Targeting Taiwan Beijing’s Playbook for Economic and Cyber Warfare

Craig Singleton & RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgomery

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Introduction

“The complete reunification of the motherland must be fulfilled, and it will definitely be fulfilled,” declared Xi Jinping on the 110th anniversary of the Chinese Revolution of 1911, underscoring Taiwan’s reintegration into China as a core element of his vision for the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), using minimal military force and preserving Taiwan’s infrastructure and economy during reunification are paramount.

A cyber-enabled economic coercion campaign is the CCP’s most strategic and logical approach to realizing this long-term national priority.

The CCP’s strategy to win without fighting is not new. In writings by ancient strategists Sun Tzu and Kautilya, undermining enemy morale and cohesion plays a prominent role. But modern globalization has created more economic connections that China can exploit to achieve coercive aims. Technological innovation created even more digital connections, offering more possibilities for coercion, including through the targeting of critical infrastructure.

China could wage economic war on Taiwan to force surrender, report say

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U.S. military officials and analysts have for years warned of possible armed attacks or blockades by China on Taiwan, but a report released Friday has raised a red flag about possible nonmilitary tactics that could be used effectively against the self-governed island.

Beijing could wage an economic and cyber war to force a surrender from Taiwan without direct use of military power, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a Washington research institute, said in the report. Such a likely but overlooked scenario, it said, poses a challenge for the U.S., the island's biggest ally, and it suggested Washington make preparations for how best to respond.

FDD researchers teamed up with banking and finance experts in Taiwan over two days earlier this year to simulate likely nonmilitary moves by Beijing, such as disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks on infrastructure. The exercise was the first of its kind and sought to fill an analytical gap, FDD said.

Taiwan’s Greatest Vulnerabilities Extend Beyond Its Military

Lili Pike

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In recent years, Taiwan wargames have become standard practice from Capitol Hill to Wall Street. The exercises model pathways China might pursue to achieve its desired end goal: bringing the island democracy, which Beijing still considers to be part of its territory, under its political control.

Over the years, such wargames have played out different military scenarios, from a Chinese blockade of the island to a full amphibious invasion, and assessed the capacity of Taiwan and the United States and its allies to respond.

China Has 3 Carriers at Sea — Will PLA Seize Middle East Distraction to Attack Taiwan?

Jim Morris

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It’s been a big story for much of the last year. But now, with the world’s attention focused on Israel and Lebanon, could China use the opportunity to ramp up the pressure on Taiwan?

China now has all three of its aircraft carriers at sea for the first time. Meanwhile, the US has moved naval and air assets to the Middle East, a move which Politico says “comes at a high cost for the Navy. It also leaves the Indo-Pacific shorthanded as ships are pulled into the Middle East to protect American forces and battle Houthi missiles and drones targeting commercial shipping in the Red Sea.”

Earlier this week, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin III ordered the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln and its escort group to stay in the region. A month ago, the carrier was diverted from a planned deployment to Pacific to head to the Middle East.

The Israel-Iran War Enters A New Stage – Analysis

Can Kasapoğlu

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What Happened?

On October 1, 2024, the Islamic Republic of Iran unleashed a large salvo of nearly 200 ballistic missiles against Israel.

Iran’s attack came only five days after Israel conducted strikes to eliminate several high-ranking officials of the Iran-backed proxy terror group Hezbollah—most notably late Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. Israel’s strike also killed General Abbas Nilforoushan, the former deputy of operations for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and Muhammad Ja’far Kasir, the chief of Hezbollah’s Unit 4400, a special body tasked with overseeing weapons transfers between the proxy network and Tehran. Iran’s strike also coincided with the Israel Defense Forces’ initiation of limited ground operations in Lebanon.

The Strategy and Concepts of Operations behind the Attack

In its April 13 attacks against Israel, Iran unleashed a mixed strike package of drones alongside cruise and ballistic missiles. This offensive configuration complicated Israel’s efforts to defend its skies, as sensors have greater difficulty tracking slow-moving drones and dealing with ground clutter. But the slower projectiles also gave the Israeli Defense Forces hours of notice before Tehran’s more powerful missiles neared their targets. The early warning made it all but impossible for Tehran to maintain the element of surprise during the April strike.

Nasrallah Assassination Will Only Make Israel Less Safe | Opinion

Daniel L. Davis

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Many in the Middle East and America hailed the September 27 Israeli assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Television stations in Israel had singing and dancing in their studios and some reporters handed out chocolate on the streets.

In time, they may come to regret these celebrations.

Hassan Nasrallah was many things, but he was a cautious and pragmatic politician at heart. He used many inflammatory words in often-fiery speeches over the years, but kept his actions restrained. He held back many of the most violent and reckless voices within Hezbollah, seeking to thread the needle of keeping up resistance against Israeli strength while avoiding anything that might invite an Israeli military response.

The day after the October 7 terrorist attack by Hamas, Hezbollah fired a limited number of rockets and artillery shells against Israeli targets "in solidarity" with the Palestinian people, 300 of whom had been killed in the first 24 hours by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in response to the terrorist attack. In the early days of the war against Hamas, there was concern that Hezbollah might attack the IDF, putting the latter in a two-front war. Nasrallah restrained his troops, however, and no northern front was ever opened.

Escalating to War between Israel, Hezbollah, and Iran

Daniel Byman, Seth G. Jones and Alexander Palmer

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Introduction

Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah continue to escalate in what Israel has called Operation Northern Arrows.1 In mid-September 2024, Israeli intelligence sabotaged thousands of Hezbollah beepers and walkie-talkies, detonating them in an operation that killed dozens of group members and wounded thousands more. On September 27, 2024, Israel killed Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah in an airstrike on the group’s Beirut headquarters—the culmination of a campaign against Hezbollah’s leaders that led to the killing of numerous senior group leaders in September 2024. Two days before the Nasrallah assassination, Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi, chief of the general staff of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), told Israeli troops from the Seventh Brigade deployed along the northern border, “We are preparing the process of a manoeuvre, which means your military boots . . . will enter enemy territory.”2 The IDF also called up two reserve brigades for what it referred to as “operational missions in the northern arena.”3 Israeli commandoes have conducted cross-border operations to gather intelligence and otherwise prepare for a ground invasion, and Israel has done limited operations so far in southern Lebanon.4 Iran responded by launching waves of ballistic missiles and other stand-off weapons at Israel.

To better understand the prospect of further escalation, this brief asks four questions: What are Israel’s and Hezbollah’s objectives? How has violence evolved over the past several months? What are plausible scenarios for further escalation? What options do the United States and other countries have to mitigate or prevent escalation? To answer these questions, this analysis draws on a mixture of quantitative and qualitative information. It compiles data on Israeli and Hezbollah strikes along the Israel-Lebanon-Syria border and geolocates Hezbollah attacks against Israel in the demilitarized zone between the Blue Line and Litani River.

Israel’s Campaign against Hezbollah and the Fight for Southern Lebanon’s Tunnels

Patrick Sullivan, John Spencer and John Amble

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“Those who go beneath the surface do so at their peril.”

So warned Oscar Wilde in The Picture of Dorian Gray. Of course, his words of caution were aimed at consumers of art and not at twenty-first-century military forces. And yet for those forces, the peril beneath the surface is even more real. Even a military with extraordinary capabilities above the ground will quickly encounter extreme limitations to those capabilities below it.

So when the Israel Defense Forces acknowledged having been quietly carrying out raids into Hezbollah tunnels in southern Lebanon for months, the natural question for many observers was why. Examining that question highlights lessons on underground warfare, illuminates how Israel likely intends to treat Hezbollah’s tunnels in its plans for a broader campaign against the group, and offers a glimpse into the capabilities required to overcome the subterranean hazards of the modern battlefield.

Hezbollah’s Tunnels

Much is unknown about Hezbollah tunnels. Like the Hamas tunnels in Gaza that Israeli forces have contended with during their military campaign there, the only way to know for sure how many tunnels there are—and their scale, form, and purposes—is discovering them on the ground.

Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don’t? Strategic Implications of Designating Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a Terrorist Organisation

Gustav Christensson

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Introduction

The effect of sanctions on state behaviour is a complex topic that is frequently debated in international studies, and views vary even among proponents or opponents. Questions of efficacy, the consequences for citizens as opposed to the targeted governments or individuals, and morality and ethics are all topics that have been frequently debated.1 The various types of sanctions can target individuals if they are limited in scope, or actors or state organs if they are broader. Sanctions are ostensibly a means of achieving specific political goals. In the contemporary debate, however, sanctions are often treated as a goal in themselves rather than as a tool for changing behaviour. This policy brief analyses the legal criteria for and the potential consequences of the European Union (EU) designating a state organ a terrorist organisation, which is one type of sanction that the EU is able to implement. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in Iran serves as the empirical case, based on the ongoing debate regarding a terrorist designation for that group. The consequences are examined in terms of the consequences for the IRGC as an organisation and the consequences for the EU. Some context is provided regarding the organisational structure of the IRGC and the Islamic Republic. The brief concludes with a succinct description of the risks and rewards of a terrorist designation and some policy recommendations. The recommendations address under what circumstances the EU should designate the IRGC a terrorist organisation and whether other options might be more effective.

Transforming to Innovate for National Security

Steve Deal

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Now is the time to create the political will necessary for real change. The four-year election cycle dominates strategic thinking and capacity for change much as Soviet five-year planning models did during the Cold War. The only reliable springtime occurs quadrennially, before the presidential election, before cabinet confirmation season, and well before the year or so it takes for each newly chosen administration to find its collective way and cull any kind of coherence it might possibly achieve.

And so, it is in the area of national security where this lengthy run-up yet crucial moment of strategic fusion matters most. It is this realm that is historically most vital to the continuance of our sovereignty and way of life. Here precisely is where we must interrogate our past “idols of the tribe” and become deadly honest with ourselves: that our capacity for self-governance, backed up by our best current defenses, could be defeated by our adversaries. That our assumptions about the nature of the competition are likely wrong. Thus, we plan to win by first contemplating how or why we could lose. We learn what we can or need to do by realizing what we can’t, or without such needed change, what we won’t, and why.

U.S. eyes geostationary orbit for next-gen GPS

Sandra Erwin

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An experimental U.S. military satellite designed to test new space-based navigation technologies has been waiting nearly 20 months for a ride to geostationary Earth orbit (GEO).

The Navigation Technology Satellite-3 (NTS-3), developed by the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory, aims to test advanced technologies for future GPS and satellite navigation systems. Its launch, potentially before year’s end, hinges on the certification of United Launch Alliance’s Vulcan rocket.

NTS-3 is set to explore next-generation positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) technologies that could help modernize the Global Positioning System. The mission is significant for the U.S. military, as it would provide a rare chance to test PNT capabilities from GEO — a domain where China’s BeiDou system currently has the upper hand.

“We really don’t understand how accurate our signals can be from GEO. We’ve never done it before. So that’s one of the experiments for NTS-3,” said Joseph Rolli, director of business development for PNT at L3Harris Technologies, which manufactured the satellite under an $84 million contract awarded in 2018.

How Top Arms Exporters Have Responded To The War In Gaza – Analysis

Zain Hussain

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Following the Hamas-led attack on southern Israel on 7 October 2023, Israel launched an intensive military campaign in Gaza, with the stated aims of destroying Hamas’s military and governing capabilities and bringing home 251 hostages taken during the incursion.

While many states were quick to affirm Israel’s right to self-defence, international concern grew about the high death toll and the severe humanitarian crisis in Gaza as well as about Israel’s conduct of the war. This has included ground assaults and air strikes that have targeted or hit hospitals, schools, emergency shelters and United Nations and other humanitarian operations, as well as areas previously designated as ‘safe zones’ in Gaza by the Israelis. These have resulted in the deaths of journalists, humanitarian workers and peaceful protesters, along with many other civilians.

On 12 December 2023 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution demanding an ‘immediate humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza, parties’ compliance with international law’ and ‘release of all hostages’.

Ukraine unveils new “Bohdana-BG” artillery system

Dylan Malyasov

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According to reports from Militarny, this new artillery system is a hybrid of the Ukrainian-made Bohdana and the Soviet-era 152mm 2A36 Giatsint-B artillery system, modified to incorporate modern features.

The Bohdana system has been mounted on the carriage of the Giatsint-B, aiming to create a cost-effective and easily producible artillery solution for Ukraine’s military. The development of towed artillery systems comes at a crucial time for Ukraine as it seeks to rapidly expand its artillery capabilities in the face of ongoing conflict with Russia.

Towed artillery offers several advantages over self-propelled systems, particularly in terms of production and operational simplicity. “Their production is much cheaper, simpler, and therefore faster compared to self-propelled units, which is a key factor for Ukraine today,” Militarny reported. This allows for quicker manufacturing and deployment on the battlefield, making it a practical solution in current conditions.

With Foundations Laid, Pentagon Building CJADC2’s Data Backbone

Josh Luckenbaugh

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North Korea launches a missile, and U.S. Forces Korea and Indo-Pacific Command initially manage command and control of the situation. So begins a hypothetical scenario raised by a former Air Force chief of staff.

“Now let’s say that that missile is … going into space, we think it’s going to hit a satellite, now [Space Command] has C2,” Greg Little, senior counselor at Palantir, said at the National Defense Industrial Association’s recent Emerging Technologies for Defense Conference and Exhibition. “Now we don’t think it’s going to hit a satellite, it’s going back towards Japan,” Indopacom takes charge again, but “then as it’s actually heading, we think, into California,” Northern Command takes control of the situation, as imagined by retired Gen. David Goldfein.

“Now imagine thousands of missiles, hundreds of ships, hundreds of tanks, not only in the Pacific but in the Middle East and Europe … and then imagine actually managing that in an integrated way in an era of great power competition,” Little continued. “The only way to do that is to leverage digital technologies” such as artificial intelligence, advanced computing and analytics.

A Crucial Step in Combating Terrorism

Eli M. Gold

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In the wake of the devastating October 7th attacks on Israel, the United States finds itself at a critical juncture in its ongoing fight against international terrorism. The horrific nature of these attacks, which claimed numerous lives, including those of American citizens, and resulted in hundreds of hostages, demands a robust and decisive response from our nation. As we grapple with the aftermath of this tragedy, a new piece of legislation, the Hamas Terrorist Fugitive Act (H.R. 9153), has emerged as a beacon of hope and a powerful tool in our pursuit of justice.

This bill represents a significant advancement in our commitment to dismantling terrorist organizations that threaten global peace and security. At its core, this crucial piece of legislation proposes adding key leaders of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) to the FBI's Most Wanted Terrorists List. While this may seem like a simple administrative action, its implications are far-reaching and profound.

By placing these terrorists on this high-profile list, we send an unequivocal message to the world: those responsible for acts of terror will be held accountable, no matter how long it takes or how far they run. This move demonstrates our unwavering commitment to bringing the perpetrators of the October 7th attacks to justice, a commitment that extends beyond mere words to concrete action.

Helen Benedict, Ending the Cycle of Revenge

Helen Benedict

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With the first anniversary of the October 7th Hamas attack on Israel approaching, the death toll in Gaza climbing to more than 41,500, and Israel inflicting ever more extreme violence on the West Bank and now on Lebanon as well, something very different happened recently in a poky classroom at Columbia University. Two young men, one Palestinian and one Israeli, both of whom had lost people they deeply loved to the conflict, came to speak not about fear and anger, revenge or oppression, but about reconciliation, friendship, and peace.

One of them was Arab Aramin, a 30-year-old Palestinian from Jerusalem whose little sister, Abir, had been shot and killed in front of her school by an Israeli soldier. She was 10 years old.

The other was Yonatan Zeigen, a 36-year-old Israeli who grew up on the Kibbutz Be’eri near the Gaza border, where his mother, the renowned peace activist Vivian Silver was killed by Hamas on October 7, 2023.

Both men are fathers, both thin and lightly bearded, and both are members of the Parents Circle, a joint Israeli-Palestinian organization of 750 bereaved people working together to end the cycle of revenge that has so scarred their lives. They and other members of the group were touring New York City and the Boston area to introduce the Parents Circle and its philosophy to Americans.

7 ways the US is beating Europe

Carlo Martuscelli and Hanne Cokelaere

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The United States and the European Union have faced similar challenges over the past couple of decades, with the financial crash and the Covid pandemic wreaking economic havoc, taking years to recover from.

But of the two, it's America that has found a way to surge ahead. When it comes to things that create wealth — science, innovation, even a higher birthrate — the U.S. is ahead by most metrics.

The EU is trying to change that. It hired the former European Central Bank chief Mario Draghi to deliver a report into all that was wrong and everything that needs to be done about it. A year and 400 pages later, the verdict was clear: The gap between the EU and U.S. is only growing. Drastic measures are called for.

Beyond the List: The Broad Range of United Front Work in Sweden

Cheryl Yu

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On October 1, Swedish reporters working as part of an international consortium of journalists broke the news of a leaked list identifying 233 individuals across Europe connected to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) united front system, shedding light on the extent of the Party’s influence abroad (tv4.se, October 1). Tony Fang, a professor at Stockholm University who is affiliated with multiple united front agencies, was featured in the report (tv4.se, October 1). However, Fang and the 17 individuals based in Sweden named in the list are just a few of the Swedish individuals and organizations that are linked to the united front system. The scope of the Party’s united front network in Sweden extends far beyond the education sector. It is present across all areas in society, including culture, business, politics, and media. Further research by the Jamestown Foundation that traces CCP activities and organizations has now uncovered at least 103 united front groups in Sweden—only some of which were identified in the leaked list.

United front work (统战工作) is a key tool the Party uses to achieve its goal of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation (中华民族伟大复兴) and become a global power by building relationships with individuals and their affiliated organizations it considers useful. As the Chinese Communist Party Regulation on United Front Work states, “The united front … is an important magic weapon for … realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (Xinhua, January 5, 2021). CCP chairman Xi Jinping stated at the Central United Front Work Conference in 2015 that the united front “is about human relations, and the purpose of promoting the united front is to strengthen the forces for common struggle” (People’s Daily, May 21, 2015). Engaging with the united front system must be understood in the Party’s terms as an explicitly political activity rather than as ordinary civil society or private sector activities in a democratic society.

More Wars, a Failed State, and a Step Back by the United States - Analysis

Daniel Byman

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Someday, probably later rather than sooner, Israel and Hamas will stop shooting at each other. Relieved U.S. officials could claim there is a cease-fire and the worst is behind us, even if limited violence continues. More good things might follow. The Houthis would be reluctant to fight a war on behalf of Hamas that Hamas itself is not fighting, returning their focus to Yemen. The fighting in Lebanon, which surged after Israel killed Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, might eventually subside.

All this would be a dramatic improvement over the deadly and devastating conflict in Gaza. Yet even a successful cease-fire would not put the Middle East back on the path it was on before Hamas’s attack on Oct. 7, as dismal as that seemed at the time.

Where Are the Mavericks?

Jeremiah Monk

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INTRODUCTION

Innovation is a driving force behind progress, and in today’s world, the ability to adapt, evolve, and think differently is critical to maintaining a strategic advantage. Nowhere is this more important than in military operations, where creativity in tactics, technology, and strategy can determine victory or defeat. However, the U.S. military has struggled with fostering innovation, primarily due to the very structure and culture of its promotion system. This article explores the tension between the need for innovation and the barriers imposed by a system that often rewards conformity and sidelines mavericks—individuals like Billy Mitchell and Jimmy Doolittle who dared to think differently and defy convention.

THE CONFORMITY CULTURE IN MILITARY PROMOTION

The U.S. military is known for its discipline, order, and professionalism—qualities that are critical for operational success and unit cohesion. But these qualities come at a cost. The military promotion system emphasizes “professional mastery,” which is often defined by adherence to established doctrine, following orders, and demonstrating a consistent record of achievement within traditional parameters. Officers who conform to the expectations of their superiors are often rewarded with promotions, while those who question the status quo or propose radical changes may find themselves sidelined or even ostracized.

Is the Israel-Hamas War Closer to Its Beginning or Its End?

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib, M.L. deRaismes Combes, Dana El Kurd, Marwan Muasher, John Nagl, Amit Segal, and Hagar Shezaf

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As the first anniversary of the Oct. 7 attack and the ensuing Israel-Hamas war approaches, the prospects of peace between Israelis and Palestinians seem less likely than ever. Despite repeated attempts by U.S., Egyptian, and Qatari diplomats to negotiate a cease-fire and hostage release deal, the conflict in Gaza remains unresolved and is now spreading across the region.

Last year, Foreign Policy asked a group of writers what Gaza would look like in a year. This year, instead of seeking solutions or draft peace plans, we asked a range of contributors—Palestinians, Israelis, Americans, and Jordanians—to assess where we stand now and what the future may hold: In short, is the war in Gaza closer to its end or its beginning?—FP Editors

WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS? A COMPETENCY DEVELOPMENT APPROACH FOR PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

Thomas Crosbie & Holger Lindhardtsen

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The global security environment is undergoing rapid change. For many countries, including the United States and its NATO allies, there has been both a push and a pull effect indicating the need for a new security posture. The push is a movement away from the sorts of conflicts that marked the first two decades of the twenty-first century. With the fall of Kabul in 2021, the era of countering insurgencies, building and stabilizing states, and countering terror organizations was thought to draw to an ambivalent, unsatisfying end. At the same time as militaries seem to be pushed out of low-intensity conflicts, there has been an alarming pull in the opposite direction, back to preparing for major combat operations.

With the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, European countries in particular have raced to enact a wide range of reforms that support a radical change in posture toward territorial defense. Given that much of the early fighting in Ukraine took place in urban environments, it also served as an indicator that urban warfighting and the lessons learned from two decades of COIN remain still relevant. This belief was reinforced in October 2023, when Hamas launched an attack into Israel, leading to a large-scale urban warfighting operation in the Gaza Strip, while also reminding the world that the era of counter-insurgency might not be coming to an end.

The Impact of Events in the War in Ukraine on ProRussian Narratives: The Case of Weibo and Telegram

Dr. Elizabeth Radziszewski

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Introduction

This report is a companion study to START’s 2024 report, The Impact of Events in the War in Ukraine on Pro-Russian Narratives: The Case of Twitter, 1 which explored pro-Russian narratives in connection with three significant events in the war in 2022: the onset of the battle of Kherson, the Bucha massacre of civilians, and NATO’s announcement of membership offer to Sweden and Finland. That report reviewed existing insights on pro-Russian narratives—a tool of irregular warfare that a state can rely on to gain an edge over an adversary—and developed a set of testable hypotheses linked to the use of various themes in messages on social media platforms in the context of three events, with specific focus on expected changes in those themes before the onset of the event and after. The report also presented findings from statistical analysis in the context of Twitter. This study tests these hypotheses by focusing on Weibo and Telegram and concludes with a discussion of differences in the evolution of pro-Russian rhetoric between these social media platforms and Twitter.

Why Russia’s Initial Assault on Ukraine Was Misinterpreted

Julia Kazdobina, Jakob Hedenskog & Andreas Umland

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Introduction

On 17 July 2014, the world was shocked by the news of the crash, in eastern Ukraine, of Malaysian Airlines Flight MH-17 from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur. All 298 passengers and crew on board the Boeing 777, including 80 children, were killed. While this was an exceptionally tragic event, it was only one of many fateful episodes in that year. Over the course of 2014, the largest European war since 1945 unfolded in Ukraine in a succession of ever more alarming monthly armed escalations by Russia in Crimea and the Donets Basin (Donbas).

The initial trigger of increasing tensions and the eventual start of war had been Ukraine’s ambition, since 2008, to forge a closer contractual relationship with the European Union. This happened through an Association Agreement, which included a so-called Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. Although largely about economic issues, this treaty – initialled in 2012, debated throughout 2013, and signed in 2014 – was seen by Moscow as a threat to its ambitions to continue to control Ukraine and as a dangerous model for other former Soviet republics to follow.

After the Kursk Incursion: A Turning Point for Russian Mobilisation?

Aleksandr Golts

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Is Russia losing its war of attrition?

It is too early to draw conclusions about the military consequences of the Ukrainian breakthrough in the Kursk region. Fighting there is continuing, and the battlefield is largely hidden by the fog of war. However, the fact that the Ukrainian troops that broke through have been in the Kursk region for more than a month and are still conducting offensive operations, albeit limited, leads to an obvious conclusion. Contrary to previously prevailing theoretical assumptions, based on objective data on population size, size of industrial production, and so on, Russia is beginning to lose in the war of attrition. The fighting in the Kursk region demonstrates Moscow's lack of strategic reserves, forcing serious reconsideration of previous assessments of the combat capabilities of Russian forces and the prospects for future combat operations.

The theory of military art unequivocally states that the key to victory on the battlefield is not a general superiority over the enemy in manpower and military equipment, but the ability to concentrate combat-ready troops in a particular direction, thereby ensuring superiority on that section of the front. Similarly, the experience of combat operations in the Kursk region shows that the most important condition for victory is not a general superiority in mobilisation resources, but the ability to covertly carry out a rapid mobilisation for use in a specific military operation.