20 October 2024

BRICS Country Rejects De-Dollarization, Embraces the US Dollar

Vinod Dsouza

In a new twist of events, BRICS member India has confirmed that it will not target the US dollar amid the de-dollarization agenda that has engulfed the global financial landscape. India made it clear that it has no plans to end reliance on the US dollar and will use the currency for trade and transactions where it remains a necessary form of payment.

The development is a complete U-turn from the BRICS initiative where the alliance is pushing de-dollarization narratives around the world. Sources say that India is unhappy with the narrative pushed by its BRICS counterparts China and Russia. According to sources, India believes China is using BRICS as a stepping stone to strengthen its dominance around the world.


Shanghai Cooperation Organization Meets In Pakistan On October 15 Amid Tension – Analysis

P. K. Balachandran

The question as to whether the SCO has been useful or not is playing in many minds. But it has its defenders too.

Top leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) will meet in Pakistan’s capital of Islamabad on October 15 and 16 amidst political turmoil in Pakistan and internal contradictions in the SCO itself, raising questions about its usefulness.

It will be a meeting of the Council of the Heads of Government (CHG) of SCO member countries. The CHG is the second-highest decision-making body in the SCO The aim of the session is to advance regional economic cooperation, combat terrorism, address environmental issues and discuss measures to strengthen the organisation.

Nine of the 10 member states are being represented at the Prime-Ministerial level. Among the attendees will be Chinese Premier Li Qiang, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, Belarusian PM Roman Golovchenko and Iran’s First Vice President Reza Aref.

Sri Lanka’s New President Is More a Pragmatist Than a Marxist

Umesh Moramudali

On September 21, National People’s Power (NPP) leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake won Sri Lanka’s eighth presidential election. Two days after being sworn in as the president, Dissanayake dissolved the Parliament and declared that a parliamentary election would be held in November 2024.

It is no secret that Dissanayake’s victory comes amidst the worst economic crisis Sri Lanka has encountered since independence, as well as the significant decline in popularity of other leaders alongside the crisis. The resignation of Gotabaya Rajapaksa from the presidency and the appointment of Ranil Wickremesinghe to that post in 2022 broke the Rajapaksa-led Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) into two major factions. One faction continued supporting the Rajapaksas, and the other sided with Wickremesinghe. Another major political party, Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB), also experienced a decline in popularity as the public was frustrated with establishment politics.

Against that backdrop, Dissanayake and his NPP coalition gained support as a viable alternative to rule the country and eliminate corruption. As a result, Dissanayake secured 42 percent of the valid votes cast in 2024, compared to the 3 percent he obtained in the presidential election in 2019. Although 42 percent support was not sufficient for him to secure the presidency in the first round, his lead of 1.2 million votes over major contender Sajith Premadasa ensured his victory in the second round.

The 75-Year Quest to Make China Great Again

Elizabeth Economy

Visitors take photos on a public square at the base of the Potala Palace near a large mural depicting current and former Chinese leaders, clockwise from top, Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping, and Jiang Zemin, in Lhasa in western China’s Tibet Autonomous Region, as seen during a rare government-led tour of the region for foreign journalists, June 1, 2021.Credit: AP Photo/Mark Schiefelbein

The transformation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) over the past 75 years from an impoverished, war-torn nation to a global power is an impressive story of both modern state-building and the creation of a new center of power in the international system. At home, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has ruled without significant opposition since the country’s inception, hundreds of millions of Chinese have moved out of poverty, and the economy has grown on average 9 percent per year for over four decades. Internationally, the PRC has become the world’s largest trading power, boasts the world’s largest military, and is a leading innovator in critical technologies such as electric vehicles, 5G, and artificial intelligence.


China and Russia Arctic Policy Convergence? Shifting Geopolitics in the North

Antonio Graceffo

Earlier this month, the China Coast Guard claimed to have entered the Arctic Ocean for the first time as part of a joint patrol with Russia. In mid-September, Russia and China launched “Ocean-24,” a large-scale naval and air exercise spanning the Pacific and Arctic Oceans. The drill involved over 400 warships, submarines, and support vessels, along with more than 120 aircraft and 90,000 troops. Around the same time, the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) tracked four Russian military aircraft entering Alaska’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ).

These recent incursions follow similar incidents from earlier this summer. In July, two Russian and two Chinese bombers flew within 200 miles of Alaska’s coast, and NORAD reported the aircraft crossing Alaska’s ADIZ. That same month, the US Coast Guard also identified Chinese military vessels operating near the Aleutian Islands, within the US exclusive economic zone. These actions highlight not only the deepening collaboration between the world’s second- and third-largest militaries but also a growing pattern of incursions into the Arctic, the Bering Strait, and waters near Alaska. This northward push appears to be part of China’s broader strategy to assert dominance in the Arctic.

China has declared itself a “near-Arctic state” as part of a broader strategy to gain influence in the Arctic, though this is a self-proclaimed title not officially recognized by Arctic nations or international bodies.

Oil Prices Plunge After Israel Says It Won’t Strike Iran’s Nuclear, Energy Sites

George Glover

Oil prices were plunging Tuesday on media reports saying that Israel will not strike Iran’s nuclear or oil facilities in retaliation for an earlier missile attack. The reports from multiple outlets cite anonymous Israeli government officials.

Brent international crude prices dropped 4.4% to $74.09 a barrel, while West Texas Intermediate U.S. crude fell 4.5% to $70.48.

Iran is one of the world’s top crude producers. The news is likely to soothe fears of an escalation between the two countries that could disrupt global supply.

China is also weighing on oil prices. On Monday, the OPEC cartel of oil producers trimmed its forecast for Chinese consumption in 2024 and 2025 as it cut its overall demand-growth outlook. On Tuesday, the International Energy Agency also warned of a “sharp slowdown” in oil demand growth, citing Chinese weakness. The Asian nation will account for just 20% of global crude gains in 2024 and 2025, per the IEA’s forecast, compared with nearly 70% last year. Beijing has struggled to jump-start the world’s second-largest economy.

Doing a Gaza in Lebanon isn’t the answer

Jamie Dettmer

“I say to you, the people of Lebanon: Free your country from Hezbollah so that this war can end.”

That was Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu last Tuesday as the Israel Defense Forces started a bombing campaign and ground incursion that has displaced more than a million Lebanese residents. Netanyahu is offering them a stark choice — throw Hezbollah out or expect “destruction and suffering like we see in Gaza.”

The Israeli leader has broad support in his country to take the fight to Iran-aligned Hezbollah, which has been launching cross-border rockets at Israel for over a year now. Even die-hard political adversaries like Benny Gantz and Yair Lapid — leaders of the country’s official opposition — have fallen in line, the former writing in the Economist that this war is perhaps the last chance for Lebanon “to become a normal state again.”

Meanwhile, several still influential former intelligence and security chiefs — including former Mossad head Tamir Pardo — have publicly urged sustaining the military campaign with the aim of redrawing the Middle East, arguing it presents “an opportunity that must not be missed” to ensure the paramilitary movement has no chance of rehabilitating itself. It’s a prospect that seems to have enthralled a hesitant U.S. administration as well, sidelining its fears of a broader regional war and quietly approving Israel’s incursion across the border.

The GCC and sub-Saharan security: equipment supplies above all

Albert Vidal Ribe

Several Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are becoming increasingly influential economic and diplomatic actors in sub-Saharan Africa. However, security cooperation and arms trade interactions between the region and GCC countries—traditionally security consumers rather than providers—are almost non-existent for five of the six members. 

Saudi Arabia and Qatar have made sporadic donations of military equipment to selected sub-Saharan partners. Bahrain’s engagement in the region is largely confined to a small-scale deployment in Somalia. As for Oman and Kuwait, there is no known tangible security cooperation. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), on the other hand, has ramped up its security cooperation with sub-Saharan Africa in the past few years, overshadowing its GCC neighbours. 

When, where and why? 

miliWhile Emirati security cooperation with and arms sales to sub-Saharan Africa during most of the 2010s were modest—except for the case of Somalia and a few other countries—defence interactions became more common toward the end of the decade, in parallel with an increase in diplomatic engagement. Since then, Emirati arms sales and transfers have risen sharply.  

Energy Cost Of Iran-Israel Conflict – Analysis

Amit Bhandari

Ever since Iran hit Israel with a missile barrage on October 1, a potential conflict between the two has created fear in the energy markets.

The worst-case scenario being envisaged is a retaliatory strike by Israel either on Iran’s nuclear facilities or its oil infrastructure. A strike on Iran’s oil infrastructure will hit Iran’s oil exports, a financial lifeline for Tehran. Iran’s potential retaliation could seriously affect the oil and gas production in its neighbouring countries, dealing a far more serious blow to the global energy market. The oil exports of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq are shipped from Persian Gulf ports and pass via the easily-blocked Hormuz straits. The kingdom of Qatar, also a mediator in the Gaza conflict, lies entirely within the Persian Gulf and is one of the world’s largest exporters of liquefied natural gas.

A serious escalation puts all of these at risk. Higher prices of oil and gas affect consumers around the world, not just those importing oil from the conflict zone.

Anxiety over a strong Israeli response peaked on October 7, the first anniversary of the Hamas attack on Israel, when the price of crude oil shot up by over 10% to over $80 per barrel. It has since receded, somewhat. If the worst case does come about, the price of oil will shoot up well past $100 a barrel, triggering a global economic crisis. These fears have led Israel’s closest ally, the U.S., to call for a ‘proportional response’, i.e. one that doesn’t target Iran’s energy or nuclear infrastructure.[1] These calls may be partly motivated by a desire to keep petrol prices low just before the November 5 U.S. Presidential election.

With Hezbollah’s Retaliation Strategy in Disarray, Israel and Iran Brace for War

Bishwajit Acharya

It has been one year since the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. Israel was caught off guard, despite the fact that the Military Intelligence Directorate had issued warnings. Two letters cautioned the Israeli government, followed by the Shin Bet who relayed the same intel hinting at a possible incoming war plotted by Iran’s proxies. They assessed that Benjamin Netanyahu’s controversial judicial reforms were a weak spot producing the potential for pandemonium within the Knesset and Israeli society so, an attack was to be timely. Since then, Israel’s war is not just limited to Hamas and Hezbollah; but, to a wide array of militia groups across the Gulf in the form of the Axis of Resistance.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq which consists of Popular Mobilisation Units (PMUs) also called al-Hashd al-Sha’bi has put out statements condemning the Zionist arrogance in Gaza and Lebanon. These groups are mostly composed of Shias and include the Badr Organisation, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Kataib Hezbollah and Saraya Talia al-Khorasan. As the intensity of engagement is concerned, Israel is in a two-front war with Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon. However, it is simultaneously embroiled on seven fronts across the Middle East with most of the fighting concentrated in Lebanon. Since September 30, the IDF has struck approximately 1100 targets in southern Lebanon ensuring the destruction of Hezbollah’s intelligence headquarters and weapons production sites.

What Are Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Capabilities?

Jonathan Masters and Will Merrow

Introduction

Many foreign policy experts warn that if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, it would be broadly destabilizing for the Middle East and nearby regions. A first-order concern is that Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons would pose a major, perhaps existential threat to Israel, its longtime foe. Other foreign policy experts say Iran would be assuring its own demise if it were to launch a nuclear strike on Israel, a close U.S. defense partner and possessor of its own nuclear weapons arsenal, which is undeclared. Either way, there would be a dangerous potential for miscalculation that could result in a nuclear exchange, analysts say.
Does Iran have a nuclear weapon?

Iran does not yet have a nuclear weapon, but it has a long history of engaging in secret nuclear weapons research in violation of its international commitments. Western analysts say the country has the knowledge and infrastructure to produce a nuclear weapon in fairly short order should its leaders decide to do so.

The United States, Israel, and other Middle Eastern partners regard Iran as a primary threat to their interests in the region, and view its potential acquisition of nuclear weapons as a game-changing scenario to be steadfastly prevented—by force if necessary.

Where Hezbollah stands, and what’s at stake, after battering by Israel

Scott Peterson

The Israeli airstrikes on a crowded central Beirut district after nightfall Thursday came without warning, in an apparent attempt by Israel to add to its long list of top Hezbollah leaders and commanders assassinated in recent weeks.

The airstrikes brought down one entire apartment block – within it, a long-standing Hezbollah office – and damaged another, leaving 22 people dead and the local Shiite community in shock.

“I am surprised by what happened – there is nobody here, just families, and I know them all,” says one man who gave the name Haidar, as he breathed the acrid burnt air that permeated the district Friday and cleared rubble from the crumpled roof of his car.

Israel’s assault on Hezbollah in Lebanon represents a dramatic broadening of the yearlong war in the Middle East. How Iran’s most important regional ally responds will determine the postwar balance of power between Israel and Iran.

Hezbollah said Israel’s apparent target, senior official Wafiq Safa, was not among the casualties.


Carnegie nuclear expert James Acton explains why it would be counterproductive for Israel to attack Iran’s nuclear program

John Mecklin

In the aftermath of Iran’s massive missile attack on Israel this week, it has become clear that Israeli missile defenses are robust. Of the estimated 180 ballistic missiles that Iran launched, only a small percentage evaded Israel’s anti-missile defenses, causing limited damage at or near some Israeli intelligence and military sites and apparently having little impact on Israeli military operations. But the attack marks a major escalation in the Israel-Iran conflict and has led to widespread speculation about when and where Israel will respond. Much of that speculation has centered on the question of whether Israel will attack facilities related to Iran’s nuclear program.

Late this week, I asked James Acton, a physicist and wide-ranging nuclear policy expert who co-directs the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, for his assessment of the Israel-Iran situation, especially as regards the possibility of an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. His answers follow in a lightly edited and condensed Q&A format.

John Mecklin: I gather you think it would be a bad idea for Israel to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities. Can you explain why for our readers?

James Acton: Sure. If Israel or the United States tries to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, my belief is that that will harden Iranian resolve to acquire nuclear weapons without eliminating Iran’s capability to do so. Israel would be motivated, in part, to punish Iran for its recent attack on Israel, using that as an opportunity to try and destroy Iran’s nuclear program, so the Israelis didn’t have to worry about it in the future. I think if they decide to attack Iran’s nuclear program, they will find themselves worrying much more about Iran’s nuclear program in the future. We’ll elaborate on this, but an attack would, I believe, simultaneously harden Iranian resolve to acquire nuclear weapons while also not destroying permanently their capability to achieve that goal.

Israel may attack Iran's nuclear sites to target weapons

Janet Loehrke

Tension have spiked in the Middle East after Iran's missile attack on Israel this week.

Fears rose that Israel's military intends to retaliate "significantly" and swiftly after Iran fired almost 200 missiles at Israel, but the country was still weighing what form a reprisal will take, according to a person briefed on the matter, USA TODAY reported.

Israel is still speaking with the United States while it looks into a number of ways to retaliate against Iran, according to the Guardian.

Where are Iran's nuclear facilities?

Iran has several locations in its nuclear program, according to the Bulletin. Although there has been a long-standing threat of Israeli airstrikes, only a few of the locations have been constructed underground.

Iran has accelerated and expanded its nuclear program as its 2015 nuclear deal with major powers has deteriorated over time, cutting down on the amount of time it would need to produce a nuclear bomb, should it choose to do so − though it denies such intentions, according to Reuters.

From missile batteries to oil refineries to nuclear labs, Israel could hit a wide range of targets in Iran

Dan De Luce, Courtney Kube, Monica Alba and Abigail Williams

Israel has vowed a hard-hitting response against Iran after Tehran launched a barrage of nearly 200 ballistic missiles at Israel on Tuesday.

With its vastly superior air force and Iran’s relatively weak air defenses, Israel could hit a wide range of targets in Iran if it wanted to, including military and intelligence sites, senior commanders, oil terminals and refineries or even nuclear sites. Israel would also be likely to get a helping hand from U.S. intelligence collected via satellites and other sources.

“There are so many things they can hit, and they’re going to be able to hit all those with great effectiveness. Iran’s not going to be able to stop them,” said a former senior U.S. military officer with experience in the region.

But Israel will have to balance the potential reaction from Iran, including the risk that Tehran could choose to launch attacks on Arab Gulf states that host U.S. air bases or choose to plant sea mines in the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway between the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean through which a fifth of the world’s oil passes.

Strategic Paralysis: The Biden Administration's Strategic Miscalculation in Israel's War on Hezbollah

Monte Erfourth

Introduction

As the Middle East experiences yet another protracted conflict, the Biden administration’s strategy—or lack thereof—regarding Israel’s strikes on Hezbollah is puzzling. Iran’s long-term investment in proxy forces such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis has created a well-oiled machine for regional disruption. This shadow war is designed to degrade Israel’s military, distract its leadership, and prevent a full focus on Tehran’s broader ambitions. The October 7, 2023, attack by Hamas, this past year-long barrage of over 8,000 missile strikes from Hezbollah, and shipping attacks by the Houthis appear to be part of a broader strategy to weaken Israel by overwhelming its defenses. Iran claims that the proxies they helped train, fund, arm, and support acted on their own. While there is evidence to support Iran’s attempts to call off proxy activities, they remain responsible for setting the conditions for violence evidenced across the region.

The Biden administration has responded with cautious diplomacy, pushing for de-escalation and peace negotiations that, at this point, seem destined to return the region to a fragile and unsustainable status quo. At the same time, Iran finishes its nuclear weapons programs. The strategic imperative, however, should be clear: Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis, as extensions of Iran’s offensive capabilities, must be severely degraded if there is any hope of lasting peace in the region. This would necessitate destroying Iran’s nuclear capability as well. This moment, however fraught, presents a critical opportunity to reshape the Middle East’s balance of power by reducing Iran's proxy forces to irrelevance, denying Iran the nuclear threat, and paving the way for a new and more favorable regional order.

Many Nations, Many Strengths

Nicholas Romanow

The U.S.S. GEORGE H.W. BUSH steamed due north at more than 30 knots, racing toward the last known location of a maritime distress signal associated with a sensitive research mission in the High North. As the American nuclear aircraft carrier continued north, the temperature dropped rapidly, which endangered the flight deck equipment that facilitated the launch and recovery of embarked fighter jets. Russian submarines were known to be in the area, making time a critical factor in reaching the research vessel. Due to changes in the water temperature and salinity due to climate change, tracking potentially hostile submarines was becoming more and more difficult.

Thankfully, a Canadian icebreaker conducting a routine patrol was simultaneously steaming to the same location, as was a British submarine and a Norwegian maritime patrol aircraft. Back on the continent, a newly established NATO Open-Source Fusion Center was combing through commercial overhead intelligence to attempt to geolocate the beacon. Together, on a state-of-the-art, low earth orbit-based tactical datalink, the platforms of these various allied countries were able to successfully locate and render aid to the vessel in distress.

The success of this High North operation was the result of a concerted shift in allied strategy from focusing on burden-sharing and meeting benchmarks in defense spending to devising mutually-supporting areas of specialization. Leaders in the Transatlantic community continued to grapple with limited resources as they struggled to meet rising defense spending thresholds and realized that much of this spending was needlessly duplicating capabilities that other allies already had. Instead, a new strategy focused on maximizing sources of competitive strategic advantage, making use of each country’s unique capabilities, thereby playing to the strengths of every NATO member’s military.

The Oslo Process: The Faรงade of Peace between Palestine and Israel

Maria Gilani

The 1993 Oslo Accords, which aimed for ‘comprehensive peace … and historic reconciliation’, marked a diplomatic breakthrough for Israel and Palestine for which the twentieth century was rife with tension as Zionist settlers dispossessed the Palestinians (Oslo Accords, 1993, p. 4). However, in this essay I refute the notion that Oslo was a peace process. Instead, I argue that the Oslo process further entrenched Israel’s occupation of Palestine and made prospects for peace and Palestinian sovereignty increasingly elusive. To supplement this argument I will assess the outcomes of the Oslo process, revealing that behind the faรงade of peace these negotiations facilitated the economic, political, and territorial dispossession of Palestine for Israeli benefit (Sen, 2015, p. 170). Before undertaking this analysis, I will briefly explain what the Oslo agreements entailed and situate the process in a wider history of Israeli-Palestinian diplomatic relations. It must be noted that the Oslo process was a key historical juncture for the Israel-Palestine conflict with far-reaching implications such as the second intifada and subsequent violence in the region. Yet, this essay focuses on the direct impacts of Oslo on territorial, economic, and political development in Israel and Palestine as these categories best illuminate the unequal outcomes of the process in line with my thesis.


Evaluating the Repercussions of the Chagos Islands Sovereignty Deal

Peter Clegg

Since the announcement on 3 October that the UK had reached a deal with Mauritius for the transfer of sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago there has been much political and media comment. Some of which has been well-informed, some less so. In the latter category, former prime minister Boris Johnson called the decision “sheer political correctness”, and Reform leader Nigel Farage said it was a “surrender” and “strategic disaster”. It has also been suggested that the handing-over of the Chagos Archipelago could precipitate a domino effect whereby some of the remaining 13 British Overseas Territories (BOTs) could also be given up by the UK. This article discusses the decision of the UK to cede sovereignty to Mauritius and the likely implications, if any, for the other BOTs.

The Chagos Archipelago is situated in the middle of the Indian Ocean and consists of seven atolls and 60 islands. It is formally known as the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) and in various guises has been under UK control since 1814. The origins of the decision to cede sovereignty was in 1965 when prior to independence for Mauritius the Chagos Archipelago was removed from the territory, creating the BIOT. Independence was conditional on the detachment taking place. Then from 1968-1973, the Indigenous Chagossian population was removed. These decisions were made to ensure that the subsequently constructed United States-UK military base on Diego Garcia was as secure as possible.

Israel is turning northern Gaza into a killing cage

Jeremy Scahill and Sharif Abdel Kouddous

With the full support of the Biden administration, Israel is waging a merciless war of extermination against the 400,000 Palestinians remaining in the northern Gaza Strip as the government of Benjamin Netanyahu is reportedly considering a plan to annex the territory. No food, water, or medicine have entered the north since October 1 as Israeli forces have conducted a campaign of intense airstrikes and ground forces have invaded and encircled much of the area.

As it orders residents to flee the north, Israel has intensified its attacks on Deir Al-Balah, a city in central Gaza that has not suffered the vast scale of destruction unleashed by Israel in other parts of the Strip. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians have fled to the city in recent months. In the early morning hours of Monday, Israel bombed a crowded tent encampment for displaced people on the grounds of Al Aqsa hospital, engulfing civilians in a massive ring of fire. Video from the scene showed patients—some of whom appeared to be in beds attached to IV cords—being burned alive as others in the encampment tried desperately to extinguish the fires with small buckets of water.

How the U.S.-Israel Relationship Actually Works

Isaac Chotiner

Earlier this week, Israel began a ground invasion of Lebanon. This followed Israel’s significant aerial bombardment of Hezbollah weapons stockpiles, and its assassination of the group’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah. On Tuesday, Iran, which backs Hezbollah, fired some two hundred missiles at Israel; no Israelis died in the barrage—which was repelled in part with help from the U.S. military—but Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s Prime Minister, has promised to retaliate. (The strike did kill one Palestinian man in the West Bank.) The prospect of an all-out regional war in the Middle East raises questions about the relationship between the United States and Israel, and how far the Biden Administration will go to continue to protect one of its closest allies. A year after the October 7th attack, in which more than twelve hundred people were killed, Israel’s war in Gaza has killed more than forty-one thousand people, including, on Wednesday, scores of people at an orphanage and several schools.

Last week, ProPublica reported that the U.S. Agency for International Development and the State Department’s Refugees Bureau had made clear to the Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, in April that Israel was intentionally blocking the delivery of humanitarian aid into Gaza. Federal law forbids U.S. weapons from being sent to countries that block U.S. aid, but Blinken testified to Congress in May that Israel was not “currently” blocking aid, thus preventing the law from being triggered. The State Department told ProPublica that its “concerns” over aid being blocked after October 7th were ameliorated because Israel “subsequently took steps to facilitate increased humanitarian access and aid flow into Gaza.” Meanwhile, human-rights organizations continue to report that sufficient aid is not being allowed into Gaza, where the humanitarian situation remains extremely dire.

Mark Milley fears being court-martialed if Trump wins, Woodward book says

Martin Pengelly

Mark Milley, a retired US army general who was chair of the joint chiefs of staff under Donald Trump and Joe Biden, fears being recalled to uniform and court-martialed should Trump defeat Kamala Harris next month and return to power.

“He is a walking, talking advertisement of what he’s going to try to do,” Milley recently “warned former colleagues”, the veteran Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward writes in an upcoming book. “He’s saying it and it’s not just him, it’s the people around him.”

Woodward cites Steve Bannon, Trump’s former campaign chair and White House strategist now jailed for contempt of Congress, as saying of Milley: “We’re gonna hold him accountable.

Trump’s wish to recall and court-martial retired senior officers who criticized him in print has been reported before, including by Mark Esper, Trump’s second secretary of defense. In Woodward’s telling, in a 2020 Oval Office meeting with Milley and Esper, Trump “yelled” and “shouted” about William McRaven, a former admiral who led the 2011 raid in Pakistan in which US special forces killed Osama bin Laden, and Stanley McChrystal, the retired special forces general whose men killed another al-Qaida leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, in Iraq in 2006.

Investigation of SEALs Drowning Also Uncovers Allegations of Performance-Enhancing Drug Use, Secret Surgery

Konstantin Toropin

A Navy investigation into the drowning deaths of two Navy SEALs released on Friday also revealed that the elite warfare community is still struggling with performance-enhancing drug use and a culture of exceptionalism where members are able to do things that would be off-limits to regular sailors.

The service determined the deaths of the sailors off the coast of Somalia in January during a ship-boarding mission to intercept Iranian-made weapons headed to Yemen were preventable and stemmed from a lack of concern over flotation gear.

But during the investigation, Navy officials also received an anonymous tip of two SEALs "wrongfully using performance enhancing drugs," a SEAL "having surgery outside the knowledge and care of U.S. Navy medicine," and "wrongful consumption of alcohol aboard USS Lewis B. Puller" by a SEAL whose name was redacted.

The Navy investigation stressed that "the allegations raised in the complaint were not root causes" of the decision to conduct the boarding operation or the drowning deaths of the two SEALs.

In fact, the heavily redacted report says that Special Warfare Operator 1st Class Christopher Chambers, 37, and Special Warfare Operator 2nd Class Nathan Gage Ingram, 27, both from SEAL Team Three, died because they were so overloaded with gear that they simply sank after they went into the water.

Tiltrotor: The need for speed & range in response to global threats

Reed Anderson

The United States (U.S.) Army recently decided to modernize its medium vertical lift fleet with the selection of Bell’s V-280 Valor, a next generation tiltrotor incorporating over 70 years of experience and nearly 800,000 operating hours with tiltrotor. The U.S. Army was part of early tiltrotor developmental programs but decided it was not the right solution at the time. The time is now for the U.S. Army, as witnessed by its approval of the FLRAA Milestone B Acquisition Decision Memorandum. This next generation weapon system is a leap in technology, flying at twice the range and twice the speed of current U.S. Army assets and includes a modular open system approach (MOSA) giving it unmatched flexibility for future mission scenarios. It will lead to a significant revolution in how the U.S. Army conducts missions, enhance its global responsiveness, and reduce deployment timelines and complexity. It will also outpace any vertical lift capabilities of the U.S. Army’s allies and partners.

The tiltrotor provides the combination of range, speed, and payload of an airplane, while combining the runway independent characteristics of a helicopter. It can deploy by, and operate from, naval vessels, and is fully capable of self-deployment. It also gives the commander a wide range of flexibility since there is reduced reliance on infrastructure and can be deployed to the point of need in a short period of time, as well as to austere and remote locations from which forces would not normally operate. Such a capability is well placed for operations in locations such as the Indo-Pacific, the Arctic, Europe, and the Mediterranean with reach into the Sahel and the Middle East.

The United States and Germany Need a New Approach to Risk Management in Ukraine

Fabian Hoffmann

The West's strategy in addressing the war in Ukraine is driven by a strong desire to minimize escalation risks. This is especially evident in the actions of the United States and Germany, Ukraine's two largest donors by absolute numbers.

Initially, this is not incomprehensible. After all, a state's raison d’รชtre is to ensure the safety of its citizens, which is arguably the main responsibility of elected officials.

However, the current approach to U.S. and German risk management is dangerous. In short: By trying to minimize risks at all costs, Germany and the United States may actually drive up risks.

There are no risk-free decisions

A key fact that US and German decision-makers fail to recognize is that in the current situation, there no longer are risk free decisions. The debate over lifting targeting restrictions for Western long-range strike weapons to strike targets inside Russia exemplifies this well.

On the one hand, unlikely as it may be, there is a non-zero chance that lifting these restrictions indeed crosses some type of redline, causing Russia to escalate against NATO or to employ a nuclear weapon.