Indian Strategic Studies: 10/11/24

11 October 2024

India Must Match China’s Speedy Moves in Bangladesh’s New Political Landscape

Rakshith Shetty

In early September, Chinese Ambassador to Bangladesh Yao Wen met with Shafiqur Rahman, the chief of the Bangladeshi political party Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), at the party’s central office in Dhaka. According to various reports, Yao termed the JI a “well-organized” and “disciplined” party. JI had been banned by deposed former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August, a decision that the interim government recently overturned.

Yao’s visit was significant because it marked the first time that a foreign diplomat had been to the JI office since 2010. In that context, the meeting was a sign that Beijing is keen to adapt to a rapidly evolving political situation in Bangladesh by maintaining lines of communication across the whole political spectrum. This approach will allow China to pivot swiftly when needed, ensuring that its economic and strategic interests are protected regardless of who comes to power in the months ahead.

By contrast, India is increasingly at risk of getting locked out and losing influence in Bangladesh as a consequence of its perceived association with Hasina. Following Hasina’s departure from Bangladesh and the formation of an interim government headed by the Nobel laureate economist Muhammad Yunus, New Delhi has chosen to wait and watch. But this approach may carry the risk of ceding leverage to China, especially if Beijing continues to engage more proactively with Bangladesh’s emerging political powers.

The Coming Drift in India-Iran Relations

Akhilesh Pillalamarri

Last week, the ongoing war in the Middle East escalated with the death of Hezbollah’s erstwhile leader, Hassan Nasrallah, in a bunker in Lebanon following an Israeli airstrike on September 27. Since then, Israeli planes and missiles have pounded Lebanon, decimating Hezbollah, in addition to causing civilian deaths. Subsequently, Iran, which is closely allied with Hezbollah, fired around 180 missiles at Israel on October 1.

India under Prime Minister Narendra Modi has grown much closer to Israel, driven by strategic, economic, and ideological concerns. In a post on X (formerly Twitter) that could be interpreted as tacit support for Israel, Modi wrote on September 30 that he “spoke to [Israeli] Prime Minister [Netanyahu] about recent developments in West Asia. Terrorism has no place in our world. It is crucial to prevent regional escalation and ensure the safe release of all hostages.”

India has traditionally done a good job of cultivating good relations with sets of countries that are hostile to each other, such as the United States and Russia, and, in the Middle East, with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. As the minister of external affairs, Dr. S. Jaishankar, has said, India’s foreign policy is “multi-vector,” and characterized by dealing with countries that may be rivals with each other on a “non-exclusive” basis.

Taiwan Thinks China Can’t Invade. They’ve Never Been More Wrong

Brandon J. Weichert

Why Taiwan Might Face a Chinese Invasion Sooner Than You Think

Taiwan’s wishful thinking continues unabated. A recent report conducted by the Taiwanese Defense Ministry asserts that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), while it has made significant strides in its modernization push, is still unable to conquer Taiwan in an amphibious invasion, at least not for another few years. Indeed, this flowery report gels nicely with the long-running contention of the Pentagon that China will not be able to successfully invade Taiwan until at least 2027.

Conveniently, that is the year that the Pentagon believes that its forces will be able to better deter China. But Beijing knows that American military capabilities if trends persist, will be shored up by 2027. And who knows how much more stable and prosperous the United States might be by then.

Compare That to Now

America’s economy is a turgid mess, its political order is crumbling, its social fabric is tearing, and there is a very real fear that the United States might devolve into some sort of civil war, in a limited sense, in the aftermath of whoever wins the 2024 presidential election.

On the international front, the U.S. military is stretched and strained to its breaking

What reports got wrong about China’s ‘sunken nuclear submarine’

J. MICHAEL DAHM and PETER W. SINGER

The purported sinking of a Chinese nuclear submarine at a Wuhan shipyard pier is the latest example of Western reporting on military developments in China that overlooks important details and context, or even takes the wrong lessons from the fragments of stories they tell.

The incident, which took place in June, drew some mention the following month on social media and even in the defense press, but it went viral after a Sept. 26 report in the Wall Street Journal touched off coverage from Fox News to CBS. What apparently lit up the U.S. media landscape were the assertions, attributed to unnamed U.S. defense officials, that the submarine was nuclear-powered. Many of the subsequent reports suggested that the incident revealed safety concerns about a new class of PLA Navy nuclear submarine and a serious setback for China’s military modernization.

These are mischaracterizations. Moreover, the reporting actually buried the lead. The shipyard accident tells us very little about the future of PLA naval modernization, but the submarine itself does.

Understanding Xi Jinping’s ‘reform and opening up’

Charles Parton

Chinese modernisation

Democratic parties announce their manifestos before an election; autocratic parties do so after their (s)election. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sets out its longer-term goals at party congresses held every five years, and at the main annual plenums. Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the CCP, described the Third Plenums of 1978 and 2013 as ‘epochal’ for their role in ‘reform and opening up’, the two main contributors to the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s rise. Xi implied that this July’s plenum should also be seen as ‘epochal.’ Its measures are to be completed by 2029, and six years later, they will have helped the PRC on its way to achieving the first part of its two-step strategy to build ‘a great modern socialist country in all respects.’

‘Reform and opening up’ have long been the party’s nostrum for success. ‘Reform and opening up are the only way to make our country strong,’ says the 2002 version of the Party constitution. 3 In his ‘Explanation’ of the Third Plenum Resolution, the conclave’s formal document, Xi declared that, ‘...If we are to break new ground in advancing Chinese modernisation on the new journey in the new era, we must continue to rely on reform and opening up.’ 4 The word ‘reform’ duly appears 139 times in the Resolution, ‘opening up’ 27 times

No End in Sight? The West, China, and the Russo-Ukrainian War

Sven Biscop

THE DITHERING WEST

It is shameful that more than two years into the war, the West has still not moved beyond piecemeal decisionmaking about its support for Ukraine. The pattern keeps repeating itself. Every few months, a new weapons system is being considered for transfer to Ukraine. Governments dither for weeks or more, before in the end refraining from delivering the weapons. Or, if they do decide to release them, then in such small quantities that they have no decisive impact. The current debate about long-range missiles is the latest iteration. Meanwhile, the continued supply of replacements and ammunition for previously allocated weapons systems is far from assured. On the contrary, Ukraine can still not count on a regular supply of war matériel.

It is not that the West has been intimated by Russia’s threat of retaliation, not even by the recent announcement of a change in nuclear doctrine (which would allow first use against a non-nuclear state that is supported by a nuclear power). If it had, the West would not have supported Ukraine at all, and the country would no longer exist as an independent state. It is necessary, though, to manage the risk of escalation in any war that directly involves a great power as a combatant. That is why in the Korean War (1950-1953), China’s territory was off limits, even though unlike today in Ukraine, American, European (including Belgian) and other UN troops were directly fighting Chinese troops in North Korea.

China's Theater-Range, Dual-Capable Delivery Systems: Integrated Deterrence and Risk Reduction Approaches to Counter a Growing Threat

Chris Andrews and Justin Anderson

China has engaged in a dramatic buildup of its nuclear forces over the past decade. While much of the attention on China’s new nuclear arsenal has focused on its development and expansion of its strategic nuclear triad, this growth has also included significant numbers of theater-range, dual-capable delivery systems. These forces are not capable of reaching the U.S. mainland but can range U.S. and allied forces and bases across strategically significant swathes of the Indo-Pacific.

This research project assessed the growing threat to the United States and its Indo-Pacific allies posed by these systems. It then considered ways and means to counter and deter this challenge. It also considered possible risk reduction options. The study team organized its work around three main research questions:

1. What is the role of China’s theater-range, dual-capable delivery systems in its strategies and plans for countering U.S. intervention within a future Indo-Pacific security crisis or conflict?

Israel's secret weapon against Iran can be a deadly option

After Iran launched a barrage of missiles at Israel, it warned Iran of consequences with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu saying that Iran would "pay for the attack". Some analysts said Israel's response would likely be sharper this time, suggesting it could target Iran's nuclear or oil facilities.

The US, meanwhile, is pushing for a measured Israeli response to avoid a broader regional war, but its influence may be limited in shaping Israel's next steps. This latest round of hostilities threatens to expand far beyond the Israel-Palestine struggle, pulling in regional powers like Iran, and sparking fears of a full-scale war across the Middle East.

US President Joe Biden has said that he would not support an attack by Israel on Iranian nuclear sites in retaliation for Tehran's firing of missiles at Israeli cities. "The answer is no," Biden said on Wednesday, when asked if he would support such retaliation after Iran fired missiles at Israel.

What Is Iran Trying to Prove? - Analysis

Vali Nasr

On Oct. 1, for the second time this year, Iran launched a barrage of missiles—nearly 200—toward Israel. This time, the attack involved more advanced missiles and came with little forewarning. The missiles did not do significant damage, but they signaled Iran’s will and ability to attack Israel—and penetrate its defense systems in potentially damaging ways. It is thus a major turning point in both the yearlong war in Gaza as well as the security and stability of the broader Middle East going forward. Why did Iran’s leaders choose to so brazenly confront Israel now—and how is Iran likely to act going forward?

The most proximate reason for this latest attack was retaliation. Iran claimed that it was responding to Israel’s assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July and the more recent killings of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Gen. Abbas Nilforoushan of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Beirut. Beyond exacting retribution, Tehran likely hoped to establish a measure of deterrence against Israeli bullishness after a series of spectacular military and intelligence successes in Lebanon that has gravely damaged Hezbollah.

Can the U.S. Still Prevent an All-Out Middle East War? - Analysis

Michael Hirsh

In the year since Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack, Israel has gone from looking more vulnerable than it has for half a century—when it almost lost the 1973 Arab-Israeli War—to dramatically restoring its strategic edge against Iran and its proxies and, as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said, changing “the balance of power in the region for years to come” in its favor.

That, in sum, is the conclusion of many military and national security experts following several months of devastating—and mostly unanswered—Israeli attacks. Since the spring, these operations have killed off senior commanders of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); taken out Hamas’s political leader in the heart of Tehran and its top general in Gaza; and with a stunningly swift series of sophisticated blows both disabled and decapitated Hezbollah.

Missile attack on Israel lays bare deep divisions among Iranians

Iranians have been expressing a mixture of pride, uncertainty and fear since their country launched a large-scale ballistic missile attack on Israel on Tuesday night.

Within minutes of the attack starting, Persian social media feeds were filled with shaky videos showing the flashes of the missiles flying overhead.

Iran’s state television broadcast pictures of groups of people cheering on the streets, waving flags and chanting “Death to Israel”.

But the mood was different online, with not everyone expressing support for the attack.

Some shared tense scenes and heated debates about a possible war between the arch-foes, after decades of keeping their conflict largely in the shadows.

The contrasting reactions laid bare the deep divisions in Iran, where there is widespread discontent at the clerical establishment and frustration over the economic troubles caused by sanctions.

Iran Is at a Strategic Crossroads

Nicole Grajewski

On October 1, Iran launched its second direct attack on Israel within six months. Code-named Operation True Promise 2, this assault came in the wake of a series of high-profile assassinations by Israel of key figures in Iran’s network of nonstate allies and proxies, in addition to senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders.

The attack, whose name echoes April’s Operation True Promise, represents another attempt by Iran to restore deterrence in its long-standing conflict with Israel that has moved from the shadows into open confrontation. By demonstrating its willingness and capacity for forceful retaliation, Iran aimed to make Israel reassess the potential costs of any aggression toward Iranian interests. However, the effectiveness of this latest operation in achieving these goals remains uncertain.

What ensues from Tehran’s latest escalation may compel a comprehensive reassessment of its national security strategy. Faced with limited options and a multitude of challenges, Tehran may consider leveraging its status as a threshold nuclear state, raising the specter of potential nuclear weaponization as a means to counter Israel’s perceived military superiority.

Targeting Iran’s Oil Could Backfire

Greg Priddy

With Iran’s decision to mount a major missile strike against Israel on October 1 in retaliation for Israel’s strike on Hezbollah’s headquarters near Beirut, which killed longtime leader Hassan Nasrallah on September 27, the regime has chosen to cross the Rubicon into direct conflict with Israel. This is very unlike the Iranian missile strike in April, which was intentionally telegraphed and resulted in only a small Israeli strike against an Iranian air defense site. Now, Israel is considering a much broader list of retaliatory options, reportedly including strikes on the IRGC, Iran’s leadership, nuclear program sites, and oil infrastructure. President Biden has already publicly opposed striking Iran’s nuclear program, concerned that it could tilt Iran toward pursuing immediate weaponization.

Oil might seem to be a logical pressure point against the Iranian regime, given its importance to the country’s economy. Iran’s oil exports have been up in 2024, contributing to restoring modest economic growth. It is arguably a problematic target for U.S. interests, though, with a high potential for blowback. In a scenario in which Iran continues to exchange blows with Israel for an extended period—which now seems likely—or even ends up clashing directly with U.S. forces in the region, Iran would still have a powerful incentive to avoid striking Saudi, Emirati, or other GCC oil and gas infrastructure. The Gulf kingdoms can field superior air forces that could damage Iran’s oil infrastructure in a manner that would take years to repair.

Ukrainian Lessons: Civilian Tech Transforms the Battlefield

Henrik Larsen

Commercial drones are repurposed. Private satellites spy. Volunteer hackers provide an essential cyber defense for Ukraine.

Ukraine has deployed these private sector technologies to bolster its military. Its success offers an opportunity for Europe to sharpen its financially strapped defense industry.

The new European Commission has put the task near the top of its agenda. A post of defense commissioner has been created, with the goal of revitalizing European militaries. Although funds are tight and the risk of duplicating NATO efforts exists – outgoing NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg warned about creating a “competing force” — the continent can and should move ahead to rationalize and expand its arms industry. Ukraine’s experience will be key.

The European Investment Bank recently removed an important obstacle by allowing itself to lend to defense firms. It plans to invest €8 billion in defense. However, the most important military innovations may not arise from traditional investment in traditional defense industries. They could come from the application of civilian high-tech on the Ukrainian battlefields. As Europe modernizes its militaries, it should pay close attention to how civilian tech is transforming warfare, in three particular areas, drones, satellites, and cyber.

In Central Europe, Massive Floods Bring Massive Implications

Antonia Colibasanu

Floods rocked Central and Eastern Europe last week, inundating Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Austria, Hungary and Romania with the worst water levels they’ve seen in two decades. Though advanced predictions mitigated what could have been a worse disaster in terms of human casualties, the floods will nonetheless have implications for the national politics of affected nations and the European Union as a whole.

Southern Poland and northern Czech Republic were reportedly hit hardest, with thousands evacuated as the governments declared states of natural disaster. It’s unclear just how extensive the economic damage is. Agriculture and energy infrastructure has been shut down in some places, and many businesses have suspended their activities. The inundated regions are home to several industries, including a thriving chemical sector and one of the continent’s largest coke manufacturers.

Don’t Blame Biden for the Yearlong War in Gaza

Aaron David Miller and Lauren Morganbesser

The story is told of the U.S. Secretary of State, who on a diplomatic mission to London, Moscow, and Jerusalem, decided to take a break and look for some new clothes. In each city, the secretary went to the tailor to ask, “For $100, what can you make me?” The British tailor offered to make a sweater and a tie. The Russian tailor could make a vest and a pair of pants for that sum. But in Jerusalem, the answer came as a surprise. “For $100 I can make you several shirts, a sport coat, and I’ll throw in a few pairs of pants,” the Israeli tailor said. Stunned, the U.S. diplomat asked how the same money could buy so much more in Israel. “It’s really quite simple,” the tailor replied: “Out here, you’re not so big.”

As we mark the first year of the Israel-Hamas war and the escalating crisis on another front between Israel and Hezbollah, nowhere is the United States’ “out here, you’re not so big” problem more stunningly and tragically apparent. The administration of U.S. President Joe Biden has not been a potted plant. While the flow of assistance to the suffering population of Gaza has been galactically insufficient, not a scintilla of aid would have gotten through without U.S. pressure. Nor would negotiations to secure the release of 105 out of roughly 252 hostages during the temporary cease-fire in late 2023 have succeeded without a central U.S. role. The Biden administration has also been successful through deterrence, pressure, and diplomacy in preventing the escalation of the Israel-Hamas war into a broader regional war—until now, that is.

Russia Releases Proposed Military Budget for 2025

Pavel Luzin

The draft proposal of Russia’s federal budget for 2025 and 2026–2027 was submitted to the State Duma on September 30. According to the document, the national defense budget for 2025 would be 13.5 trillion rubles (almost $140 billion). There will additionally be a minor decrease in military spending of 12.8 trillion rubles ($128 billion) in 2026 and 13.1 trillion rubles ($126.6 billion) in 2027 (Sozd.duma.gov.ru, September 30). This is an evident administrative victory of the coalition consisting of the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the military-industrial complex. Regardless of whether or not the war against Ukraine will end or cease in the foreseeable future, the military budget will not return to the pre-war level of only 3.6 trillion rubles ($48.5 billion), nor the levels from 2022–2023 of 5.5 trillion rubles ($80.3 billion) and 6.4 trillion rubles ($75.2 billion) respectively. Russia’s dramatic increase in military spending indicates that it anticipates the war lasting beyond the next year and perhaps represents preparations to expand its military operations beyond Ukraine.

This victory increases the imbalances in Russia’s domestic economy. Consequently, the authoritarian regime promises to become tougher and more self-isolated, meaning taxpayers will inevitably suffer an additional fiscal and inflationary burden. The remaining profitable assets will be reallocated in favor of Russia’s most loyal groups, families, and people. This will likely lead to discontent among regular Russians, who are already becoming fatigued from the long war (see EDM, November 27, 2023, August 14, September 4).

Advanced Technologies in the War in Ukraine: Risks for Democracy and Human Rights

Anna Mysyshyn

Introduction

New advanced technologies are profoundly changing modern warfare. The war in Ukraine illustrates this with the use of tools such as satellite-enabled remote sensing, situational-awareness systems and drones, facialrecognition technology, and artificial intelligence (AI). The combination of traditional and technological warfare provides new opportunities, but it also creates challenges at the intersection of ethics, law, and democracy.

Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 led to Ukraine undergoing defense-technological progress that helps it fight against the enemy but also carries risks for society. The government’s collaboration with technology companies shows the deep integration of the defense and digital spheres. However, with technological progress comes political dilemmas such as over AI making autonomous decisions in wartime, protecting citizens from the misuse of facial-recognition tools and of surveillance by satellite technology, and the danger of information warfare

On Influence Operations: Brainpower as a Weapon of Choice

G.L. Lamborn

Of Sweet Potatoes and Newsreels

During the American Revolution, a British officer was sent from Charleston under flag of truce to negotiate a prisoner exchange with “Swamp Fox” Francis Marion. The officer was blindfolded but treated courteously as he journeyed under escort to Marion’s hidden camp. The Swamp Fox warmly greeted the British officer upon his arrival and invited him to dine. The British officer noted that although the camp was austere, morale was high, and the cook provided baked sweet potatoes for breakfast. Francis Marion indicated that the only food he and his guerrillas had to eat was sweet potatoes, but the visitor was told that he might eat as many as he pleased. The visiting officer was awed by Marion and his men—in good spirits despite obvious privation. Upon his return to Charleston, he declared that the Americans could never be beaten and that the Royalist effort in the South would ultimately fail. His testimony had an impact as British morale began to fall despite their military victories in the Carolinas. Canny and resourceful, the Swamp Fox conducted a successful influence operation. Francis Marion won a small but important psychological victory using only courage, courtesy, and sweet potatoes.

In another war on American soil, four months had passed since the battle ended. It was late November and turning cold. After a great orator spoke for two hours, a gaunt-looking man in a dark suit and wearing a tall hat rose to speak. He did not have much to say because he thought himself a poor public speaker. But he hoped to encourage a nation grown weary of war: “that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion—that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain—that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom—and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.”

The United States is the world’s largest gasoline exporte

The United States is the world’s largest exporter of motor gasoline (finished gasoline plus gasoline blending components), supplying over 16% of total global exports. U.S. motor gasoline exports in 2023 averaged 900,000 barrels per day (b/d), equivalent to about 10% of domestic consumption and enough to fill up the tanks of over 1.5 million SUVs per day, assuming an average tank size of 24 gallons. Other large gasoline exporters, including Singapore and the Netherlands, have never exceeded 700,000 b/d in gasoline exports. China and India have both added significant refining capacity since 2010 and have also increased gasoline exports.

The United States was a net importer of motor gasoline for over a half century from 1961 to 2015. However, that trend changed during the past decade. The high volume of motor gasoline exports in recent years reflects longer trends in increasing U.S. exports of refined products in general, which set records in 2022 and 2023. The growth in U.S. refined product exports reflects several factors, including generally increasing refinery capacity from 2010 to 2023 and rising production from existing refineries through increased utilization. Much of the increase in refinery capacity has led to higher motor gasoline yields because of added light crude oil processing units that process increasing volumes of light tight oil produced by hydraulic fracturing, or fracking. Finally, although refinery capacity has grown, U.S. consumption of gasoline has not, making more gasoline available for export. Motor gasoline consumption in 2023 was flat compared with 2010 (and 0.4 million b/d less than its peak in 2018).

Journal of Policy & Strategy, 2024, v. 4, no. 3

China’s Nuclear Delivery Vehicles

Germany and Extended Deterrence

“Knowing Your Enemy”: James R. Schlesinger and the Rise of Tailored Deterrence

Israel-Hezbollah War and the Islamic Republic of Iran

Adapting U.S. Missile Defense Policy to Evolving Threats, May 2024

The Impact of Arms Control on Extended Deterrence and Assurance, June 2024

Emergence of A New ‘Quad’: The Growing Entente Between China, Russia,

North Korea, and Iran, July 2024

Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI)Perspectives on Terrorism, 2024, v.18, no. 3

Is Religious Terrorism More Dangerous? What Have We Learned and How Does It Matter?

Uncovering the Bias and Prejudice in Reporting on Islamist and Non-Islamist Terrorist Attacks in British and US Newspapers

Hybrid Ideologies in Clinical Settings: Implications for Intervention of the Changing Landscape in Violent Extremism

Risk and Protective Factors Associated with Violent Extremism: A Multilevel and Interdisciplinary Evidence-Based Approach

Far-Right Political Violence in Ukraine: Assessment of the Donbas War and the Odesa Massacre

The Deradicalisation and Disengagement of Women Convicted of Terrorism Offences in Spain

Grounds for Cooperation in the Radicalisation Governance Milieu? A Qualitative Exploration of Stakeholder Issue Frames of Online Radicalisation

Demographic Profile, Mapping, and Punishment of Terrorist Convicts in Indonesia: An Introduction to the Indonesian Terrorism Cases Database

Bibliography: Conflict in Syria (Part 5)

Online Radicalisation: A Contested and Contestable Term

How Will Israel Strike Back?

Dov S. Zakheim

Israel has promised to retaliate for the Iranian ballistic missile strike on its airfields and cities, which left several people injured, hit a school in Gedera, caused some damage at the Tel Nof airbase and landed at or near the Hatzerim and Nevatim airbases. The last of these houses Israeli F-35 fighter aircraft, though it is not clear whether any of them were hit. The vast majority of F-35s presumably were conducting air operations at the time. In turn, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has promised that should Israel retaliate for the Iranian attacks, it would unleash an even more devastating blow against the Jewish State.

It is unlikely that the IRGC’s threats will deter Jerusalem. To begin with, Israel was not alone in defending against Iran’s ballistic missiles. For the second time, not only the United States but Britain, France, and Jordan came to Israel’s defense. Amman did so to protect its own people from both wayward missiles and shrapnel. Indeed, falling shrapnel wounded two people on Jordanian territory. Israel can, therefore, expect that should Iran launch yet another strike, America will come to its defense. So, too, Jordan will once again protect its own citizens. And other states, notably Britain, may do so as well.

There can be little doubt that Israel will go on the offensive in response to the Iranian attack. One option would be for it to attack some of Iran’s nuclear facilities. It certainly has the capability to do so since it operates tanker aircraft and likely would be able to refuel over Saudi airspace.

AI Against Terror: Harnessing Technology to Combat Terrorism in the Horn of Africa

Abraham Ename Minko

Introduction

Countries in the Horn of Africa, including Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti, have long faced challenges from terrorism and violent extremism. Groups like Al Shabaab have taken advantage of the region’s instability by spreading propaganda online and carrying out deadly attacks. Just in August 2024, Al Shabaab struck a beach in Mogadishu with a suicide bomb, killing at least 37 and injuring more than 200. Their ability to recruit, radicalise and mobilise people locally and globally demonstrates how modern terrorist organizations can adapt to situations. They don’t just rely on violence, they use online platforms to promote their agenda and coordinate activities effectively.

In today’s era, terrorism has evolved as groups use the internet to connect with an audience. Online platforms offer a ground for these groups to share their beliefs, attract members and raise funds. For instance, Al Shabaab has leveraged social media sites like Twitter and Telegram to spread their message drawing supporters and operatives from outside the Horn of Africa region. This shift towards tactics highlights the need for strategies, beyond traditional law enforcement or military actions.

Cyber Resiliency: CrowdStrike Outage Highlights Challenges

The Big Picture

In July 2024, a software update from the cybersecurity firm CrowdStrike caused Microsoft Windows operating systems to crash—resulting in potentially one of the largest IT outages in history. The outage disrupted critical infrastructure operations by grounding commercial flights and interrupting critical hospital care, among other impacts.

CrowdStrike’s investigation of the incident found that a faulty security update caused widespread system failures, affecting millions of Windows systems. Although the CrowdStrike crash was caused by human error and not a cyberattack, it highlights similar vulnerabilities we saw during the SolarWinds attack in 2019. In that event, instead of attacking systems directly, malicious actors targeted system support software. That software, SolarWinds Orion, was widely used by federal agencies to monitor network activity and manage network devices. This allowed the threat actor to breach several federal networks. Cyber incidents at federal agencies and the nation’s critical infrastructure sectors, such as transportation and healthcare, are growing in number, impact, and sophistication. Federal entities, such as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), lead efforts to coordinate national cyber policy and critical infrastructure cybersecurity.