20 September 2024

A Quad Initiative on Digital Public Infrastructure

Rudra Chaudhuri and Aadya Gupta

In 2024, India will host a Quad Leaders’ Summit. This will be the sixth convening of a high-level dialogue between India, the United States, Australia, and Japan. Following a series of half-starts dating back to 2007, the dialogue resumed in 2017. Since then, six Quad working groups have been created to deepen cooperation in the areas of climate, critical and emerging technologies, cybersecurity, health, infrastructure, and space.

There is an urgent need to create a separate strand within existing working group mechanisms on digital public infrastructure (DPI). Given that each member state offers a set of faculties that can be leveraged for specific projects, the Quad is well-placed to deploy DPI in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Indeed, DPI could be piloted in at least six countries within 2024 alone.

This essay provides a rationale for our thinking. It draws on discussions the authors have had with DPI builders, states with a DPI demand, including Pacific Island countries, and the different DPI communities that have emerged in the last eighteen months. Much of these linkages were fused during India’s presidency of the G20.

Adani Airport Controversy in Kenya Discredits India’s Reputation in Africa

Rushali Saha

Earlier this month, a long-simmering dispute involving the Adani Group erupted into a full-blown aviation crisis with hundreds of passengers stranded at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA). Kenya Aviation Workers Union (KAWU) members are protesting against the build-and-operate agreement allegedly in the works with the Adani Group, which critics say is expected to result in significant job losses and impose additional tax burden on Kenyans.

Union workers are demanding the government disclose all details of the proposed agreement, which remains shrouded in secrecy. They have found support from opposition leaders, who are calling for the project to be abandoned.

In response to a petition by the Kenya Human Rights Commission and Law Society of Kenya to stop the deal, the high court has granted a temporary order, suspending the deal pending the determination of the case. While the government’s position is that only a legally non-binding “head of terms” agreement has been signed with Adani, senators allege that the “takeover” project is a “done deal.”

ASEAN Needs To Reclaim RCEP For Regional Economic Leadership – Analysis

Mari Pangestu and Rania Teguh

There is a chorus of calls for ASEAN to walk the talk on its claims of centrality in the management of the strategic challenges to peace and prosperity in East Asia. Calls for ASEAN to ‘do more’ usually centre on its claiming a more assertive role in security affairs in the South China Sea and redoubling its efforts to encourage political dialogue in Myanmar.

But the bigger threat to ASEAN centrality is corrosion of the open economic order on which its prosperity and security depend. And there is opportunity to cement its role as a platform for negotiating a regional economic order attuned to its members’ interests in East Asia through the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which is less politically fraught.

RCEP is the world’s largest trade agreement, with its 15 members of 2.3 billion people accounting for 32 per cent of global GDP and 29 per cent of world merchandise trade. It aims to create a more integrated and efficient regional market, driving growth, strengthening regional value chains and boosting competitiveness of member economies. RCEP will also promote investment by attracting more foreign direct investment into regional manufacturing.

Other provisions on e-commerce, competition, intellectual property and SME development can also support trade growth. In the 15–20 year phase-in for less developed members, the agreement provides for 92 per cent market access among all the partners.

War game reveals Chinese attacks on communications could paralyze Taiwan - Opinion

Henry Sokolski

Earlier this year, the chairman of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party asked Elon Musk if he was withholding StarShield satellite services from United States service members on and around Taiwan. Musk replied that he was in full compliance with his Pentagon contract. Shortly thereafter, Musk refused a Taiwanese bid to secure Starlink services and Taiwan announced it would be developing a “Starlink” constellation system of its own. As a stopgap, Taiwan contracted with OneWeb for satellite internet and communication services.

Two years ago, to find out, the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center proposed conducting a space war game that focused on a near-term Taiwan-China scenario. This June, it tapped the talents of current and retired officials, Congressional Staff and outside experts to play the game. They were divided into multiple teams, representing Taiwan, Eutelsat OneWeb, the Allied Space Nations (the U.S., U.K., Japan, France, Russia and India), and China which was played by the Control team.

Top security analysts have noted how China could disable Taiwan’s undersea cable and disrupt its microwave, cell and space-based communications systems in order to secure a smokeless victory over the Island. What has complicated this prospect is the increasing importance of private commercial space-based communications and internet services. The controversy surrounding Starlink’s selective support of Ukrainian military operations amply demonstrates this point.

Normalizing Abnormalities: Life in Myanmar’s Resistance Zone

Helen Li

Since gaining independence in 1948, Myanmar has faced persistent political crises and ethnic tensions. The most recent upheaval, the military coup of 2021, ignited widespread protests and brutal crackdowns once again, and Myanmar has descended into a civil war, with a patchwork quilt of resistance forces fighting against the military government.

Amid this chaos, a quiet, resilient life took shape and grew in the borderlands. In the jungle controlled by the Karen National Union (KNU), an armed ethnic resistance group, survival is a collective endeavor. Here, resistance soldiers, Civil Disobedience Movement activists, and internally displaced civilians have forged a new normal, a life where the lines between resistance and routine blur, and hope is reconstructed from the fragments of their shattered pasts.

The Lives of Resistance Soldiers in the Borderland

After the military junta overthrew the elected government on February 1, 2021, Myanmar plunged into turmoil. A.K. and his 27 childhood friends were among the many youths who vowed to resist and fled immediately to ethnic group-controlled zones. Through close contacts, they reached out to the KNU in Karen State via Telegram. Neither of them informed their families about their destination. The farewell was abrupt but solemn, with little certainty about when they would be able to return.

From Ukraine To Myanmar, Drone Warfare Marks A Paradigm Shift – Analysis

Antonio Graceffo

On September 10, Ukrainian forces launched the largest drone attack of the war to date, targeting Moscow with 144 drones. The assault resulted in 20 drones being shot down, while several multi-story residential buildings near Moscow were set ablaze. Flights from Russia’s most important airports were temporarily suspended. In response, Russia launched a retaliatory strike using 46 drones.

The strikes from both sides highlight a now indisputable fact: drone warfare is playing a determining role in the Ukraine war.

Armed drones, or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), are pilotless aircraft used to locate, monitor, and strike targets, including individuals and equipment. Since the September 11 attacks, the United States has significantly expanded its use of UAVs for global counterterrorism missions. Drones have key advantages over manned weapons. They can stay airborne for over 14 hours, compared to under four hours for manned aircraft like the F-16, allowing for continuous surveillance without risking pilot safety. Additionally, drones offer near-instant responsiveness, with missiles striking targets within seconds, unlike slower manned systems, such as the 1998 cruise missile strike on Osama bin Laden, which relied on hours-old intelligence.

The Case Against the China Consensus

Jessica Chen Weiss

Washington faces growing criticism for pursuing open-ended competition with China without defining what success would look like. Even as China’s coercive capabilities and threatening behavior have rightly focused U.S. attention on the risks to American interests, the absence of clear metrics for success leaves the door open for partisan aspersions of the Biden administration’s approach. The administration’s defenders, meanwhile, rebuff these attacks by pointing out that its policies align with a broad consensus about the challenge China poses and the steps necessary to counter it.

To be sure, both Democratic and Republican politicians have engaged in the typical campaign ploy of sounding tough on China. During their recent debate, U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris accused former President Donald Trump of selling out American interests and praising Chinese leader Xi Jinping, and Trump erroneously claimed that “China was paying us hundreds of billions of dollars” under his administration’s tariffs (which the Biden administration has expanded). Meanwhile, the drumbeat of hyperbolic rhetoric and congressional hearings on the threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party has blurred the line between legitimate commercial, scientific, and educational pursuits involving Chinese entities and those that pose unacceptable security risks or invite other vulnerabilities. Fearing that what might have been welcome yesterday could be deemed disloyal today, companies, researchers, and students have pulled back from many of the activities that have underpinned U.S. economic and scientific leadership.

A Step-Change to Beijing’s “Lawfare” in the South China Sea

Peter Leavy

Recent Chinese maritime activity around the Second Thomas Shoal marks a potentially new and more aggressive stage in China’s campaign to extend control over the South China Sea. Concerningly, the same type of behaviour has now expanded to Sabina Shoal, only 86 nautical miles from the Philippines island of Palawan. Chinese assertiveness is spreading laterally, becoming more violent, and may well be tied to new laws China recently granted itself.

China has long used “lawfare” – leveraging legal systems and principles to achieve military and strategic objectives – to exploit the seams that democracies have between military and civilian activities. They create and exploit legal ambiguities as part of a deliberate strategy. As the PLA Daily commented in describing the People’s Armed Force Maritime Militia (PAFMM), a para-military organisation: “Putting on camouflage, they qualify as soldiers; taking off the camouflage, they become law-abiding fishermen.”⁠

On 15 June, China implemented the “Provisions on Administrative Enforcement Procedures for Coast Guard Agencies 2024”, also known as CCG Order #3. This law allows China Coast Guard (CCG) commanders to detain foreign vessels and personnel for up to 30 days (or 60, for “complicated” issues) if they are in “waters under Chinese jurisdiction”. Such jurisdiction is not defined, although it is likely based on the flawed Nine-Dash Line concept that the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled illegal in 2016.

Where Donald Trump and Kamala Harris Stand on China

Chad de Guzman and Koh Ewe

China clearly looms large over the U.S. presidential election in November. Both the Democratic ticket led by Vice President Kamala Harris and Republican one led by former President Donald Trump have emphasized the great power rivalry throughout their campaigns, albeit Harris to a lesser extent. Overall, their approaches have some differences—and many similarities.

Trump—and his running mate Ohio Sen. J.D. Vance, who has called China “the biggest threat” to the U.S.—have repeatedly offered a zero-sum view, in which the U.S. and China are at a crossroads and only one can come out on top. (Despite this, Trump also boasts of his great relationship with Xi Jinping, saying he’d like to “get along with China, but they’ve really taken advantage of our country.”)

Meanwhile, Harris—who has similarly promised to make sure “America, not China, wins the competition for the 21st century,” a line she repeated at the ABC News debate in September and Democratic convention in August—and her running mate Minn. Gov. Tim Walz, who has a history of engagement with the country, have offered a more diplomatic tone but, nevertheless, advocate for some of the same policies to deal with the economic and security challenges posed by an increasingly assertive Beijing. Harris previously expressed in 2019 a willingness to cooperate with China on issues like climate change, while Biden Administration national security adviser Jake Sullivan recently assured Chinese leaders that she’s committed to “responsibly managing” bilateral ties.

Houthis Launch Missile at Central Israel

Adam Rasgon

The Houthi militia in Yemen claimed responsibility on Sunday for a rare missile attack on Israel, the second time in two months that the Iranian-backed group has successfully penetrated the skies over the central part of the country.

The assault was the latest illustration of the evolving conflict in the Middle East between Israel and Iranian proxies, which have mounted attacks on Israeli territory in what they have said is solidarity with Palestinians under bombardment in Gaza. It also demonstrated the military capabilities of the Houthis, based hundreds of miles from Israel on the southern edge of the Arabian Peninsula.

Air-raid sirens blared in dozens of towns and villages in central Israel around 6:30 a.m. on Sunday, sending people rushing to fortified safe rooms and bomb shelters.

The Israeli military initially said the Houthis had fired a surface-to-surface missile that landed in an “open area” and that no casualties were reported. In a follow-up statement, the military said an initial inquiry indicated the missile had “fragmented midair” and that it was reviewing its attempts to intercept the strike.

Perilous Consequences Of The AI Revolution In Drone Warfare Spurred By Ukraine Conflict

Tanmay Kadam

The modern battlefield is rapidly ushering into an era when cheap drones infused with Artificial Intelligence (AI) would be the next favoured weapon for large-scale long-range precision strikes after missiles, warplanes and artillery.

For centuries, artillery was known as the ‘King of Battle’ relied upon by military commanders to rain hell on their adversaries. However, with the introduction of combat airplanes in the mid-1940s, also called as ‘flying artillery’, big guns got a bit sidelined, especially in the advanced Western-style militaries like the United States, NATO countries and Israel.

With the war in Ukraine, artillery rose back to prominence with airpower playing a very limited role due to Ukraine’s small fleet of aircraft and the reluctance of the Russian military to deploy its warplanes in the face of the threat posed by a wide array of air defense systems fielded by Ukraine.

However, alongside artillery, another category of weapon that rose to prominence in the Ukraine conflict is the armed unmanned aerial systems (UAS), especially the cheap off-the-shelf commercial drones and one-way kamikaze drones that are emerging as an expendable and cost-effective alternative to expensive warplanes, cruise and ballistic missiles, and artillery munitions.


The Russian Non-Strategic (Tactical) Nuclear Exercise

Mark B. Schneider

In 2024, Russia, in conjunction with Belarus, held what Russia called a three-part non-strategic (tactical) nuclear exercise whose purpose, according to Russia’s Defense Ministry, was training in the “…practical aspects of the preparation and use of non-strategic nuclear weapons.” Russia stages yearly large strategic nuclear exercises sometimes involving non-strategic nuclear weapons and many smaller ones involving the strategic forces. Russia often stages theater war exercises which reportedly always end in Russia’s simulated nuclear first use. However, Russia had never previously announced a non-strategic nuclear exercise. Since Russia’s initial announcement of simulated nuclear weapons first use in the Zapad [West]-1999 exercise, Russia had never again officially announced nuclear weapons use. The political purpose of the overt non-strategic nuclear exercise was to intimidate the West and deter assistance to Ukraine.

The second phase of the exercise was broadened to cover almost the entire Russian border with NATO. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) said, “The crews of navy ships involved in the training will equip sea-based cruise missiles with special [nuclear] mock warheads and enter designated patrol areas.” The Russian MoD also indicated the exercise would involve nuclear-capable Backfire bombers, Mig-31s, cruise missiles and Kinzhal hypersonic missiles. The exercise involved what the Russians call “electronic launches” (everything short of igniting and launching the missile).

Pacific Dragon: Is the Shipping Industry Ready for Containerized Missile Warfare?

John Konrad

In a groundbreaking naval exercise, the U.S. Navy and its allies tested the launch of one of its most powerful defensive missiles from a shipping container, marking a significant leap in ship defense technology. During Pacific Dragon 2024, the system successfully launched Raytheon’s SM-3 Interceptor anti-ballistic missile, showcasing a new level of flexibility in defending against airborne threats. What’s even more intriguing—and unsettling for some—is the potential to deploy these containerized missile systems on commercial vessels, blurring the lines between civilian and military assets.

Could these systems be installed on commercial ships to defend against threats like Houthi missile and drone attacks in the Red Sea? While it’s a remote possibility, it raises serious questions about the future of maritime security. Extensive testing, and even tougher international discussions on the legalities of arming merchant ships, would be required before this concept could become reality.

A New Era for Naval Warfare: The Mark 70 PDS and Its Capabilities

Central to this exercise was the Mark 70 Mod 1 Payload Delivery System, a containerized version of the Navy’s Vertical Launch System (VLS). This system packs four VLS cells into a standard shipping container, making it easily transportable by semi-truck and mountable on a wide range of naval platforms. It’s a flexible, modular solution that can enhance missile defense capabilities both on land and at sea.


Educate Americans First

Jay P. Greene

As the number of foreign students at our selective universities exceeds a third of total enrollment, it is important to remember the maxim of the 16th-century physician Paracelsus: “Sola dosis facit venenum.” The dose makes the poison.

From the end of World War II to 1977, the percentage of U.S. university enrollment from abroad never exceeded 2%. With this modest level of foreign enrollment, international students offered significant benefits. They strengthened the education of American students by contributing talent, experiences, and ideas from around the world to the learning environment.

Foreign students also added financial resources to U.S. universities because they tended to pay full tuition and sometimes brought with them large donations from wealthy foreign governments or families. In the context of the Cold War struggle between the Soviet Union and the West, foreign students who learned about the American political system and its values could bring ideas about individual liberty and representative democracy back to their home countries.

After 1977, foreign enrollment at U.S. universities crept higher, slowly at first, before it dramatically skyrocketed over the last two decades. Nationwide, the percentage of international students on college campuses has now nearly tripled since 1977. At our leading universities, the percentage of students from abroad has reached critical mass, averaging about a third but sometimes approaching half of total enrollments.

Israel's conduct in the war will consume us all

Daniel L. Davis

Hamas terrorists were responsible for the deaths of 1,139 Israelis – mostly civilians – on October 7, 2023. The Israeli government was fully within its rights to bring the terrorists to justice.

But nearing the one-year mark of Israel’s resultant war against Hamas, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may now be an impediment to peace rather than providing a path to it.

No one can question Israel’s right to seek justice for Hamas’s bloody massacre on 10/7 and few challenge Washington for providing military support to Israel as it seeks to punish Hamas. Yet it is entirely reasonable to question how Israel is conducting its operations, especially if it becomes apparent the Israeli government pursues a course of action that is ineffective — or worse — is making Israel less secure.

I have argued, as far back as November of last year on CNN that Netanyahu has been using military power to pursue a political objective that cannot succeed: the total elimination of Hamas. The reason is simple: one cannot kill an idea with bombs and bullets.


Israel Must Protect Its North, but Can It Afford the Price? | Opinion

Yaakov Katz

In 2002, as Hamas launched its first rudimentary rockets at Israel, their range barely stretched a mile, with most of their targets being the Israeli settlements that still existed at the time in the Gaza Strip. It was a primitive, yet ominous beginning to what would eventually evolve into one of Israel's greatest threats.

As the rocket fire intensified, Ariel Sharon, Israel's prime minister at the time, faced mounting pressure from his right-wing base to respond decisively. "If the rockets were falling on Tel Aviv, Israel would retaliate!" claimed the settlers, who felt abandoned. To them, the government's inaction was proof that it valued Tel Aviv's safety far more than the lives of those living in Gaza's settlements.

A seasoned politician, Sharon pushed back: "The rule for Netzarim is like the rule for Tel Aviv," he said at the time, naming one of Gaza's settlements and emphasizing that an attack on any part of Israel would prompt the same response.

It was a noble sentiment, but nice phrases rarely stand the test of reality. Years passed without a significant Israeli military response to the rocket attacks. In fact, it wasn't until 2008, when Hamas demonstrated the ability to fire rockets that reached closer to Tel Aviv, that Israel finally launched a large-scale military operation aimed at curbing Hamas's capabilities. Meanwhile, the thousands of rockets that had rained down on Gaza's settlements before their evacuation in 2005 did not seem to warrant the same level of urgency.

Even with $1 Trillion a Year the US Military Is Falling Behind

Hal Brands

Vice President Kamala Harris, in last week’s debate with former President Donald Trump, repeated her call for the US to maintain the world’s most “lethal” military. It’s a good thought, given today’s menagerie of geopolitical malcontents.

Russia is slugging away at Ukraine as part of a long, bitter struggle against the West. China’s military buildup, and hoarding of food and energy, suggests that President Xi Jinping is putting his country on a war footing, too. North Korea’s nuclear and missile arsenals are improving. Iran and its proxies are roiling the Middle East and the neighboring sea lanes. But far from arming up for what looks more and more like a prewar era, America is slouching toward disarmament, as it struggles to maintain the (insufficient) military strengths it has.

The Pentagon is undertaking a multidecade project to modernize the US nuclear arsenal — put plainly, to ensure that the US has nuclear weapons and delivery systems that really work. But all three aspects of that modernization — the bomber force, land-based missiles and ballistic-missile submarines — are behind schedule and over budget. The US is struggling to update missile silos and other vital infrastructure.




A Korean War Ending For the Ukraine War?

Brent M. Eastwood

An Armistice and DMZ: The Best Idea to Keep the Peace in Ukraine and Russia—Former President Donald Trump has often said he would immediately work to end the war in Ukraine, repeatedly claiming that he could find a way to end hostilities in as little as 24 hours. He has amended that quick turnaround by saying that he would help both sides create a ceasefire before his inauguration day if he gets elected in November.

However, Trump had never offered details on what his peace plan would look like.

That all changed when running mate J.D. Vance appeared on the Shawn Ryan Show at the end of last week and gave some flesh to the bones of a peace plan. You hear it above.

What would the plan exactly look like?
Time for a Demilitarized Zone

“So, I think what this looks like is Trump sits down, he says to the Russians, the Ukrainians, the Europeans ‘You guys need to figure out what does a peaceful settlement look like?’” Vance told Ryan. “And what it probably looks like is the current line of demarcation between Russia and Ukraine, that becomes like a demilitarized zone.”

The Rise Of Euroscepticism: How Strong Is The EU’s Future? – OpEd

Simon Hutagalung

The European Union (EU) has been a cornerstone of post-war stability and economic cooperation in Europe. However, as the Union has expanded and deepened its integration, it has also encountered significant resistance from within. Euroscepticism, or the growing disillusionment with the EU among its member states, has become a potent force across the continent. This scepticism manifests itself in the form of criticisms against EU policies, perceived erosion of national sovereignty, and dissatisfaction with the functioning of its institutions.

In this context, Euroscepticism presents a serious challenge to the future of the Union, threatening its unity and stability. To secure its future, the EU must address the concerns driving Euroscepticism while maintaining its commitment to integration, multilateralism, and democracy. This essay argues that through institutional reforms, improved economic policies, and a more balanced approach to national sovereignty, the EU can strengthen its resilience against the rising tide of discontent.

Euroscepticism, at its core, reflects a deep-seated dissatisfaction with the current state of European integration. It is not a monolithic ideology but rather a spectrum of opinions that range from mild criticism of specific EU policies to outright opposition to the Union itself. The most visible manifestation of Euroscepticism in recent years has been Brexit, where the United Kingdom voted to leave the EU, signalling a severe breakdown in trust between the EU and one of its key members. Yet this discontent is not confined to the UK. Across the continent, populist and nationalist movements have gained ground, from Hungary and Poland to Italy and France, challenging the authority of Brussels and calling for greater national control over economic, political, and migration policies.

Calls Grow For NATO Members To Help Ukraine Shoot Down Russian Drones And Missiles

Tony Wesolowsky

NATO, whose military aid and support has been vital for Ukraine in its war with Russia, is facing growing calls to do more to fend off Russian missiles and drone strikes — a few of which have violated NATO members’ airspace.

Romania and Latvia, both NATO members, have recently reported that Russian military drones had violated their airspace. Neither country interceded militarily, although Romania did have military jets shadow the drone and later said it lacked the legislation to act.

Romania also said that “pieces of a Russian drone” had been found at an “impact site” on the outskirts of the village of Periprava in Tulcea, along the Romanian-Ukrainian border. Latvia said that the drone had flown into the country’s airspace from Belarus and crashed in the municipality of Rezekne.

While rare, incidents of drones and missiles, nearly all believed to be Russian, have crossed or crashed into states neighboring Ukraine — including Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, and now Latvia — since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022.

A New Front in the Meme Wars

Joan Donovan

When the Department of Justice indicted two employees of Russia’s state-backed media outlet RT last week, it didn’t just reveal a covert influence operation—it also offered a clear picture of how the tactics used to spread propaganda are changing.

This particular operation allegedly exploited popular U.S. right-wing influencers, who amplified pro-Russian positions on Ukraine and other divisive issues in exchange for large payments. The scheme was purportedly funded with nearly $10 million of Russian money funneled through a company that was left unnamed in the indictment but is almost certainly Tenet Media, founded by two Canadians and incorporated in Tennessee. Reportedly, only Tenet Media’s founders knew that the funding came from Russian benefactors—some of the involved influencers have cast themselves as victims in this scheme—though it’s unclear whether they knew about their benefactors’ ties to RT.

This recent manipulation campaign highlights how digital disinformation is a growing shadow industry. It thrives because of the weak enforcement of content-moderation policies, the increasing influence of social-media figures as political intermediaries, and a regulatory environment that fails to hold tech companies accountable. The consequence is an intensification of an ongoing and ever-present low-grade information war playing out across social-media platforms.

Regulating AI Is Easier Than You Think

Paul Scharre

Artificial intelligence is poised to deliver tremendous benefits to society. But, as many have pointed out, it could also bring unprecedented new horrors. As a general-purpose technology, the same tools that will advance scientific discovery could also be used to develop cyber, chemical, or biological weapons. Governing AI will require widely sharing its benefits while keeping the most powerful AI out of the hands of bad actors. The good news is that there is already a template on how to do just that.

In the 20th century, nations built international institutions to allow the spread of peaceful nuclear energy but slow nuclear weapons proliferation by controlling access to the raw materials—namely weapons-grade uranium and plutonium—that underpins them. The risk has been managed through international institutions, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and International Atomic Energy Agency. Today, 32 nations operate nuclear power plants, which collectively provide 10% of the world’s electricity, and only nine countries possess nuclear weapons.

Countries can do something similar for AI today. They can regulate AI from the ground up by controlling access to the highly specialized chips that are needed to train the world’s most advanced AI models. Business leaders and even the U.N. Secretary-General Antรณnio Guterres have called for an international governance framework for AI similar to that for nuclear technology.

How to spot the telltale signs of a deepfake

Chan Eu Imm

Amid growing global concern, Singapore has proposed a law to ban deepfakes of candidates during elections.

The rise of such content - digitally manipulated to look or sound like someone else - has contributed to the increasing difficulty of determining if something online is authentic.

Deepfakes have been used in scams involving political office holders – from United States president Joe Biden to Singapore’s past and present Prime Ministers – as well as celebrities like Taylor Swift. They’ve also been used to generate pornographic material – which make up more than 90 per cent of deepfake videos online.

Ms Ong Si Ci, a lead engineer in Artificial Intelligence and machine learning at Singapore’s HTX, or Home Team Science and Technology Agency, breaks down for CNA the ways to spot a deepfake, how to protect oneself from becoming a victim, and the effectiveness of banning such altered content.

How to identify deepfakes?

They typically have a few telltale signs, according to Ms Ong:
  1. Excessive blurring or inconsistencies around the edges of a face
  2. Inconsistent skin tone or lighting around the face, compared with other regions of the face or surrounding conditions
  3. Poor synchronisation between audio and video
  4. In a speech, an unnatural, monotonous way of speaking

Space: Remote Sensing Satellite Race


September 14, 2024: For over a decade the United States has observed China putting more Remote Sensing satellites into orbit. Currently there are over 300 of them up there. A few dozen of these satellites would be sufficient for commercial use. China has spent billions to put a much larger number of satellites in orbit so that it has an assured network of surveillance satellites that could survive a major attack. China continues to maintain a larger number of these satellites in orbit, must frequently replace ones which become disabled or wear out, and also periodically replaces existing satellites with improved ones with more capabilities and longer use lives. China requires such a large and survivable satellite network to keep an eye on potential naval threats. It’s not just the U.S. Navy, but naval forces from South Korea, Japan, Australia, Taiwan and most other countries bordering the Western Pacific.

The U.S. government does not want to pay for an equally robust and comprehensive satellite system that can survive a Chinese attack. China has been smart about their threatening satellite network by not talking about it and, when pressed, insisting that all those satellites are for commercial uses, to assist Chinese fishing trawlers and China commercial shipping industry. China is currently the largest shipbuilder in the world, building over half the commercial ships produced each year.

The threat to the United States and its allies is real and for over a decade the U.S. Navy has been developing countermeasures. While the U.S. Navy has been quiet about how it plans to defend its ships against Chinese ship-killer ballistic missiles, they have not been idle. The navy has quietly expanded its layered air defense system with the addition of new electronic defenses. The navy is particularly quiet about any efforts to conduct realistic tests of its defenses against Chinese ballistic missiles.

Modern Wars Are Wars of Attrition

Sean Durns

“Battles,” Carl Von Clausewitz said, “decide everything.” Yet the famed Prussian military theorist is wrong. Great battles and brilliant leaders can shape the course of events. But often it is attrition that is decisive in modern warfare. As Stalin observed in the wake of the Second World War, “Hitler’s generals, raised on the dogma of Clausewitz and Moltke,” lost because they “could not understand that wars are won in the factories.”

Too often the history of warfare is reduced to names and dates. Popular thought emphasizes military engagements, from Waterloo to Verdun and beyond, and it often underscores famous generals and admirals, from Napoleon to Robert E. Lee. Battles can be turning points, and leadership does matter. But as the historian Cathal Nolan convincingly argued in his 2019 book The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost, they are seldom decisive. Indeed, for all their brilliance, famous commanders like Napoleon and Lee both ultimately lost.

Austerlitz was a triumph for Napoleon, and the Seven Days Battles rightly contributed to Lee’s legend. But in the end, battlefield brilliance wasn’t enough to overcome greater forces, be it via coalition or otherwise, marshaled against both men. “Exhaustion of morale and material rather than finality through battles marks the endgame of many wars,” Nolan observes. This has long been the case, he notes.