Indian Strategic Studies: 09/08/24

8 September 2024

Quo Vadis Bangladesh?

Calvin Nixon

Introduction

On August 5th, 2024, Sheikh Hasina got deposed as Prime Minister of Bangladesh.1 This marked the end of a remarkable era in Bangladeshi politics, as Hasina reigned at the top of Bangladesh since coming to power for a second time in 2009, after previously serving from 1996 until 2001.2 Being the head of the secular-minded Awami League (AL)3 , Prime Minister Hasina oversaw a Bangladeshi economy which registered extraordinary growth rates until the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic.4 While her time in office was marked by positive stories such as a successful garment industry5 , declining child mortality6 , a vastly rising GDP per capita7 and her government’s fight against Islamist extremism, 8 these achievements were paralleled by growing authoritarianism.9 Thus, the AL was virtually unopposed in its parliamentary rule since 2014 when the main opposition party – the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) – boycotted the elections.

Hasina’s ouster from power came only months after she got reelected in an election that was widely perceived as neither free nor fair and which again got boycotted by the BNP.11 Protests against the Hasina government started in early June in response to the reinstation of a 30 percent quota for descendants of freedom fighters of the Bangladesh War of Independence in 1971. This reversed a decision made by the Hasina government in 2018 on the same matter.12 Resultingly, students felt that they did not receive a fair opportunity on the job market, as the quota targeted coveted jobs in the state bureaucracy.13 Due to the government’s violent response to the initial protests and the worsening economic situation, the protests quickly spread throughout Bangladesh. As the government responded with increasing violence and introduced daily curfews and internet shutdowns14, the Hasina government seemed to not only quickly loose support domestically, but also came under international pressure.

Sheikh Hasina’s Ouster Has Muddied South Asia’s Waters – Analysis

P. K. Balachandran

India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and China, are all impacted, for better or worse.

The ouster of the Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina by a student-led movement on August 5, has muddied South Asia’s waters. India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and China, are all impacted, for better or worse. Hasina’s exit in a cloud is a grave setback for India, but it opens new opportunities for the US, China, and also Pakistan.

The ouster has caused acute anxiety in India because Hasina was New Delhi’s protégé. India’s anxiety is reflected in the frenzied comments in Indian television debates, news reporting and expert opinions aired in seminar halls.

While government of India has not commented on the developments in Bangladesh, Indian think tanks and the media have attributed Hasina’s overthrow to a conspiracy hatched by Pakistan, the US and China.

India’s Stakes

The new government in Dhaka is not anti-India at least on the face of it. But it is certainly not going to be India’s camp follower as Hasina’s government was. One of the popular charges against Hasina in the movement against her was that she was India’s puppet.

The internet under attack

Dr James Shires & Isabella Wilkinson

Many aspects of modern conflict are increasingly defined by the internet and digital technologies. The concept of resilience is essential to understanding the complex web of incentives, interests and dependencies that have come to define how the internet and these technologies work – and, often, do not work – in conflict and crisis.

To aid understanding of how different actors use the internet and digital technologies in such scenarios, this research paper proposes a distinction between two types of resilience – technical and sociopolitical. Technical resilience focuses primarily on technological systems constituting the internet, while sociopolitical resilience refers to the human networks and groups that both maintain those technological systems and ensure they are available to use.

The paper draws on two case studies for key insights on elements of internet resilience such as digital infrastructure, conflict dynamics and policy priorities. The first case study discusses internet resilience in the context of events before, during and after the Western coalition’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. The second reflects on the interplay of technical and sociopolitical resilience in relation to Russia’s war on Ukraine. Each study is a demonstration of how internet resilience is crafted and contested – and how decisions taken in conflict or crisis situations can have significant consequences for the resilience of the internet at the global and local levels.

Decoding Social Media’s Role In Taliban 2.0 And Its Implications For Afghan Youth – Analysis

Muhammad Akran, Asim Nasar and Shama Perveen

The resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan (here- after Taliban 2.0) following their takeover on Aug. 15, 2021, marked a significant turning point in the nation’s socio-political landscape (Akram et al., 2023). Amidst their two-decade-long resistance, the Taliban employed various tactics, including the strategic use of social media platforms, to influence public narratives and consolidate their power. Other tactics included, but were not limited to, addressing people’s grievances in rural areas, continuous messaging about their will to retake the country, and framing themselves as the true warriors of Islam (Misra, 2002).

The usage of social media by extremist groups and individuals to radicalize for violent extremism is a threat that goes beyond any one country (Almoqbel & Xu, 2019). The under-controlled spread of misinformation on social media helps extremist groups to disseminate radical and violent beliefs to a wide range of audiences. With minimal financing, social media can spread propaganda to the wider population (Nakov & Martino, 2021). Social media platforms allow people of diverse backgrounds and worldviews to share their opinions in an open and unstructured way, but on the other hand, it has also eased mass radicalization by extremist groups (Gallacher et al, 2021; Ul Rehman et al, 2021). Since moral intuitions are central to defining human behavior, extremist groups target people’s moral intuitions to propagate their radi- cal and extremist ideologies (Hopp et al., 2021). Young people, especially between the ages of 15 to 24 who spend comparatively more time online, are highly vulnerable to radicalization amidst their higher chances of exposure to hateful and extremist content online (Costello et al., 2020).

Islamic State’s remarkable and terrifying staying power

Busra Nisa Sarac

Austrian authorities announced the arrest of two people on August 7 for planning attacks on large events around Vienna, including Taylor Swift concerts. The suspects, a 19-year-old who was known to security services and a 17-year-old, are Austrian citizens believed to have been radicalized by extremist Islamist propaganda from Islamic State (IS) and Al-Qaeda.

These foiled plans were followed by a knife attack in the west German city of Solingen on August 23 that killed three people and wounded eight others. IS claimed responsibility for the attack the following day.

To understand the message that IS intended to send through these attacks, we must consider how the group operated both at its peak and after its 2019 defeat, when the final stretch of the group’s territory was liberated in Baghuz, Syria.

Between 2014 and 2016, IS gained international media attention for its campaign to establish a so-called Islamic caliphate in Iraq and Syria. The group recruited men and women from over 80 countries and committed atrocities against minorities including Kurds, Shabaks, Christians and Yazidis in the territories across Iraq and Syria that fell under its control.

Operation Neptune Spear: The Most Important American Special Operatio

Practitioners

On May 2, 2011, the world received a historic announcement from President Barack Obama: Osama bin Laden, the mastermind behind the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, was dead. The news echoed worldwide, signifying a significant turning point in the War on Terror. The U.S. Navy SEAL Team 6 successfully conducted the raid, known as Operation Neptune Spear, in Abbottabad, Pakistan. This operation not only eliminated the most wanted terrorist in the world but also showcased the unmatched capabilities of American special operations forces. This essay will delve into the circumstances leading up to the operation, the meticulous planning and execution of the mission, the command structure involved, and the impact of the operation on the Global War on Terror. Lastly, it will explore why Operation Neptune Spear is considered the most critical and successful special operation in American history.

Osama Bin Laden and the Need for His Elimination

Osama bin Laden, the founder of al-Qaeda, became a household name on September 11, 2001, when his terrorist organization orchestrated the deadliest attack on American soil, killing nearly 3,000 people and forever altering the course of U.S. foreign policy. Bin Laden's vision was to wage a holy war against the United States and its allies, whom he perceived as enemies of Islam. His ability to inspire and coordinate acts of terror worldwide made him an extreme threat to global security. Following the 9/11 attacks, bin Laden became the prime target of U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Despite an intense manhunt, he managed to evade capture for nearly a decade, moving between Afghanistan and Pakistan, shielded by loyal followers and a sophisticated network of supporters.

Hoodwinking Sri Lanka’s Minority Tamils On Devolution Of Power – Analysis

P. K. Balachandran

Promises made in the Presidential election manifestos are unlikely to be implemented given past experience and also in the context of current priorities.

The minority Tamils of Sri Lanka have been promised devolution of power since the India-Sri Lanka Accord was signed in 1987. The J.R. Jayewardene government even got the 13 th. Amendment (13A) of the constitution passed by an overwhelming majority in parliament.

But till date, the 13A has not been implemented in full with devolution of the powers over the police and State land. As of now, what goes as devolution is only a shell comprising an elected Provincial Council and a Board of Ministers. Moreover, over the years, the Centre has seized powers that had been devolved using the Concurrent List in the 13A.

But come national elections, whether Presidential or Parliamentary, political parties in the fray make promises to the Tamils about devolving power to the provinces either in the form of a fully implemented 13A or in the form of an entirely new constitution drafted as per a consensus evolved in parliament.

In China, Jake Sullivan cements a triumph of quiet diplomacy

Ann Scott Tyson

As Americans prepare to celebrate Labor Day, U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan has been working overtime to keep the United States’ most crucial diplomatic relationship on an even keel.

Mr. Sullivan’s efforts paid off this week, as he made the first visit by a United States national security adviser to China in eight years, held unexpected talks with top Chinese leader Xi Jinping, and landed a rare meeting with China’s most senior military officer, General Zhang Youxia.

The three-day visit paved the way for a phone call in coming weeks between President Joe Biden and Mr. Xi, and for a possible in-person meeting later this year.

“Intense diplomacy matters,” Mr. Sullivan told a Beijing press conference as he wrapped up his visit late Thursday. His Beijing trip capped a series of unpublicized meetings he had held over the past 15 months with China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi.

During a U.S. campaign season in which many American politicians are hostile to China, this quiet diplomatic effort by Washington and Beijing has succeeded in reversing the past few years’ dangerous tailspin in relations between the world’s two superpowers, experts say.

US Navy’s Achilles Heel In Indo-Pacific Gives Edge To China; Pentagon Banks On Asian Allies To Boost Its Navy

Ritu Sharma

In the coming decade, the US Navy will be stretched thin to counter the burgeoning numerical strength of the Chinese PLA Navy in the Indo-Pacific. The US Navy that will deliver the wrath of the US beyond its border has an Achilles Heel—not the lack of warships but trained crew to man those warships.

The shortage of qualified mariners is forcing the US to sideline 17 support ships, impacting the logistics backbone of the force.

A plan drafted by the Military Sealift Command suggests that to resolve the shortage of qualified mariners, the US Navy will dock the vessels for extended maintenance periods as its crew is redistributed.

The “force generation reset” would involve 12 spearhead-class Expeditionary Fast Transports (EPF), 2 Lewis and Clark-class replenishment ships, 2 forward-deployed Navy Expeditionary Sea bases, and 1 fleet oiler.

The proposed plan awaits a nod from Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Lisa Franchetti. This would help cut the demand for 600-700 billets. Reports suggest that roughly 4,500 billets are needed for mariners across various US support ships, with a ratio of about 1.27 mariners per billet.

Why It’s So Hard for China to Fix Its Ailing Econom

Daisuke Wakabayashi and Claire Fu

In 2004, as China’s economy was emerging as a global force, a group of researchers started conducting nationwide surveys asking Chinese people if they were better off financially than they were five years earlier.

The percentage who felt wealthier climbed when surveyed five years later and again in 2014, when it reached a high of 77 percent.

Last year, when respondents were asked the same question, that figure dropped to 39 percent.

The results of that survey, titled “Getting Ahead in Today’s China: From Optimism to Pessimism,” speak to a new reality. China’s economy is confronting a crisis unlike any it has experienced since it opened its economy to the world more than four decades ago. The post-Covid rebound that was supposed to bring the economy roaring back to life was more like a whimper.

A few years ago, Beijing resolved to wean its economy from its dependence on an overheated real estate market, a sector that had underpinned the savings of families as well as China’s banking sector and local government finances. Now, the property sector is in crisis. Developers collapsed, leaving behind huge debts, a trail of failed investments, unsold apartments and lost jobs.

No One Should Think the War Will Be Short

Commander Justin Cobb

It is prudent to consider how a conflict over Taiwan might unfold. Within military circles, there is growing fatalism and an almost dogmatic certainty that China will strike first and target both U.S. and Taiwanese forces simultaneously in a Pearl Harbor–style surprise attack, but is that the most likely or most dangerous possibility?1

Chinese revisionism and designs for Taiwan could spur conflict that ranges from economic and political gray zone contests at one end to a massive preemptive conventional assault on the other.2

Across the range of possibilities, if conventional war breaks out between the United States and China, any notion of a short war with defined off-ramps fought solely over Taiwan’s independence seems naïve.3 The Chinese Communist Party has staked its legitimacy on reunification and stated it would “pay any price,” which points to the unlikely availability of off-ramps.4 Several recent articles have pointedly noted that a fixation among the United States and its allies and partners on a “short, sharp war” could have disastrous consequences.5 A reflexive desire to immediately surge forces into combat and win a rapid victory also is misaligned with current capabilities, risk tolerances, and escalation management principles.6 Worse still, short-war thinking encourages misaligned force design decisions prior to conflict and risk management decisions during it. Stunning an enemy and killing him are two different things, and both the United States and China must consider what comes next after a first, violent clash.7 Ample research suggests surprise attacks and/or large-scale aggression are highly likely to invoke the human psychology for revenge, leaving rational cost-based analysis by the wayside as the desire to strike back at all costs takes the forefront.

US-China AI competition + Deng Xiaoping's 120th birthday + South China Sea

US-China AI competition could reshape innovation as we know it

In July, two tech leaders, Sam Altman (OpenAI) and Marc Zuckerberg (Meta), outlined opposing visions for how the United States can secure its artificial intelligence (AI) leadership amid strategic competition with China. Their op-ed exchange showed how closely our global technology future is tied to an increasingly zero-sum China debate in the United States. In the background is a new draft bill, the ENFORCE Act, that would take AI export controls to a new level, controlling not just hardware exports, but also access to the models themselves.

Policymakers in Washington increasingly worry that foreign adversaries like China’s government could exploit powerful machine learning models for dangerous purposes, such as developing weapons of mass destruction or launching cyber-attacks. Congress is now working through the details of the ENFORCE Act, which would allow the Commerce Department to impose export controls on AI models with capabilities that could threaten US national security. So far, US export controls targeting China have focused on the chips needed to train AI. Open-source models would likely be exempted, yet the Biden administration is reportedly thinking through the risks of keeping certain frontier models fully open.

Likely in preparation for more AI restrictions, Altman’s OpenAI in June blocked Chinese developers entirely from using its ChatGPT, following earlier actions against malicious uses of its services by state-affiliated actors. In his op-ed, Altman said that some security restrictions are warranted to ensure the US stays ahead. He envisages a future where a US-led club of democracies keeps control of the most advanced AI capabilities.

China reaps most benefits of the Africa relationship

Bhaso Ndzendze

The ninth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Beijing September 4-6 takes place under the theme of “Joining hands to advance modernization and build a high-level China-Africa community with a shared future.”

But how shared can that future be between the Asian economic giant and Africa?

The eight summits since 2000 have not resulted in mutual gain, particularly in trade and industrialization for Africa. China has reaped most of the benefits. The fault lies with Africa’s lack of a strategy for engagement with China.

I am a scholar of international relations and have researched Africa-China relations over several years.

The China-Africa cooperation forum has become the most important event on the African international relations calendar. More African leaders attend these summits than show up for the United Nations general assembly. Data shows that the forum attracts 40 to 60 African heads of state and government, far more than any other regular summit with a single country. The US-Africa Leaders Summit in December 2022 saw participation by 45 heads of state and government and 49 countries, but it is far less frequent. The previous one was in 2014.

Geopolitics of the Houthi Red Sea Campaign

Haydee Dennard, Bela Koshy, Ana Martín Gil, Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Jim Krane

Since October 2023, attacks by Yemen’s Houthi militants against civilian shipping in the Red Sea have created havoc along one of the world’s busiest maritime trade routes. These attacks have produced the third major disruption to global supply chains since 2020, coming on the heels of interruptions arising from the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Shipping firms — particularly those with ties to Israel or its allies in the United States and Europe — have been forced to reroute their vessels around the southern tip of Africa, adding costs and delays to cargoes. This issue brief examines the strategic and economic significance of the Houthi attacks, which have been motivated by the war in Gaza and abetted by geopolitical shifts in the region.

It also summarizes a discussion — hosted by the Baker Institute Middle East Energy Roundtable in May 2024 —led by the following experts:

Elisabeth Kendall, president of Girton College at the University of Cambridge.
Mohammed Ayatollahi Tabaar, fellow for the Middle East at the Baker Institute.
Christian Dwyer, shipping and offshore specialist and partner at Schjødt.
The Honorable David M. Satterfield, director of the Baker Institute.

A Way Forward in the Israeli Hostage Crisis

Mickey Bergman

As we approach the one-year mark since the horrific events of Oct. 7, 2023, it’s time to recognize that the methods attempted so far to gain the release of the remaining 101 hostages held in the Gaza Strip—including four American citizens—aren’t working. President Biden has failed to get Israel and Hamas to accept a ceasefire and a prisoner exchange despite months of prodding. Israeli rescue attempts have had only limited success. Israel said on Sunday that during a recent military operation, its troops discovered six hostages who had been killed by their captors, including Hersh Goldberg-Polin, an American Israeli who had been one of the faces of the hostage ordeal—and whose parents spoke at the Democratic National Convention last month. Goldberg-Polin and the others did not have to die.

It’s Congress, Stupid

Julian E. Zelizer

Americans love to focus on presidential campaigns. The House of Representatives and Senate receive some attention every now and then, but our political love affair tends to center on the race for the White House. When congressional elections gain some attention, it usually happens during the midterms when political junkies don’t have much else to talk about.

The Narrow Bottleneck of Ukraine-Russia Reconciliation

Elena Davlikanova

Introduction

The end of Russia’s war in Ukraine — whether through Ukraine’s victory or defeat, a frozen conflict, or a negotiated settlement — will not automatically lead to lasting peace between the two largest powers in Eastern Europe. In the name of sustainable peace, Western leaders are likely to advocate for a rapid postwar reconciliation process, focusing on one or more of the following three reconciliation mechanisms:

Instrumental reconciliation through symbolic rapprochement and enhanced cooperation across various domains.
Historical reconciliation through transitional justice and truth-seeking.
Structural reconciliation through political and social reform.

However, rushing Ukraine into reconciliation without substantial changes in Russia risks increasing insecurity. Western policymakers should take a pragmatic approach to Russia’s imperial ambitions, carefully considering if and how to apply reconciliation methods, with a clear understanding of both historical and current contexts.

In essence, genuine reconciliation requires depth change in the Russian Federation, which may take generations and involve political reform and a shift in the prevailing mindset among the majority of its population. Insisting on democratic reforms in Russia is essential to avoid perpetuating insecurity.

Center for Security Studies, Georgetown UniversityGeorgetown Security Studies Review, February 2024, v. 12, no. 1

The Role of Conventional Counterforce in NATO Strategy: Historical Precedents and Present Opportunities

The Rise of Iran’s Cyber Capabilities and the Threat to U.S. Critical Infrastructure

Constructive Competition: A Strategic Framework for U.S. Engagement and Policy Alternatives to the Belt and Road Initiative

Assessing the Efficacy of U.S. Policy in The Sahel: A Multifaceted Approach

The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Islam for Legitimation in the Aftermath of the Second Chechen War

Marine Corps University PressJournal of Advanced Military Studies, Fall 2024, v. 15, no. 2

Maritime Militias: Disrupting Naval Operations in the Pacific Theater and the case for Intermediate Force Capabilities in the Maritime Domain

Rescuing the Unreachable: Personnel Recovery and Resupply in a Contested A2/AD Environment

Land Power in the Littoral: An Australian Army Perspective

Reconnaissance-Strike Tactics, Defeat Mechanisms, and the Future of Amphibious Warfare

Bringing Clarity to Stand-in Forces: How Operational Art and Science Provide the Linkage between Stand-in Forces, Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, and Reconnaissance/Counterreconnaissance Operations

Houthi Motivations Driving the Red Sea Crisis: Understanding How Ansar Allah’s Strategic Culture Goes Beyond Gaza and Iran

Oceans Are Now Battlefields: How the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps can Counter North Korea’s Navy in an Evolving Age

Fires from the Shore: Supporting the Fight for Sea Control

China’s “Second Battlefield”: Political Warfare in Combat Operations

Selecting San Carlos: The Falklands War, 1982

National Defense University PressJoint Force Quarterly (JFQ), 114, ( 3rd Quarter, July 2024)

The Future of Great Power Competition: Trajectories, Transitions, and Prospects for Catastrophic War

Deviance and Innovation: Change in a “Society of Saints”

Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response: The Imperative of an All-Domain Approach

Was 50 Years Long Enough? The All-Volunteer Force in an Era of Large-Scale Combat Operations

Balancing Nonresident Joint Professional Military Education With Military Life

Jointness as Virtue: Increasing the Value of Joint Qualification to the Joint Force and Services

Engines of Chaos: Counterlogistics in Competition

The Marine Corps the United States Needs

After Afghanistan: The Need for a New Noncombatant Evacuation Operation

A New Army Air Force

Cognitive Warfare: The Fight for Gray Matter in the Digital Gray Zone

The World Is Not About Us: Information and Power in the Current Strategic Environment

Winning in the Competition Continuum with Engineer Civic Assistance Projects

Five Truths for Foreign Area Officers

Integrate to Win From Competition Through Conflict: Create a Joint Force Information Warfare Component Commander

Russia deploys rare air defense system on Crimea bridge

Dylan Malyasov

This deployment was recently highlighted in images published by the Telegram channel “Crimean Wind,” showcasing the system’s placement on the critical infrastructure.

Satellite images confirm that the ‘Pantsir’ system has been present on the bridge for at least a month, indicating a long-term strategy to protect this vital route from potential Ukrainian strikes.

The specific variant deployed is an export model featuring an armored cabin mounted on a KamAZ-53958 chassis, and it is painted in desert camouflage. Notably, this version appears to have been a unique prototype, previously featured in the Victory Parade in Tula and exhibited at the “Army” forum.

This ‘Pantsir’ model, designated as ‘Pantsir-S1M’, boasts several enhanced tactical and technical specifications over standard models, including increased range and altitude capabilities for engaging air targets. It can employ two types of missiles, the 57E6M-E and the 57E6-E, both integral to the ‘Pantsir-S1’ systems.

Ukraine’s Air War

George Friedman

The ground war in Ukraine appears to have come to a halt. There is, of course, continued movement at the tactical level, but a definitive outcome is not in the offing. The gridlock has made the air war all the more important.

In some ways, it is a logical evolution. The war began as a ground war, with Russia engaging but failing to break Ukrainian forces. Kyiv responded with ground operations designed to disrupt Russian movements, essentially throwing them off balance. There was little doubt in the minds of many that Russia had the manpower and the capability to take key cities, and that over time it would win the war. But in war, little doubt is a dubious foundation. For over a year, Ukrainian troops resisted the Russian advance. Yet in spite of all this – not to mention the political crisis and attempted coup in Moscow, the mounting casualties, and a declining enthusiasm in Russia for the war – it was still assumed that Russia would ultimately win the conflict.

Many wars have bogged down to a bloody grind. All too often, the country that won was the one that had more blood to spare. In World War II, the ground war was indeed bloody, but it was met by the relatively new concept of mechanized air power. Air power had three strategic goals: to add firepower to offensive operations; to directly attack vital military installations without ground forces; and to undermine the morale of civilian populations through the loss of non-combatants and infrastructure. Except for the one time when it was decisive in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, air power, disruptive and devastating as it can be, has never really decided the outcome of a war.

Putin Will Never Give Up in Ukraine

Peter Schroeder

Two and a half years after Russia invaded Ukraine, the United States’ strategy for ending the war remains the same: impose enough costs on Russia that its president, Vladimir Putin, will decide that he has no choice but to halt the conflict. In an effort to change his cost-benefit calculus, Washington has tried to find the sweet spot between supporting Ukraine and punishing Russia on the one hand, and reducing the risks of escalation on the other. As rational as this approach may appear, it rests on a faulty assumption: that Putin’s mind can be changed.

The evidence suggests that on Ukraine, Putin simply is not persuadable; he is all in. For him, preventing Ukraine from becoming a bastion that the West can use to threaten Russia is a strategic necessity. He has taken personal responsibility for achieving that outcome and likely judges it as worth nearly any cost. Trying to coerce him into giving up is a fruitless exercise that just wastes lives and resources.

There is only one viable option for ending the war in Ukraine on terms acceptable to the West and Kyiv: waiting Putin out. Under this approach, the United States would hold the line in Ukraine and maintain sanctions against Russia while minimizing the level of fighting and amount of resources expended until Putin dies or otherwise leaves office. Only then will there be a chance for a lasting peace in Ukraine.

‘AI gold mine’: NGA aims to exploit archive of satellite images, expert analysis

Sydney J. Freedberg Jr.

The director of data and digital innovation at the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency said the NGA has started training artificial intelligence algorithms on its unique trove of visual and textual data.

This data is “an AI gold mine,” said Mark Munsell. That’s not just because it consists of large amounts of well-labeled, well-organized, and carefully vetted data, accumulated over decades by the intelligence agency tasked with compiling and analyzing geospatial data for policymakers from the president on down. It’s also because this data is what experts call multi-modal, combining images with text descriptions.

Contrast that to how GenAI companies are feverishly scraping everything from Reddit posts to YouTube captions in their desperate quest for training data — and that’s all pure text, without any ability to cross-reference other kinds of sources.

“We’re in the early days of some really cool experiments,” Munsell told the annual INSA Intelligence & National Security Summit on Tuesday. “Those experiments involve taking the visual record of the Earth that we have from space … and merging it with millions and millions of finely curated humans’ reports about what they see on those images.”

Navigating the shifting sands of open source

Aaron Tan

The world of open source is undergoing significant transformation, moving away from its roots in individual developer contributions to become increasingly dominated by technology companies. This shift brings opportunities and challenges, as the motivations and priorities of these corporations can sometimes clash with the ethos of open collaboration.

Take the move by HashiCorp last August to transition from the Mozilla Public Licence to the more restrictive, “source-available” Business Source Licence for future releases of Terraform, a popular infrastructure-as-code tool. The decision rattled the community, prompting the creation of OpenTofu, a community-driven fork of Terraform.

In a wide-ranging interview with Computer Weekly on the sidelines of KubeCon + CloudNativeCon + Open Source Summit in Hong Kong, Chris Aniszczyk, chief technology officer of the Cloud Native Computing Foundation (CNCF), talks up the challenges of navigating the global open source landscape, future directions at the CNCF and the motivations behind the surge of open source projects emerging from China.

Defence Digital Strategy and Roadmap 2024

On the 27 August 2024, the Minister for Defence Personnel and Minister for Veterans’ Affairs, the Hon Matt Keogh MP, launched the Defence Digital Strategy and Roadmap 2024.

Highlighted in the Defence Strategic Review 2023 and subsequent 2024 National Defence Strategy (NDS) is the critical role that digital technology plays in defending Australia and its national interests.

Informed by the NDS and 2024 Integrated Investment Program, the strategy and roadmap define Defence’s approach to deliver a secure, integrated and scalable digital environment able to fight and win in the digital age.

The roadmap represents Defence’s 9 dimensions of information and communication technology capability focus areas over the next 3 years, with the delivery of digital effects underpinned by the strategy’s 3 core priorities:

Best-in-class Australian Public Service/Australian Defence Force workforce.
Best-in-class global platforms.
Best-in-class sovereign capabilities.

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