India Brings Maldives Under Its Security Umbrella – Analysis

P. K. Balachandran

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New Delhi backs it up with financial bonanza to help Maldives meet its development needs and debt repayment obligations

There were two major outcomes of the official visit of the Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu to India: New Delhi has brought Male under its security umbrella and has backed it up with a financial bonanza to help Maldives meet its development needs and debt repayment obligations.

President Muizzu had talks with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on October 7 and was scheduled to visit Agra, Mumbai and Bengaluru before going back to Male.

Security Dimension

On the security dimension, the Indo-Maldivian Vision Document had the following things to say:

India and Maldives share common challenges in the Indian Ocean Region which have multi-dimensional implications for the security and development of both the countries. As natural partners, they resolve to work together in advancing the maritime and security cooperation for the benefit of peoples of both India and Maldives as well as for the larger Indian Ocean Region.

Reclaiming the Promise of Nuclear Power in India

Ashley J. Tellis

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Introduction

Ever since its independence in 1947, India has obsessively pursued the goal of domesticating high technology. After the Second World War, atomic energy came to symbolize the acme of scientific prowess. It is therefore not surprising that a country whose nationalist narrative held that Western technological superiority had ensured its colonial subjugation would want to master the most important scientific advances as a means of preserving its newly secured freedom.

The history of atomic energy in India, however, predates the country’s independence. Homi Bhabha, the visionary who founded India’s nuclear program, created the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR) in 1945 to pursue his myriad scientific interests, which included nurturing nuclear science to promote nuclear power production in India after it was freed from British rule.1 Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister, knew Bhabha well and shared his belief that economic development required dramatically increased availability of electricity. Consistent with the common assumption then, that atomic energy would provide electricity plentifully and cheaply, Nehru created the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in 1948 to oversee India’s efforts to develop nuclear technology and govern its accompanying institutions.2 And in 1949, the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research—the agency overseeing science and technology development within India—would designate the TIFR as the nodal center for all large-scale projects in nuclear research.3

Q&A: What was the Relationship Between the United Front System and the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office?

Arran Hope

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The Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO) was a constituent element of the united front system prior to their official merger in 2017 under the aegis of the United Front Work Department (UFWD). Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and government guidance documents, bureaucratic and budgetary linkages, and dual-hatted personnel all show clear relationships between OCAOs and their respective UFWDs. The official merger removed bureaucratic duplication.

United front work has a long history of being the responsibility of the entire party. Agencies at all levels, including OCAOs, are tasked with carrying out united front work. The centrality of united front work has been reiterated by every Party leader. In 1951, while he was primarily in charge of consolidating CCP control over southwestern China, Deng Xiaoping (邓小平) said, “united front work is the responsibility of all departments within the Party. If every cadre and every Party member does not understand this point, this work will not be done well” (China Association for Promoting Democracy, Accessed September 25). Jiang Zemin (江泽民) and Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) made similar comments (CPC News, Accessed September 25; China Reform Data, July 10, 2006). More recently, during the Central United Front Work Conference in July 2022, Xi Jinping also stated: “United front work is the responsibility of the entire Party. It must be taken seriously by the whole Party, and everyone should work together. We must establish a united front work framework in which the Party committee provides unified leadership, the united front departments take the lead in coordination, and relevant sectors assume their respective responsibilities” (PRC Central Government, July 30, 2022).

Deterring Dictators: Whose Foreign Policy Will Stand Up to China, Russia, and Iran?

G. E. Butler

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Introduction

As the election draws near, getting a better sense of the effectiveness of the next President’s foreign policy should be scrutinized and considered as part of each voter’s ballot calculus. The foreign policy analysis published by Strategy Central over the past three weeks, along with selected deterrence articles, was used to compare policy and possible success at deterring China, Russia, and Iran. We used AI to compare and judge each policy. The conclusion was a surprise.

In comparing the foreign policies of Donald Trump, Joe Biden, and Kamala Harris to determine whose approach would most effectively restore the United States' deterrence capabilities against authoritarian rivals such as China, Russia, and Iran, we must first understand the context in which each policy was crafted. The U.S. today faces a deteriorating global order, one increasingly shaped by authoritarian regimes that challenge the norms of international relations with little repercussions. These regimes exploit gaps in international rules and capitalize on weakened U.S. deterrence. With that backdrop, we can now compare the respective foreign policies of Trump, Biden, and Harris and judge their relative effectiveness in confronting these challenges.

An American alternative to the China’s Belt and Road Initiative

Ami Bera

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China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), referred to as “Yi dai yi lu” in Chinese, has reshaped global infrastructure financing and investment. It promotes a “China-centred model” of development, which often does not set terms with regard to human rights, transparency or Western legal and market-based principles. BRI emphasises flexible, voluntary cooperation without the stringent legal frameworks and infrastructure financing that host governments might find beneficial in the short term to start projects. Such a model comes with risks for participating countries. As we navigate this landscape, the US must offer a compelling alternative that prioritises transparency, rule of law and sustainable economic models.

Projects associated with BRI have frequently led to substantial financial obligations for participating countries. These arrangements typically involve long-term repayment commitments to Beijing, creating financial dependence on the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) and giving the PRC significant leverage over host nations. This influence extends beyond loan terms and project implementation to broader political pressures China may exert on these countries.

China frequently prefers to extend or renegotiate loans rather than offer debt forgiveness, thereby maintaining or even increasing its economic and political sway over host governments. In contrast, institutions like the World Bank and IMF have shown greater willingness to forgive debt, particularly for highly indebted poor countries.

The Middle East, One Year After October 7

Joshua Yaphe

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Much of the commentary coming out of think tanks and news outlets over the last week has been limited in scope and vision, often focusing on public attitudes in Israel, the prospects for reviving a two-state solution, and the potential for yet more escalation. The limited horizon of expectations derives in part from the fact that fighting is ongoing and outside observers are still caught up in the ever-changing battlefield dynamics. That is logical.

Another reason for the narrow lens of analysis is that Israeli prime minister Netanyahu has consistently caught everyone else off-guard in terms of his risk tolerance and advance planning, leaving the experts to play catch-up in their assessments at every stage. That, too, is understandable. A third reason for the tunnel vision is that the war has had rather little impact on domestic politics and economics in most of the region.

Algeria and Tunisia held presidential elections and returned Presidents Tebboune and Saied, respectively, to office. The opposition in both cases was largely excluded from the polls by the countries’ electoral commissions, ending in court cases in Tunisia for over a dozen candidates brought up on spurious charges of falsifying endorsement signatures.

Russia’s Eroding Influence in the Middle East

Pavel K. Baev

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Escalation over the last year of the decades-long conflict in the Middle East has exposed the near-total disappearance of Russian influence from the region. Historically, Moscow excelled at exploiting outbreaks of regional violence and was poorly equipped for promoting peace processes. In the current fast-moving crisis, however, Russia has not been able to partner with those who oppose US positions. The only feeble signal from the Kremlin in recent days was a statement of “serious concern” by Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, who described the possibility of Israeli strikes on nuclear facilities in Iran as unacceptable (RIA Novosti, October 3). Former US President Donald Trump, however, who has praised Russian President Vladimir Putin and his regime, suggested worrying about the consequences of a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities after the destruction (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, October 5). Russia is desperately trying to maintain its position in the world, which is dwindling due to its war in Ukraine. Its meager efforts to influence the situation in the Middle East highlight the reputational damage it has sustained among global powers.

Previously, Syria was Russia’s main bastion in the Middle East, but Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s abbreviated visit to the Kremlin in July of 2023 illustrated Damascus’ weakening dependency on Moscow and Tehran as the pivotal source of support (see EDM, November 27, 2023, July 29; Kommersant, July 25). Russia’s military command has no knowledge about, nor control over, the supply of Iranian arms to Assad’s regime, and Russian media is only capable of circulating basic reports, such as one covering Israeli strikes on a smuggling tunnel under the Syrian-Lebanese border (Interfax, October 4). This is in contrast to Israel’s strike on Russia’s Khmeimim airbase on October 3, which was hardly reported on. Only a few “patriotic” bloggers dared to clarify that the target was an Iranian munitions storage facility, not the Russian base itself. The facility, constructed close to the perimeter of the airbase, was destroyed, while the expectation that Russian surface-to-air systems would intercept the incoming missiles was not met (News.ru, October 3).

Israel to refrain from attacking Iran's nuclear sites, focus on military targets, sources say

YONAH JEREMY BOB

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Israel is not expected to attack Iran’s nuclear program but rather focus on various kinds of military bases and intelligence sites, The Jerusalem Post has learned, following a New York Times report on the issue.

Confronted with the Times report, sources did not deny the thrust of it, which predicted that Israel’s retaliation against Iran for its massive October 1 strike on the Jewish state would fall more in the medium range of attack scenarios.

Further, the Post understands that Israel’s attack on Iran – which virtually all top Israeli officials have publicly promised – will still be much more substantial than its narrower retaliation on April 19, when Iran’s S-300 anti-aircraft missile system was damaged.

Despite being presented with the idea that the current context could be a once-in-50-years opportunity to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, sources indicated that attacking Iran’s nuclear program would not necessarily be consistent with the “goals of the war” as set by the security cabinet.

Hezbollah’s fatal miscalculations

Jamie Dettmer

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TEL AVIV, Israel — “We are winning.”

That’s the unwavering refrain from senior Israeli officials when asked about where all the warfare roiling the Levant will end.

Astonishingly scything through arch-foe Hezbollah’s upper echelons, remorselessly picking off leaders and military commanders one after another, Israel’s becoming increasingly bullish, convinced the disaster of Oct. 7 is being paid back.

Israel is being made safer, victory snatched from the jaws of defeat — or so its leaders argue. And soon, they believe, it will achieve the unbelievable — vanquishing both of Iran’s key allies in the region: Hamas and Hezbollah — the redrawing of the Middle East’s geopolitical map within its grasp.

Of course, how Israel’s military campaign actually fares — whether Iran and Hezbollah find a convenient hook to disengage, are thoroughly defeated on the battlefield or, as some fear, Israel is beckoned by a quagmire in the stony, ravine-filled terrain of southern Lebanon — only time will tell. But whatever happens, the cost in human misery and lives will be high. And as Israelis continue to mourn those murdered in Hamas’ slaughter of innocents, many are in no mood to think much about the human toll in Lebanon or Gaza.

The Iranian-Israeli Confrontation: The Start Of A Regional War Or A ‘Deterrence Strategy’? – Analysis

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Iran’s bombardment of Israel on 1 October 2024, with approximately 180 projectiles, including many ballistic missiles, marked a clear shift toward direct confrontation between the two regional powers, Iran and Israel.

This contrasts with the indirect ‘proxy wars‘ waged since 7 October 2023, through pro-Iranian militias, particularly the Palestinian Hamas movement, Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Houthi movement in Yemen. According to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, the attack came in response to Israel’s assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in central Tehran on 31 July 2024, and Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah on 27 September 2024.

This attack differs from Iran’s earlier strike on 13-14 April this year, as it was twice as intense. In this operation, Iran used ballistic missiles, unlike the April attack, where mostly drones and cruise missiles were employed. Most of the missiles in the April strike were conventional rockets, which took at least two hours to reach their targets in Israel, except for a few ballistic missiles. In contrast, in the latest attack, the rockets took only 15 minutes to hit their targets in Israel. For the first time, Iran deployed its hypersonic missile “Fattah,” capable of speeds 15 times faster than the speed of sound and with a range of up to 1,400 kilometres. This is only the second time such missiles have been used, with Russia deploying them first in the Ukraine war.

Why Israel is the envy of the Western world - comment

AMY NEUSTEIN

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For many Jews, the past year began on Simchat Torah, when a joyous holiday of celebrating the annual conclusion of the Torah readings turned into a bloodbath of epic proportions.

A music festival and towns in southern Israel on October 7 were ambushed by Hamas terrorists who murdered 1,200 innocents and took 251 hostages. Universities around the world ignited vociferous attacks on the Jews reminiscent of 1930s Europe.

With the one-year remembrance of October 7, to occur shortly after Rosh Hashanah, we will begin the year on a far different note. Israel’s tour de force intelligence gathering, military superiority, and technical prowess realized a major feat against Hezbollah in its long-term efforts to eviscerate the axis of resistance. Its military prowess and intelligence-gathering capabilities have proven, once again, to be the envy of the Western world.

What Really Fueled the ‘East Asian Miracle’?

Jerusalem Demsas

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The transformation of several East Asian countries from developing, agrarian economies to highly developed, industrialized economies is one of the great success stories of the 20th century. According to one World Bank report, almost 1 billion people were pulled out of poverty as a result of fast growth in the region. But the questions of why this happened and how it can be replicated by other countries remain essential to answer for the roughly 700 million people trying to survive on less than $2.15 a day.

In today’s episode of Good on Paper, I speak with Oliver Kim, an economist working at Open Philanthropy, whose recent paper co-authored with Jen-Kuan Wang, a Ph.D. student at Penn State, investigates one country that was part of the “East Asian miracle”: Taiwan. In the 1950s, Taiwan pursued a series of land reforms that were widely credited for transforming its economy. Other countries in the region had pursued similar reforms—including mainland China, Japan, and South Korea—adding to the sense that these specific changes were important for understanding the region’s development. In broad terms, the story went like this: Taiwan redistributed land to the peasantry, which significantly increased the nation’s agricultural productivity and helped finance the country’s industrialization.

The Risk of Another Korean War Is Higher Than Ever

Robert A. Manning

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This past January, Robert Carlin and Siegfried Hecker, both experienced Korea-watchers, caught many by surprise when they wrote that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is preparing for war. That may be an exaggeration, but the concern is not misplaced. I have worked on the Korea nuclear problem in and out of government over the past three decades, and the Korean Peninsula seems more dangerous and volatile than at any time since 1950.

Since 2019, there have been three interrelated strategic shifts around the North Korean nuclear problem that have invalidated the core assumptions guiding United States and South Korean diplomacy since 1992. First, following the failed 2019 summit in Hanoi between Kim and former U.S. President Donald Trump, Kim revealed a five-year plan in 2021 for a major nuclear and missile buildup, including solid-fuel ICBMs, miniaturized warheads, tactical nuclear weapons, and hypersonic missiles. North Korea’s investment in its nuclear-industrial complex, along with Kim’s emphatic statements that it will not give up its nukes (which is embodied in its constitution and preemptive nuclear doctrine) underscore the strategic shift in posture.

The UK deal on Diego Garcia is positive, but it won’t reverse declining support for the rules-based order

Kate O’Shaughnessy

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The UK government announced last week that it will cede sovereignty of the Chagos archipelago to Mauritius. The agreement ends an almost 60-year dispute between the two countries, allowing Chagossians displaced in the early 1970s to return home, and ensuring the continued operation for the next 99 years of the US military base on Diego Garcia (one of the islands in the archipelago).

But concluding this deal likely won’t reverse declining support for the international rules-based order, especially across Africa. And for those countries who want more and better multilateralism – like Australia – there’s important lessons to be learned from how the Chagos dispute played out, and now in watching early reactions to the deal, especially in the “Global South”.

What was the Chagos dispute about, and why does it matter?

The dispute over this little-known archipelago goes to the heart of efforts to maintain strategic stability in the Indian Ocean.

Israel and Hamas Are Kidding Themselves

Hussein Ibish

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One year after Hamas’s attack on southern Israel, both sides believe they are winning. The war in Gaza appears poised to continue indefinitely and probably expand, to the apparent delight of both Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar. Each must be surveying the wreckage in the region and anticipating the dark days ahead with determination and confidence. Each must think he is playing a sophisticated long game that the other will lose.

This is hardly the first time that the designs of right-wing Israeli leaders have coincided with those of Hamas. Netanyahu has long seen Hamas as a useful tool for weakening Fatah, the secular nationalist party that dominates the Palestinian Authority and rules parts of the West Bank. As he allegedly explained at a Likud strategy meeting in 2019: “Anyone who wants to thwart the establishment of a Palestinian state has to support bolstering Hamas and transferring money to Hamas. This is part of our strategy—to isolate the Palestinians in Gaza from the Palestinians in the West Bank.” (Netanyahu denies having said this, but it certainly reflects his actions.)

Wars Are Not Accidents Managing Risk in the Face of Escalation

Erik Lin-Greenberg

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Israel’s assassination of a top Hamas leader in Tehran in July, Ukraine’s incursion over the summer into Russia, and a recent series of increasingly assertive Chinese air and maritime interceptions in the South China Sea have fanned fears that long-simmering conflicts could escalate into broader wars. In the wake of these provocations, analysts fret about the heightened risk of military accidents and strategic misperceptions. They worry that incidents of this sort could ratchet up tensions until policymakers lose control and stumble into wars they do not intend to fight. As U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in August, attacks in the Middle East “raise the risk of dangerous outcomes that no one can predict and no one can fully control.”

Although provocative incidents can push crises up the escalation ladder, truly inadvertent wars are rare. History provides few examples of conflicts that have erupted without policymakers’ authorization, and leaders frequently exercise restraint to avoid combat, especially in high-stakes situations. During the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, for example, U.S. policymakers held off on retaliating after Soviet troops shot down an American spy plane, stepping back from the brink of war. When faced with the risk of a spiraling conflict, rivals often find off-ramps to de-escalate crises. This brinkmanship requires careful choreography: states must learn how to pressure their adversaries just enough to shape their behavior without crossing thresholds that could trigger a significant response.

Anti-Israel protesters show true colors by celebrating October 7 attacks

Liel Leibovitz

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As if commemorating the first anniversary of the worst single-day massacre of Jews since the Holocaust wasn’t harrowing enough, we American Jews were treated Monday to a reminder that the marauders who want us dead are alive and well in New York City.

There they were, in Times Square and in Grand Central and in Columbus Circle and elsewhere in the greatest city on Earth, chanting for Hamas, Hezbollah and other death cults committed to raping, kidnapping and killing Israelis, Americans and Jews.

There they were, on American soil, cheering for the monsters who still hold four American citizens in captivity.

There they were, promising to globalize the intifada and bring the bloodshed that is their only true passion to these shores as well.

Biden must unleash Israel America has appeased Iran for too long

Edward Luttwak

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Having been attacked by almost 200 ballistic missiles — launched by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and each the size of a tanker truck — Israel must now decide how to respond. Whatever happens, one thing is obvious: the Jewish State’s reaction won’t equal Iran’s attack.

That is true both in terms of scale, which was vast and could have killed 20,000 Israelis, were it not for the advanced Arrow interceptors, and in its very meagre results. A Gazan Palestinian died in the West Bank, and debris from intercepted missiles caused widespread but only superficial damage to civilian houses and airforce bases. Certainly, Israel will not dispatch its pilots all the way to Iran without destroying targets that materially weaken the Islamic Republic’s military capabilities.

Not that Israel can act alone in choosing its targets. For while the US fully accepts that Netanyahu must respond for the sake of deterrence, the Biden Administration is equally reluctant to give the IDF carte blanche. For one thing, the White House doesn’t want Israel to attack Iran’s nuclear installations. Even now, those officials who run Biden’s foreign policy cling to their dream of reconciliation with Tehran, believing that all would now be well if only Trump had stuck by the nuclear agreement negotiated by Obama, their former boss.

Russia can’t conduct maneuver warfare – and this is costing it a lot

Stavros Atlamazoglou

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For almost one year, the Russian military has been maintaining a large-scale offensive in eastern Ukraine.

At the cost of over 100,000 dead and thousands of heavy weapon systems destroyed, the Russian military has failed to achieve the operational breakthrough that the Kremlin desires so much.

The Ukrainian military has fought cleverly within its means, conceding territory only when it must and living to fight another day.

“The Russian offensive effort in eastern Ukraine that began in fall 2023 continues to produce gradual Russian tactical gains in specific sectors of the front, but operationally significant gains will likely continue to elude Russian forces,” the Institute for the Study of War assessed in its October 3 operational update on the war in Ukraine.

The Ukrainian military, understanding its shortcomings in manpower and munition availability, especially in artillery rounds, is pursuing an in-depth defense strategy. This strategy stipulates conceding territory to the Russian military very slowly and only after inflicting heavy losses on the attacker.

How Much Has Hamas’s October 7 Attack Damaged Iran And Its Anti-Israel Alliance? – Analysis

Michael Scollon

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Iran has spent decades assembling its “axis of resistance,” a loose network of armed proxies and allies against Israel.

But on October 7, Hamas — the U.S.- and EU-designated Palestinian terrorist group that is a key member of Iran’s axis — launched a deadly cross-border assault on Israel, killing nearly 1,200 Israelis and taking a further 251 hostages.

One year on, how much has Israel weakened key members of the axis and how near is all-out war with Iran?

‘Hezbollah Reduced To Almost Nothing’

Ali Alfoneh, senior fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, said that by taking on Iranian proxies Israel has undermined a major component of Tehran’s national-security doctrine.

“Iran has seen Lebanese Hezbollah reduced to almost nothing,” he said, adding it has greatly limited “what Hezbollah can do for Iran in the short term.”

Assessing the Kursk Campaign

Mick Ryan

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Two months ago, Ukraine launched one its most audacious campaigns of the war. While it initially appeared to be a small-scale incursion similar to previous Belgorod operations, it quickly became apparent that this was a significant conventional ground campaign that had experienced combat formations in the vanguard.

For the first couple of weeks at least, Ukrainian ground forces were able advance rapidly along several axes of advance inside Kursk. The Russians, caught off guard in Moscow, were slow to respond to the incursion, repeating a pattern from other events when they have been surprised.

However, by September, the Russian response to the Ukrainian incursion had begun to take shape. Forces from multiple brigades and divisions were deployed from Russia and from inside Ukraine to stem the Ukrainian progress, which throughout September the Russians largely achieved. In the second half of September, the Russians were able to mount a significant counterattack against the western part of the Ukrainian salient and smaller attacks against the Ukrainians in the southeastern part of the salient.

Concrete National Security Benefits of Spectrum Allocation for Commercial 5G

Clete Johnson

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In an ongoing paper series, the CSIS Strategic Technologies Program has explored the national security implications of spectrum allocation. The series argues that it is a national security imperative for the United States to make spectrum available for licensed 5G and future-generation wireless technologies to secure its position as the leader in trusted network technologies, especially as autocracies, led by China, seek to dominate. As previous CSIS analysis has observed, China has adopted an aggressive strategy to lead in technology, particularly 5G and future-generation networks and applications. Since spectrum is critical to the future of the networks and applications that their societies rely on, the security of the United States and its allies depends on leading and fostering trusted partnerships in this arena.

Continuing with this area of focus, this two-part paper examines the concrete national security impacts of commercial licensed spectrum availability: Below, Part 1 explores the reasons why spectrum allocation for commercial 5G is indispensable for developing trusted technology. Part 2 will explore why commercial spectrum is crucial to U.S. and allied military operations and capabilities.

Spectrum Availability and the Development of a Trusted Technology Supply Chain

Commercial spectrum allocation is critical to the security of the United States and its allies, as it is indispensable to the future of the networks and applications on which their societies depend. These networks and applications will be designed either to advance the principles that support the United States and its market-democratic allies or to serve the control and suppression efforts of the deepening autocratic alliance of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

Silicon Valley, the New Lobbying Monster

Charles Duhigg

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One morning in February, Katie Porter was sitting in bed, futzing around on her computer, when she learned that she was the target of a vast techno-political conspiracy. For the past five years, Porter had served in the House of Representatives on behalf of Orange County, California. She’d become famous—at least, C-span and MSNBC famous—for her eviscerations of business tycoons, often aided by a whiteboard that she used to make camera-friendly presentations about corporate greed. Now she was in a highly competitive race to replace the California senator Dianne Feinstein, who had died a few months earlier. The primary was in three weeks.

A text from a campaign staffer popped up on Porter’s screen. The staffer had just learned that a group named Fairshake was buying airtime in order to mount a last-minute blitz to oppose her candidacy. Indeed, the group was planning to spend roughly ten million dollars.

From Mine to Microchip

Gracelin Baskaran and Meredith Schwartz

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Introduction

Semiconductors are a critical technology for economic security, and they are also incredibly mineral intensive. Semiconductors are present in all types of electronics, including smartphones, computers, automotives, energy storage, medical devices, lighting, and military and aerospace applications. Four indispensable minerals—gallium, germanium, palladium, and silicon—face significant supply chain risks. While current government funding and tax incentives, such as the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), focus on addressing supply chain vulnerabilities and stimulating private investment, they are limited to metals used to manufacture electric vehicle (EV) batteries. Moreover, though the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 was designed to boost semiconductor manufacturing, it does not include any support for the related mineral inputs.

The CHIPS Act provided over $280 billion for advanced chip manufacturing, packaging, and workforce development. The bill focused almost entirely on onshoring downstream capabilities, and as a result significant funding has gone to companies such as Intel and Micron to enable them to build and expand fabrication facilities for chipmaking. Yet the CHIPS Act did not include any provisions to incentivize the diversification of critical mineral supply chains for semiconductors. This is a major national security oversight. Without alternative sourcing, the semiconductor supply chain remains highly dependent on China and other U.S. adversaries. This has already backfired. In August 2023, China imposed export restrictions on gallium and germanium, alarming the U.S. semiconductor industry. China accounts for 98 percent of the world’s refined gallium and 68 percent of the world’s germanium production. The United States, meanwhile, produces no gallium and less than 2 percent of the world’s refined germanium. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) estimated that just a 30 percent supply disruption of gallium could cause a $602 billion decline in U.S. economic output, equivalent to 2.1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), posing a significant economic threat.

The Price of Victory

Garrett Chandler

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The sound of incoming enemy artillery was a low rumble in the bunker Lieutenant Colonel Duke Rogers stood in, seventy feet below ground. The space, dimly lit by flickering artificial light, was part of a massive underground complex of tunnels, bunkers, and fighting positions that made up the eastern defensive lines in the Ural Mountains. He stood silently, listening to the whir and hum of the 3D printers all around the room. He was in the main logistics bunker of his brigade and around him machines were busy printing the commodities that would keep his force in the fight.

Against the wall to his left was the munitions printer, rapidly churning out small arms bullets from sheets of metal polymer. The new rounds were launched using electromagnetic force and didn’t need any propellant, allowing for full production at the front. On the other side were the medical and food production printers. The food printer combined nutrients together and produced cubes that functioned as meal replacements. To produce medicine, the machines combined the chemicals used to produce pharmaceuticals just like in the old days at factories.

It sounded funny to Rogers to think of the old days. They hadn’t produced things in true manufacturing lines since he was a teenager. Not since the Big War of the 2020s. He had been a private then, at least when it started. That was twenty years ago now. He wasn’t the same kid as he was back then. Back then he was reckless and carefree. He had been promoted quickly, after being in one of the few tanks to survive his first battle. His tank commander had died when an explosively formed penetration round cut through their tank. After that, he did what he had trained to do. He killed enemy tanks. He killed a lot of enemy tanks. He kept doing it too. The Army gave him a medal for it, a Distinguished Service Cross. They commissioned him too. And he chose to stay because of that.

Bridging the Gap: The Dynamics Between Irregular Warfare Practitioners, Academics, and Policymakers

Sal Artiaga

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Irregular warfare (IW) combines military actions, academic theories, and strategic policies. This field draws important viewpoints from each area. Yet, differences between those who fight, research, and create policies can cause problems. Soldiers who face combat situations provide hands-on lessons. Researchers offer big-picture concepts and deep studies, while government officials concentrate on broader aims and policymaking. We must understand these differences to create effective IW plans and develop opportunities for better communication and collaboration.

The Role of Practitioners in Irregular Warfare

Irregular warfare practitioners carry out IW operations on the ground. These include special operations forces, intelligence operatives, and other military personnel who employ unconventional tactics, guerilla warfare, sensitive activities, and psychological operations. Practitioners have direct experience and practical know-how, having dealt with IW's unpredictable and often chaotic nature. They frequently face situations that don't match theoretical models. The complexities of human behavior in local cultures and the changing nature of conflict zones can make strict academic frameworks seem to need to be more in touch with real-world conditions. Practitioners need spaces to present their experiences and insights in ways that academics and policymakers understand. Practitioners’ specific terms and tactical focus can create obstacles to clear communication. On top of that, practitioners often work under policies made by people who might need to grasp the operational environment. This situation can cause frustration and a feeling of disconnect between what happens in the field and what policies say.