Indian Strategic Studies: 09/18/24

18 September 2024

Displacing Tribals For Tigers – OpEd

Amarendra Kishore

The Adivasis of the Kaimur Hills in Bihar are engulfed in turmoil, their fears mounting as they face the threat of displacement under the pretext of establishing a tiger reserve. Their protest is a desperate cry against what they see as an impending eviction from their ancestral lands.

These Adivasis, deeply connected to their natural resources, view violence as futile in achieving their democratic rights. With 108 tribal villages living in constant anxiety over potential displacement, many are resorting to a boycott of the upcoming Assembly elections to voice their dissent against the proposed tiger reserve in the Kaimur Wildlife Sanctuary. These villagers, whose ties to the forest date back to centuries ago, fear the displacement of around one lakh indigenous people from their home and hearth, highlighting their urgent struggle for survival and identity. Villagers and forest rights activists are demanding a complete rollback of the proposed tiger reserve– the forest dwellers in the area refer to the proposed tiger reserve as an “attempt to seize their forest land.”

The doubts and fears are not unfounded—the Adivasis in Kaimur hills are speaking out. They have already lost a huge portion of land in the Durgawati and Haraiya dams. When these two dams were constructed, the forest department was given around 5,000 hectares in this forest. It severely impacted their dwellings. They repeatedly sense that under the guise of development, there is a deliberate and calculated effort to displace them from their ancestral lands. It has become a subject of mockery to talk about the presence of tigers in this part of the Kaimur hills. Here, spotting a fox, jackal, or mongoose is considered a significant event.

Can Afghanistan’s Economy Survive Without Aid?

Gul Maqsood Sabit

The evolving political landscapes and priorities of the United States and other donor nations may pose a threat to the ongoing provision of humanitarian aid funds, particularly in the form of regular dollar shipments, to Afghanistan. If aid is halted or diminished, it could have a severe impact on the country’s economy and its impoverished populace. The Interim Taliban Administration (ITA) will be required to assume the responsibility of catering to the needs of the population, potentially depleting the existing fiscal buffer that is currently allocated towards their own objectives.

It is imperative for the ITA to enact appropriate measures preemptively to prevent Afghanistan from facing another abrupt cessation or reduction in aid.

An estimated 23.7 million people, more than half of Afghanistan’s population, will need humanitarian assistance in 2024, as reported by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in January of this year. The same report also stated that millions of people who have received assistance, including Afghans returning from Pakistan, will require ongoing support for basic needs such as food, cash, healthcare, education, suitable shelter, and access to water in the coming months. OCHA cautioned that the need for humanitarian assistance is increasing while donor funding is decreasing.

Afghanistan Is America’s Shame, However You Vote – OpEd

Luke Coffey

US House Foreign Affairs Committee chair Michael McCaul, a Republican, released a scathing report last week blaming Joe Biden for the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021. McCaul’s Democratic counterpart on the committee, Gregory Meeks, dismissed the report as a “partisan narrative.”

It was the latest example of the political blame game over the 20-year US involvement in Afghanistan. And there’s plenty of blame to go around: while the chaotic withdrawal happened on Biden’s watch, the groundwork was laid during the Trump administration.

Trump, during his 2016 campaign, promised to end the so-called “forever wars,” with Afghanistan the prime example. By then the conflict had dragged on for 15 years, but it looked very different from the earlier, bloodier years. US troop levels had peaked at over 100,000 during the height of the fighting in 2010–2012, when hundreds of American soldiers were killed every year and the US was spending about $120 billion a year on the war — $300 million a day, $230,000 every minute.

But by the time Trump took office in 2017, this had evolved significantly. The war he wanted to end was not the one the US was then fighting. Casualties had decreased and troop levels were down to about 18,000, mainly trainers for Afghan security forces and counterterrorism operators. The cost had also dropped to about $18 billion a year. Nevertheless, Trump remained focused on his populist message of ending “forever wars,” which resonated with a significant portion of Americans.

China’s Risky Power Play in the South China Sea

Agnes Chang, Camille Elemia and Muyi Xiao

China’s coast guard ships have swarmed and collided with Philippine boats. They have doused Philippine vessels with powerful water cannons. Chinese crew members have slashed inflatable crafts, blared sirens and flashed high-powered lasers at Filipino troops.

As China pushes to dominate the South China Sea, it is increasingly willing to use force to drive out the Philippines, a treaty ally of the United States. In recent months, China’s tactics have damaged Philippine boats and injured personnel, and raised fears of a superpower showdown in the strategic waterway.

A New Flashpoint

For months, the latest target of China’s power play was a Philippine coast guard ship, the Teresa Magbanua. The video above was taken by the crew of that ship, as a Chinese coast guard vessel collided into it late last month.

The episode was one of four confrontations between the two countries’ vessels, in just two weeks. The encounters were not only becoming more frequent, but they were also taking place in a new location — Sabina Shoal, a resource-rich atoll close to the Philippine mainland.

Vladimir Putin's Pivot to China is Backfiring

Micah McCartney

Russia's pivot to China has faced multiple setbacks this year as Chinese banks, wary of U.S. sanctions imposed over Vladimir Putin's invasion of Ukraine, are rejecting transactions, forcing Moscow to raise fees on yuan (RMB) transfers.

Heavily sanctioned Moscow has benefited from the world's second-largest economy since the Ukraine war began, with bilateral trade rocketing up by 26 percent to a $240 billion high last year, and Russia becoming China's top source of oil.

Last month, Russian media reported that some 98 percent of Chinese banks now reject RMB-denominated settlements. First major, and now also more local, Chinese banks have stepped up compliance with the Biden administration to shield themselves from the secondary sanctions. This limited ability to use RMB has caused a liquidity squeeze, which seems to have driven the recent fee hikes by Russian banks.

Russian companies doing business with China began facing additional hurdles this month, this time from domestic lenders.

Trade Balances In China And The US Are Largely Driven By Domestic Macro Forces – Analysis

Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, Ceyla Pazarbasioglu, Krishna Srinivasan and Rodrigo Valdés

Worries that China’s external surpluses result from industrial policies reflect an incomplete view

China’s widening trade surplus and the growing US trade deficit since the pandemic have renewed concerns about global imbalances and fueled an intense debate on their causes and consequences. There are increasing worries that China’s external surpluses result from industrial policy measures designed to stimulate exports and support economic growth amid weak domestic demand. Some worry that the resulting overcapacity could lead to a “China shock 2.0”—a surge of exports that would displace workers and hurt industrial activity elsewhere.

This trade and industrial policy view of external balances is incomplete at best and should be replaced with a macro view. External balances are ultimately determined by macroeconomic fundamentals, while the link to trade and industrial policy is more tenuous. To understand the pattern of global external imbalances, we need to understand the macroeconomic drivers of desired saving relative to desired investment, not only in China, but also in the rest of the world including, importantly, the United States. While other countries contribute to global imbalances, the United States and China together account about one-third of the global current account balance.

Cislunar Space Competition With China

James Frelk & Chris Williams

Like previous rivalries between nation-states throughout history, the U.S. and PRC are competing for political prestige, international influence, scientific knowledge, technological advancement, economic prosperity, and military power. The PRC sees itself in a new space race with America that it intends to win. The Sino-American rivalry to influence or control the physical and human geography of the world now extends from Earth to cislunar space – the line between the Earth and the Moon or the Moon’s orbit – and is a direct outgrowth of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) aim to reestablish China as the world’s dominant power. China considers space a “critical domain in international strategic competition.”

China is conducting operations in cislunar space and has even more ambitious future space plans. Lagrange points, lunar transfer orbits, lunar orbits, and the Moon’s surface are “strategic key points” and “strategic thoroughfares” in cislunar space from which China could exert influence in or control over the Earth- Moon system.

Israel braces for possible 'all-out' war against Hezbollah, Iran proxies

Andrew Parasiliti

Israel’s destruction of an Iranian-controlled precision missile facility in Syria on Sept. 8 may be prelude to a wider escalation with Hezbollah in Lebanon and other Iranian-backed militias, Ben Caspit reports from Israel.

“The sides are bracing for an all-out war with Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed militias,” writes Caspit.

The Biden administration wants it both ways with its pressure to restrain Israeli escalation: to maintain the threat of the impermanence of the enhanced US military deployment, while reassuring Israel, and warning its adversaries, that the United States has its back in the event of an attack. Although the United States may have withdrawn the aircraft carrier USS Roosevelt last week, the guided missile submarine USS Georgia has taken its place.

As we wrote here last week, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu knows the decisions run through him. The effect of US pressure is minimal. The White House doesn’t want an escalation, but the United States will come to Israel’s defense if war breaks out with Hezbollah and other Iran-linked proxies along the so-called belt of fire described by Caspit.

Netanyahu Is Playing Into Khamenei’s Hands

Dennis Ross

Iran makes no secret of its commitment to seek Israel’s destruction. Its strategy is to keep it under constant pressure and consume it in ongoing conflicts on its borders. While that is plain to see, Israel’s current approach seems, ironically, to be playing into Iran’s hands.

Alarm in UK and US over possible Iran-Russia nuclear deal

Dan Sabbagh

Britain and the US have raised fears that Russia has shared nuclear secrets with Iran in return for Tehran supplying Moscow with ballistic missiles to bomb Ukraine.

During their summit in Washington DC on Friday, Keir Starmer and US president Joe Biden acknowledged that the two countries were tightening military cooperation at a time when Iran is in the process of enriching enough uranium to complete its long-held goal to build a nuclear bomb.

British sources indicated that concerns were aired about Iran’s trade for nuclear technology, part of a deepening alliance between Tehran and Moscow.

On Tuesday last week, Antony Blinken, the US secretary of state, made a similar warning on a visit to London for a summit with his British counterpart, David Lammy, though it received little attention, as the focus then was the US announcement of Iran’s missile supply to Moscow.

“For its part, Russia is sharing technology that Iran seeks – this is a two-way street – including on nuclear issues as well as some space information,” Blinken said, accusing the two countries of engaging in destabilising activities that sow “even greater insecurity” around the world.

Ukraine Captures Multiple Villages As Kursk Incursion Advances

Flynn Nicholls

Ukrainian forces have made gains in Russia's Kursk Oblast, capturing several villages as part of its ongoing cross-border offensive, according to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).

The report claims that Ukrainian troops advanced in the Glushkovo district on Saturday, near the villages of Tyotkino and Sudzha, citing reports from Ukrainian and Russian sources.

Footage released on September 13 and verified through geolocation confirms Ukrainian troops are now operating in Veseloye, southwest of Glushkovo.

Additionally, Russian military bloggers acknowledged that Ukrainian forces had taken control of Veseloye.

Reports from Russian military sources indicate that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in several areas, including Obukhovka and Novy Put, between September 13 and 14.

Ukrainian Officials have claimed that the aggressive push into Russian territory has forced Moscow to bolster its military presence in the region.

Ukrainian Pivnich (Northern) operational command spokesperson Vadym Mysnyk said on Saturday that Russia has increased its troop deployment in Kursk Oblast from 11,000 personnel before the incursion in August to an estimated 30,000 to 45,000 now.

The U.S. Military Is Not Ready for the New Era of Warfare

Raj M. Shah and Christopher M. Kirchhoff

The First Matabele War, fought between 1893 and 1894, foretold the future.

In its opening battle, roughly 700 soldiers, paramilitaries and African auxiliaries aligned with the British South Africa Company used five Maxim guns — the world’s first fully automatic weapon — to help repel over 5,000 Ndebele warriors, some 1,500 of whom were killed at a cost of only a handful of British soldiers. The brutal era of trench warfare that the Maxim gun ushered in didn’t become fully apparent until World War I. Yet initial accounts of its singular effectiveness correctly foretold the end of the cavalry, a critical piece of combat arms since the Iron Age.

We stand at the precipice of an even more consequential revolution in military affairs today. A new wave of war is bearing down on us. Artificial-intelligence-powered autonomous weapons systems are going global. And the U.S. military is not ready for them.

Weeks ago, the world experienced another Maxim gun moment: The Ukrainian military evacuated U.S.-provided M1A1 Abrams battle tanks from the front lines after many of them were reportedly destroyed by Russian kamikaze drones. The withdrawal of one of the world’s most advanced battle tanks in an A.I.-powered drone war foretells the end of a century of manned mechanized warfare as we know it. Like other unmanned vehicles that aim for a high level of autonomy, these Russian drones don’t rely on large language models or similar A.I. more familiar to civilian consumers, but rather on technology like machine learning to help identify, seek and destroy targets. Even those devices that are not entirely A.I.-driven increasingly use A.I. and adjacent technologies for targeting, sensing and guidance.

Ukrainian Troops Talk of Stiffer Resistance as They Fight in Russian Territory

Marc Santora

After racing across Russian fields in an American Stryker armored fighting vehicle this month, the six-man Ukrainian assault team dismounted in a tree line about 700 yards from the enemy’s trenches and waited for the order to attack.

When it came, Afonya, a 40-year-old construction worker drafted into the Ukrainian military just two months ago, said the Ukrainian soldiers were met with a hail of gunfire as soon as they moved from their hastily dug foxholes. He was hit in the hand by a bullet that shattered a bone.

Three members of the assault team were injured and pulled back while the other three waited for reinforcements to resume the attack in the Kursk region of Russia.

“There were too many of them,” Afonya said in an interview at a hospital in eastern Ukraine, where he was recovering after being evacuated.

What Harris and Trump Will Do

Ian Bremmer, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Anders Åslund, Shang-Jin Wei, Joseph E. Stiglitz & Daron Acemoglu

With her energetic demeanor, fluid delivery, and skillful handling of her opponent, US Vice President Kamala Harris came across very differently in her recent debate against Donald Trump than US President Joe Biden did in June. But it is not only presentation that sets Harris apart from Biden, let alone Trump.

While there is “plenty of overlap” between Harris and Biden’s worldviews and foreign-policy preferences, writesIan Bremmer, Founder and President of Eurasia Group and GZERO Media, there is also “significant daylight” between them. In particular, Harris is far less inclined to view international relations as a “struggle between democracies and autocracies,” with the US “always” acting as a “force for good.” When it comes to exercising power in a “more contested and multipolar world,” she is warier of “unintended consequences” and would probably favor “multilateral approaches over unilateral interventions.”

Trump certainly does not share Harris’s commitment to multilateralism, points outJoseph S. Nye, Jr., of the Aspen Strategy Group. To be sure, “there will be large areas of continuity in US foreign policy” no matter who wins in November, such as with regard to China. But whereas Harris would work to reinforce US alliances and promote multilateralism, Trump would most likely embrace unilateralism, particularly on issues such as NATO to Ukraine.

What Ukraine’s Kursk Incursion Tells Us About Putin’s Russia – Analysis

Olga Khvostunova

In early August, the Ukrainian army broke into Russia and, virtually undeterred, rapidly advanced seizing a significant area of the borderline region of Kursk. Given that this was the first foreign invasion of Russia since World War II, Russia’s fierce retaliation should have followed. Instead, Russian authorities pretended that this was nothing but a local crisis and a temporary setback. The reality is more complex and the implications are more serious than the Kremlin would like to admit.

What is Happening in Kursk

On the night of August 6, the Ukrainian Armed Forces crossed the border at Russia’s Kursk region and launched a surprise offensive on several regional towns. Within twenty-four hours the Ukrainian army advanced up to ten kilometers into Russia and reportedly captured the regional center of Sudzha. A month later, not only had they not been stopped by the Russian counteroffensive, but managed to advance further, claiming control of over 1,300 sq km in the Kursk region (other estimates range from 1,150 sq km, accordingto the Institute of the Study of War, and 480 sq km, according to Russian officials).

Observations on the War in Ukraine: Impressions from Our Visit

Daniel Byman and Elizabeth Hoffman

One month ago, Ukraine took Russia by surprise when its military successfully executed a daring incursion into Kursk Oblast. We were sitting in a café in Kyiv between meetings when the news of the operation began to emerge. At the time, the operation was an internet rumor, and the Ukrainian government was not acknowledging it. Although the Kursk operation has inspired many Ukrainians and their international supporters, the Russian army continues to push forward in the east, and ballistic missiles wreak havoc on Ukrainian population centers. We were in Ukraine to learn from Ukrainians and U.S. officials about the progress of the war and also to hear about the effects of the Russian invasion on the country as a whole.

Since August of 2023, CSIS has led three congressional member and staff delegations to Ukraine, Moldova, and Poland. These trips allow lawmakers the opportunity to see firsthand how U.S. dollars are being put to use in support of Ukraine in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion and how U.S. policy is affecting the war. Although members of Congress do have the ability to travel to Ukraine through the U.S. Department of State, they are unable to spend the night in the country, and their movements are restricted to the Kyiv region. In contrast, our most recent trip in early August allowed for five nights in Ukraine and an overnight in Odesa in addition to time spent in Kyiv. Throughout the course of the stay, we met with U.S. and Ukrainian government officials and personnel from international organizations, business, media, and civil society. Below, we offer a few thoughts on our recent trip.

Ukraine Uses Maneuver Warfare at the Strategic Level

Gary Anderson

When Ukraine began its incursion into Russian territory in August, I hoped that it signaled a strategic shift to an offensive maneuver warfare vice accepting the Russian diktat of an attritional war on the part of both antagonists. I hope that is still the case. If it is, the Ukrainians are looking for the next weak spot along the front, not just in eastern Ukraine, but along its extensive border with the Russian homeland. One of the prime tenets of maneuver warfare is that the enemy cannot be strong everywhere, and that it is best to strike at weak spots (gaps). I am hoping that Kyiv is looking for the next big gap.

Since the Kursk incursion began, the Russians have doubled down in their offensive in the Donbass and rushed reinforcements to the Kursk region. Despite, the gloom of some number crunchers, the Russian supply of manpower is not unlimited. Putin is limited by domestic constraints from issuing a general draft call-up and there are only so many prisoners that can be released to swell Russian ranks. There are weak spots like Kursk elsewhere. The art in operational art is finding them and exploiting them.

The Ukrainians have shown a natural inclination for maneuver warfare at the tactical level and have occasionally at the operational level. It remains to be seen if they can do it at the strategic level of war. By this time, the Ukrainians realize that the war will eventually have to be resolved at the bargaining table, and the more land -particularly Russian- that they have when talks begin, the better off they are. These kinds of pinprick incursions -particularly those into Russian territory- place the Moscow's troops in a "whack a mole" situation.

Now that the IDF has defeated Hamas in Rafah, what comes next? - analysis

SETH J. FRANTZMAN

Over the last month, the IDF has cemented the defeat of the Rafah Brigade of Hamas. This is an important achievement and an example of how difficult defeating the terrorist group has become.

Rafah could be seen as a microcosm of the challenges in Gaza in general. This raises many questions, including what may come after Rafah.

Rafah was initially a challenge because of opposition from the international community to an Israeli operation in an area where around a million people were sheltering. Once people were evacuated and the international community was placated, Israel was able to proceed in the city and its border area.

The operation was daunting. Hamas had apparently used the Rafah border crossing to bring in weapons and material that it used to fuel its war machine. It had up to 36 kilometers of tunnels under the city and in nearby areas, connecting it to Tel al-Sultan and Khan Yunis. The operation’s delay allowed Hamas to festoon the area with booby traps.

The tragedy of American wealth

Han Feizi

“Pay them off,” he said. Over two decades ago, that was the plan for globalization’s losers coughed up by a junior priest of the Washington Consensus then teaching at one of America’s august indoctrination asylums.

What he meant was that the gains from globalization would be immense – more than enough to compensate Ohio factory workers whose jobs would be outsourced to China.

This junior priest founded a consulting company, rode the globalization wave to its peak, reversed course with perfect timing and now advises American companies and state organs as a China hawk, ascending to high priest status in the New Washington Consensus.

“Pay them off.” We all bought it then. So simple, so elegant, so logical, so easy. Democracy and capitalism would surely figure out a mechanism. It wasn’t our problem. Our problem was getting past round one of the Goldman Sachs interview.

Of course, we now know that there was not going to be a pay-them-off mechanism. The winners of globalization – those who passed rounds two and three – were going to fight tooth and nail for every last cent the Washington Consensus threw our way.

The EU is disintegrating before our eyes

Gavin Mortimer

Germany’s decision to reintroduce border controls in an attempt to halt mass immigration is awkward for Keir Starmer.

A fortnight ago the British Prime Minister, a friend of European free movement, visited Berlin and among the issues he discussed with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz were trade, defence and immigration.

A few days before Starmer’s visit, three people were killed at a diversity festival by a suspected Syrian refugee. Germany’s decision to tighten its borders (initially for six months but this could be extended) is partly a reaction to that atrocity as well as the failed attack last week on the Israeli consulate in Munich.

It is also a response by Scholz to the victory last week of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Thuringia’s state election.

That success was the latest triumph in Europe for parties variously described as populist, far-right or nationalist. Take your pick.

The Imminent Russia-US War

Christopher Caldwell

All week long, the Biden administration has been hinting that it would authorize Ukraine to strike deep inside Russian territory with US-made Army Tactical Missiles Systems, or ATACMS. These are computer-guided supersonic missiles with a range of up to 190 miles. They can’t reach Moscow, but they could hit the Russian cities of Kursk, Voronezh, and Rostov. Britain has already authorized Ukraine to use British-supplied Storm Shadow missiles to attack Russia. Secretary of State Tony Blinken traveled to Kiev in the company of British Foreign Secretary David Lammy to discuss the matter with Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky. Some kind of escalatory announcement was expected to accompany British Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s Friday visit to Washington.

This development prompted Vladimir Putin to make a carefully worded statement to a TV interviewer Thursday: “If this decision is made, it will mean nothing less than the direct participation of NATO countries, the United States, the European countries, in the war in Ukraine. This changes the very nature of the conflict.” Starmer dismissed the remark. Putin, he said, can stop his war with Ukraine any time he wants. One could just as easily say that, any time they wanted, Starmer and Biden could stop risking Armageddon to meddle in the affairs of sovereign countries halfway around the world.

The more troubling thing is that Starmer doesn’t seem to understand what Putin is saying. Because, although the point is somewhat complex and the reporting on the West’s intentions has been cloudy, Putin is right.

De-escalation and Double Standards

Daniel J. Samet

“The failure of the Carter administration’s foreign policy is now clear to everyone except its architects, and even they must entertain private doubts,” opens “Dictatorships & Double Standards,” Jeane Kirkpatrick’s seminal Commentary essay of 1979. Substitute “Carter” for “Biden-Harris,” and her lede is as true today as it was forty-five years ago. Biden and Harris inherited peace and stability and, in under four years, have created war and chaos. The world is in a much more precarious state with them at the helm.

One reason for this is their fundamental misunderstanding of international crises. Biden and Harris have made de-escalation a pillar of their foreign policy. The word appears often in their public statements. As the vice president put it in a recent X post, their administration has been furiously “working to de-escalate regional tensions and prevent further conflict.” The idea is to limit conflicts before they spiral out of control. Countries really don’t want to fight one another per this line of thinking. If they try hard enough to lessen tensions, they won’t come to blows. There should always be an off-ramp from the escalatory highway. War is invariably a failure of de-escalation, the Biden-Harris administration believes. De-escalating, not winning, is the objective.

Their foreign policy is based on a fallacy. What Biden, Harris, and their subordinates don’t get is that de-escalation doesn’t de-escalate. It escalates. When the administration invests so much in “de-escalation”—which means appeasing adversaries, proscribing the United States’ own intervention in conflicts, and proscribing the behavior of its wartime allies—the bad guys try to get away with even more. This has been so time and again throughout the Biden-Harris presidency.

Is Climate Activism Working?

Cameron Abadi and Adam Tooze

Last year, Germany’s Constitutional Court rejected 60 billion euro ($65 billion) fund set aside for renewable energy investments. Ever since, the country’s climate policy has been set adrift, with political parties struggling to agree on how to achieve Germany’s climate targets. In response, the country’s climate activist movement has tried taking matters into its own hands.

This Army division just ran cybersecurity for a far-away brigade

Todd South

One of the Army’s most modernized armored brigades and its parent division recently conducted the service’s first long-range, fully remote cybersecurity operation at the division level.

The 3rd Infantry Division’s network operations and security cell remained at Fort Stewart, Georgia, in July, covering the first 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team’s cyber 6 as the Raider Brigade conducted a two-week rotation at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California.

Army officials believe that such remote cyber protection will be critical to units using cloud-dependent systems on missions, systems increasingly being fielded to the force.

The division cell’s oversight of Internet firewalls, sensors and scanners for a unit more than 2,300 miles away occurred during one of the brigade’s most demanding rotations to date.

Hook, Message, Call to Action: Advice on Journal Article Writing for Dummies—by a Dummy

Leyton Summerlin

However, contributing these experiences or insights can be intimidating for several reasons. Over the last year, I have learned much about writing by reading almost everything the Army’s journals have published—the good and the bad. I’ve also had the opportunity to meet and learn from some phenomenal writers and editors whose advice I have collected and want to share to help soldiers with great ideas who may simply need another perspective on writing to get started.

I recently spent three weeks traveling the Army, talking about professional discourse and the importance of the Army’s journals. At least once a day, someone would say, “Not all of us have a writing background or a degree like you do. It’s not that easy to just get started.” Well, let me enlighten you on my academic background. I barely passed high school, failed junior English twice, and lied or cheated my way out of any writing assignment I ever had in school because I hated its rigidity and subjectivity. My teachers only passed me because they didn’t want to deal with me for another year. Incoming cliché—if I can do it, anyone can. If you’re like me and struggle with conforming your ideas to what you were told all writing should look like, this different approach to formatting may help.