Indian Strategic Studies: 09/30/24

30 September 2024

The Battle for the BRICS

Alexander Gabuev and Oliver Stuenkel

In late October, the group of countries known as the BRICS will convene in the Russian city of Kazan for its annual summit. The meeting is set to be a moment of triumph for its host, Russian President Vladimir Putin, who will preside over this gathering of an increasingly hefty bloc even as he prosecutes his brutal war in Ukraine. The group’s acronym comes from its first five members—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—but it has now grown to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates. Saudi Arabia also participates in the group’s activities, but it has not formally joined. Together, these ten countries represent 35.6 percent of global GDP in purchasing power parity terms (more than the G-7’s 30.3 percent) and 45 percent of the world’s population (the G-7 represents less than ten percent). In the coming years, BRICS is likely to expand further, with more than 40 countries expressing interest in joining, including emerging powers such as Indonesia.

Putin will be able to claim that despite the West’s best efforts to isolate Russia after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, his country not only is far from being an international pariah but also is now a pivotal member of a dynamic group that will shape the future of the international order. That message is not mere rhetorical posturing, nor is it simply a testament to the Kremlin’s skillful diplomacy with non-Western countries or to those countries’ self-interested, pragmatic engagement with Russia.

Agni-IV Missile Test Bolsters India’s Nuclear Deterrence

Debalina Ghoshal

Nuclear deterrence is existential. States will have myriad ways to strengthen their nuclear deterrence: through land-based, aerial based, and sea-based nuclear weapons delivery mechanisms. Irrespective of the delivery platforms, nuclear signaling is crucial to nuclear deterrence. There is limited relevance of nuclear weapons unless a strong signaling is achieved. Such signaling could be both strategically and politically relevant. In 2015, when Iran developed its nuclear capable long range cruise missile, the Soumar, the missile had political and strategic signaling strings attached to it.

In September 2024, India successfully test-fired the intermediate range Agni-IV nuclear-capable ballistic missile. The success of the missile test signaled many parameters of nuclear deterrence. The missile was operationally ready while its technical parameters were also validated through the successful test. Operational readiness of nuclear delivery systems is another key factor that determines nuclear deterrence.

Mere possession of nuclear delivery systems is not enough: they need to be operationally prepared for quick response. Frequent testing of missile systems is one way to ensure operational readiness by validating relevant technological parameters that would enable the missile to not just take off during crisis situation but also be able to deliver the payload to assigned target, thus ensuring reliability. This can be ensured when missiles meet all trial objectives during their flight tests.

Cooperate or Compete?: What Chinese Analysts Think of India’s ‘Global South’ Leadership

Anushka Saxena

Introduction

At present, India-China relations are at their lowest since the 1962 war. Naturally, this is reflected in the two sides’ engagement with the Global South. So far, India has hosted three ‘Voice of the Global South’ Summits (VOGSS) – in January and November 2023, and most recently, on August 17, 2024. At each VOGSS, India refrained from inviting China. Even though New Delhi communicated the decision to Beijing, consequent non-invitations added to Beijing’s ire, and made the issue competitive in the Chinese perspective. To hence respond to India’s decision, in the aftermath of each of these summits, Chinese analysts took to the papers to express why a Global South without China is a fallacious or a ‘pseudo-proposition’ – a term popularised by a September 2023 Global Times article on the VOGSS.

A “Fallacious” Global South

Three major patterns of note emerge from Chinese analysts’ contentions on the subject:

Firstly, Chinese analysts have repeatedly emphasised the vagueness of the concept of the ‘Global South’, in a bid to legitimise their position that China is as much a part of the Global South as India, or the other 120+ attendee countries of the VOGSS. As the above-referenced Global Times article states.

Honing The PLA’s Capacity For Information Warfare Is Not Without Precedence – Analysis

Chia Shimin and James Char

On 19 April 2024, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) underwent a major reorganisation. The PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) was disbanded and replaced by a new PLA Information Support Force (PLAISF). Various other constituents of the now-defunct PLASSF have been subordinated under the Central Military Commission. The latest streamlining of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) armed wing underscores the regime’s efforts to adapt to new trends in military modernisation.

The new PLAISF has also been elevated to ‘deputy theatre command’ grade — a higher status than its previous designation as the old Information Communications Base under the PLASSF. Broadly speaking, the PLAISF is responsible for the PLA’s operations in the information domain, which includes strategising data and information security as the Chinese military shifts towards a network-centric force. This reform shows the growing attention placed on modern warfare in the cyber, space and information domains in the CCP’s restructuring of the PLA.

An informatised military refers to how the various service branches and theatre commands would collect and share data with one another, as the PLA also strives towards intelligentisation. This serves as yet another testament to the PLA’s continuous efforts to adapt to an already heavily informatised operational environment — as the world’s leading militaries prepare for ‘intelligentised warfare’ on the horizon.

Proposed Ban Would Be a ‘Death Sentence’ for Chinese EVs in the U

Aarian Marshall & Zeyi Yang

After officially hiking tariffs on Chinese electric vehicle imports earlier this month, the US government is getting even more serious about keeping China-made autos out of the country. On Monday, the US Commerce Department proposed a new rule that would ban some Chinese- and Russian-made automotive hardware and software from the US, with software restrictions starting as early as 2026.

The Biden administration says the move is needed for national security reasons, given how central technology is to today’s increasingly sophisticated cars. In announcing the proposed ban, Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo cited vehicles’ internet-connected cameras, microphones, and GPS equipment. “It doesn't take much imagination to understand how a foreign adversary with access to this information could pose a serious risk to both our national security and the privacy of US citizens,” she said.

The US government’s move comes as China has dramatically increased the number of affordable vehicles, and especially electric ones, it makes and sells overseas. Chinese auto exports grew by more than 30 percent in just the first half of this year, setting off alarm bells in Europe and the US, where officials worry inexpensively made Chinese vehicles could overwhelm domestic industry. The US and Europe had moved to make it harder and more expensive for China to sell its autos in those regions, but the Chinese automakers have responded by setting up manufacturing bases in Eastern Europe, Africa, and Mexico—all of which might one day provide a loophole to allow more Chinese-designed and engineered vehicles into new Western markets.

The West’s reckless dishonesty over Lebanon

Brendan O'Neill

If a keffiyeh-adorned posh kid on a leafy campus were to hold forth on the Israel-Lebanon clash without once saying the word ‘Hezbollah’, none of us would be surprised. To the West’s à la mode loathers of Israel, the Jewish State is responsible for every ill in the Middle East, and its foes are always blameless. But for a world leader to do it, to pontificate on this bloody battle without mentioning the ruthless terror outfit whose rocket fire started it, is unforgivable.

Step forward President Emmanuel Macron. On Friday, in the aftermath of Israel’s pagers attack on Hezbollah militants and the firing of missiles by both sides, he said France stands with Lebanon and feels ‘grief for all civilian victims of [the] attacks’. He said he’d spoken to the key parties to the war, ‘from Israel to Iran’, and told them to de-escalate. There was one party he neglected to mention, however. Which is odd given it’s the party that started the war by raining rockets on Israel from 8 October 2023 onwards – in solidarity with the racist pogromists of Hamas – and in the process drove 60,000 Jews from their homes, destroyed land and massacred children. As the Times of Israel put it: he ‘made no explicit mention of Hezbollah’.

As oversights go, it’s a shocker. It’s like gabbing about the West’s intervention in Raqqa without saying ‘ISIS’ or lamenting 9/11 but forgetting to mention a certain Islamist death cult. Is it any wonder that in a reportedly tense phone call between Macron and Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu, the latter said ‘instead of putting pressure on Israel, it’s time for France to increase pressure on Hezbollah’? Or at least to mention Hezbollah. That would be a start: saying out loud the name of the Iranian proxies who’ve been battering the Jewish State with missiles for a year in a show of support for the worst act of violence against Jews since the Holocaust.

Is this the end for Hezbollah?

Michael Karam

The recent fighting between Israel and Hezbollah is a war that’s not yet officially a war, initiated by a political party without a mandate that takes its orders from Tehran, in support of a Palestinian party that few Lebanese care about.

It is a decades-old conflict, an exhausting, deadly stalemate, but this recent escalation could prove to be decisive. There’s a chance Israel could finally deliver a dagger blow to Hezbollah. This would be a staggering achievement because the Iranian-backed Shia militant group controls many, if not all, of the levers of power in Lebanon, and has been a constant irritant to Israel for nearly 40 years.

The optics don’t look good for either side. On Monday, nearly 600 Lebanese, mostly civilians, were slaughtered and over 1,000 injured in ‘precision’ Israeli air strikes, allegedly given the green light by the Americans. Over 10,000 residents of southern Lebanon fled north to Beirut, just like they did in 2006, the last time Hezbollah and the Israeli armed forces went toe-to-toe. This time though, the residents of south Lebanese have had enough.

On Tuesday morning, I called my colleague Zeinab who lives in the town of Shemlan, a town perched on the hills south of Beirut. When she answered the phone she could hardly speak for exhaustion and anxiety. Her brother was trying to get out of the southern city of Tyre and she hadn’t heard from him in hours. ‘We are tired,’ she told me. ‘We can’t take it anymore. I might need to leave the country.’

Lebanon braces for 1982-type Israeli invasion

Mireille Rebeiz

Lebanese families have been fleeing the country’s south in the thousands amid escalating tensions and an Israeli bombardment that has so far killed hundreds.

Their fear, echoed by many onlookers, is that Israel will accompany the airstrikes with something that has the potential to have far worse consequences: a ground invasion of south Lebanon.

The rationale behind such a move, from the Israeli government’s perspective, is that a ground offensive may be its best chance to push Hezbollah fighters beyond the Litani River in the middle of the country.

This would achieve an Israeli war goal of securing its northern borders and allowing an estimated 60,000 residents who have been forced to flee northern Israel to go back to their homes.

Why Pressure on Iran Failed

Paul R. Pillar

U.S. policy toward Iran clearly has failed. This has been conspicuously true for at least the last six years since former president Donald Trump reneged on the multilateral agreement, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), that restricted Iran’s nuclear program. He did so despite Iran’s compliance with those restrictions, which had effectively closed the paths to a possible Iranian nuclear weapon.

Trump’s administration later expanded sanctions on Iran to all-out economic warfare termed “maximum pressure.” The Biden administration has continued most of its predecessor’s economic pressure on Iran, notwithstanding Republican efforts to make an issue out of limited waivers needed to permit technical discussions in the interest of nuclear nonproliferation and the partial unfreezing of some Iranian assets as part of a prisoner swap. The current administration has even added anti-Iran sanctions of its own.

In short, whatever Iran has been doing lately that one might choose to describe as bad or nefarious, it is doing during continued heavy economic pressure from the United States.

Israel's Bloodbath in Lebanon

Jeremy Scahill and Murtaza Hussain

On Monday, Israel engaged in its most deadly attacks in Lebanon since its 2006 invasion of the country, striking heavily populated areas throughout southern Lebanon—including hitting medical centers and ambulances, according to the Lebanese health minister—and expanding its attacks to Beirut and the Bekaa Valley in the east. The Israeli strikes included the targeting of a high-rise building in the Beirut suburb of Dahieh, reportedly aimed at killing Ali Karaki, a senior commander in Hezbollah. The group released a statement saying Karaki was “in full health and wellness and has moved to a safe place.” By evening local time, the death toll in Lebanon reached 492 people—including at least 35 children—with more than 1,600 injured, as some Israeli officials threatened the prospect of a Gaza-style war of annihilation against Lebanon.

Earlier in the day, local residents began receiving text messages and calls with audio recordings warning them to leave their homes and villages. The Israeli military maintains that its assault, which it claims hit 1,300 “targets,” is aimed at destroying Hezbollah's weapons supplies and rocket launch facilities. The roads out of the south were jammed on Monday afternoon as people attempted to flee Israel’s bombs. The Associated Press called it “the biggest exodus since 2006.” Schools and universities have closed throughout the country and Lebanese authorities are opening up educational facilities to shelter the displaced.

A Critical Trip For Zelenskyy As Battlefield Worsens And US Election Looms – Analysis

Todd Prince

At a Pennsylvania munitions factory where 155-mm artillery shells are churned out by the thousands, President Volodymyr Zelenskiy grinned and shook hands, and he signed one of the shells that the Ukrainian military is heavily dependent on.

“It is in places like this where you can truly feel that the democratic world can prevail,” he said in a post on X, “thanks to people like these — in Ukraine, in America, and in all partner countries — who work tirelessly to ensure that life is protected.”

The munitions plant was Zelenskiy’s first stop on a weeklong visit to the United States, a trip shaping up to be one of the most consequential trips for the Ukrainian leader since Russia launched its all-out invasion in February 2022.

In speeches at the United Nations and meetings at the White House, Zelenskiy is hoping to rally the world to his cause fighting Europe’s largest land war since World War II — and also get permission to expand his military’s ability to hit Russia more forcefully inside Russia itself.

In Pursuit of the Harris Doctrine

Dominic Tierney

In July, U.S. President Joe Biden announced that he would not stand for a second term and endorsed Vice President Kamala Harris as the Democratic candidate, triggering one of the great traditions of American politics: the search for a presidential doctrine, or the encapsulation of a leader’s foreign policy beliefs. A legion of journalists, scholars, and politicians began hunting for the “Harris doctrine” as a guide to what a Harris presidency might look like. Some said the Harris doctrine does not yet exist. Others claimed to have discerned the outlines of a clear agenda. For former president Donald Trump, the essence of the doctrine is weakness: “The Tyrants are laughing at her.” Meanwhile, commentators on the progressive left hope that a Harris presidency will mark a pivot away from American militarization and primacy and toward the pursuit of global justice.

One problem in identifying the Harris doctrine is that a presidential “doctrine” can refer to varying things: a presidential commandment, a leader’s inner compass, or their ultimate policy decisions. Each of these perspectives casts a different light on a potential Harris presidency. Taken together, they suggest that powerful foreign and domestic constraints are likely to guide a Harris presidency—to the surprise, relief, or disappointment of her critics—in a hawkish direction.

Germany torpedoes EU dreams of being a financial superpower

Johanna Treeck, Carlo Martuscelli and Carlo Boffa

An Italian bank making a big move to buy into a German bank sounds like exactly the sort of tie-up Europe's leaders have spent years crying out for, so the EU can rear more home-grown heavyweight corporate champions to compete with rivals from the U.S. and Asia.

Now that UniCredit this week actually made a swoop on Commerzbank, however, the devotees of deeper EU integration look set to be disappointed as Berlin's domestic interests — once again — outweigh pan-European dreams.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz's instant condemnation of UniCredit's "unfriendly attack" suggests that ambitions for the cross-border scaling-up of the EU financial sector will remain, as they have been for a decade, just empty talk.

“All member states, not only Germany, are calling for greater financial integration, but when faced with potential takeover of national champions they start having ‘second thoughts’,” said Italian MEP Irene Tinagli, a former chair of the European Parliament’s economy committee.

The Russo-Ukrainian War and Mackinder’s Heartland Thesis - Opinion

Kyrylo Cyril Kutcher

In 1904, Sir Halford J. Mackinder, one of the founders of classical geopolitics, conceptually divided the world into three parts: the pivot area of northeastern and central Eurasia, the surrounding area of an inner crescent of remaining Eurasian and North African territories, and an outer crescent of all the remaining oceanic countries. His notion was that any malicious power able to organize the defined pivot area, which became known as the ‘Heartland,’ and accumulate sufficient highly mobile manpower, inevitably becomes aggressive toward its neighbors on all sides. Mackinder warned that if anyone succeeds in adding a substantial oceanic frontage to the Heartland, they might constitute a “peril” to the world’s freedom. In Mackinder’s view, Eastern Europe is the key region which empowers the land empire claiming the Heartland. Within this geopolitical framework, it can be argued that the Russian claim over Ukraine is not a mere land grab, but an attempt to substantially increase Heartland’s manpower and resources for further expansion beyond currently defined borders. Russia’s defeat in Ukraine is thus crucial for preventing a new global war and subjugation of the wider free world by the resurgent power in the Heartland, along with its geostrategic allies.

Israel is dominating its neighbours, but to what end?

Bruce Anderson

The fate of Lebanon is heart-rending. It should be one of the glories of the Levant and of Mediterranean civilisation. At ground level, the Lebanese have always had an appetite for a good time: every vice imaginable can be found in Beirut. But there’s one problem. The pleasures of dolce far niente are likely to be drowned out by ancestral voices prophesying war.

One is often astonished by the resilience of the Lebanese. When the shelling stops, they emerge from their shelters. One group of kids will gather up brass shell-casings, another one will have cardboard boxes full of oranges. If Lebanon, like us, had been on an island with its ancient enemy more than 20 miles away by sea, goodness knows what the Lebanese might have achieved in a long and successful history. As it is, their enemies are legion; the tragedy endless.

The recent strike on Hezbollah’s pagers and walkie talkies arouses a mixed reaction. It is hard not to admire the Israelis’ ultra high-tech skills. How did they do it? Could any other nation rival that prowess? On which subject, it is impossible not to smile at the thought that many seem to have that the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) will suffer because the UK is cutting off a tiny proportion of our arms exports to Israel. Indeed, it is reassuring to know that the IDF still thinks that some of our kit is worth buying. One might have thought that it would be the other way around.

Diplomatic Games on UN Security Council Expansion

Brett Schaefer

Some topics never die at the United Nations. Calls to expand and reform the Security Council is one of those persistent issues. An amendment increasing its size was adopted only once in 1965. But calls for further expansion were raised again only a few years later. Those subsequent pushes stalled for decades. Yet due partly to a cynical assist from the Biden-Harris administration, that may be about to change.

It is understandable why governments -- aside from China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, who all have permanent seats – want to increase the size of the Security Council. The Council is the most powerful and prestigious body in the UN system with authority to authorize use of military force, impose economic sanctions, and pass resolutions that the other members are obligated to obey. Because of this authority and prestige, non-permanent member nations expend great effort to secure election to one of the 10 non-permanent seats on it.

Proposals to increase the size of the Council are as old as the organization itself. In fact, they precede the UN, as the size of the Security Council was a key point of contention in negotiations to create the world body in 1945. The tension then and now was to balance two countervailing priorities: having enough members for legitimacy and participation among the UN member states while not having so many members that the Council could not act quickly or decisively.

Victory over Hamas in Gaza hasn't been achieved, but it's within reach - opinion

MOSHE POZAILOV

Many of the same military officials and commentators who previously claimed that "Hamas is deterred" now assert that Hamas has been defeated.

According to them, its brigades, commanders, and parts of its leadership have been eliminated, and its "military" structure has ceased to exist.

At the same time, they do not deny the reality that our forces encounter armed terrorists daily and that rockets are still occasionally fired, including at Ashkelon. However, they firmly state that if we can create a political alternative to Hamas, the mission will then be complete.

This week, the IDF published a document sent by the Khan Younis brigade commander to Yahya Sinwar and his brother Mohammed in May of this year.

The letter indicated that although Hamas is in severe distress, it is still functioning at various levels and is working to recover and rearm.

Russian hackers have shifted tactics in third year of war, Ukraine cyber agency says

Daryna Antoniuk

Ukraine’s cyber agency has observed “a significant change” in the use of cyberattacks by Russian hackers in recent months, according to a new report.

Whereas in the first two years of the war Russian hacker groups launched opportunistic attacks across an array of targets — for either destructive purposes or cyber-espionage — this year they have shifted their focus to Ukrainian entities directly connected to the war effort.

“Hackers are no longer just exploiting vulnerabilities wherever they can but are now targeting areas critical to the success and support of their military operations,” Ukraine’s State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection (SSSCIP) said in the new report.

The number of cyber incidents analyzed by Ukraine’s computer emergency response team (CERT-UA) in the first half of 2024 grew by almost 20% — to 1,739 — compared to the second half of the previous year.

SSSCIP also observed a significant increase in attacks on government organizations and local authorities. The number of incidents targeting the security and defense sectors, as well as the energy sector, has more than doubled.

NATO’s Outgoing Leader Stoltenberg Reflects on Missed Opportunities in Ukraine (Part One)

Vladimir Socor

Outgoing North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg is reexamining NATO’s role in Russia’s war on Ukraine as part of two valedictory statements in a recent interview with the Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung (Faz.net, September 14) and a speech hosted by the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Brussels (NATO, September 19). He queried: Could NATO have done more to prevent Russia from invading Ukraine for the second time in 2022? And could NATO do more than it has thus far done to bring this war to an end favorable to Ukraine? Stoltenberg poses these questions with due political and diplomatic caution, yet at a level of candor that had not been available to the Secretary General during his decade-long service in that post. Admittedly, this pair of questions stop far short of covering the full picture of NATO’s policies toward Ukraine in recent years—and decades. Genuine introspection could help trace and explain the long track record of Western strategic failure in Ukraine.

It must, however, be borne in mind that criticism, grumbling, and perhaps exhortation should not be addressed to NATO “as NATO” (collectively and institutionally). NATO is an inter-governmental organization, not a supranational one. Member states hold full sovereign authority over their national security and defense policies as well as the corresponding budgets. The Alliance makes policy decisions by unanimous consent, which often translates to the lowest common denominator. The Secretary General is, essentially, a civil servant whose public statements are bound to express the Alliance’s political consensus on specific policy issues. The Alliance’s military and civilian staffs execute policies made by national political leaders in conclave.

Beijing’s Soft Power Push with African Nations

Arran Hope

The ninth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was held in Beijing on September 4–6 (FMPRC, September 5). The theme of the event was “joining hands to advance modernization and together building a high level China-Africa community of common destiny (携手推进现代化，共筑高水平中非命运共同体)” (FMPRC, September 5). The triennial event was co-chaired by Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and President Faye of the Republic of Senegal. Heads of states, governments, and delegations from 53 African countries traveled to Beijing for the Summit and the Ministerial Conference, as did the Chairperson of the African Union Commission. Xi met with at least 40 leaders (Tracking People’s Daily, September 7).

Politics was front and center at this year’s FOCAC. Marquee announcements were made of financial assistance and business investment totaling Renminbi 360 billion ($51 billion) and project funding has increased for the first time in seven years, but these were secondary to the political implications that the summit symbolized (The China in Africa Podcast, August 29). The most notable was the “elevation of relations with all African countries with whom the PRC has established diplomatic relations to the “strategic” level and the framing of overall relations as an “all-weather China-Africa community of common destiny for the new era (新时代全天候中非命运共同体)” (FMPRC, September 5). [1] Other significant moments include the deepening of ties with President Cyril Ramaphosa’s South Africa and the signing of a memorandum of understanding on the revitalization of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority railway (Global Times, September 4). Beneath these headline announcements were myriad other projects and areas of engagement and a decisive expansion of political alignment.

Legacy of Putin’s War on Terror Weighs Heavily on Modern Russia

Pavel K. Baev

In September 1999, Moscow and the whole of Russia were shaken by a series of deadly explosions that marked the beginning of a still ongoing era of autocratic degradation under the rule of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The perpetrators of those crimes were never prosecuted beyond reasonable doubt. There is no doubt, however, that the swift exploitation of this shock propelled Putin into power (The Moscow Times, September 18). The Russian polity was instantly reconfigured for waging war against presumed terrorists. The brutal projection of military power, which had roiled Russian society during the First Chechen War (1994–1996), became entirely acceptable in the second one. The effects of this pivotal point in Russian history are visible today as Putin wages his war against Ukraine using the same methods he used then.

The distortion of moral guidelines and the fragmentation of horizontal ties in Russian society has been sustained by propaganda and repression. In the last 32 months, the majority of Russians have been able to internalize and normalize the reality of partaking in the war against Ukraine (see EDM, February 29, August 14; Svoboda.org, September 2). Explosions still come as a shock to some families residing in high-rises in Moscow suburbs, but the atomized society is broadly accustomed to the strict suppression of news about increasingly frequent Ukrainian drone strikes (see EDM, April 18, 24, 25; Meduza, September 15). Concern spiked at the outset of theUkrainian offensive into Kursk oblast, but seven weeks into this unprecedented occupation of Russia’s territory by hostile forces, the alarm has dissipated (see EDM, August 14, 15, September 3; Verstka, September 20).

Unexceptional Exceptionalism: The Use of Force by Great Powers and International Instability

Andrea Maria Pelliconi

In their 2022 essay In Defense of Comparisons: Russia and the Transmutations of Imperialism in International Law, Kotova and Tzouvala contend that the future of the international order needs to be ‘anti-imperialist’ (Kotova and Tzouvala, 2022). This would require a critical change in the way in which Western powers justify their external military politics and abandon ‘civilizational’ and ‘exceptionalist’ interpretations of the law on the use of force and self-defence. This is because, besides being illegitimate in their own rights, these interpretations of jus ad bellum are replicated mutatis mutandis by other actors to justify their own military activities. For example, the Russian Federation (Russia) referred to several instances of unlawful use of force by the United States (US) and other NATO powers to justify its aggression against Ukraine. Western powers’ ‘leading by example’ role in using force in international relations – despite the use of idealistic language– provides multi-polar competitors with pretexts to legitimise their own transgressions.

Two years after this essay, there seems to be more evidence substantiating a comparison between Western and Russian ‘justifications’ of their military operations abroad. Building upon Kotova and Tzouvala’s suggestion, this article seeks to corroborate this claim by looking at Russia’s arguments justifying its invasion and de facto annexation of eastern Ukraine, showing that they are symmetrical – albeit different – to those of their Western counterparts.

Army's AI Strategy Sprints Forward With 500-Day Plan

Laura Heckmann

The Army’s ongoing effort to accelerate the secure adoption of artificial intelligence wrapped up an initial 100-day sprint paving the way for its next objective: a 500-day plan to operationalize it.

Announced in March, the Army’s AI Implementation Plan kicked off with a 100-day risk assessment sprint to lay the foundation for “a single, coherent approach to AI across the Army, aligning multiple, complex efforts within 100 and 500-day execution windows” and establish a baseline to “continuously modernize AI” and contribute “solutions as technologies rapidly evolve,” an Army release stated.

Young Bang, principal deputy assistant secretary of the Army for acquisition, logistics and technology, said the 100-day window is complete and being used to build the plan’s next installment.

“The 100-day plan really looked at, ‘How do we set the conditions around accelerating AI adoption for the Army?” including risk associated with third-party vendor algorithms and creating a pathway for industry to work with the Army’s secure network, he said at the National Defense Industrial Association Michigan Chapter’s Ground Vehicle Systems Engineering and Technology Symposium and Modernization Update in August.

Drone, Counterdrone, Counter-Counterdrone: Winning the Unmanned Platform Innovation Cycle

Zachary Kallenborn and Marcel Plichta

Shooting down drones is now an international pastime. In Ukraine, Russia, Sudan, Myanmar, and the Red Sea, militaries are scrambling to get their hands on counterdrone systems. In June, the US Navy issued a call for immediate kinetic counterdrone solutions and the UK is racing to have a high-energy laser operational as soon as possible. Market analysis estimates the global counterdrone market could reach $10.56 billion by 2030.

Global militaries, manufacturers, and pilots are not standing idly by.

Drone counter-countermeasures are a critical part of the competition between drone offense and defense. Today’s drones can defeat countermeasures through a broad range of technologies and tactics. Drones might fly nap-of-the-earth to avoid detection, adopt greater autonomy to reduce the effects of jamming, fly in mass to overwhelm defenses, incorporate onboard defenses like antiradiation missiles, and more. Our new Joint Force Quarterly article, “Breaking the Drone Shield,” describes and analyzes eleven such counter-countermeasures.

Deviance and Innovation

Thaddeus V. Drake and Derrick L. McClain

Military innovation and adaptation studies are a growth industry.1 Since the publication of Barry Posen’s seminal study The Sources of Military Doctrine in the early 1980s, the field has grown extensively.2 Despite well-known military thinkers’ recent book-length treatments of the topic, most studies of change in the military retain two key commonalities. First, nearly all assume that innovation or adaptation is inherently good and worth pursuing.3 Second, they agree that militaries are famously resistant to change and accept this as part of the fundamental nature of the military system. This article acknowledges the first point; indeed, modern military leaders continually claim the need for change.4 The second, on the other hand, is correct but flawed. Innovation and adaptation studies should not accept resistance to change as a fundamental characteristic of the military system but instead must recognize cultural openness as a necessary precondition for any existing concept of innovation or adaptation to succeed to its full potential.

Examples abound of organizational intransigence in the face of military change efforts—everything from the institutional resistance regarding unmanned aircraft,6 to the Army’s controversies on headwear,7 to criticisms of the Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030.8 Indeed, a recent report from the Atlantic Council noted: “[T]he United States does not have an innovation problem, but rather an innovation adoption problem.”

Subscribe to: Posts (Atom)