Indian Strategic Studies: 10/01/24

1 October 2024

Pakistan Should Restructure Its Debt Now

SANJAY KATHURIA

In July, Pakistan reached a staff-level agreement with the International Monetary Fund on a record 25th program, in yet another attempt to kick-start economic growth and development as the country lurches from crisis to crisis. But the new IMF program, which will likely be finalized once Pakistan secures “adequate” assurances from major creditors that its outstanding loans will be rolled over, fails to address a much more fundamental problem: the country’s unsustainable debt.

Interest payments on public debt consumed an estimated 68% of Pakistan’s revenue in the 2022-23 fiscal year, and its debt-to-GDP ratio was more than 80%, compared to less than 40% in Bangladesh, which gained independence from Pakistan in 1971. The IMF estimates the country’s total external-financing needs will total roughly $128 billion over the next five years, with every year’s needs exceeding even optimistic forecasts of its foreign reserves. To restore debt sustainability, Pakistan would need to restructure its internal and external obligations, as Sri Lanka is currently doing.

Pakistan’s deep-seated problems, including entrenched business elites, a persistent democracy deficit, and the military’s outsize economic role, have undermined market credibility, investment, and GDP growth. High levels of non-transparent protection have resulted in stagnant exports – $35.2 billion in 2023, compared to Bangladesh’s $57.6 billion – and recurrent foreign-exchange crises. Investment spending amounted to only 12% of GDP in 2023, compared to 31% in Bangladesh and neighboring India, and GDP per capita was 56% of Bangladesh’s.

PRC Expands De Facto Jurisdiction in the Taiwan Strait

Yu-cheng Chen, K. Tristan Tang

Since July 2024, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has further intensified its maritime incursions into Taiwan’s waters. For instance, on July 2, a China Coast Guard (CCG) vessel detained the Taiwanese fishing boat Dajinman 88 (大進滿88號) off the coast of Fujian (CNA, July 3). Additionally, on August 17–18, several official vessels, including the Hai Xun 06 (海巡06) under the PRC Ministry of Transport, conducted the “2024 Taiwan Strait Maritime Patrol and Law Enforcement Action (2024年台湾海峡海上巡航执法行动)” within the Taiwan Strait, crossing the median line (Xinhua, August 20). As analysts have observed, the PRC has increasingly engaged in gray-zone operations against Taiwan this year (see China Brief, March 29; July 26). The PRC’s objectives now extend beyond gray-zone incursions. The aim is to assert greater jurisdiction over the Taiwan Strait.

By unilaterally expanding its jurisdiction, the PRC seeks to enhance its administrative control and governance capabilities over the Taiwan Strait, establish customary practices, and legitimize its jurisdictional actions. Previous gray-zone operations mainly involved PRC harassment of other parties without escalating to formal conflict. Since July 2024, such operations have expanded to include harassment of Kinmen, interference with Taiwanese fishing vessels, and new patrol patterns from PRC official vessels.

Pope Francis Offered Asylum To Myanmar’s Imprisoned Leader Aung San Suu Kyi

Hannah Brockhaus

Pope Francis said he has offered Myanmar’s imprisoned prime minister Aung San Suu Kyi to come to the Vatican.

In a meeting with Jesuits in Indonesia earlier this month, the pope said he “called for the release of Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi and received her son in Rome. I offered the Vatican as a place of refuge for her.”

The prime minister, who has been in prison since she was ousted in a military coup in February 2021, “is a symbol, and political symbols are to be defended,” Francis added.

The pope commented on the situation in Myanmar in a private meeting with about 200 Jesuits at the apostolic nunciature in Jakarta during his Sept. 2–13 trip to four countries in Southeast Asia and Oceania.

The transcript of Pope Francis’ three meetings with Jesuits — in Indonesia, East Timor, and Singapore — were published in the Jesuit journal La Civiltá Cattolica on Sept. 24.

To Beat China: The Next President Must Master the Ancient Chinese Game of “GO!”

Ken Robinson

Introduction:

China's strategic bad-behavior draws directly from ancient Chinese wisdom, rooted in its cultural and philosophical traditions. It's long past time to "get real with China."

One of those traditions is the Chinese board game Go, a complex game of encirclement and territorial control that emphasizes long-term strategic patience over short-term gains.

The US has been unsuccessful in sustaining a coherent strategy that survives a four year presidential term.

In World War II, Mao Zedong used a similar strategy against the more powerful Japanese army, likening his approach to attacking puzzle pieces, striking where the enemy was weak and avoiding direct confrontation where the enemy was strong.

This strategy of indirect pressure, long-term encirclement, and patience continues today under Xi Jinping, shaping China's foreign policy, covert action, military tactics, and geopolitical maneuvers, particularly in its relations with its neighbors and the West.

Simply, Mao's "Go" strategy against Japan has informed Xi’s modern strategy against the west, and global competitors.

Washington’s Playbook for China Must Change

Evan G. Greenberg

Over the past four decades, I have built and managed businesses throughout Asia, including China. In my dealings, I met frequently with successive leaders, including President Xi Jinping in Beijing. Through that period, I have watched America’s approach to the region change from one presidential administration to the next. Some presidents emphasized regional strategy and others concentrated on China. Many presidents prioritized trade promotion. Washington’s increasingly bipartisan priority over the last decade has become shielding American workers from global competition. In the process, America’s strategic community has become enamored with viewing U.S.-China competition as a new cold war.

This emerging policy orthodoxy is wrongheaded and counterproductive. If the United States wants to create a more favorable balance of power in the face of China’s growing challenge, it will need to adjust its approach. America’s next president should redirect Asia policy to strengthen deterrence while driving regional economic integration. Absent such a shift, the United States risks undermining its own leadership and interests.

US funding helped China’s military modernization: Congressional report

Ray Bogan

Hundreds of millions of dollars in U.S. federal research funding has contributed to China’s technological advancements and military modernization, according to a new report. Republicans on the House Committee on the Chinese Communist Party found that partnerships between Chinese and American universities helped the CCP make advancements in hypersonic and nuclear weapons, artificial intelligence, advanced lasers, semiconductors and robotics.

The committee said that the funded technology is the same kind that the People’s Liberation Army would use against the U.S. military in the event of a conflict.

“The research funded by the [Department of Defense] and the [Intelligence Community] is providing back-door access to the very foreign adversary nation whose aggression these capabilities are necessary to protect against,” the report stated.

The committee said there is a lack of legal guardrails around the federal funds. It recommends stricter guidelines for federally funded research, including restricting researchers who receive U.S. grants from working with Chinese universities and companies that have military ties.

Hezbollah Breaches Israel’s Iron Dome: A Major Setback for Air Defense

Huma Siddiqui

In a significant escalation of the conflict, Hezbollah has launched a barrage of rockets targeting Safed and other cities in northern Israel, including Haifa and Karmiel. The attack marks a crucial breach of Israel’s Iron Dome, a defense system designed to intercept and neutralize incoming rockets and artillery. This breach signals a significant failure in Israel’s air defense capabilities, sparking concerns over the system’s reliability in the face of a larger, more coordinated assault.

Based on the information in the public domain, for the first time since the 2006 conflict, Hezbollah rockets have struck deep into central Haifa, shaking Israeli defenses. The sound of missile sirens has echoed through several cities, as residents scramble to take cover. The sudden breakdown of the Iron Dome system, which had been a symbol of Israel’s technological edge in missile defense, raises questions about its ability to protect the country against high-volume attacks from Hezbollah’s extensive arsenal.

Why Did the Iron Dome Fail?

The breach of the Iron Dome can be attributed to Hezbollah’s advanced military capabilities. Unlike Hamas, whose arsenal consists mostly of short-range rockets, Hezbollah possesses a vast collection of missiles, drones, and precision-guided munitions, many of which have been supplied by Iran over the years. This makes Hezbollah’s weaponry not only more sophisticated but also more numerous. According to estimates from the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Hezbollah has around 150,000 rockets and missiles, including several thousand precision-guided ones capable of reaching deep into Israeli territory.

Israel and Hezbollah Are Escalating Toward Catastrophe

Dana Stroul

Within 24 hours of Hamas’s October 7 terror attack, Hezbollah followed with an attack of its own, launching projectiles from Lebanon into northern Israel. Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader, explained that the campaign was intended to strain Israel’s resources and force the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), then preparing its response to Hamas in Gaza, to fight on two fronts. Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar hoped that Hezbollah, along with other Iranian-backed groups across the Middle East, would encircle Israel in a “ring of fire,” overwhelm its defenses, and threaten its existence.

What the Hezbollah Pager Attack Reminds Us About the Logic and Risks of Terrorist Innovation

Austin Doctor and Sam Hunter

Hezbollah may need to resort to homing pigeons. Last week, more 2,500 people in Lebanon and Syria were reported injured and at least ten killed by exploding pagers—yes, pagers. The incident, during which the devices exploded virtually simultaneously, seemed to target members and affiliates of Lebanese Hezbollah, a group designated by the United States as a foreign terrorist organization. Israel is likely behind the attack. One day later, thousands of two-way personal radios used by Hezbollah members in Lebanon also detonated.

In the wake of the attack, the Wall Street Journal published a report describing the analog system by which Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Palestinian terrorist organization Hamas, issues commands to his followers. Handwritten, encoded notes delivered by a stable of fleet-footed couriers—a medieval solution to dire constraints.

There are at least two puzzles here. First, pagers, walkie-talkies, and penciled messages are not the cutting-edge tools we tend to expect to be wielded by high-capacity terrorist organizations. Second, Hezbollah’s innovative use of low-tech communications devices seemingly backfired in spectacular fashion. What do these dynamics mean for our understanding and treatment of terrorist innovation?

The Ever-expanding War in the Middle East: the Questions Multiply By Robert Bruce Adolph

Robert Bruce Adolph·

The American and British militaries have been regularly ordered to attack Houthi positions within Yemen. The attacks make sense. The Houthis are repetitively attacking civilian ships in the Red Sea. The Bab al Mandab separates Yemen and Djibouti by a mere 16 miles, making it one of the narrowest shipping choke points on the planet. The Houthis feel justified in their attacks because of committed US support of the State of Israel in their on-going war with Hamas that has taken the lives of over 40,000 Palestinians. Far too many are innocent women and children. Houthi actions mirror those of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. Both groups are thought to be Iranian proxies. No matter if true or not, the war in Gaza is ever-expanding. The dangers are clear and present.

Iran supplies the Houthis the military means for such attacks, currently and primarily missiles and drones. Hezbollah is also beholden to Iran for arms supplies. Iran, Hezbollah, and the Houthis — all members of the Shia variant of Islam — clearly share common cause, hatred of the Jewish State that was thrust upon a major Muslim geographic area by Western powers, often described by scholars as the last gasp of European-style colonialism in the wake of World War II. Nothing in the greater region has been the same since.

The Hezbollah Pager Explosions Are More Dangerous Than You Think

Howard W. French

When Israel attacked Hezbollah last week by unleashing a spate of synchronized explosions in Lebanon and Syria, the first response of many observers—wherever they sat on the geopolitical spectrum—was of awe.

Adversaries and friendly nations alike marveled at the degree of sophistication needed to pull this off. Not only did agents working for Israel have to place tiny amounts of explosives inside of pagers and walkie-talkies; they also had to get these into the hands of a sworn enemy. The feat was a reminder of Israel’s long history of technical and operational sophistication that includes its victory against a coalition of Arab armies in the 1967 Six-Day War, the raid on Uganda’s Entebbe Airport to free hostages captured in the hijacking of a commercial airliner in 1976, and the use of booby-trapped cellphones to attack militant groups that dates back to the late 1990s.

Israel-Hezbollah Escalation

Jon B. Alterman

On September 23, Israeli airstrikes killed almost 500 Lebanese in the country’s deadliest day of conflict since the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war. Hezbollah has been shelling Israel since the day after Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack on Israel, and tensions have been escalating in the days since Israel targeted Hezbollah’s communication tools and several key commanders. In response, Hezbollah fired some of its deepest strikes into Israel since the start of the war, and its top leaders warned that this was “just the beginning.”

Q1: How do most Lebanese citizens feel about this recent escalation, and what are their opinions of Hezbollah more generally?

A1: It depends on who you are and where you are. There are a lot of Lebanese who resent the fact that Hezbollah has independence. It is an armed militia that is impervious to rule by the state. There are a lot of Lebanese, whether they’re in the north of the country or whether they’re Sunnis or Christians, who feel that Hezbollah is undermining the integrity of Lebanon. There are some Shi`a who feel that Hezbollah is a threat, but there are also Shi`a who feel that Hezbollah is a necessary defender of their rights, which have been historically marginalized in Lebanon. There are some Christian factions that are aligned with Hezbollah. The reality is that there are a lot of different Lebanese views. There’s also a lot of Lebanese hostility toward Israel, and there’s a fear that Lebanon is going to be dragged into conflict, not because of what most Lebanese want, but because that’s what Hezbollah wants and that’s what Hezbollah thinks Israel wants.

Why Israel’s Assault On Lebanon’s Hezbollah Puts Iran’s IRGC In An Unprecedented Dilemma – Analysis

Razia Ruknudin Desai and Robert Edwards

As world leaders gather in New York for the UN General Assembly, global attention is glued to the latest escalation taking place in the Middle East between Israel and Hezbollah, which has brought the region yet another step closer to all-out war.

On Monday, nearly 500 people, including 35 children, were killed in Israeli strikes in Lebanon, according to the country’s Health Ministry. The Israeli military said it had hit about 1,600 Hezbollah targets, killing a “large number” of militants.

Further strikes were carried out on Tuesday, making these the deadliest attacks Israel has carried out on Lebanon since the 2006 war.

The Israeli strikes came less than a week after coordinated sabotage attacks targeting Hezbollah’s communication devices killed 39 people and wounded almost 3,000. Hezbollah has responded with fresh rocket attacks deep into Israeli territory.

There are now fears of a looming Israeli ground offensive into southern Lebanon.

“Although a full-scale war between Israel and Hezbollah is a real possibility, both parties still prefer a diplomatic solution,” Hanin Ghaddar, the Friedmann Senior Fellow in The Washington Institute’s Linda and Tony Rubin Program on Arab Politics, wrote in Foreign Policy this week.

Overcoming the Fear of Escalation

William R. Hawkins

However, it is a dynamic situation with the potential to evolve so that we do not have to wait for the next president to consider a “disproportional response” to end the interconnected conflicts across the Levant.

The U.S.-led response to Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea has been defensive, focusing on intercepting Houthi missiles and drones while only striking sites in Yemen supporting the anti-shipping campaign. The Houthi attacks are meant to exact a cost from those who support Israel’s counterattack into Gaza following Hamas’ horrendous terror attacks on October 7. The Houthis and Hamas are backed by the Iranian regime, as is Hezbollah, which has continued to fire rockets and drones into Israel during the Gaza and Red Sea battles.

It must be remembered how far the U.S. has come in its reaction to the escalation of violence in the region. When President Joe Biden entered the White House, he immediately cut off all aid to the Saudi-led coalition fighting the Houthis in Yemen and pushed for a cease-fire. Yemen was called the world’s worst humanitarian crisis (the same argument as in Gaza today). The Obama administration had supported Riyadh’s war effort with logistics, weapons, and intelligence, as did President Donald Trump. Biden’s action reflected the majority view of Congress, comprised of Democrats, including then-Senator Kamala Harris (D-CA) and a handful of isolationist Republicans led by Senator Rand Paul (R-KY). Trump then vetoed their bill. Now, American forces are in direct combat with the Houthis.

Stop Politicizing the Military

Peter D. Feaver

Americans are used to seeing military service get politicized in presidential campaigns. They have seen this politicization on full display in recent weeks, with the campaign of former President Donald Trump criticized for the way that Trump turned the gravesites of soldiers who died in the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan three years ago into a campaign photo-op that apparently violated Department of Army regulations. The campaign had intended the event as a way of criticizing Trump’s rival in the upcoming election, Vice President Kamala Harris, on the anniversary of that withdrawal, but did so in a ham-handed way that exploited the grief of the Gold Star families who were remembering those who died in the incident. When members of the Harris campaign pushed back with criticisms of their own, the Trump campaign pounced with video from some of the Gold Star families who were politically aligned with Trump.

In addition to this ugly back-and-forth, we are also witnessing the weaponization of military service, in which a candidate’s association with the military is turned from a positive into a negative. Both vice presidential candidates served in the enlisted ranks—Trump’s running mate, Sen. J.D. Vance, as a junior enlisted Marine and Harris’s, Gov. Tim Walz, as a senior enlisted noncommissioned officer in the Army National Guard. What should have been a positive—that both VP candidates volunteered to serve in the country’s all-volunteer force at a time when most Americans did not—has instead become a potential negative, with partisans on both sides casting aspersions on their service.

Volodymyr Zelensky's Victory Plan for Ukraine: 3 Key Takeaways

Brendan Cole

Ukraine's president Volodymyr Zelensky will present a suite of proposals to Washington this week which he hopes will end the war that Vladimir Putin started.

Zelensky will travel to the U.N. General Assembly in New York and then go to Washington where he will present a "victory plan" to the U.S. President, Congress and the two candidates in the presidential election, Kamala Harris and Donald Trump.

Newsweek has contacted the Ukrainian presidential office for comment over the details of Zelensky's plan which have yet to be officially unveiled, but three key elements have emerged based on his public statements:

Forcing Russia to peace

Russian forces have held the momentum in the east of Ukraine for most of this year. The Kremlin has also rejected Zelensky's 10-point peace formula, which among other things, calls for a complete troop withdrawal from Ukrainian territory.

But a source close to Zelensky told the Kyiv Independent that the victory plan would force Putin to no longer ignore a peace formula or summit to end the war.

The Truth About Fentanyl Is Scary Enough. Myths About It Don’t Help

Ryan Hampton

The bowling ball on my chest is always heaviest at 3 a.m. Its steady pressure pushes me out of sleep most mornings before the sun rises on either coast. I could set my alarm by it, but I don’t need to. Wherever I wake up—in hotel rooms, at friends’ houses, or in the home I share with my husband—the bowling ball is there, in the pocket right between my ribs and a little bit north of my stomach.

When the weight wakes me up in the morning, it’s never for a good reason. Every day, I talk to friends, parents, loved ones, and peer workers as they face yet another unspeakable tragedy. One in ten Americans has lost someone to an overdose, and that number is only rising.

An entire generation is dying off, as though killed by a plague that nobody is brave enough to name.

There are no words for these losses—these deaths. What I felt in the beginning—the hot anger and outrage that fueled my advocacy, pushing for bipartisan legislative solutions and distributing lifesaving naloxone—has faded to a dull ache that sits in my body and never goes away.

It feels like grief. Or maybe, heartbreak.

‘Everyone Is Using OSINT’—That’s Why There Shouldn’t Be an IC Agency for It, Experts Argu

Charles Lyons-Burt

As is evident from the modern way battles have been waged in Ukraine and elsewhere, warfare and military relations are becoming increasingly driven by technology and data. If we engage in a conflict with near-peer or peer adversaries like China down the line, “data is going to be key to that” too, predicted Brad Ahlskog, chief of the Open-Source Intelligence Integration Center within the Defense Intelligence Agency.

“From where I sit, in 10 years, the [Intelligence Community] will be much more focused on the data, more so than the actual source of the data,” Ahlskog continued. He was musing on how the perception of open-source intelligence — a.k.a. OSINT, information extracted from readily available sources like the internet or any public domain — is evolving at a fast clip. The federal executive participated in a panel discussion about OSINT and artificial intelligence as industry enablers at the Potomac Officers Club’s 2024 Intel Summit on Thursday.

Calling your attention to the Potomac Officers Club’s hotly anticipated 2024 Homeland Security Summit on Nov. 13. If you’re a contractor trying to serve the national security mission, you won’t want to miss this packed day of illuminating keynote speakers, panel discussions and Q&A sessions. Check out the full lineup and save a spot now.

Moscow Focusing on Åland Islands as Target in Event of War With NATO

Paul Goble

As relations between Moscow and the West have deteriorated in the course of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, the Russian government has been focusing on islands belonging to Western countries as possible targets for attack, especially those with complicated legal and demographic situations (see EDM, June 11). Earlier this year, Moscow devoted particular attention to the Svalbard islands, a Norwegian archipelago in the North Atlantic whose military use is regulated by international treaty, and to Gotland, a Swedish possession in the Baltic Sea, which Stockholm had earlier unilaterally demilitarized (see EDM, May 30, August 15). Now, however, Norway and Sweden have adopted a harder line in both places, with the former rejecting Moscow’s plans to increase Russia’s presence on its territory and the latter remilitarizing its strategically located island (Window on Eurasia, July 11, September 8; see EDM, August 15). As a result, Russian officials have shifted their attention to the Åland Islands. Russian commentators suggest that its even more complicated situation could allow Moscow to exploit what they see as potential Western divisions about defending this archipelago.

The World Is Leaving Biden Behind

Michael Hirsh

It wasn’t an especially warm goodbye on either side of the podium.

U.S. President Joe Biden, making his valedictory speech to the United Nations General Assembly on Tuesday, drew a mild laugh when he talked of his half-century in public service and delivered his now-tired joke about his age. (“I know I look like I’m only 40,” he said.) But that was it for the merriment: Biden then droned on dully about the global challenges ahead, and the U.N. delegates responded with a mere smattering of applause, even when he spoke of defending Ukraine and ending the war in the Middle East. When he defended his withdrawal from Afghanistan, there was dead silence.

Level of Violence in Russia Reaches New High as Veterans Return From War

Ksenia Kirillova

Independent Russian media outlet Vot Tak posted an article on September 8 containing statistics on the criminal activities of veterans of Russia’s war against Ukraine. While Russian President Vladimir Putin touts these returning veterans as the “new elite” of Russia, reports show that there are hundreds of criminals among them (see EDM, March 13). An uptick in violence in Russia has been exacerbated by the return of former prisoners from the front who, upon coming home, have returned to their previous criminal activity, including rape and murder. Since the beginning of 2024, no fewer than 15 people—including children—have been murdered by these veterans (Vot-tak.tv, September 8). Numerous cases of rape and attempted rape have been reported, including a case of a 70-year-old woman who was attacked in Moscow by a 25-year-old veteran in July (MK.ru, July 18). Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, not only has there been a growth of violence, but also it has transitioned to a fundamentally different level (see EDM, January 29, February 29). Numerous shootouts have occurred in Moscow, and the army is increasingly merging with organized crime. The growing violence in Russian society will only increase as the long war continues, further contributing to Russia’s rupture.

This uptick in violence in Russian society has become so serious that even the Russian government has discussed the issue. According to statistics from the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, more serious crimes were committed from January through August 2024 than during the past 13 years (Deutsche Welle–Russian service, September 12). On September 18, there was a massive shootout not far from the Kremlin, which left seven people wounded, including three police officers. The incident arose from a conflict between the married owners of the “Wildberries” company, one of which was supported by Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov. he other secured the patronage of Suleiman Kerimov, a member of the Federation Council and “shadow cardinal” of Dagestan (Kazkaz.Realii, September 19). As a result, an attempt to split up a family business turned into a large-scale, 1990s-style reorganization of the spheres of influence between two competing clans (Novaya Gazeta–Evropa, September 18).

The Russia-Ukraine War: A Study in Analytic Failur

Eliot A. Cohen and Phillips O'Brien

Surprise occurs in many forms. Many think of it in terms of a surprise attack, but it occurs in other dimensions. The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 is a good example: the attack was foreseen, but the immediate outcomes were astonishing. To use an old Soviet phrase, analysts misunderstood in fundamental ways the “correlation of forces.” Their judgments about Russian and Ukrainian military capacity were not merely off—they were wildly at variance with reality. And even more perplexing, leading and widely acknowledged experts misjudged with a degree of certainty that in retrospect is no less remarkable than the analytic failure itself.

Their misjudgment was not a case of normal error or exaggeration. The expert community grossly overestimated Russian military capabilities, dismissed the chances of Ukraine resisting effectively, and presented the likely outcome of the war as quick and decisive. This analytic failure also had policy implications. Pessimism about Ukraine’s chances restricted military support before February 24, 2022. For years, voices in the analytic community argued publicly against providing crucial military aid for Ukraine precisely because Russia was presumably so strong that a war between the two countries, particularly a conventional one, would be over too quickly for the aid to make a significant difference. Once the war began, some of Ukraine’s most important international friends hesitated to supply advanced weapons, in part out of the mistaken belief that Ukraine would prove unable to use them or would be overrun before it could deploy them effectively. Today, such hesitation remains, with Ukraine still lacking the weapons systems it needs to defeat Russia in its relentless effort to destroy Ukraine as a state. Thorough consideration of why responsible and expert analysts made egregious misjudgments is the best way to avoid a similar outcome in this part of the world or elsewhere. This report documents and explains a large, consequential failure.

AI Additionality Is the Wrong Solution to a Real Problem

Cy McGeady

The United States needs to think seriously about the energy demands of AI. On this point, Brian Deese and Lisa Hansmann, who’ve penned an interesting proposal on regulating the energy use of AI, are exactly right. Electric demand growth is a paradigm shift for the industry and a strategic scale challenge for the nation. Whatever the outcome of November’s elections, the incoming administration and Congress should make addressing electricity demand growth a top priority.

Despite agreement on this basic premise, the approach articulated by Deese and Hansmann arguably takes the policy conversation in the wrong direction. Pursued as the lynchpin of a policy response, this approach risks introducing uncertainty and delay into the AI sector, does little to address the real challenges on the supply side, and misses the big opportunity to radically scale ambition in the electric power sector.

Additionality for AI?

Deese and Hansmann propose a “National AI Additionality Framework.” This would extend the concept of additionality—originally developed around the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA)’s tax credit for low-carbon hydrogen production—onto AI data centers.

What Does it Mean to Win the War in Ukraine?

Thomas E. Graham

It was a “simple question,” the moderator told former president Donald Trump during the recent presidential debate, “Do you want Ukraine to win this war?” Trump answered that he wanted to end it and has been pilloried for not just saying “yes.” Vice President Kamala Harris didn’t say yes either, but unlike her rival, she made it clear she backed Ukraine against Russian aggression.

In truth, it is not a simple question. What does it mean to win? There is no shared view in the West or between the West and Ukraine.

From the very beginning, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has defined victory as liberating all the Ukrainian land Russia has seized since 2014. That would make his country whole again within the internationally recognized borders of 1991 when Ukraine emerged from the wreckage of the Soviet Union. Ukraine’s Peace Plan calls unequivocally for the restoration of the country’s territorial integrity. “It is not up for negotiations,” the plan declares. Polls indicate most Ukrainians share Zelensky’s goal, although attitudes are shifting as the costs of war mount.

What Public Discourse Gets Wrong about Social Media Misinformation

Hailey Reissman

In 2006, Facebook launched its News Feed feature, sparking seemingly endless contentious public discourse on the power of the “social media algorithm” in shaping what people see online.

Nearly two decades and many recommendation algorithm tweaks later, this discourse continues, now laser-focused on whether social media recommendation algorithms are primarily responsible for exposure to online misinformation and extremist content.

Researchers at the Computational Social Science Lab (CSSLab) at the University of Pennsylvania, led by Stevens University Professor Duncan Watts, study Americans’ news consumption. In a new article in Nature, Watts, along with David Rothschild of Microsoft Research, Ceren Budak of the University of Michigan, Brendan Nyhan of Dartmouth College, and Emily Thorson of Syracuse University, review years of behavioral science research on exposure to false and radical content online and find that exposure to harmful and false information on social media is minimal to all but the most extreme people, despite a media narrative that claims the opposite.

A broad claim like “it is well known that social media amplifies misinformation and other harmful content,” recently published in The New York Times, might catch people’s attention, but it isn’t supported by empirical evidence, the researchers say.