force troops, on vessel-aircraft collaboration, joint air control and strikes on sea and land targets in the waters and airspace to the east of Taiwan.

”The drills aim to test the joint combat capabilities of multiple services in integrated operations inside and outside the island chain,” said Li Xi, spokesperson of the Eastern Theater Command.

He added that the drills, conducted in the Taiwan Strait and the north, south and east of the island of Taiwan, are a powerful deterrent to the separatist activities of “Taiwan independence” elements, and are legitimate and necessary actions to safeguard national sovereignty and national unity.

As of 4:30 pm, the Taiwanese military said the PLA had deployed a record total of 125 aircraft, 17 warships and 17 coast guard vessels in its exercise on Monday.

Chinese hackers access US telecom firms, worrying national security officials

Sean Lyngaas and Evan Perez

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A highly skilled group of Chinese government-linked hackers has in the last several months infiltrated multiple US telecommunications firms in a likely search for sensitive information bearing on national security, multiple sources briefed on the matter told CNN.

US investigators believe the hackers potentially accessed wiretap warrant requests, two of the sources said, but officials are still working to determine what information the hackers may have obtained. US broadband and internet providers AT&T, Verizon and Lumen are among the targets, the sources said.

US officials are concerned about the potential national security damage done by the hacking, which they only recently discovered. It’s the latest sophisticated hack targeting US federal agencies that investigators have linked to China, and it comes amid tensions between Washington and Beijing over cyber-espionage and other high-stakes national security issues.

The Qin Gang Saga Reveals Security Gaps

Matthew Brazil

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In June 2023, then-Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Qin Gang (秦刚) disappeared from public view. Speculation about his fate ensued, including rumors of torture and execution for being a Western spy. This year, however, reports have trickled out indicating that he remains alive and an active, if demoted, member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

The first signs of leniency emerged months ago. Qin was referred to as “comrade” and allowed to resign, rather than be expelled, from his seats at the National People’s Congress in February and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee in July (Xinhua, February 27; Gov.cn, July 18). In late August. Western outlets including Intelligence Online and The Washington Post cited unnamed sources to report that the deposed minister was now a deputy director at World Affairs Press, a publishing arm under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Qin’s career work unit (Intelligence Online, 28 August; The Washington Post, 8 September).

If Qin is working at World Affairs Press, it appears to be a state secret, albeit an open one. The organization’s “Company Leadership (公司领导)” page shows only two deputy directors, Yan Nan (闫楠) and Gu Yu (谷雨) (World Affairs Press, accessed September 30). No page on the site includes Qin Gang, even those with photos of employee gatherings (World Affairs Press, accessed September 30). A reporter for The Washington Post who visited the World Affairs Bookshop in August was told by staff that they had not heard of Qin Gang being one of their own (The Washington Post, 8 September).

Apple is losing to Huawei in China. Here's why

Britney Nguyen

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Since releasing its Mate 60 Pro series last August, Chinese tech giant Huawei has made a comeback in China’s smartphone market, knocking Apple (AAPL-0.89%) from its pedestal.

Huawei and other homegrown smartphone makers have experienced double-digit growth this year, boosting smartphone shipments in China by 8.9% year-over-year in the second quarter, according to the International Data Corporation.

China’s Vivo, Huawei, Oppo, Honor — a former subsidiary of Huawei — and Xiaomi made up the top sharers of China’s smartphone market, respectively. Apple, meanwhile, fell to sixth place. And despite cutting prices on some iPhone models to compete, the data showed Apple’s year-over-year sales declined 3.1%.

Apple’s iPhone shipments in China experienced “marginal decline” in the second quarter of this year, Counterpoint Research said, noting that during the same period last year, Apple had the third-highest number of shipments — only behind Oppo and Vivo — while Huawei was in sixth place.

China’s Joint Swords 2024B

Mick Ryan

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Just last week, Taiwan celebrated its national day. Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te gave an address on 10 October that included a statement that China "has no right to represent Taiwan" and that his mission as president would be to "resist annexation or encroachment upon our sovereignty."

After the speech by the President of Taiwan, the predictable Chinese Communist Party response arrived. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Mao Ning stated that Lai had tried to “sell the fallacy of Taiwan independence,” and accused him of a “pernicious intention to escalate tensions across the Taiwan Strait for political gain.”

As I wrote in my last weekly update, there was some speculation in the wake of the Chinese statement that the PLA would use Lai's National Day speech as a pretext to launch military exercises around Taiwan, similar to the Joint Swords 2024A exercise conducted in May this year. While PLA activity around Taiwan immediately after the Taiwanese president’s speech held steady for a couple of days at an average of 10-20 aircraft and 4-7 ships, the situation changed in the past 24 hours.

Artificial Intelligence Is Accelerating Iranian Cyber Operations

Michael Mieses, Noelle Kerr & Nakissa Jahanbani

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In late June and early July, Iranian hackers stole information from Donald Trump’s presidential campaign and sent it to Biden campaign officials, according to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the FBI, and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). This was far from a one-off. Recently, Tehran has increased its asymmetrical advantage by harnessing cyber capabilities through the internet and social media, a trend that extends back even further. Over the past few decades, Iran has been quietly building its cyber capability in the shadow of great powers.

These recent activities took place after sustained Houthi attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea and attacks on U.S.-backed installations in Iraq and Syria. Iran’s cyber activities are part of a broader hybrid strategy combining conventional military power, economic leverage, and the strategic use of proxies. While there is considerable information about Iranian offline proxies, its cyber proxies largely fly under the radar. Though they are less visible than their offline counterparts, cyber proxies are nonetheless a powerful asymmetric tool.

Iran’s multifaceted approach in the cyber domain allows Iran to project power and influence in the Middle East while avoiding direct conventional military confrontations with stronger adversaries. Iran uses cyber operations to complement its broader geopolitical strategies, often employing cyber espionage and sabotage to gain strategic advantages or to retaliate against sanctions and military threats. As Iran increasingly incorporates AI technologies into its cyber operations, the likelihood of more disruptive and damaging activities escalates, presenting a substantial challenge not only to regional stability but also to global security.

Iran, Russia and North Korea changed cyber attack tactics in the last year, says Microsoft

Mickey Carroll

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Microsoft users face more than 600 million cyber attacks every day, partly fuelled by a growing trend of cybercrime gangs working with nation states, according to a new report by the company.

In this year's Digital Defence report, Microsoft said countries like Russia, Iran and North Korea have changed how they worked in the last year, including starting to experiment with AI.

"We must find a way to stem the tide of this malicious cyber activity," said Tom Burt, the company's vice president of customer security and trust.

"That includes continuing to harden our digital domains to protect our networks, data, and people at all levels."

Russia appears to have "outsourced" some of its cyber espionage to criminal gangs, especially around its spying in Ukraine, and in June, a suspected cyber crime group managed to compromise at least 50 Ukrainian military devices.

Saudi Arabia Energy Profile: World’s Top Crude Oil Exporter – Analysis

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Saudi Arabia was the world’s third-highest crude oil and condensate producer, the world’s top crude oil exporter, and OPEC’s top crude oil producer in 2023.1

As part of its OPEC+ membership, Saudi Arabia agreed to 0.5 million barrels per day (b/d) in additional crude oil production cuts that began in May 2023. In June 2024, OPEC+ extended these cuts through December 2025. Saudi Arabia unilaterally cut an additional 1.0 million b/d of OPEC+ production starting in July 2023, which (at the time of writing) it plans to gradually restore from November 2024 through the end of 2025.2

Saudi Arabia seeks to increase its electricity generation capacity from natural gas and renewable energy sources as part of the country’s Vision 2030.3 The Saudi Power Procurement Company (SPPC) awarded bids for four natural gas-fired power plant projects in October 2023 and began receiving bids for four additional projects in January 2024. Each project has 1.8 gigawatts (GW) of additional capacity.4 Saudi Arabia’s government has over 21 GW in planned renewable energy projects as of mid-2024, the majority of which are for solar power.5

Petroleum and other liquids

Saudi Arabia produced 9.5 million b/d of crude oil in 2023, a 9% decrease from 10.4 million b/d in 2022. This decrease reflects OPEC+ production cuts from 2023 intended to balance the market amid increased production from non-member countries. Total liquid fuels production in Saudi Arabia decreased 8%, from 12.1 million b/d in 2022 to 11.1 million b/d in 2023.6

Between Russia And Iran All Is Well That Ends Well – OpEd

M.K. Bhadrakumar

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The mystery about the hastily-arranged ‘working meeting’ between Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Iranian counterpart Masoud Pezeshkian at Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, on Friday has only deepened after the event. This was their first-ever meeting. Putin didn’t even have the post-event presser.

Why such a meeting was considered necessary becomes an intriguing thought, as the two leaders are to meet in Kazan within days on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit on October 22-24.

Russia and Iran have had a difficult relationship through centuries. It remains complicated, as the protracted negotiations over their strategic partnership treaty have shown. They have serious conflict of interests, as the controversial idea of Zangezur Corridor makes plain.

The two countries are potential competitors in Europe’s energy market. Both are tough practitioners of strategic autonomy. Their partnership in a future multipolar world order belies an overall prediction.

Iran’s Year of Living Dangerously

Ali Vaez

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Over four decades, in an effort to preserve itself, project regional influence, and deter adversaries, the Islamic Republic of Iran has invested in three projects: funding and arming a network of nonstate allies; developing ballistic missiles that can reach its rivals; and launching a nuclear program that can be either dialed down to deliver economic benefits or dialed up to deliver a nuclear weapon. Setbacks to the first, mixed results from the second, and uncertainty over the third have increasingly called this strategy into question.

After Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack on Israel, groups in the Iranian-backed “axis of resistance” quickly mobilized on multiple fronts. In Yemen, the Houthis’ missiles and drones menaced maritime traffic in the Red Sea. In Iraq and Syria, militias launched drones and rockets at U.S. forces. And in Lebanon, Hezbollah ramped up cross-border fire into Israel. As Israel waged its military campaign in Gaza, Israel also sought to douse Iran’s ring of fire, including by targeting Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps personnel. In April, an Israeli strike on an Iranian consular facility in Damascus—which the leadership in Tehran considered a direct hit on sovereign territory—killed several of the IRGC’s senior commanders. In response to the mounting losses of IRGC officers in Lebanon and Syria, Tehran, for the first time, mounted a direct military attack against Israel. Iran indirectly telegraphed its strike in advance to the United States, rendering the barrage of drones and missiles largely ineffective. But Iran’s leaders nonetheless declared their attack a success.

Iran’s Nuclear Tipping Point

Carol E. B. Choksy and Jamsheed K. Choksy

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When it comes to Iran’s capacity and desire to develop nuclear weapons, conventional wisdom in the West has generally held that Tehran treasures its so-called threshold status—in which it possesses the ability to quickly manufacture such armaments but does not do so. Threshold status should, in theory, afford Iran the leverage that comes with having a nuclear deterrent without the blowback. 

A Mysterious Hacking Group Has 2 New Tools to Steal Data From Air-Gapped Machine

Dan Goodin

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Researchers have unearthed two sophisticated tool sets that a nation-state hacking group—possibly from Russia—used to steal sensitive data stored on air-gapped devices, meaning those that are deliberately isolated from the internet or other networks to safeguard them from malware.

One of the custom tool collections was used starting in 2019 against a South Asian embassy in Belarus. A largely different tool set created by the same threat group infected a European Union government organization three years later. Researchers from ESET, the security firm that discovered the toolkits, said some of the components in both were identical to those fellow security firm Kaspersky described in research published last year and attributed to an unknown group, tracked as GoldenJackal, working for a nation-state. Based on the overlap, ESET has concluded that the same group is behind all the attacks observed by both firms.

Quite Unusual

Not only Israel: The burning fronts in the global cyber war

Denis Vitchevsky

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It’s easy to forget, but nearly two decades have passed since the first documented state-attributed cyberattack. In 2007, Estonia’s infrastructure was crippled, likely by Russia, following a diplomatic dispute. Three years later, malware targeting Iranian centrifuges was discovered and named Stuxnet. While the field of cyber warfare still feels like a new frontier, the children born in the year Estonia was attacked will be enlisting next year—some of them to develop new cyber tools.

When the first instances of cyber warfare surfaced, one of the biggest concerns was the lack of rules or restraints. Apocalyptic predictions warned of poisoned water supplies, rigged elections, remote power plant explosions, derailed trains, missile launches, and more. Fortunately, little of that has come to pass.

There are many reasons why cyber warfare hasn’t wreaked global havoc yet. Some of the initial fears were unfounded—many critical systems aren’t actually connected to the internet, and targeted attacks like the one on Iranian centrifuges are far from easy.

Sanctions, cyber wars, and global collaboration: Huawei executive sheds light on future cybersecurity challenges

Tawney Kruger

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The U.S. sanctions on Huawei, particularly during the Trump administration, have significantly shaped the global cybersecurity landscape, intensifying the challenges faced by the Chinese tech giant. “We faced tremendous headwinds in new deals because of alleged trust issues,” explained Dr. Aloysius Cheang, Huawei’s President of Cybersecurity & Privacy Protection and Chief Security Officer for the Middle East and Central Asia in an interview with Daryo's Tawney Kruger at the Cyber Security Summit in Tashkent. “They were using cybersecurity as a weapon against us,” he added, emphasizing how Huawei became a central figure in the U.S.-China trade war.

Under the Trump administration, the U.S. pushed a paradigm of “trusted and untrusted vendors,” often placing Huawei in the latter category.

“The Trump administration had pushed out a trusted and untrusted vendor paradigm,” the Huawei executive explained.

This narrative led to initiatives such as the 5G Clean Network, which sought to exclude Huawei from playing any role in global 5G infrastructure. “They have the 5G clean power thing they were pushing,” he remarked, underscoring the U.S. government’s efforts to block Huawei from participating in critical telecommunications networks worldwide.

A “Land-For-Land” Solution to the Ukraine War?

Andreas Umland

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Beijing’s and other non-Western capitals’ calls for a ceasefire and negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv have acquired a new meaning after the Ukrainian occupation of western Russian lands. A Chinese or other non-Western push for Russo-Ukrainian accommodation could now lead to meaningful peace talks.

Ukraine’s unexpectedly successful and deep incursion into Russian territory on August 6, 2024, has changed the conversation about the Russo-Ukrainian War. The most important international impact that the Ukrainian surprise action may eventually have is on officially neutral non-Western countries such as China, India, or Brazil. The West was and will be supportive of Ukraine—irrespective of the Kursk operation and its outcome. In contrast, a prolonged Ukrainian occupation of legitimate Russian state territory introduces a new dimension into non-Western approaches to the war.

If Moscow does not reverse the Ukrainian offensive soon and fully, it will change Kyiv’s position and leverage in hypothetical negotiations, which many third actors have officially promoted since the war started in 2014. So far, Kyiv has had to rely solely on moral and legal arguments referring to the rules-based world order in its communication with foreign partners. Now, in contrast, a less normatively driven, more transactional, and more straightforward “land-for-land” deal between Russia and Ukraine has become theoretically feasible.

Ukraine bridles at no-holds-barred US support for Israel

Veronika Melkozerova, Robbie Gramer and Paul McLeary

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The U.S. this week deployed an advanced air defense system and dozens of troops to protect Israel from Iranian ballistic missiles, but there is nothing like that level of help for Ukraine even though it daily faces Russian drone, missile and bomb attacks.

In Kyiv, that’s being called out as a double standard.

“If the allies shoot down missiles together in the sky of the Middle East, why is there still no decision to shoot down drones and missiles over Ukraine?” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy asked last month.

When U.S. and British air defense systems and fighter planes helped knock down hundreds of Iranian missiles Oct. 1., Ukraine’s foreign ministry said: “We call on Ukraine’s allies to defend Ukrainian airspace with the same determination and without hesitation from Russian missile and drone attacks, recognizing that human life is equally precious in any part of the world.”

The allies also intervened in April.

The reason why the U.S. acts boldly in Israel and cautiously in Ukraine is clear: Russia is armed with nuclear weapons and Iran isn’t.

Is the U.S. Helping Israel—or Emboldening It To Take Bigger Risks? | Opinion

Daniel R. DePetris

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On October 1, Israel dodged a bullet—or, more accurately, a barrage of 180 ballistic missiles. Iran's strike, meant to avenge Israel's assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and a senior Iranian general days earlier, did little damage to Israel's military infrastructure. For the most part, Israel's air defense system, aided by U.S. Navy ships based in the Eastern Mediterranean, neutralized the missiles before they landed.

A few dozen, however, did break through Israel's anti-missile network. Satellite images taken the day after the Iranian attack showed multiple impact points at the Nevatim Airbase, deep in the Negev Desert. U.S. defense officials likely had some of those images in mind over the weekend when they announced the deployment of a U.S. Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery, along with a 100-strong U.S. crew, to buttress Israel's defenses.

The THAAD is a highly sophisticated air defense platform that can intercept medium- and intermediate-range missiles, above and beyond what the trademark U.S. Patriot system can do. There are only nine THAAD batteries available at any one time, so the fact that one was so rapidly moved to Israel demonstrates just how concerned the Biden administration is about hostilities with Iran flaring up in the days and weeks to come.

How Hamas Infiltrated Europ

Olivia Reingold

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Since October 7, when Hamas terrorists murdered more than 1,200 people in a single day, anti-Israel—and antisemitic—sentiment has roiled Europe. In the Netherlands, strangers have targeted Jewish people, calling them slurs like “child murderer” and “dirty Jew.” Over the summer, UK voters elected four anti-Israel politicians, all of whom consider the Jewish state’s retaliatory war against Hamas a “genocide”—with one even questioning reports that the terrorists raped their female victims.

On Tuesday, the European Leadership Network, a nonprofit pro-Israel advocacy group, released a report—first shared with The Free Press—that helps explain the origin of this rising hate. It states that an extensive network of Hamas-affiliated officials and activists throughout Europe use a “civilian front” of charities and nonprofits to line the pockets of the terrorist group.

The report, titled “Hamas in Europe,” identifies five European countries where it claims Hamas is most active outside of Gaza: the UK, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium. Its hundreds of pages detail the histories of at least a dozen individuals with Hamas ties who are living in Europe while they fundraise, lobby for, and make media appearances on behalf of the terrorist group.

How The US Government Turned On The People – OpEd

Peter St. Onge

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The catastrophic mismanagement of Hurricane Helene relief is showing the American people that Washington’s dysfunctional but, worse, it doesn’t even seem to be trying to serve the people.

Instead, we serve it. Like livestock.

So how did we get here?

The Long March of Bureaucracy

As with the economy, the seeds of our political crisis began a hundred years ago in the Progressive era.

The Progressives’ big year for taking over the economy was 1913, with the income tax and the Federal Reserve Act.

But the political takeover was earlier — according to historian Murray Rothbard, it began precisely 30 years earlier with something called the Pendleton Act of 1883.

The Act made bureaucrats professionals who are independent of politicians. This was allegedly to fight corruption, but note that a bureaucracy that’s independent of politicians is also independent of voters.

Ukraine’s Sprawling Hybrid Warfare Could be the Middle East’s Future

Eugene Chausovsky

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The Middle East teeters on the brink of a regional war, and Israel’s conflict with Hamas hit the one-year mark on Oct 7. The longer that such wars—particularly when they are centered around long-standing geopolitical hot spots—go on, the greater their potential to spread—not just militarily, but also into the tangled domains of hybrid warfare, where political, strategic, and economic demands meet. Russia’s war in Ukraine offers a telling set of examples of what might be to come in the Middle East.

While the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 brought global attention to the conflict, the war was already long underway. Its start came with the Euromaidan revolution in Kyiv in 2014 and Russia’s subsequent annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, which was followed by Russian support of pro-Moscow separatists in eastern Ukraine during the ensuing years. Attempts at international mediation and negotiations over a cease-fire ultimately proved unsuccessful, leading to a gradual escalation of tensions between Russia and Ukraine that exploded into full-scale war nearly a decade later.

A new military-industrial complex: How tech bros are hyping AI’s role in war

Paul Lushenko & Keith Carter

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Since the emergence of generative artificial intelligence, scholars have speculated about the technology’s implications for the character, if not nature, of war. The promise of AI on battlefields and in war rooms has beguiled scholars. They characterize AI as “game-changing,” “revolutionary,” and “perilous,” especially given the potential of great power war involving the United States and China or Russia. In the context of great power war, where adversaries have parity of military capabilities, scholars claim that AI is the sine qua non, absolutely required for victory. This assessment is predicated on the presumed implications of AI for the “sensor-to-shooter” timeline, which refers to the interval of time between acquiring and prosecuting a target. By adopting AI, or so the argument goes, militaries can reduce the sensor-to-shooter timeline and maintain lethal overmatch against peer adversaries.

Although understandable, this line of reasoning may be misleading for military modernization, readiness, and operations. While experts caution that militaries are confronting a “eureka” or “Oppenheimer” moment, harkening back to the development of the atomic bomb during World War II, this characterization distorts the merits and limits of AI for warfighting. It encourages policymakers and defense officials to follow what can be called a “primrose path of AI-enabled warfare,” which is codified in the US military’s “third offset” strategy. This vision of AI-enabled warfare is fueled by gross prognostications and over-determination of emerging capabilities enhanced with some form of AI, rather than rigorous empirical analysis of its implications across all (tactical, operational, and strategic) levels of war.

SpaceX’s giant robotic leap for mankind

Norman Lewis

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‘A day for the engineering history books.’ That is how Kate Tice, a senior engineering manager at SpaceX, characterised her company’s achievements this weekend.

She’s not wrong. On Sunday, Elon Musk’s SpaceX managed a remarkable feat. It caught the massive booster stage from its Starship rocket in a pair of giant robotic arms as it fell back to the company’s ‘Mechazilla’ launchpad in southern Texas.

SpaceX has taken another huge step closer to developing a fully reusable rocket system whose parts can be recovered and reused. As such, Sunday’s giant booster catch also marked another significant milestone in Elon Musk’s ambitious plan to send people and cargo to the Moon and, eventually, Mars.

Since its foundation in 2002, SpaceX has opened up a new frontier in space exploration. It has revived the dream of establishing Moon bases, from which humankind could potentially colonise Mars. And it has reignited the ambition of NASA, too. The US government agency originally withdrew from further Moon landings back in 1972. Now, in response to SpaceX, it has developed its Artemis lunar programme, which aims to get humans living and working on the Moon and ultimately lay the ground for future missions to Mars. Musk’s Starship will be integral to helping NASA get there.

Being Responsive to Combatant Commanders

Pete Modigliani and Matt MacGregor

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The primary purpose of the defense acquisition enterprise is to acquire and deliver capabilities for the operational commanders to use to deter and if necessary, win wars.

Per Title X, the military services are responsible for organizing, training, and equipping the forces. The Combatant Commands are joint military commands responsible for geographic (e.g., INDOPACOM) or functional areas (e.g., CYBERCOM).

Ample debate over the last few decades includes the case that the Services too often put their parochial views above those of the Joint Force (we have written about this ourselves). Combatant Commanders remain frustrated by what they view as “the system” not delivering the capabilities they require at the speed and quantity needed to complete their missions.

This was a major reason for the initiation of the European (EDI) and Pacific Deterrence Initiatives (PDI). In particular PDI was driven by years of Congress getting massive unfunded lists from INDOPACOM that the Services had seemingly ignored. The 2020 $20B wish list that INDOPACOM had submitted to the Hill turned into a 2021 NDAA provision with $6.9B allocated to address the combatant command needs. Predictably, this was hijacked by the Services (and OSD) to buy more ships and planes…when commanders really needed “long-range weapons, missile defenses, and critical enablers such as logistics capabilities, training ranges, and support infrastructure.”