Indian Strategic Studies: 10/05/24

5 October 2024

A Crisis of Competence

Andrew A. Michta

Last month we marked the third anniversary of the United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan—a poorly planned and executed retreat that capped a two decade-long policy that cost some two and a half thousand American lives, over twenty thousand American servicemen and women wounded, and an estimated $1 to $2 trillion—or between $150 million to $300 million a day for the duration of the conflict.[i] Yet Afghanistan is but one example of the profligate expenditure of American blood and treasure post-Cold War—the wars in Iraq, Libya and Syria all failed to achieve their stated strategic objectives and cost the nation dearly. The total price tag for the Global War on Terror post 9/11 is estimated to stand at up to $8 trillion.[ii] The accuracy of such estimates is subject to debate, but in hindsight none of the overall goals that had been originally declared to justify the effort were achieved, nor did much of the bespoke “nation-building” or “democracy-building” we were promised come to pass. And so, during the current election season, when debates about different strategies going forward oscillate between the “China first” and “pivot to Asia” on the one hand, and business as usual of American primacy—AKA hegemony—compete for the public’s ear, it is time we took stock of what happened during those three decades, and ensure we chart a different course going forward, one that no longer allows for the unsustainable profligacy in expending American blood and treasure.

China pressures Myanmar ethnic groups to cut ties from forces perceived as close to US

Nyein Chan Aye

China, which has long influenced Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups, is pressuring the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, or MNDAA — part of the Three Brotherhood Alliance that includes the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Arakan Army (AA) — to avoid aligning with other opposition forces that China perceives as Western-backed, experts say.

The MNDAA, also known as the Kokang ethnic armed group, whose members are Mandarin-speaking Han Chinese native to Kokang, reposted a statement on social media confirming their alliance with China.

“Our political red line is not to form alliances or work together with those who are against China,” read the statement, which was briefly posted Sept. 4 and reposted on Sept. 19.

Analysts say that Beijing’s pressure on ethnic armed groups, especially the MNDAA, reflects its strategic interests in maintaining control over Myanmar’s political landscape. Strategically located along Myanmar’s northeastern border with China, the MNDAA is being pushed to sever ties with opposition forces that Beijing views as having U.S. support.

PRC Seeking to Boost Ties with Bangladesh After Hasina’s Demise

Khandakar Tahmid Rejwan

On August 5, 2024, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina of Bangladesh was forced to step down after student protests became what is now referred to as the “Monsoon Revolution.” These demonstrations began shortly after Hasina visited the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in early July (MFA, July 10). Since her demise, PRC ambassador to Bangladesh Yao Wen (姚溫) has been quick to launch a diplomatic campaign among the country’s political elites (Global Times, September 3). Yao, the PRC’s top envoy in Dhaka, has met with the Chief Advisor (CA), Dr. Muhammad Yunus, and at least two advisers of the interim government. He expressed Beijing’s total commitment to working with Dhaka’s new political leadership and enhancing the recently upgraded “Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership (全面的战略合作伙伴关系)” (The Business Standard, August 25; UNB, August 25) He has also held discussions with top political figures such as Mirza Fakhrul, secretary general of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), and Dr. Shafiqur Rahman, emir of Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh (JIB)—two of the largest political parties that competed with Hasina’s Awami League (AL). The BNP’s foreign policy stance is historically pro-PRC (Dhaka Tribune, March 28).

In his discussion with Yao, the BNP’s Fakhrul remarked that the PRC has “made it clear that they do not believe in hegemony. They had previously promised to always stand by the people of Bangladesh, considering its geopolitical situation, and they have now reiterated this” (Dhaka Tribune, August 21). JIB also sees Beijing as an ally due to its anti-India sentiment and Yao has praised it as a “well-organized party (组织良好的派对).” Rahman thanked the PRC for engaging in Bangladesh’s social and economic development. After the meeting, Yao Wen expressed Beijing’s desire to work with all the political parties to deepen ties (JIB, September 2; Global Times, September 3; News18, September 3).

Using a Sledgehammer to Crack a Nut?

Anushka Saxena

China’s decision to publicly test an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) on September 25 indicates that it may be bringing the nuclear option back to light, and has sparked many questions surrounding the potential reasons for such a manoeuvre. While the test has been referred to as “routine,” and a part of the PLA’s “annual training” module, this specific form of ICBM testing, with the warhead landing in the Pacific Ocean, has happened for the first time since 1980.

The missile, which deployed a dummy warhead and landed in the Pacific Ocean (somewhere near French Polynesia), is speculated to be the Dongfeng-41 (DF-41) type under command of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), though no official confirmation of the model has come from the Chinese. Nonetheless, an understanding of Chinese missile systems, as well as the internal and geopolitical contexts in which this test was conducted, may give us some clues as to how to interpret the manoeuvre.

A new stimulus might (or might not) jump-start China's economy

Joel Mathis

Doldrums continue to plague China's post-pandemic economy. Now the country's leaders are firing up a new round of plans to jump-start growth. It just might not be enough.

Amid concerns of a "prolonged structural slowdown," China's central bank this week unveiled the "biggest stimulus" of the post-Covid era, Reuters said. The "broader-than-expected" package includes mortgage interest rate cuts and other measures designed to pull the country's economy out of a "deflationary funk." That's the good news. The not-so-good news? "The move probably comes a bit too late, but it is better late than never," said Natixis' Gary Ng to Reuters.

It's a "massive adrenaline shot" for an economy beset by a "property market blowout, consumer price weakness and rising global trade tensions," said Bloomberg. But the "sweeping" effort doesn't meet demands to "fundamentally reconfigure" the economy away from manufacturing exports and toward domestic consumption. The missing piece? "A coherent strategy to get China's 1.4 billion people to ramp up spending," Bloomberg said.

The New Gang of Four

RICHARD HAASS

The Gang of Four was the name given to four senior Chinese officials closely associated with some of the Cultural Revolution’s most radical features. They lost out in the power struggle that followed Mao Zedong’s death, after which they were arrested, convicted of various crimes, and imprisoned.

Fifty years later, a new Gang of Four has emerged: China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. This grouping is not a formal alliance committed to defending one another. But it is an alignment driven by shared antipathy toward the existing US-led world order and features mutual exchanges of military, economic, and political support.

This Gang of Four seeks to prevent the spread of Western liberalism domestically, which they see (correctly) as a threat to their hold on power and to the authoritarian political systems they head. They also oppose US leadership abroad, including the norms the United States and its partners embrace, above all the prohibition on acquiring territory by the threat or use of force.

Setback: Sinking of China’s nuclear submarine - opinio

Khedroob Thondup

The recent sinking of China’s newest nuclear-powered attack submarine, identified as a Zhou-class vessel, marks a significant setback for Beijing’s military ambitions. This incident, which occurred at a dock in Wuhan between May and June, has far-reaching implications for China’s naval capabilities and its broader strategic goals.

China has been aggressively modernizing its military, particularly its naval forces, to assert its dominance in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. The loss of a state-of-the-art nuclear submarine not only diminishes its immediate naval strength but also raises questions about the quality and reliability of its military hardware. This incident could slow down China’s naval expansion plans, which aim to challenge the maritime supremacy of the United States and its allies.

The sinking of the submarine also highlights potential issues within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and China’s defence industry. Reports suggest that the incident may have been concealed, reflecting a lack of transparency and accountability within the PLA. This secrecy can undermine trust in China’s military capabilities, both domestically and internationally, and may indicate deeper systemic problems, such as corruption and inadequate training standards.

Xi Jinping Is Prioritizing Political Survival Over Economic Prosperity

Raja Krishnamoorthi

If the citizens of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) were asked, “Are you more hopeful for the future now than you were before Chairman Xi came to power?” the answer for most, if they were able to answer freely, would likely be a resounding “no.”

China’s economy is facing its gravest challenges since the Maoist era amid a collapse in public confidence. Growth has slowed, the unemployment rate is high, and the housing market is tumbling. But at the recent Third Plenum, a meeting of top Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials held roughly every five years and centered on economic policy, President Xi Jinping made clear that he has decided to stay the course and is doubling down on state control of the economy. At the same time, Xi has been baselessly claiming that the economic reform goals set at 2013’s Third Plenum were met.

US stopped Israel from launching Hezbollah war in October based on false alarm – report

In the opening days of the war, the US frantically tried to reach senior Israeli officials huddled to plan a major strike on Hezbollah to tell them they were not acting rationally and relying on bad intelligence, according to a US report Wednesday.

US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan eventually managed to pass a dictated note to Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer warning him against launching a preemptive strike against Hezbollah on October 11, according to the Atlantic, which provided further revelations on the 90-minute panic in Israel that evening over a suspected invasion by the Iran-backed terror group.

Without providing sources, The Atlantic reported that top Biden administration officials were persuading the government to avoid launching a preemptive strike on Hezbollah when Dermer informed Sullivan that Hezbollah paragliders had flown across the border — similar to Hamas’s October 7 massacre days earlier — and fired shots at a funeral.

Impact of Hezbollah assassinations may take months to emerge

Peter Beaumont

In 1992, Israeli media celebrated an assassination. The man killed then was Abbas al-Musawi, the secretary general of Hezbollah, whose convoy was struck by Israeli helicopters.

Then, as now, Israeli analysts speculated that Musawi’s death might possibly portend the end of Hezbollah, which had been founded 10 years earlier, after Israel’s invasion of Lebanon.

The opposite would turn out to be true. Musawi was succeeded by his 31-year-old protege, Hassan Nasrallah, who went on to lead and build Hezbollah for three decades, right until his own assassination by Israel on Friday.

Nasrallah’s killing, in a subterranean Hezbollah headquarters in a southern suburb of Beirut, has inevitably focused attention on two questions: whether Israel’s long-term policy of assassinations is effective, and what the killing of Nasrallah and other senior Hezbollah commanders means for the group.

After Nasrallah, three quandaries shape the future of the war—and the Middle East

Jonathan Panikoff

In February 1992, Israel killed the then-Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Abbas al-Musawi, who had led the group for less than a year before his death. Musawi was replaced by Hassan Nasrallah, a religious and political protégé of Musawi’s. In contrast to his mentor’s rather short tenure, Nasrallah has been at the helm of the terrorist organization for more than thirty-two years before his death on Friday. So ingrained was his leadership of the group that Hezbollah today is very much an organization designed to operate as a direct extension of Nasrallah himself.

Terrorists are not equal. Nasrallah was not Osama bin Laden, hiding in caves and at a rural compound. Nor is Hezbollah an isolated radical terrorist group; it’s a direct part of Lebanon’s society and government—to the dismay of many of the Lebanese people and the Arab world. Nasrallah was not just leader of one of the world’s most lethal and dangerous terrorist organizations, but a political figure with significant religious, financial, and governing responsibilities.

What now? Nasrallah’s death promises to fundamentally change politics in Lebanon, potentially the group’s future as Iran’s most critical ally in the region, and how Israel views the group. His death creates three interrelated quandaries—for Hezbollah, Iran, and Israel—that will determine if the region erupts in conflict and shape what it looks like for years to come.

What Israel’s Assassination of Hezbollah’s Leader Means for the Middle East

Robin Wright

Hassan Nasrallah, the iconic leader of Hezbollah who captivated many in the Arab world with his charismatic oratory, was killed on Friday in an Israeli attack on Beirut. At the apex of his career, the cleric was so popular that shops sold DVDs of his speeches, and many Lebanese used lines from them as ringtones. But he was also loathed or feared by rivals for the formidable power he wielded, both politically and militarily, well beyond Lebanon’s borders. Nasrallah’s death will be a political earthquake for Hezbollah, a Shiite movement that he built from clandestine terrorist cells thirty-two years ago into a powerful political party, network of social services, and the most heavily armed non-state militia in the world today. It could have a rippling impact across the volatile Middle East, with implications for the United States, too. The Biden Administration, which had already sent more troops in response to increasing violence between Israel and Hezbollah, moved quickly to assess the safety of U.S. military personnel and diplomats in the region.

The bombings, which killed other top Hezbollah officials, and civilians, in the Lebanese capital, “crossed the threshold of all-out war” and sought “to deliver a mortal blow,” Firas Maksad, a Lebanese American who is a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, in Washington, told me. Hezbollah is “reeling” from the wave of Israeli military and intelligence operations conducted in the past two weeks, he added. Its military wing has been decapitated in the targeted assassinations of top commanders. Israel has also carried out extensive air strikes on what it has said were weapons caches and other military infrastructure, and has also been blamed for sabotage of pagers and walkie-talkies used by Hezbollah fighters and followers that injured thousands.

Hezbollah's Decapitation And an Elusive Cease-Fire

Lawrence Freedman

Until a year ago the consensus view inside Israel’s security establishment was that Lebanon-based Hezbollah was a much greater threat than Gaza-based Hamas. Hamas was fenced in, launching the occasional barrage of rockets in Israel’s general direction without truly testing its defences. There was even some hope that, frustrated by its impotence, it might be resigned to concentrating on governing the territory it controlled.

Hezbollah, by contrast, was altogether more capable, claiming up to 100,000 soldiers and with an estimated inventory of rockets and missiles normally put at around 150,000, many with precision guidance. The group was only likely to get stronger, as Iran provided it with progressively better equipment. Here the hope was that Hezbollah did not want a new war with Israel. It respected Israeli firepower, particularly after the two had clashed in 2006. In addition, Lebanon was in a fragile state, aggravated by the terrible port explosion that ripped across Beirut in 2020, for which Hezbollah is widely blamed. It currently has a caretaker government as the country’s political parties, including Hezbollah, are divided on a new government. The other potential source of Hezbollah’s restraint was that as an agent of Iranian foreign policy, its military strength was being held in reserve to remind Israel, and also the US, of the risks of going to war with Iran.

How the Islamic State Weaponizes Imitation in Its Propaganda

Niels Schattevoet

In the first months after the proclamation of its ‘caliphate’, the Islamic State (IS) executed by beheading local inhabitants, soldiers, as well as Western hostages. James Foley, Steven Sotloff, David Haines, Hervé Gourdel, Alan Henning, and Peter Kassig—the lives of all these men ended in the Syrian desert while being clothed in orange jumpsuits. By dressing its to-be-executed hostages as such, IS reminds its audiences of how the United States humiliates Muslim prisoners at Guantánamo (Richey & Edwards 2019). They mirror the way in which the US violates the human dignity of their captives. What IS communicates through this archetypical form of aggressive imitation is that the US’s claims to human rights and moral superiority are nothing but a façade. Aggressive imitation, here, is not just a justification for IS’s violence but also, fundamentally, an expression of its worldview—of restoring Muslim honour by avenging the humiliation Muslims have suffered, in Guantánamo and elsewhere.

Imitation in Human and International Relations

The ability, (unconscious) willingness, and tendency of human beings to imitate “constitutes the fundamental structure of human existence” (Brighi 2019:126). In his work Les lois sociales (1898), French sociologist Gabriel Tarde demonstrates how imitation shapes human society and relations. Most human beings, Tarde argues, “are forever imitating someone else” unless they themselves create an innovation, “an event that rarely happens” (1898:23-4). As such, imitation is not a premeditated strategy but rather a structural but ‘spontaneous’ feature of human social life. Indeed, René Girard (2000:310) writes, “no existence is free from imitation”.

Israel’s Two Front War - Opinion

Bishwajit Acharya and Soumya Narain

On Saturday 28 September Israel confirmed that it had bombed the central headquarters of Hezbollah in Beirut and has claimed that the attack killed Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah. Ever since the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) led by Yassir Arafat had to withdraw from its erstwhile headquarters in Beirut in the 1980s, coupled with the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, Hezbollah has been a formidable foe for Israel. On September 16, the Israeli security cabinet approved the return of its northern population. Yet, for Israel, the real threat is the deteriorating security condition in the region with various militant groups operating under the Iranian umbrella. Of these threats, most prominent is the Iranian-backed militant group Hezbollah. Although Iran presides over these groups, there has not yet been a credible response from Tehran after its unsuccessful attempt at bombing Israel in April 2024 via ballistic missiles and drone strikes. This is all the more surprising when considering the international humiliation it faced after the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh on Iranian soil.

The Hezbollah leadership has seemed to not want to escalate this cross-border aerial bombardment into a full-blown war with Israel and at the same time, it cannot cease to obey the demands of the “Axis of Resistance” for that would isolate the group significantly reducing its support and training from Iran. Thus, Hezbollah’s bombing of Israel would not terminate until there is a ceasefire agreement in Gaza. The goals set out by the Axis of Resistance are three-fold: to prevent Israel from launching a ground offensive against Hezbollah, to dislodge the US from its presence in Syria and in the long-term, to draw up a plan to fight Israel in a protracted regional conflict.

Hezbollah is diminished, decapitated, and in disarray—but still dangerous

William F. Wechsler

Israel’s assassination of the Hezbollah leader “is likely to inflame tensions,” according to the Washington Post, and it will keep the region “locked in a new cycle of violence,” according to the New York Times. Noting the civilians that died in the attack, including children, the US State Department spokesperson urged “all concerned to exercise maximum restraint.” If this all seems familiar that’s because it is—all three of those quotes are from more than thirty years ago, after the Israeli strike in 1992 that killed Hassan Nasrallah’s immediate predecessor, Abbas al-Musawi.

Today Hezbollah is diminished, decapitated, and in disarray. The details are yet to emerge, but my bet is that the strike that killed Nasrallah was a target of opportunity for Israel that presented itself only over the last week. It likely emerged due to Hezbollah’s increasingly sloppy communications protocols in the wake of Israel’s impressively effective pager and walkie-talkie bombing operations that killed dozens and blinded hundreds if not thousands of Hezbollah operatives, and the subsequent elimination of the senior chain of command of the Radwan Force, Hezbollah’s special operations unit. With these operations, along with the operations in Syria and Iran, the Israeli Defense Forces and Mossad have regained much of the credibility they lost on October 7.

The Real Way to Fight Russian Disinformation

Mark Scott

In the ongoing battle to combat Russian election interference, Washington just showed Brussels what real enforcement looked like — and it didn’t take glitzy new social media rules to hobble Moscow’s global disinformation machine.

First, the Justice Department seized and shut down scores of Kremlin-backed websites that pretended to be those of American outlets like the Washington Post and Fox News to peddle clandestine Russian propaganda at U.S. voters. Then, the Treasury Department sanctioned high-profile Russian officials, including the editor-in-chief of RT. The Justice Department indicted two separate Russians for funneling $10 million into a Tennessee-based company that produced millions of social media posts that spewed Russian disinformation directly into people’s smartphones.

Europe hasn’t done anything close to that — despite Russia also targeting countries across the Atlantic with similar covert tactics.

It’s a reminder that while the European Union has long championed itself as the global frontrunner on digital rulemaking to combat the Russian threat, it’s struggling to keep pace with the United States when it may matter most.

Drones are changing warfare. The U.S. military is working to adapt

Tom Bowman

The war in Ukraine is dragging on. Each side is losing ground, then gaining ground. And at the center of that fight are drones. High in the sky, they drop bombs on troops and armor. They spy on targets with an unblinking eye. And they have caught the attention of the U.S. military as it prepares its own future fights.

NPR's Tom Bowman recently watched an Army exercise in Louisiana and joins us now. Hi, Tom.

TOM BOWMAN, BYLINE: Hey, Ailsa.

CHANG: So do you get the feeling that the U.S. military is learning a lot of lessons from the war in Ukraine?

BOWMAN: You know, Ailsa, they are, and this is really the first major war where you have drones playing a vital role. You know, some military experts I talk with are comparing it to other technological advancements we've seen in past wars that were a leap forward, like the machine gun in World War I.

CHANG: Interesting. OK. And I'm guessing that drones were also front and center in this Army exercise that you watched at Fort Johnson in Louisiana, right?

The War That Would Not End

Franklin Foer

On October 6, 2023, Brett McGurk believed that a Middle East peace deal was within reach—that the Biden administration just might succeed where every administration before it had failed.

McGurk, the White House coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa, was meeting in his office with a group of Saudi diplomats, drawing up a blueprint for a Palestinian state. It was the centerpiece of a grand bargain: In exchange for a Palestinian state, Saudi Arabia would normalize diplomatic relations with Israel. At a moment when Israel was growing internationally isolated, the nation that styled itself the leader of the Muslim world would embrace it.

The officials were there to begin hammering out the necessary details. The Saudis had assigned experts to redesign Palestine’s electrical grid and welfare system. The plan also laid out steps that the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank would need to take to expunge corruption from its administrative apparatus.

At approximately 11 p.m., several hours after the meeting adjourned, the whole vision abruptly shattered. McGurk received a text from Israel’s ambassador to the United States, Michael Herzog. “Israel is under attack,” Herzog wrote. McGurk quickly responded, “We are with you.”

Kamala Harris is Fashioning a Foreign Policy

Monte Erfourth

Introduction

As Vice President Kamala Harris looks to ascend to the presidency, her foreign policy will face a world shaped by immense complexities. Global affairs are dominated by climate change, the rise of authoritarianism, and growing geopolitical competition between major powers like the United States, China, and Russia. The article "Foreign Policy for the World as It Is" provides a sobering assessment of the current global order, outlining how U.S. dominance has waned and how the old rules-based system is under strain due to challenges from both allies and adversaries. Harris will inherit this fragmented landscape and must chart a foreign policy that addresses these challenges while distinguishing her leadership from her predecessors.

Navigating a Fragmented World Order

President Joe Biden’s foreign policy was driven by the idea of restoring America’s global leadership, rallying allies to counter Russian aggression in Ukraine and managing competition with China. Yet, as the world grapples with the growing influence of regional powers like India, Brazil, and Turkey, it is clear that U.S. primacy is no longer a given. This reality sets the stage for Harris to craft a foreign policy that accepts a more multipolar world while seeking to maintain U.S. influence. More importantly, three central problems define America’s predicament: the failure to restore a cohesive rules-based order, the contradictions within its foreign policy legacy, and if she wins election, the apparent risks of a pro-Trump majority in either the House or Senate failing to appoint critical appointees and sabotaging foreign policy initiatives. Most notably, failing to pass immigration reform.

Draghi’s Report Confirms Europe’s Irreversible Decline

YANIS VAROUFAKIS

When the euro crisis was young, some of us became convinced that a massive public green investment program was necessary to save Europe from economic stagnation and from the ultra-right that would emerge as stagnation’s sole beneficiary. In 2017, I put a figure on what was needed: up to 5% of Europe’s total income for investment in green energy and sustainable technologies. Since we knew then, as we know now, that neither the European Union’s member states nor the EU’s budget could afford this sum, I proposed a novel way to finance it through European Investment Bank (EIB) bonds guaranteed by the European Central Bank (ECB).

When I presented this idea to the committee of European finance ministers and central bankers in 2015, it was never rejected because it was never debated. Not giving up, in 2019 I ran for the European Parliament elections in support of DiEM25’s Green New Deal for Europe, arguing that the 5% green investment campaign could be “for progressives what immigration and racism is to the rightists.” Instead, the incoming European Commission, under Ursula von der Leyen, adopted a hopelessly underfunded so-called Green Deal that was macroeconomically insignificant and, as I had warned, environmentally duplicitous.

The Fight for a New Israel

Dahlia Scheindlin

In late July 2024, Israel experienced one of the biggest shocks to law and order in its history. For several hours, dozens of Israeli protesters were able to infiltrate two military compounds largely unimpeded, starting with Sde Teiman, a recently established base in the Negev desert where thousands of Palestinian detainees have been held since Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack. For months, journalists and nongovernmental organizations had reported systematic abuses at the base, and on July 29, Israel’s military police detained ten Israeli reservists on suspicion of raping one of the prisoners. But the protesters, among them several far-right elected officials who are members of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s ruling coalition, were not decrying the mistreatment of Palestinians. They were furious that the military was taking such a step against its own, and were trying to block the arrests.

Although the riots at Sde Teiman and Beit Lid, the base where the suspects were taken, were unusual in their extremity, they were not isolated events. Since the war in Gaza began, there have been proliferating signs that Israel’s institutions of state are under severe stress. Netanyahu has ignored repeated warnings from Israel’s attorney general that his government’s actions have violated the law; in response, government ministers have called for the attorney general’s dismissal. Israel’s legal system is in disarray. For over a year, the government held up dozens of judicial appointments, including on Israel’s Supreme Court; and in September, Netanyahu’s justice minister escalated his efforts to stymie the appointment of a chief justice to the Supreme Court, even defying a court order requiring that the position be filled.

The Big Five - 27 September edition

Mick Ryan

We continue to live in interesting times. Here is my (long) update on Ukraine, the Middle East and the Pacific, as well as my top five recommended readings for this week.

The Russo-Ukraine War

Five key topics dominate reports on the war in Ukraine and Russia this week.

First, the Ukrainians have conducted strikes on at least three major Russian munitions storage depots. I wrote about these strikes in a piece earlier this week. Stocks of S300 and S400 missiles were among the stocks destroyed, as well as munitions provided by North Korea. While the effects of these attacks are not certain, it is possible they will restrict the supply of some natures of ammunition to Russian forces in Ukraine. An estimate from Estonian military intelligence noted that the destruction at the Russian munition depots would have an impact on Russian operations over the coming months.

A second topic of focus this week has been the ongoing Ukrainian campaign in Kursk. The Russian counter attack appears to have gained some ground in the western parts of the Ukrainian salient, however the tempo of this counter attack has slowed significantly. The Ukrainian incursion to the west of where the Russian counter attacked has potentially compromised the flank security of the Russians, and reportedly has cutoff hundreds of Russian troops.

How Defense Experts Got Ukraine Wrong

Eliot A. Cohen and Phillips Payson O’Brien

One might think that an intelligence failure can be benign: The good guys do far better than expected, the bad guys far worse. In fact, erring on the side of pessimism can be as big a problem as being too bullish. The period just before and after Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, in February 2022, is a good example of this. At the West’s most influential research organizations, prominent analysts—many of them political scientists who follow Russian military affairs—confidently predicted that Russia would defeat its smaller neighbor within weeks. American military leaders believed this consensus, to the point that the Joint Chiefs of Staff chair reportedly told members of Congress that Kyiv could fall within 72 hours of a Russian attack. Although those analysts’ gloomy assessments turned out to be wrong, they’ve nevertheless made the United States and its allies overly cautious in assisting Ukraine in its self-defense.

Both of us are military historians who have a keen interest in contemporary strategic issues—and who, at the outset of the war, harbored grave doubts about the prevailing analysis of Russian and Ukrainian capabilities. One of us, Eliot, has served in senior positions in the U.S. government; the other, Phillips, has advised the British Ministry of Defense on Ukraine and other matters. In a report published this week by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, we sought to understand how prominent military analysts had been so badly wrong. Why did they assume that Russia could successfully conduct an exceedingly complex lightning offensive and win a major war in considerably less time than the Wehrmacht needed to overrun France, a smaller country, in 1940? Why did they persistently take the most negative possible view of Ukraine’s abilities and prospects?

From Sun Tzu to Cyber Wars: Rebalancing the DIME for the 21st Century

For centuries, military power has been the cornerstone of national security and strategy, with nations often equating military dominance to global influence and strength. Today, U.S. policymakers tend to overemphasize the "M" in DIME—military—at the expense of "D" (diplomacy), "I" (information), and "E" (economics). A military-centric strategy, which focuses heavily on armed force, is ultimately hollow and creates opportunities for adversaries to exploit weaknesses in the other areas. A big “M,” one-dimensional approach can lead to costly strategic failures in today’s interconnected world.

This article delves into how classical strategists viewed this balance, examines case studies of the over-militarization of foreign policy, and argues for the need to adopt a more balanced approach.

Perspectives from the Big Three

Sun Tzu’s The Art of War remains a cornerstone in discussions of strategy, even in modern military and corporate environments. One of Sun Tzu's most famous tenets is the idea of winning without fighting, emphasizing strategic foresight, deception, and psychological warfare. This approach aligns perfectly with the modern emphasis on non-military tactics like diplomacy and cyber warfare.