Indian Strategic Studies: 09/09/24

9 September 2024

Can Europe and India deepen ties through critical raw materials cooperation?

Emil Havstrup & Louise van Schaik

Critical Raw Materials Dependencies

In 2023, the European Commission introduced the Critical Raw Materials Act. The legislation seeks to both identify potential supply chain risks for materials deemed critical for European Industry and the wider green energy transition1 . India has launched a similar domestic initiative, identifying 30 CRMs in a report envisioned as a roadmap for a more self-reliant India2. Both parties have begun to refer to these supply chain risks as “threats”, spurring global competition for control of these resources3.

These policy initiatives fit into a wider global pattern of a desire for greater diversification within the mineral supply chain to reduce existing dependencies. This has become ever more prominent in recent years with rising demand for these goods, which in the case of lithium alone is expected to increase 89-fold by 20504. In large part, the growing demand is linked to the growing renewable energy capacity that requires critical raw materials. Renewables now account for over 21.8% of the overall energy share among the European Union member states5. In India, renewable sources accounted for 20.5 percent of India’s electricity generation in 2022.6 In particular, solar energy has helped support the growing demand for energy in the country7

However, the supply chains for these minerals have increasingly become unstable. The Covid-19 pandemic revealed how major shocks to global trade can hamper the reliable supply of goods8. In addition, much of the global supply chain underpinning these industries is based in or around Chinese refining and mining conglomerates. China is the main refiner and supplier of resources such as graphite, germanium, rare earth minerals (REE), etc.9, 10. China has been willing to use its role as a major supplier of CRMs to apply political pressure when needed.

The West’s undermining of democracy

Brahma Chellaney

With great-power rivalries again at the centre of international relations, democratic governments have been relying on secret statecraft to shape or sway regimes in weaker states, including by supporting or aiding regime change. Far from advancing democracy globally, these efforts are exacerbating its vulnerabilities at a time when authoritarianism is on the rise.

To be sure, local militaries—with or without external backing—remain the leading drivers of regime change. In Pakistan, for example, the military reasserted its traditional dominance over government in 2022, when it engineered the ouster of Prime Minister Imran Khan. In Bangladesh, the military recently took advantage of a violent student-led uprising to compel Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to flee the country, before installing an interim civilian-led administration headed by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus.

But external powers also often play a key role in driving regime change. Yes, the mechanisms remain murky. Since strategic skullduggery rarely leaves any political fingerprints, intervening powers can plausibly deny involvement, leaving independent analysts struggling to distinguish fact from fiction.

The Revolving Door Of Nepali Politics – Analysis

Anil Sigdel

Instability is the norm in Nepali politics. The multiparty democratic system revolves around power-hungry politicians, short-lived, unnatural alliances and high-profile corruption cases.

Following the 2022 elections, Nepali Congress, with 89 seats, and the Communist Party of Nepal–Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN–UML), with 78 seats, are the first and the second largest parties respectively in the 275-seat House of Representatives. Former prime minister Puspa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’ previously led a coalition comprised of his party, the Communist Party of Nepal–Marxist Center and CPN–UML. Prachanda, who has served as prime minister for three non-consecutive terms, had maintained his grip on power by switching sides in quick succession.

But Prachanda began to punch above his weight of 32 seats in the parliament by taking steps that further widened the differences between him, the CPN–UML and the opposition party Nepali Congress. The result was that CMN–UML and Nepali Congress formed a coalition to oust him. Prachanda left office on 6 July 2024, replaced by CPN–UML leader Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli.

ASEAN Handbook

Introduction

This comprehensive resource has been written for the diverse and varied audience of policymakers, practitioners, social workers, and other professionals involved in rehabilitation and reintegration programmes in Southeast Asia.

The handbook provides an in-depth understanding of the complex processes involved in rehabilitating and reintegrating individuals who have been involved in violent extremism and terrorism. It underscores the importance of tailored, individually focused strategies that are sensitive to the unique vulnerabilities and needs of each individual.

By navigating through the various sections of the handbook, users can learn about methodologies for rehabilitation and reintegration (R&R) and explore the role of data aggregation, information dissemination, and resource mapping in the creation of effective R&R programmes. The handbook is structured in two primary sections, detailing both pre-release and post-release scenarios, which acknowledges the unique challenges and opportunities inherent in each phase of the rehabilitation and reintegration process.

Young People Challenging Violent Extremism Online: Insights from Asia

Primitivo III Cabanes Ragandang

It focuses on the 2013–2023 online presence of 13 youth organisations, namely: KRIS (Philippines), Youth for Peace Movement Davao de Oro (Philippines), United Voice for Peace Network Inc. (Philippines), Global Peace Youth (Philippines), Students Against Violence Everywhere, Paiman Alumni Trust, Sri Lanka Unites, Youth for Peace (Cambodia), Sambisig, Team Pakigsandurot, MasterPeace, Youth for Peace Philippines Cordillera Youth Brigade and College of Youth Activism and Development.

Based on data scraped from more than 130 social media posts, the report highlights the dynamics of youth‐led CVE efforts online, and discusses at strategic planning, content creation and organisational challenges.

The study identifies the dual approach of young people in CVE work across both online and offline spaces. The predominant use of digital platforms to document offline activities suggests that for many, the online platform is secondary, pointing to the challenges of internet access in certain regions of Asia.

Limited internet access in marginalised communities emerges as a significant barrier, underlining the need for more inclusive online participation. Organisational hurdles include communication issues, resource constraints, team dynamics and visibility challenges, particularly where messaging is too localised.

Biden’s Record on China Leaves Big Problems for His Successor

Hal Brands

US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan traveled to Beijing last week for what the White House called “candid, substantive, and constructive” — in other words, contentious — talks with Chinese officials. Sullivan’s visit is his first to China in his current role. But it probably marks one of the last major attempts at diplomatic engagement between President Joe Biden’s administration and the government of Xi Jinping.

It also offers a chance to take the measure of Biden’s record on China, one that features historic achievements, glaring weaknesses and unanswered questions.

Biden’s team likes to call its China strategy “invest, align, compete”: invest in core US strengths, align with friendly countries, and thereby compete effectively where American and Chinese interests clash. Add a fourth verb — “talk” — and you have a framework for evaluating the administration’s approach.

US domestic investments are most notable in advanced and emerging technologies. This administration steered legislation through Congress promoting generational investments in semiconductors and clean-energy technology, two vital sectors in the clash for economic and geopolitical power.

Africa can and should get more from China

Theo Neethling

China’s relationship with Africa is vital to Beijing’s efforts to expand its influence in the Western-dominated world order. China is Africa’s most significant trading partner and a crucial source of continental investment, hence the importance of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation to both.

The forum’s summit, which takes place every three years, provides a platform for China to showcase its global influence and for African nations, both individually and collectively, to engage with the world’s second-largest economy on political and economic matters.

This year’s summit is an opportunity for Africa to find a way through the challenges of the post-Covid era. Previous summits have yielded tangible benefits for African nations. For instance, Kenya has become the largest exporter of flowers to China, with annual exports valued at US$800 million, since the eighth China-Africa summit in Dakar in 2021.

Another positive spin-off linked to the opening of new trade between African countries and China since 2021 is the promotion of e-commerce. This, for instance, has enabled Ethiopian coffee to be exported to China. And, through the China-Africa Peace and Security Fund, Chinese finance and equipment was channelled towards the African Peace and Security Architecture.

Cognitive Combat China, Russia, and Iran’s Information War Against Americans

Bradley Bowman

Introduction

China, Russia, and Iran are waging an information war against the United States, yet many Americans do not realize they are under attack. Nor do they appreciate that developments on the battlefield of ideas and beliefs can have a decisive impact on the security and way of life Americans enjoy. This lack of awareness is ideal for Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran — predators like nothing better than hunting slumbering prey.

Americans may not realize they are already in an information war because adversaries attempt to conceal their activities. To make matters worse, Americans often think of international conflict consciously or subconsciously in the context of kinetic war — soldiers, ships, and aircraft battling one another on land, at sea, or in the air. So, when there is no overt conflict, Americans can be lulled into a false sense of security.

This propensity works to the advantage of China, Russia, and Iran, which view conflict with the United States more like a dial than a two-way switch.1 These adversaries turn the dial’s intensity up or down as needed, but hostile intentions toward the United States and attacks in the information domain remain constant regardless of whether a ‘shooting war’ is underway.

Chinese Research in Space-Based Space Surveillance

Dr. Randy Liefer

Space Surveillance is a subset and contributor to space situational awareness (SSA), which in turn, is a subset and contributor to space domain awareness (SDA). To clarify the purpose and scope of this paper, these three terms are defined and their relationships illustrated.

SDA is the overall understanding of the space operational environment required to enable planning and execution of space operations involving satellites, supporting ground assets, plus the ground-to-space, space-to-ground and space-to-space communications links that connect satellites, users and operators.1 The space operational environment encompasses active satellites (their locations, capabilities and intentions), orbital debris, space weather, terrestrial weather, policies, politics, and intelligence. SDA activities include collecting raw observables, identifying physical states and parameters (such as orbit, attitude, size, shape), determining functional characteristics (such as active vs. passive, thrust capacity, payloads), inferring mission objectives (such as communications, weather), identifying behaviors, and predicting credible threats and hazards.2

SSA is a subset of space domain awareness that focuses on the orbital segment. SSA is the requisite foundational, current, and predictive knowledge and characterization of space orbital objects including live satellites, dead satellites, and debris. It provides planners, users and operators with knowledge and characterization of objects in orbit to ensure safe, stable, and sustainable space activities.3

How Close Is Iran to the Bomb?

Jay Solomon

If Iran ever builds a nuclear bomb, then we’ll be living in a drastically more dangerous world. For more than two decades, avoiding that reality has motivated American foreign policy, with decidedly mixed results. Now, recent activities at a secretive office inside Tehran’s Ministry of Defense is stoking fears that we’re far closer to that day than many experts understand.

Two separate documents—about a half dozen pages written in Farsi—obtained by The Free Press reveal how Iran’s parliament, or Majlis, is significantly expanding the funding and military pursuits of the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research, known by its Farsi language–based acronym, SPND. The pages of legislation, passed this summer, were downloaded from the parliament’s website, but are being detailed for the first time in the Western press.

While the new Iranian legislation doesn’t specifically mention nuclear bomb development, it clearly states that SPND’s mandate is to produce advanced and nonconventional weapons with no civilian oversight. The legislation, which The Free Press translated, states that “this organization focuses on managing and acquiring innovative, emerging, groundbreaking, high-risk, and superior technologies in response to new and emerging threats.”

Beware of Big Tech Steering AI Regulation

PETER G. KIRCHSCHLÄGER

Last October, the European Commission adopted a new roadmap to fight drug trafficking and organized crime, one of the most serious security threats facing the bloc. For obvious reasons, European Union policymakers did not invite cartel members to help design and develop this strategy; asking for input from criminal networks would have only made it easier for them to continue operating with impunity.

What a Trump Victory Would Mean for the US Economy

Joseph E. Stiglitz

The US presidential election in November is critical for many reasons. At stake is not just the survival of American democracy, but also sound stewardship of the economy, with far-reaching implications for the rest of the world.

American voters face a choice not only between different policies, but between different policy objectives. While Vice President Kamala Harris, the Democratic nominee, has yet to detail her economic agenda fully, she likely would preserve the central tenets of President Joe Biden’s program, which include strong policies to maintain competition, preserve the environment (including reducing greenhouse-gas emissions), reduce the cost of living, maintain growth, enhance national economic sovereignty and resilience, and mitigate inequality.

By contrast, her opponent, former President Donald Trump, has no interest in creating a more just, robust, and sustainable economy. Instead, the Republican ticket is offering a blank check to coal and oil companies and cozying up to billionaires like Elon Musk and Peter Thiel. It is a recipe for making the US economy weaker, less competitive, and less equal.

Russian aerospace manufacturers re-make and re-model

Piotr Butowski

Despite its war in Ukraine, Russia went ahead with its annual International Military-Technical Forum (or ‘Army’), albeit with restrictions. The forum was also more modest than in previous years, shortened to just three days, from 12–14 August, with no days open to the public. Army 2024 used only the Patriot Expo pavilions in Kubinka, with all other events cancelled.

With the biennial Moscow air show cancelled for this year, two of the country’s aerospace manufacturers used Army 2024 to showcase projects. Uninhabited-aerial-vehicle specialist Kronshtadt unveiled a new design of its Grom (Thunder) uninhabited combat air system concept. Yakovlev, meanwhile, displayed a light-attack variant of its Yak-130 Mitten advanced jet trainer.

Back in view

A full-scale mock-up of Grom was debuted at Army 2020. This year, Grom appeared again in public. While the concept remains the same, the platform is new. The revised design was actually on display at Army 2023 but in a restricted section of the show.

The 2020 Grom was a low-observable design intended to be fitted with two Ukrainian Ivchenko-Progress AI-222-25 turbofan engines, the same engine that is used in the Yak-130. The general designer at Kronshtadt at that time was Nikolai Dolzhenkov, formerly of Yakovlev and the designer of the Yak-130.

Washington’s hesitancy on digital-trade diplomacy

On 26 July 2024, Australia, Japan and Singapore announced that 81 countries had consented to the release of a draft agreement that, once adopted, would facilitate global electronic commerce. This was the most notable achievement since formal negotiations began via the World Trade Organization (WTO) in January 2019. The negotiating group debating how best to harmonise digital-trade rules eventually grew to 91 countries and territories. The United States was among the ten that did not sign off on the draft, which was ‘due to domestic consultations and considerations’, as noted in a footnote.

At the time of the announcement, Washington released a statement from Ambassador María Pagán, the chief US envoy to the WTO, noting that ‘the current text falls short and more work is needed, including with respect to the essential security exception’. The type of security exception favoured by the US would allow signatories to bypass the terms of the agreement if following them would harm national security (by, for example, exposing sensitive software source code). In late 2023, US Trade Representative Katherine Tai announced that Washington would withdraw its support for key items on the agenda of the Joint Statement Initiative (JSI) on E-Commerce, as the initiative is called, so US abstention did not come as a surprise.

It will take further negotiations for the parties to reach a comprehensive agreement that can be implemented, a process that will likely take years, but US resistance casts some doubt on whether a broad global push to reform long-outdated digital-trade rules can succeed. Some had thought that the administration of US President Joe Biden would be able to resolve its major concerns regarding regulatory autonomy and security in 2024, but with less than five months remaining before the inauguration of a new president, this now appears unlikely.

Ukraine’s Kursk Offensive: One Giant Blunder?

Brent M. Eastwood

Was the Ukrainian Kursk Incursion One Big Mistake?: It was bound to happen. One side would eventually break the stalemate and rush through an opening in the front lines in Ukraine. The Ukrainian army was the first to do so in the Kursk Oblast on August 6. The Ukrainians sent an estimated 1,000 troops with tanks and armored vehicles through a weak point in the Russian lines on the first day of the incursion.

The invasion was an initial success as Russian troops gave up and scattered or became prisoners. By the end of the first week, Ukraine controlled 390 square miles of Russian territory and later ended up with 500 square miles in gains.

But what happens next and can Kyiv keep the momentum going? That seems to be the question the entire world is asking–and the news is not all positive.

Kursk Offensive: Russia Paid the Price at First

Kursk was seen as a considerable triumph done with surprise and confidence. Ukraine finally had their breakthrough, and they were going to make Russia pay in territory, men, and material.

Ukraine could use the land they gained in Kursk (100 settlements, towns, and villages) as a jumping-off point to grab more territory from the Russians.

Is the U.S. relationship with Israel still worth it?

K. Ward Cummings

As the anniversary of 9/11 approaches, I find myself asking out loud a question I’ve whispered to myself often since the Twin Towers came down: Is the U.S. relationship with Israel worth it?

This was a lot easier to answer during the Cold War, when the U.S. supported Israel in order to counterbalance Soviet influence in the region. But, that was a long time ago, and though the Russians are still active in the Middle East, it’s not on the same scale.

Stable oil markets are also a longtime reason we have supported Israel, but that situation is changing too, as the U.S. is now the leading producer of oil on the planet.

Of course, Israel continues to help the U.S. in many important ways politically in the region. But I still feel compelled to ask: Is that enough?

The U.S. has paid a heavy price for our relationship with Israel over the years — not just in treasure, but also in blood. According to the 9/11 Commission, U.S. support for Israel was a key reason for the attacks on Sept. 11, 2001.

The Evolving Context for Deterrence

Stephen Cimbala & Adam Lowther

The member-states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) face an unprecedented challenge in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and their threats to employ nuclear weapons against NATO.1 There is also the potential risk of Chinese aggression against Taiwan; should the United States come to the aid of Taiwan and China attack the United States, the US would likely seek support under Article 5 of the NATO charter. Either directly or indirectly, Europe cannot avoid the consequences of a war in the Pacific. This makes it imperative for NATO member-states that deterrence holds.

The following discussion identifies eight of the most important challenges facing alliance efforts to maintain deterrence. The reality of modern deterrence is that it is more uncertain, and difficult to maintain because of the added complexities of the cyber and space domains and additional post-Cold War geopolitical variables. With both the space and cyber domains playing a prominent role that did not exist during the Cold War and new technologies reshaping deterrence, understanding deterrence is certainly a more pressing need than ever before.

Ukrainian Resistance to Russian Disinformation

Todd C. Helmus & Khrystyna Holynska

Introduction

Nation-states have increasingly turned to the sowing of false narratives and online influence operations as a tool of statecraft. The Oxford Internet Institute, for example, identified 81 nations that used government or political party actors to manipulate online opinions. This figure is up from 70 identified in 2019, 48 in 2018, and 28 in 2017.1 In addition, Diego Martin and colleagues documented a significant rise in the number of influence campaigns “advocating controversial viewpoints and spreading disinformation,” from 1 detected in 2011, to 18 and 16 in 2016 and 2017, respectively. Thirty such campaigns were ongoing as of 2020. Russia, Iran, and China—key U.S. adversaries—were among the most prolific in authoring such campaigns.

With this rise in internet-enabled disinformation, we can already observe that warfare will not be immune from such efforts. Russia famously and systematically operationalized disinformation in its cold war against the United States.3 False narratives were a common refrain in the Syrian war and included false claims about the White Helmets, the Syrian humanitarian organization that worked to save victims of Syrian air strikes, as well as denials about Syrian use of chemical weapons.4 False narratives about the threats to Russian speaking Ukrainians in the east and south of Ukraine fueled the annexation of Crimea and start of the war in Donbas.5 The Israeli war against Hamas, spurred by the October 7 Hamas attack against Israeli settlers, has also proved a breeding ground for false claims.6 Indeed, the 2,500-year-old maxim “In war, truth is the first casualty,” attributed to Aeschylus, the father of Greek tragedy, remains as true as it ever was.

Army Cyber Institute (ACI)Cyber Defense Review, Summer 2024, v. 9, no. 2

Data In The Cybersecuirty Landscape

Cyber Data Sanitation: A Cyber Revival at the Heart of the Next Data Battle

The Importance of Analytic Superiority in a World of Big Data and AI

Emerging Technologies for Data Security in Zero Trust

An Introduction to Quantum Computing and Its Applications

Data as Ammunition

Overcoming the Labeled Training Data Bottleneck: A Route to Specialized AI

Leadership Matters

Army University PressMilitary Review, July- August 2024, v. 104, no. 4

2024–2025 Dubik Fellows: Demonstrating the Pen Is Mightier than the Sword

The NATO Strategic Concept on Its Seventy-Fifth Anniversary

Who in NATO Is Ready for War?

NATO’s Most Vulnerable Flank, but Not for the Reasons We Think

From the Hindu Kush to the Banks of the Dnieper: NATO’s Promise and Peril in a New Reality

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Architects of Training: Assessing How TRADOC Makes Soldiers for the All-Volunteer Force

Marketing Authoritarianism: How Putin and Xi Cultivate Isolationism

What’s the Big Idea?: Major General Fremont and the Foundation of an Operational Approach

The Queen of Battle: A Case for True Light Infantry Capability

Little Spoon [poem]

How the 10th Mountain Division Is Going Back to Its Alpine and Mountain Roots

Hunter Electromagnetic Spectrum: A Model to Both Train and Advance Modernization Efforts

Light Infantry Logistics: Transforming from the Global War on Terrorism

Finnish Joint Air-Ground Integration: Building Allied Partner Capability

Lead Climbers: Noncommissioned Officers Drive Change in the 10th Mountain Division

Army War College PressParameters, Autumn 2024, no. 54, no. 3

The Forward Edge of the Fifth US Army War College

Avoiding the Escalatory Trap: Managing Escalation during the Israel-Hamas War

The Challenges of Next-Gen Insurgency

A Long, Hard Year: Russia-Ukraine War Lessons Learned 2023

Why the Afghan and Iraqi Armies Collapsed: An Allied Perspective

Restoring Priority on Cultural Skill Sets for Modern Military Professionals

Operating Successfully within the Bureaucracy Domain of Warfare: Part Two

The Fallacy of Unambiguous Warning

Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander: A Reappraisal

Resources Designed to Promote Professional Discourse

The Military and the Election: Thinking through Retired Flag Officer Endorsements

Exploring Strategy in India

Why the EU Should Never Be a Military Actor

Jakub Grygiel

The United States needs militarily strong European allies that are capable of holding Europe’s frontiers in the east and south against the threats of an imperial Russia and unstable North Africa.

Grief and Fury in Israel

Ruth Margalit

The news that the bodies of six young hostages had been found in an underground tunnel in Gaza, after eleven months of war, sent hundreds of thousands of Israelis out on Sunday evening, in one of the largest protests in the country’s history. By nighttime, Israel’s largest labor union had declared a rare general strike. Even Ben Gurion Airport shut down for several hours. The marches continued on Monday, and there is no telling when they will ebb. The nation seems once more at a breaking point.

It wasn’t the first time that several of the roughly two hundred and fifty hostages seized by Hamas terrorists on October 7th had been killed. Just this June, four other hostages were pronounced dead, including two over the age of eighty; their bodies are still being held in Gaza. I went to the vigils that followed those deaths. They were sizable, charged, and emotional—but nowhere near the outpouring of public fury unleashed this time around.

Perhaps the difference was that the killing of the six hostages by Hamas appeared to many Israelis to have been preventable. The Army has confirmed that all six—ranging in age from twenty-three to forty—were alive until just a few days ago, possibly as late as last Friday. According to the Israeli authorities, they were executed by their captors at short range. That knowledge, combined with reports that Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s Prime Minister, had insisted on adding demands to a proposed ceasefire deal that would have seen the hostages’ release, fuelled the public outcry. Three of the slain hostages had been expected to be freed in the deal’s first phase.

Authoritarian Countries’ AI Advantage

Angela Huyue Zhang

Last year, the United Arab Emirates made global headlines with the release of Falcon, its open-source large language model (LLM). Remarkably, by several key metrics, Falcon managed to outperform or measure up against the LLMs of tech giants like Meta (Facebook) and Alphabet (Google).

Four Fallacies of AI Cybersecurity

Chad Heitzenrater

As with many emerging technologies, the cybersecurity of AI systems has largely been treated as an afterthought. The lack of attention to this topic, coupled with increased realization of both the potential and perils of AI, has opened the door for the development of various AI cybersecurity models—many of which have emerged from outside the cybersecurity community. Absent active engagement, the AI community is now positioned to have to relearn many of the lessons that have been developed by software and security engineering over many years.

To date, the majority of AI cybersecurity efforts do not reflect the accumulated knowledge and modern approaches within cybersecurity, instead tending toward concepts that have been demonstrated time and again not to support desired cybersecurity outcomes. I'll use the term “fallacies” to describe four such categories of thought:

Cybersecurity is linear. The history of cybersecurity is littered with attempts to define standards of action. From the Orange Book (PDF) to the Common Criteria, pre-2010s security literature was dominated by attempts to define cybersecurity as an ever-increasing set of steps intended to counter an ever-increasing cyber threat. It never really worked. Setting compliance as a goal breeds complacence and undermines responsibility.

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