13 September 2024

The Complex Legacy of Ahmad Shah Massoud

Freshta Jalalzai

The assassination of Ahmad Shah Massoud on September 9, 2001, reverberated through Afghanistan with a shock akin to that felt in the United States following the attacks just two days later on September 11.

The scale of tragedy differs. Nearly 3,000 lives were lost on that fateful day in America, while in Afghanistan, it was the death of a single militia leader. Yet, Massoud’s killing marked a seismic shift in the Afghan political landscape and profoundly impacted the fate of a nation already burdened by decades of conflict and instability.

Massoud was reportedly assassinated by two al-Qaida operatives disguised as reporters in the Khwaja Bahauddin district of Afghanistan’s Takhar Province, approximately 90 miles from his native Panjshir Valley.

In a desperate attempt, his lifeless body was transported to a makeshift hospital, a temporary medical facility in Tajikistan that had been set up by India to treat wounded members of his resistance forces during the first Taliban regime in Afghanistan (1996-2001). His body was eventually flown by helicopter to his home province and laid to rest on September 16 in his native village of Bazarak, in the Panjshir Valley.


Afghanistan And Central Asia Collaborate To Boost Regional Trade – Analysis

James Durso

Now that the U.S.-led punitive expedition to Afghanistan has ended, regional trade patterns are returning to normal, as in pre-Soviet Union normal, enhanced by China’s Belt and Road Initiative and local efforts, like the Uzbekistan-Pakistan-Afghanistan (UAP) Railway Project.

In August, the government of Uzbekistan announced the opening of the Termez International Trade Center, in the border town of Termez, the location of the Friendship Bridge that connects Termez with the Afghan dry port of Hairatan.

As the center has a regional role the governments of Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan were represented at the opening that was presided over by the Uzbek prime minister, Abdulla Aripov, and the acting prime minister of Afghanistan, Abdul Ghani Baradar, latterly seen negotiating the Doha Accord with the U.S.

Underscoring Uzbekistan’s interest in firming relations with Afghanistan, Prime Minister Aripov visited the Afghan capital of Kabul two weeks before the Termez opening. That visit resulted in 35 investment and trade agreements worth $2.5 billion, with a goal of increasing bilateral trade to $3 billion. Simultaneously, Kabul hosted a trilateral meeting of the economy ministers of Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan on ways to enhance regional trade ties.

A ‘Chinese Starlink’ Launches New Era For Domestic Space Industry

Arran Hope

At 14:42 on August 6, a Long March 6 (LM-6) carrier rocket took off from the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Centre in Xinzhou, Shanxi Province (Xinhua, August 7). The rocket carried 18 satellites—the first official batch of the Qianfan (千帆) constellation—into orbit. Qianfan, formerly known as “G60,” constitutes an initial response by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to Starlink, the private satellite internet constellation operated as a subsidiary of Elon Musk’s commercial space venture SpaceX.

The company behind the launch, Yuanxin Satellite (垣信卫星)—also known as Shanghai Spacecom Satellite Technology Ltd (SSST)—is not a state-owned enterprise (SOE). This is surprising, as SOEs usually take precedence in the unveiling of new, strategic technologies. Analysts therefore have described the August development as “the most significant commercial launch in Chinese space industry history” (The China Space Monitor, August 31). A confluence of factors led to SSST winning the race to launch a constellation of internet satellites in non-geostationary orbit (NGSO). These include problems in the state-owned constellation sector coupled with an explosion of activity in the burgeoning commercial sector. The initial trigger for PRC efforts in this area has been the launch and dramatic expansion of Starlink since 2019. The PRC’s space sector is still centrally controlled, but the emergence of a more dynamic commercial sector indicates that Beijing is learning how to successfully combine government direction with market forces (China Brief, November 20, 2023).

Murky Media Network Aligns with Beijing on Sensitive Issues

Shannon van Sant

On March 3, 2023, a digital publication called Beijing Times began operation (EIN Presswire, March 3, 2023; Beijing Times, August 18; accessed August 18). [1] Produced by Delaware-based Cedrus Media, the outlet says it provides “unbiased English news on China.” Its font and layout mimic The New York Times, and the website publishes articles primarily about domestic news in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and international stories related to the PRC. The outlet describes its mission as “enlightening the World on China.” Its website reads, “Tightened media controls within China and budget cuts in foreign reporting globally have led to a dearth of in-depth, unbiased information about this crucial player on the world stage. Beijing Times is here to bridge this information gap” (News Channel Nebraska, January 4). There is more to this publication than meets the eye, however. Not only do many of its articles align with the preferred narratives of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), but its main journalists do not appear to exist. Beijing Times articles have been cited and quoted in mainstream media in the West, likely by journalists who are unaware of the dubious credibility of its coverage.

Coverage Toes Party Line on Sensitive Issues

The Beijing Times appears to be well-resourced and funded and is part of a much larger network of information websites targeting local audiences around the world. It publishes long-form articles that often appear studiously balanced. The outlet makes efforts to present all sides, claiming that its “neutrality” is its strength. “We are not pro- or anti-China, nor do we carry biases for or against any nation,” the website reads. “Our goal is to paint a comprehensive and nuanced picture of China, allowing our readers to form their own informed opinions on everything from censorship and human rights to technological advancements and environmental policies” (Beijing Times, August 18). The Beijing Times’ coverage of the PRC has included short pieces on the history of Beijing and biographies of PRC diplomats who have worked in the United States (Beijing Times; June 30, August 18, August 22).

Is China Running Out Of Options In The Trade War?

Christine McDaniel

The U.S.-China trade war has been going on for six years. After several rounds of tariffs and other countries getting roped in, the limits of retaliation are showing. And while trade wars are always costly, rarely do countries have equal leverage. As this confrontation drags on, China’s options appear especially and increasingly limited.

In the beginning, emotions usually fly high, and countries target products for which a tariff would do little harm to itself but a lot of harm to the opposing side. For instance, six months after the U.S. tariffs, China chose U.S. soybeans to include in its retaliation, which made sense because U.S. soybean exporters were heavily reliant on China’s market (57 percent of exports in 2017) and China had other options (Brazil).


But the longer the tariffs stay in place, the more time countries have to adjust to the new trade landscape, find workarounds and form alliances. Time also reveals the weakest links in each country’s trade-war armor. Two major determining factors in understanding these weak links are trade orientation and the ability to coordinate with others. China is getting squeezed on both fronts.

A Progress Report on Hypersonics

Bill Sweetman

The U.S. and Australia have been collaborating on technology for hypersonic weapons since 2007, but you might be forgiven for not knowing that. Until 2014, when China was seen to be testing the DF-17 boost-glide weapon, the standard line was that ‘hypersonics are the weapon of the future—and they always will be.’ The Hypersonic International Flight Research Experimentation (HIFiRE) program of Australia and the U.S. was seen as a lab project.

Its successor, the Southern Cross Integrated Flight Research Experiment (SCIFiRE) program, is linked to a funded weapon: the U.S. Air Force’s Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM), to be carried by U.S. Air Force F-15Es and, possibly, by Royal Australian Air Force F/A-18F Super Hornets.

HACM development won’t be complete until 2029, if it stays on schedule, and its costs are undefined. For now, U.S. hypersonic weapons are confined to a different class of vehicle, similar to the systems that China is deploying. But due to geography, a technology that is useful to China may be less so to the Pacific alliance.

‘Hypersonic’ has a clear definition: Mach 5 and above. As a vehicle approaches five times the speed of sound (5300km/h at altitude), a layer of stagnant air forms at its nose and leading edges and becomes hot and compressed, subjecting the vehicle to much more extreme conditions than are encountered even at Mach 4.

Why Blocking Nippon Steel’s Purchase of U.S. Steel Is a Mistake

Howard W. French

Around this time last year, during a speaking visit to Pennsylvania, I found the time to go to one of the most unusual parks I have seen in my life. It is built around the sprawling remains of what was once one of the world’s largest steel plants: Bethlehem Steel.


Letters to the Next President

Catherine Ashton, Jason Bordoff, Arancha González, Martin Kimani, Mark Malloch-Brown, Joseph S. Nye Jr., Danny Quah, Nirupama Rao, and Joseph E. Stiglitz

The tradition started with a cartoon elephant and some turkeys. On Jan. 20, 1989, before leaving the Oval Office for the last time, Ronald Reagan put pen to paper with some advice for his vice president and successor, George H.W. Bush. “You’ll have moments when you want to use this particular stationery,” Reagan wrote on a notepad illustrated by children’s book author Sandra Boynton. The caption? “Don’t let the turkeys get you down.” As with so many elements of political life in the United States, Reagan’s influence is still felt, as U.S. presidents continue to leave their successors handwritten missives. Most recently, Joe Biden described Donald Trump’s as “shockingly gracious.”

Cloud Seeding and the Water Wars of Tomorrow

Nicola Stoev

Fueled by the climate crisis and El Niño, 2024 has been a year of global extreme temperatures. Australia suffered a string of heat waves through its summer months and, in February, parts of West Africa reported 50C temperatures that made “time stand still.” From March, heat waves hit Mexico, the southern United States and Central America, then India, southern Europe, Japan, and Saudi Arabia, where 1,300 people died during the Hajj pilgrimage. At the beginning of July, the temperatures in Antarctica were 28C higher than usual on some days in July.

The number of people exposed to extreme heat is growing exponentially due to climate change in all world regions. Heat-related mortality for people over 65 years of age increased by approximately 85% during 2000–2004 and 2017–2021.

From 2000–2019, studies show about 489,000 heat-related deaths occurred each year, with 45% of these in Asia and 36% in Europe. In Europe alone in the summer of 2022, an estimated 61,672 heat-related excess deaths occurred. High-intensity heat wave events can bring high acute mortality; in 2003, 70,000 people in Europe died as a result of the June–August event. In 2010, 56,000 excess deaths occurred during a 44–day heat wave in Russia.

Putin Cannot Escape War in Ukraine Amid Travels to Far East

Pavel K. Baev

Russia’s ninth annual Eastern Economic Forum was held last week on September 3–6 in Vladivostok. It was intended to promote Moscow’s commitment to pivoting its economic policy toward the Asia-Pacific, but instead exposed the shortcomings of this ambition. The Kremlin is not only demanding the redeployment of all combat-capable Russian units to the battlefields in Donbas for its war in Ukraine, but also is forced to sustain political efforts on withstanding Russia’s confrontation with the West. Russian President Vladimir Putin performed with his usual grandiloquence at the forum, asserting that economic growth in the Russian Far East was spectacular and that the combat operations in Ukraine were going according to plan (Izvestiya, September 5). Recent forecasts from the Russian Central Bank present a more sober picture. Growth is barely registered, mainly on account of the accumulating stresses in Russia’s economy in the course of the long war (Forbes.ru, September 2; The Moscow Times, September 5). The tumultuous effect of Russia’s war in Ukraine on its economy is affecting Moscow’s relations with partners, especially China, which Russia is increasingly relying on as it combats Western sanctions and international ostracism (see EDM, January 22, May 6 [1], [2], September 5).

The Era of Large U.S. Navy Warships Is All Done Now

Brandon J. Weichert

Is the Era of U.S. Aircraft Carriers Ending in the Face of China’s A2/AD?

For centuries, navies around the world have taken pride in their large surface warships. The dominance of these warships persisted even after the advent of submarines. In fact, during the Second World War, when submarines became a primary weapons platform for navies, the aircraft carrier stole all the headlines.

Today, however, things are changing.

A Sizeable Liability

The rise of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) means that the large surface warship’s days as the primary form of power projection in a naval fleet are coming to an end.

Consider that the Ford-class aircraft carrier, America’s newest, costs $13 billion per unit, plus hundreds of millions of dollars per year to maintain. The more numerous Nimitz-class aircraft carriers, while older than the Ford-class, are also very expensive.

An aircraft carrier is a large, highly complex warship. Its purpose is to maneuver a floating airbase near the territory of an enemy in order to threaten that rival with precise and consistent airstrikes.


Will the Ukraine War End in 2025?

Zalmay Khalilzad

There are four reasons why the coming year could be the year the Ukraine war ends—and plenty of reasons why it might continue for the foreseeable future. Principal among these is the huge gap between Putin and Zelensky on potential terms. The factors favoring an end to the war appear to be gaining. What are these factors?

First, there is Ukraine’s brilliant and bold military move into Russia in the Kursk region. In the short term, it has been very impactful, bringing the war home to Russia and demonstrating that Russia is vulnerable. This development has likely made Putin’s continued war more controversial among Russians. The attack against Russia has also been a morale booster in Ukraine. During much of 2024, the Ukrainians were struggling militarily and suffering economically, resulting in waning support for the war. The attack also slowed the decline in Western political support for the war in Ukraine. It has imposed additional military and reputational costs on Russia. And if the occupation of Russian territory can be sustained, this can be a bargaining chip in any negotiations about the end of the war.


Islamist terrorism is staging a barbaric comeback

TOM SLATER

Islamist terror has returned to Europe. But in truth, it never really went away.

On 23 August, the German city of Solingen was the scene of an all too familiar and barbaric crime.

Issa Al H, a suspected member of Islamic State, slashed at the necks of people in a crowd, as they gathered to celebrate the city’s 650th anniversary.

He killed three people and injured eight more.

Islamic State swiftly took responsibility, calling this murderer a ‘soldier’, and hailing the attack as an act of ‘revenge for the Muslims in Palestine and elsewhere’.

The killer is a Syrian asylum seeker, who was slated for deportation last year to Bulgaria – the place where he had first registered for asylum.

He only managed to stay in Germany because he was not at his asylum accommodation when immigration officials showed up to collect him.


Where is American empire’s fall taking us all? - Opinion

Richard D Wolff

The evidence suggests that empires often react to periods of their own decline by over-extending their coping mechanisms.

Military actions, infrastructure problems, and social welfare demands may then combine or clash, accumulating costs and backlash effects that the declining empire cannot manage.

Policies aimed to strengthen empire—and that once did—now undermine it. Contemporary social changes inside and outside the empire can reinforce, slow, or reverse the decline.

However, when decline leads leaders to deny its existence, it can become self-accelerating. In empires’ early years, leaders and the led may repress those among them who stress or merely even mention decline.

Social problems may likewise be denied, minimized, or, if admitted, blamed on convenient scapegoats—immigrants, foreign powers, or ethnic minorities—rather than linked to imperial decline.

Netanyahu's Lust for Power Is Getting Israeli Hostages Killed | Opinion

Menachem Z. Rosensaft

Let's unpack the essence of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's utterances at Monday's disastrous press conference. In a nutshell, he told the Israeli public, he told the anguished families of the still surviving hostages held captive by Hamas in Gaza and the grieving families of the murdered ones, he told President Joe Biden, he told Diaspora Jewry, he told Hamas, he told the world that he never intended to make any deal to rescue any of the hostages, that he will never make such a deal, and that his narcissistic, egocentric intention is to continue waging war in Gaza, perhaps forever.

That's the gist of his belligerent and bellicose comments. He made clear that everything he ever said to the contrary to Biden, to Vice President Kamala Harris, to Secretary of State Antony Blinken, to French President Emmanuel Macron, to anyone, was a sham, a subterfuge, a delaying tactic, an outright lie.

Israel's war goals, Netanyahu declared defiantly, were "to destroy Hamas, to bring back all of our hostages, to ensure that Gaza will no longer present a threat to Israel, and to safely return the residents of the northern border," adding that "three of those war goals go through one place: the Philadelphi Corridor," a narrow 14 kilometer-long (8.7 miles) stretch along the Egyptian-Gaza border, which, he contended, "is Hamas's pipeline for oxygen and rearmament."

Did Communism Really Fall?

Sean McMeekin

Whenever the foreign news is especially depressing, I like to reminisce about the halcyon days of 1989, when the fall of the Berlin wall so memorably illustrated the collapse of Communist tyranny in eastern Europe, or 1991, when a still relatively sober Boris Yeltsin stared down an “anti-democratic” coup mounted by stodgy Soviet bureaucrats and then grandly outlawed the Russian Communist Party, perpetrator of so many crimes in the USSR, Europe, and Asia. If domestic affairs get me down, I recall fondly the atmosphere of 1994 and 1995 when, as a wide-eyed Stanford undergraduate in the heart of Silicon Valley, I witnessed the exciting launch of the World Wide Web, with its heady promise of new liberties dawning in cyberspace.

The reverie does not last long. Even in 1989, I have to remind myself, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), demonstrating ruthlessness that the last Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev fortunately lacked, had placed a giant asterisk on the “fall of Communism” narrative by slaughtering hundreds of demonstrators in Tiananmen Square. Since the West followed China down the Covid path of forcible quarantine, Orwellian “contact tracing” and online surveillance and censorship in 2020—enabled, to my shame, by Stanford University’s now-disbanded “Internet Observatory”—the failure of Communist-style statist tyranny to die off is hard to ignore. We should not forget that President Yeltsin lost in court when the Communist Party sued to be reinstated in 1992; it is still the second-largest political party in Russia. In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the aggressive western sanctions (and Russian counter-measures) that followed it, relations between Moscow and the West are now colder, by many measures, than at the height of the Cold War. As for the vaunted World Wide Web, compare a typical headline from its muse, Wired magazine, in 1995 (“Save Free Speech in Cyberspace!”) to today (August 19, 2024): “The Pentagon is Planning a ‘Drone Hellscape’ to Defend Taiwan.”

Strategic Failure: The Biden Administration and Ukraine

Stephen Blank

For two and a half years the Biden Administration has had a policy of not letting Kyiv win lest Russia escalate. At the same time, it clearly does not want Russia to win as it has often stated. Not only does this policy rest on untenable foundation it virtually trumpets the absence of a strategy for victory, its fear of escalation, and thus allows Putin to continue in the clear belief that the West lacks the will to prevail. Moreover, this astrategic and intellectually bankrupt policy surrenders the vital process of escalation dominance to Moscow who continues making threats it cannot or will not carry out, but which clearly intimidate key allies like the U.S. and Germany.

Worse yet this policy is not only based on a non sequitur for if Ukraine does not win it loses and Russia wins. The arguments underlying the policy of procrastination, taken in their totality reveal an Administration more frightened of its partner and ally Ukraine winning than it is of the opportunity to advance long-standing U.S. interests in Europe or globally. There are numerous examples of this procrastination if not outright obstruction in the Administration’s policy even beyond the glaring lack of a strategy or desire for victory. Indeed, the first and possibly most devastating, failing is the Administration’s staunch refusal to entertain the possibility of any strategy whatsoever, a sure guarantee of a negative outcome. The second example of Administration failure is the unbroken record of the Administration’s consistent procrastination on virtually every weapons request from Ukraine since 2022, a policy that forced Ukraine to conceal the Kursk offensive from states who would otherwise be its partners. Worse, despite all the talk of support as long as it takes, many weapons deliveries continue to be held up due to obsolescence of parts, ongoing issues with supply chains, bureaucratic obstruction, and the overall unreadiness of our defense industrial sector. These are pervasive problems throughout the Administration. For example, despite an agreement that took too many months to negotiate on promoting the integration of the U.S. and Ukrainian defense industrial sectors at the end of 2023, as of this writing nobody has been appointed to this position due to bureaucratic obstruction and this process continues to languish consigning this vital process to a bureaucratic limbo.

The Deep Roots of Trump’s Isolationism

Charles Kupchan

The mainstream U.S. foreign policy establishment views former President Donald Trump as a dangerous neo-isolationist, completely out of step with American ideals and interests. Internationalists at home and abroad shudder at the prospect of Trump’s potential reelection in November, fearing that he would dismantle the liberal order that the United States and its allies have built and defended since World War II.

Such fears are justified; Trump may indeed seek to do away with at least some core elements of the U.S.-led liberal order. But to portray his “America first” approach as a dark deviation from the American experience is to misunderstand its deep historical and ideological roots, as well as its considerable political appeal. Trump’s statecraft is a response to a changing world and to demand signals from the U.S. electorate, not a capricious effort to take apart the world that the United States made.

None of this is to deny that Trump’s return to office could be disastrous. At home, he may well imperil American democracy. Abroad, Trump’s mere reelection would set the world on edge. U.S. allies would have to face the reality that their security guarantor—the globe’s premier power—has been beset by intractable political dysfunction; they would have no choice but to question Washington’s long-term reliability and make other plans. Meanwhile, autocrats would be emboldened and the cause of democracy everywhere debilitated.

US tech giant unveils latest artificial intelligence chip

Mariko Oi

The firm has an 80% market share and hopes to cement its dominance.

In addition to the B200 "Blackwell" chip, its chief executive Jensen Huang detailed a new set of software tools at its annual developer conference.

Nvidia is the third-most valuable company in the US, behind only Microsoft and Apple.

Its shares have surged 240% over the past year and its market value touched $2tn (£1.57tn) last month.

As Mr Huang kicked off the conference, he jokingly said, "I hope you realise this is not a concert."

But Bob O'Donnell from Technalysis Research who was at the event told the BBC that "the buzz was in the air".

"I haven't seen something like this in the tech industry in quite some time," he said.

"In fact, some people were making analogies to the early days of Steve Jobs types of presentations."

How the Debate Will Test Harris and Trump

Brian Bennett

When Vice President Kamala Harris and former President Donald Trump step onto the debate stage in Philadelphia at 9 p.m. on Tuesday night, it will mark the first time the two politicians have ever met. The evening is set to present crucial tests for both candidates in a race that polls show to be in a statistical dead heat.

For Harris, the 90-minute debate will be the first chance for many voters to hear her lay out in detail her policy ideas and see how she performs under pressure.

“She needs to fill in the blanks that voters may have,” says Kevin Madden, who was a senior advisor and spokesman for Mitt Romney's 2012 presidential campaign. “What direction are you going to take the economy? How are you going to make me feel more safe and secure? Do you understand the problems of people like me?”

For Trump, the moment will test his ability to contain his instincts to belittle his political opponents, a trait that electrifies many of his hard-core supporters but could turn off the swing voters he needs to win.

South Korea summit to target 'blueprint' for using AI in the military

Joyce Lee

South Korea convened an international summit on Monday seeking to establish a blueprint for the responsible use of artificial intelligence (AI) in the military, though any agreement is not expected to have binding powers to enforce it.

More than 90 countries including the United States and China have sent government representatives to the two-day summit in Seoul, which is the second such gathering.

At the first summit was held in Amsterdam last year, where the United States, China and other nations endorsed a modest "call to action, opens new tab" without legal commitment.

"Recently, in the Russia-Ukraine war, an AI-applied Ukrainian drone functioned as David's slingshot," South Korean Defence Minister Kim Yong-hyun said in an opening address.

He was referring to Ukraine's efforts for a technological edge against Russia by rolling out AI-enabled drones, hoping they will help overcome signal jamming as well as enable unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to work in larger groups.

"As AI is applied to the military domain, the military's operational capabilities are dramatically improved. However it is like a double-edged sword, as it can cause damage from abuse," Kim said.


Russia Offsets Ukraine’s Kursk Offensive – OpEd

M.K. Bhadrakumar

Russian President Vladimir Putin has outwitted the West by his response to Ukraine’s Kursk offensive one month ago, which was widely celebrated as a tipping point in the conflict. The conflict is indeed at a tipping point today, but for an entirely different reason insofar as Russian forces seized the folly of Ukraine’s deployment of its crack brigades and prized Western armour to Kursk Region to reach an unassailable position in the most recent weeks in the battlefields, which opens the door for multiple options going forward.

On the contrary, the West finds itself in a ‘Zugzwang’, a situation found in chess whereby it is under compulsion to move when it would rather prefer to pass.

Putin’s address to the plenary of the 9th Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok on Thursday was eagerly awaited for what he had to say on the conflict in Ukraine. Several things stood out.

Putin no longer characterised the Ukrainian interlocutors as the ‘Kiev regime.’ Instead, he used the expression ‘Kiev government’. And he summed up: “Are we ready to negotiate with them? We have never given up on this.” Was he being a taunting poser, as the Kremlin leader who has tangoed with four American presidents already, expects a fifth with an “infectious” laugh, which makes him “happy.”

From Ransomware to Ransom War: The Evolution of a Solitary Experiment into Organized Crime

Max Smeets

Historically, discussions on cyber conflict have primarily centered on the involvement of state-sponsored or affiliated groups. Yet, the growing prominence of criminal actors – specifically, ransomware groups – now demands a shift in attention. Ransomware, a type of malicious activity where hackers lock access to files or systems until a ransom is paid, increasingly threatens both citizen safety and global stability. In 2022, the majority of the U.K’s government’s crisis management “Cobra” meetings were convened in response to ransomware incidents rather than other national security emergencies. According to Sami Khoury, the head of the Canadian Center for Cyber Security, the threat from nation-states remains significant but cybercrime, of which ransomware is the most disruptive form, is “the number one cyber threat activity affecting Canadians.” The Swiss National Cybersecurity Centre warns that ransomware could pose an “existential threat” to businesses and government agencies.

It starts with the adoption of better encryption techniques by criminals, enabling them to effectively hold data for ransom. The use of botnets subsequently expanded their operational reach, while there was also a shift away from prepaid card systems in favor of crypto-currencies such as Bitcoin, which provided anonymity and ease of transaction. Following these developments, the emergence of Ransomware as a Service (RaaS) allowed for a better division of tasks within the cybercriminal community, making it easier for newcomers to participate. Tactics evolved further to include double extortion, where attackers threaten to publish stolen data unless a ransom is paid. The final shift saw the professionalization of ransomware groups. It also increased their intent and capability to target major organizations, maximizing their ransom potential. I refer to the ransomware groups at the forefront of this troubling trend in the criminal ecosystem as ransom war groups.

AI and the A-bomb: What the analogy captures and misses

Kevin Klyman, Raphael Piliero

When OpenAI released ChatGPT in the fall of 2022, generative AI went global, gaining one million users in days and 100 million in months. As the world began to grapple with AI’s significance, policymakers asked: Will artificial intelligence change the world or destroy it? Would AI democratize access to information, or would it be used to rapidly spread disinformation? When used by the military, could it be used to spawn “killer robots” that make wars easier to wage?

Technologists and bureaucrats scrambled to find ways to understand and forecast generative AI’s impact. What other revolutionary technological achievement combined the hope of human advancement with the lingering dangers of massive societal destruction? The obvious analogue was nuclear weapons. Within months, some of the leading scientists in machine learning signed a letter that claimed “mitigating the risk of extinction from AI should be a global priority alongside other societal-scale risks such as pandemics and nuclear war.” Elon Musk went further, stating AI poses a “significantly higher risk” than nuclear weapons. United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres proposed creating an International Atomic Energy Agency equivalent to promote the safe use of AI technology, while OpenAI CEO Sam Altman has suggested a Nuclear Regulatory Commission for AI, akin to the agency that regulates the operation of nuclear plants in the United States.


Is Artificial Intelligence The Next Easy-Money Bust? – OpEd

Justin Murray

Since early 2022, the big buzz in the tech industry, and among laymen in the general public, has been “artificial intelligence.” While the concept isn’t new—AI has been the term used to describe how computers play games since at least the 1980s—it’s once again captured the public’s imagination.

Before getting into the meat of the article, a brief primer is necessary. When talking about AI, it’s important to understand what is meant. AI can be broken down into seven broad categories. Most of the seven are, at best, hypothetical and do not exist. The type of AI everyone is interested in falls under the category of Limited Memory AI. These are where large language models (LLMs) reside. Since this isn’t a paper on the details, think of LLMs as complex statistical guessing machines. You type in a sentence and it will output something based on the loaded training data that statistically lines up with what you requested.

Based on this technology, LLMs can produce (at least on the surface) impressive results. For example, ask ChatGPT 4.0 (the latest version at the time of writing) the following logic puzzle:

This is a party: {}

This is a jumping bean: B

The jumping bean wants to go to the party.

It will output, with some word flair, {B}. Impressive, right? It can do this same thing no matter what two characters you use in the party and whatever character you desire to go to the party. This has been used as a demonstration of the power of artificial intelligence.