What a Kamala Harris Administration Would Mean for India

Akhilesh Pillalamarri

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The politics of the United States have been upended in the past few weeks from the attempted assassination of Republican candidate Donald J. Trump to the sitting Democratic President Joe Biden’s decision not to seek another term. Biden’s vice president, Kamala Harris, has stepped into his shoes to run as her party’s candidate for the office of president of the United States.

What would her presidency mean for India?

Kamala Harris is half-Indian, born in California to a mother from Tamil Nadu and a father from Jamaica. Her parents met and married in the United States, before separating and getting divorced. Growing up, she visited her maternal family several times in Chennai, and apparently enjoys South Indian food such as dosas. Beyond this, it is unclear to what extent Harris has a strong cultural connection to India, let alone to the politics and geostrategic concerns of her mother’s homeland. Raised a Baptist Christian — her father’s religion — and married to a Jewish man, she has not spoken much about her Hindu heritage in public.

Throughout her adult career, she has been identified more with the Black community than the Indian American one. As her political career progressed — she served as a senator from California in the U.S. Senate before becoming vice president — Harris has done little to highlight her Indian heritage or support Indian causes. As vice president, she has not visited India. In short, despite her Indian heritage, Harris does not seem to bring to the India-U.S. relationship any special cultural connection, nuance, or attention.

Nuclear Security Takes Priority Amid India’s Renewed Push for Nuclear Power

Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan

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India is witnessing a revival of its nuclear energy ambitions. In June 2024, the government announced plans to increase the country’s nuclear power generation capacity by approximately 70 percent by 2029. Announcing the ambitious target, Science and Technology Minister Jitendra Singh revealed that India will achieve this target by adding seven new reactors and focusing on developing indigenous technology.

These plans received a significant boost last week when India’s second home-built 700 MW pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR), at Kakrapar Atomic Power Station in Gujarat, began operating at full capacity. India is building 14 more such reactors, as it aims to reach an installed capacity of 100 GW by 2047. There are also plans to build 40-50 small modular reactors based on the PHWR technology.

Earlier this year, India also achieved a critical milestone in operating its first indigenous fast breeder reactor (FBR) with 500 MWe capacity at Kalpakkam, Tamil Nadu. FBR technology is enormously beneficial because of its minimum nuclear waste generation, thereby reducing the reliance on large-scale waste repositories. Once commissioned, India will be the second country after Russia to operate a FBR. Additionally, reports suggest that India and Russia are discussing the possibility of building six more nuclear power units in India.

India’s ambitious nuclear energy plans are a key element of its energy security, as it aims to attain the target of net-zero emissions by 2070. India’s expanding nuclear energy program also brings attention to India’s nuclear security policies and regulatory practices, which continue to play a pivotal role in preventing unauthorized access, proliferation, and other security risks.

CIA deputy director wrongly claims the Taliban is combatting Al Qaeda

Bill Roggio

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In the latest effort by US officials to simp for the Taliban, David Cohen, the deputy director of the CIA, claims the Taliban has “taken on the effort to combat” Al Qaeda. Cohen is wrong, of course, as there have been exactly zero reported Taliban operations targeting Al Qaeda’s network in Afghanistan. In fact, all available evidence shows that the Taliban’s ties to Al Qaeda have increased dramatically since the US withdrawal in August 2021.

Cohen made the outrageous claim at “a national security conference in Rockville, Maryland,” according to NBC News. He also said the CIA has kept in communication with the Taliban as it now rules Afghanistan, reminding the group of its commitment to ensure the country does not again become a staging ground for terrorist attacks abroad: “We have been engaging with them, all throughout this period, in various ways, as they have taken on the effort to combat both Al Qaeda and ISIS-K,” Cohen said[.] “And so this isn’t a 'mission accomplished' sort of thing. But it is worth noting that in Afghanistan today, the dire predictions have not come to pass,” he said.

Now, it is true that the Taliban battles the Islamic State (IS), as the two are mortal enemies. IS demands that the Taliban swear allegiance to its caliph and join its caliphate-building program, but the Taliban refuses.

Taliban 2.0 looking like the old, harsh and brutal Taliban

Kambaiz Rafi

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Until the collapse of Afghanistan’s US-backed government in August 2021, few knew clearly what the Taliban wanted once they could return to power. Some Western officials and observers hoped for a big change from the regime, which had governed the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate in the 1990s.

This time, they hoped, a more sophisticated and pragmatic vision might have replaced the Taliban’s previously extremist approach.

Some also argued that the rest of the world had a moral responsibility to approach Afghanistan’s new rulers with cautious optimism. Engagement should be the key. Anything else risked condemning the country and its population to isolation and economic hardship.

Others weren’t convinced.

During the negotiations that led to the February 2020 Doha agreement, the Taliban’s position on post-settlement Afghanistan’s politics remained ambiguous. The group continued this vague posture during the subsequent intra-Afghan dialogues with the former Afghan government.

The Real Tragedy of Afghanistan

James W. Carden

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Any story of the August 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan must begin in the earliest days of the Obama administration, when the young president, possessed with an overwhelming mandate to end the endless wars begun by his predecessor, was rolled by members of his own cabinet—most notably Secretary of State Hillary Clinton—and his top military and intelligence advisers, who together prevented the president from doing what he was sent to Washington to do: End the disastrous wars begun under George W. Bush.

Almost alone among Obama’s advisers counseling withdrawal were his vice president, Joe Biden, and Biden’s longtime adviser Tom Donilon, then serving as Obama’s national security adviser.

Twelve years later, President Biden must have felt some measure of satisfaction that it was he who was able to do that which his two predecessors, Obama and Trump, could or would not, when he ordered the final withdrawal of American troops from that Central Asian wasteland.

And yet, as with anything involving Biden and his national security team of Keystone Cops, all did not go as planned.

Paethongtarn Shinawatra, Thailand's New Prime Minister, Demonstrates the Excessive Power of the King and Royalist Elite

Joshua Kurlantzick and Pavin Chachavalongpun

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The latest member of the Shinawatra family recently rose to become head of the Thai government despite having virtually no government experience and a background in hotel management. Following the Constitutional Court’s recent verdict forcing the resignation of Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin on the grounds that he appointed an illegitimate politician to his cabinet, the ruling Pheu Thai Party decided to nominate Paethongtarn Shinawatra, the youngest daughter of longtime power broker Thaksin Shinawatra, to take the helm.

Overwhelmingly winning the vote of Pheu Thai’s parliamentary coalition, Paethongtarn became the 31st prime minister of Thailand and the second female leader of the kingdom. The other woman was her aunt, Yingluck, who was Thaksin’s youngest sister. Yingluck served as prime minister in 2011 before being overthrown in a coup in 2014.

The Shinawatra family has continued to resonate in the Thai political realm in the last two decades, demonstrating their lasting influence despite coups and other attempts to push them out of power. Dynastic politics has never gone out of fashion, whether here or elsewhere in Southeast Asia. The leaders of neighboring states like Cambodia and the Philippines are also the children of former leaders. The son of the current Indonesian president, Joko Widodo, is also poised to become president after winning the vice presidency alongside president-elect Prabowo Subianto. Indonesia’s top court, run by the president’s uncle, lowered the age of the vice presidency so he could run. As in these other states, dynastic politics in Thailand has served to entrench the influence of political clans and sustain patron-client relationships in politics—and do little to promote real democracy.

A dangerous new flashpoint is fast emerging in the South China Se

Nectar Gan and Brad Lendon

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A stretch of uninhabited, low-lying reefs in the South China Sea is fast becoming a dangerous new flashpoint between China and the Philippines, dealing a blow to recent efforts to de-escalate tensions in one of the world’s most vital waterways.

Over the past week, Chinese and Philippine vessels have engaged in multiple collisions and face-offs near Sabina Shoal, a disputed atoll lying just 86 miles from the Philippines’ west coast and 745 miles from China, which claims almost all of the South China Sea as its sovereign territory despite an international ruling to the contrary.

The violent confrontations came just weeks after Beijing and Manila struck a temporary deal to lower tensions that had been rising all summer at another nearby reef, where China’s increasingly aggressive tactics had raised alarm across the region as well as in Washington, a mutual defense ally of the Philippines.

Renewed tension in the South China Sea is expected to be on the agenda of meetings between US national security adviser Jake Sullivan and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi during Sullivan’s visit to China this week.

US security official meets China’s Xi as American election looms large over relations

Simone McCarthy

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Chinese leader Xi Jinping met with US national security adviser Jake Sullivan in Beijing Thursday as the two countries press ahead on stabilizing communication in their increasingly contentious relationship.

The meeting was the capstone of a three-day trip that also saw Sullivan hold talks with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Central Military Commission vice chairman Gen. Zhang Youxia – the first meeting between a US official and Chinese military figure in that role since 2018.

Xi said China’s “commitment to the goal of a stable, healthy and sustainable China-U.S. relationship remains unchanged,” according to a readout from China’s Foreign Ministry.

The leader expressed “hope that the US side will work in the same direction with China, view China and its development in a positive and rational light, see each other’s development as an opportunity rather than a challenge,” the readout said.

Sullivan in introductory remarks reiterated that US President Joe Biden is “committed to responsibly managing this consequential relationship to ensure that competition does not veer into conflict.”

Army Identifies China’s Emerging “Precision-Attack” Strategy

Kris Osborn

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What if a missile “in-flight” uses AI-enabled sensing and data analysis to adjust in real time to vulnerabilities within enemy defense systems? Specifically, what if multi-domain sensors use AI to instantaneously adapt course or trajectory “in-flight” because new information is discovered in a matter of seconds or milliseconds? Perhaps a defensive perimeter is less fortified in a particular area, a “gap” in an enemies defensive radar aperture is recognized or previously undetected high-value targets emerge …the idea is that an attacking long-range precision missile could be redirected by advanced, AI-enabled guidance systems leveraging multi-domain sensor data organization and analysis?

These scenarios form the basis of what a significant new Army intelligence report describes as emerging Chinese Concepts of Operation regarding long-range precision attack . This Chinese tactic, or ambition, is identified in a detailed Army Training and Doctrine Command G2 intelligence assessment referring to what it calls China’s “intelligentized C2 and ISR structure.”

“The PLA is exploring longer range precision strike systems enabled by a robust, informatized (current) to intelligentized (future) C2 and ISR structure that enhance their anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. These are tenants of the PLA’s core operational concept known as Multi-Domain Precision Warfare (MDPW),” TRADOC G2 told Warrior, referring to its published report … The Operational Environment 2024-2034 Large-Scale Combat Operations.” (US Army Training and Doctrine Command, G2),

Xi wants to enlist the Global South in his anti-American movement

Michael Schuman

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At the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation starting September 4, Beijing will once again seek to deepen its engagement with countries in the Global South. Chinese leader Xi Jinping was, to his credit, prescient in recognizing the frustrations and aspirations within the developing world and has capitalized on those sentiments to build China’s global political and economic influence. The three-day event, which the Chinese foreign ministry called “the largest diplomatic event China has hosted in recent years,” is only one of a series of programs, initiatives, and gatherings that Beijing has launched to tighten its bonds of diplomacy, business, and trade with countries throughout the Global South.

Yet over the past two years, Xi’s approach to the developing world has undergone a significant change: It has become increasingly consumed by Beijing’s geopolitical competition with the United States and its allies and partners. This shift will have major consequences for Beijing’s relations with the Global South, China’s role in the international order, and the future course of its global power.

The aim of Xi’s strategy is to build a coalition of states within the Global South to act as a counterweight to the US global alliance system and a base upon which to promote China’s political, economic, and ideological interests. Xi wants to undermine the US-led rules-based international order by creating a Chinese-led alternative order based on illiberal political principles that can roll back US influence and shape global governance through international institutions and forums.

The US military's anti-Houthi campaign still isn't working

Jonathan Hoffman & Benjamin Giltner

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For more than nine months, the United States has been engaged in an open-ended — and congressionally unauthorized — military campaign against Yemen’s Houthi movement. Citing Israel’s war in Gaza as their primary motive, Yemen’s Houthis began attacking shipping vessels transiting the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait in November 2023. In response, Washington launched a retaliatory campaign in the hopes of stopping such attacks, constituting what U.S. Navy officials describe as the most intense running sea battle the United States has faced since World War II.

The problem, however, is that it’s not working.

Washington’s approach to the Houthis is the epitome of strategic malpractice. It won’t work, costs too much, jeopardizes the lives of American servicemembers stationed in the region to protect primarily foreign vessels, and risks further destabilizing Yemen as well as the broader region. Moreover, though the Houthis maintain their own unique incentives, Washington’s refusal to acknowledge Israel’s war in Gaza as the original catalyst of the Houthis’ attacks prevents any hopes of stopping these attacks in the Red Sea. Washington should immediately end its military activity against the Houthis, press European and Asian states to take a more proactive role in protecting their own shipping vessels, and stop subsidizing Israel’s war in Gaza in the hopes of deescalating rising tensions across the Middle East.

Understanding the Global Debate on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems: An Indian Perspective

Charukeshi Bhatt and Tejas Bharadwaj

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Militaries worldwide are increasingly developing advanced weapons systems powered by artificial intelligence (AI) while simultaneously revising their military strategies to accommodate AI’s integration. Of particular concern is the emergence of lethal autonomous weapons systems, or LAWS—a class of advanced weapons that can identify and engage targets without human intervention. Reports from conflicts in Ukraine, Israel and Palestine, and Libya suggest that weapons with some autonomous capabilities may already be in use. These include systems like Saker Scout, Gospel, and Kargu-II. Many countries including China, Israel, Russia, South Korea, Türkiye, the United Kingdom, and the United States are also reported to be investing in building autonomous weapons.

The autonomous nature of these weapons has transformed human-machine interaction amid conflicts, complicating the application of international humanitarian law (IHL). Concerns have arisen over unsupervised use and potential system errors in these weapons systems that can cause unintended civilian casualties, escalate conflicts, and threaten peace. Many observers have also flagged their potential to go beyond human control, which could lead to rapid conflict escalations and probable flash wars. Further, there are concerns about these weapons being proliferated by nonstate actors such as terrorist and criminal groups. Despite these risks, some argue that LAWS could enhance IHL protections, while ethical debates question the morality of machines making life-and-death decisions.1 These humanitarian, legal, ethical, and security challenges spurred discussions within the UN Group of Governmental Experts on LAWS (GGE) under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in 2016. The GGE, composed of High Contracting Parties to the CCW, has produced numerous reports and documents offering valuable insights into each party’s stance on regulating LAWS.

A year into its cyber workforce initiative, DoD faces personnel shortages, bureaucratic hurdles

Carley Welch

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A year after the Pentagon launched a new initiative to dramatically boost its cyber workforce, it finds itself making progress but grappling to fill thousands of jobs, to accurately assess the cyber talent it has and to free up its people to learn more when the opportunity is available.

“We’re at a 28,000 shortage, which is better than we were last year, but that’s still a 28,000 shortage, so I have to get after how do we create and generate that next generation of talent,” Mark Gorak, principal director for resources and analysis for the DoD Chief Information Officer, told Breaking Defense on the sidelines of TechNet Augusta last week.

Gorak said the Pentagon has hired 12,000 people as part of the Cyber Workforce Strategy Implementation Plan, but has seen a turnover of 10,000 people in the overall staff in the same time, meaning there’s been a net positive hire of 2,000 people. For context, there are approximately 225,000 total personnel that are part of the cyber workforce, according to Gorak’s office, split between 75,000 federal civilians, 75,000 military personnel and 75,000 contractors. The DoD counts 72 positions as roles in the cyber workforce.

Filling the vacancies in the cyber workforce is one problem, Gorak said, but filling them with qualified people is a whole other issue.

The IDF’s Double Offensive: Israel’s Bold Move Against Hezbollah and West Bank Militants

Seth J. Frantzman

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On August 25, the Israel Defense Forces carried out airstrikes on dozens of targets in Lebanon, blunting a Hezbollah attack hours before the attack was expected to take place. The airstrikes, conducted by one hundred aircraft, were designed to preempt a large attack that could have wreaked havoc across central and northern Israel. Three days after preempting Hezbollah’s attacks, the IDF launched a large multi-pronged raid into Palestinian cities in the northern West Bank, aimed at defeating a growing wave of terror attacks.

The two IDF operations, seventy hours apart, illustrate a new strategy by Israel to take the initiative against Iranian-backed threats. This new strategy is important because Israel has largely been reacting to attacks since the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel that killed more than 1,000 people last year. The IDF’s reaction to that assault was to begin an air and ground offensive in Gaza. However, the war in Gaza has been slow going. The IDF recently redeployed and withdrew its 98th Division from Khan Younis. The division had been sent to southern Gaza for the second time because Hamas fighters kept returning to areas that the IDF had already taken and cleared.

Israel has been focused on the war in Gaza. It has chosen to react proportionately to threats by Hezbollah in northern Israel. Hezbollah, backed by Iran, has launched more than 7,500 rockets and 200 kamikaze drones at Israel over ten months. In addition, the Iran-backed Houthis have targeted Tel Aviv, Eilat, and commercial shipping in the Red Sea. Israel has only carried out one known retaliatory attack on the Houthis in the form of a strike on the port of Hodeidah. Iraqi-based militias and militias in Syria have also attacked Israel with drones. Israel has generally not responded to these attacks.

Ukraine’s Kursk 'Incursion': A Turning Point in the War?

Steven Pifer

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Ukrainian forces crossed into Russia’s Kursk oblast on August 6. More than three weeks later, the Ukrainians occupy some 500 square miles of Russian territory. Whether the incursion will have a strategic impact on the overall course of the war remains uncertain. However, it represents a welcome near-term success for Kyiv.

The ground war between Russia and Ukraine in 2024 has been characterized largely by the Russian army grinding out slow and costly gains, primarily in Donbas. In February, the Russians captured Avdiivka, a town of limited strategic import for which thousands of Russian soldiers paid with their lives. The Russian army has pressed on, seeking to capture the more important city of Pokrovsk. While Pokrovsk is threatened, it is not apparent that the Russians can make a breakthrough.

With the Russian focus on Donbas, the Ukrainian invasion of Kursk caught the Russian army flat-footed. Experienced Ukrainian units had little trouble crossing the border, which was largely defended by poorly-trained Russian conscripts. The Ukrainians used drones to wreak havoc on early Russian reinforcements. While the Ukrainians’ progress slowed and Russian resistance stiffened, Kyiv says it controls 100 towns and settlements in Kursk.

Interview: Ukraine's Bold Strike Into Russia Is A Tactical Win With Unclear Strategic Benefits

Vazha Tavberidze

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Emil Kastehelmi is an open source intelligence (OSINT) analyst and military history expert working at the Black Bird Group, which is headquartered in Finland and currently focused on following and analyzing Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

In a recent interview with RFE/RL's Georgian Service, Kastehelmi says Ukraine's incursion of Russia's Kursk region has caught Russian President Vladimir Putin off guard and proved that Ukraine is still capable of launching offensive actions, shifting attention from Kyiv's "problems to its achievements." But the operation is also fraught with risk, Kastehelmi argues, and its strategic value is still unclear.

RFE/RL: Let's start with a situational update of sorts, a brief summary of what has actually transpired, and how massive this incursion is in what has happened over the course of the war?

Emil Kastehelmi: Well, first of all, the Kursk offensive [is] most likely the summer offensive of Ukraine in 2024. It's not just the border incursion anymore, in my opinion. We can think about it in many ways. If we look at the gained square kilometers, it's, of course, rather successful. It has succeeded better than last year's summer offensive of Ukraine. It's the biggest offensive into Russian soil since World War II. It's also historically really a significant event.

The Israel-Hezbollah Conflict: Where It Stands

Steven A. Cook

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How significant was the weekend exchange of attacks between Israel and Hezbollah?

The Israelis have warned since the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and Hezbollah’s leader Fuad Shukr in recent weeks that they would preempt any impending retaliatory attack. That is precisely what happened on Sunday. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reportedly targeted six thousand Hezbollah rocket launchers in southern Lebanon in a significant demonstration of both force and technical capability. Even so, Hezbollah was able to launch more than two hundred rockets and drones at northern Israel, causing limited damage.

It seems clear that while the Israelis have not deterred Hezbollah from firing on Israel, the IDF’s demonstration of force against the Lebanon-based militant group over the last eleven months, combined with Sunday’s preemption, have compelled Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah to think twice about launching more significant attacks on central Israel and critical Israeli infrastructure. After declaring Hezbollah’s operation on Sunday a success (it was not), Nasrallah indicated that he would prefer to avoid any further escalation.

What are the chances of a sharp escalation between the two sides, including an Israeli ground offensive?

Israel’s Fight for the Eurasian Heartland

Anthony De Luca-Baratta, Mollie Sharfman, William Erich Ellison & Joseph Schneider Malamud

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For the last ten months, Israel and Iran have been engaged in a wide-ranging proxy war from Gaza and Lebanon to Syria and Yemen. In the aftermath of several high-profile assassinations of leaders of Iranian proxies, it appears possible the conflict will escalate even further. The Israeli-Iranian conflict, in turn, is deeply enmeshed within an ongoing cold war between a Western bloc led by the United States and a Eurasian bloc led by China, Russia, and Iran.

To the casual observer, it is apparent that the Israeli-Iranian conflict is raging across the Middle East. Analysts, including the authors, have also highlighted Israeli and Iranian involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War. Beyond these central theaters, however, the Israeli-Iranian cold war is also being waged across the Caucasus and Central Asia. Taking advantage of geopolitical flux, both Jerusalem and Tehran are trying to expand their footholds in these pivotal regions.

The onset of the Russo-Ukrainian War led to Russia’s attention being diverted from these regions, two of its traditional spheres of influence. Taking advantage of this growing vacuum, Israel and Iran have stepped into the fray. The former has been cementing its partnership with Azerbaijan and building new bonds with the Central Asian states, while the latter has been expanding ties with Armenia and refortifying its position in Central Asia. Meanwhile, Turkey, a geopolitical swing state, shifts between the Western and Eurasian camps.

Kamala Harris and Donald Trump: Who’s Really Flip-Flopping?

Jacob Heilbrunn

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Who’s flip-flopping? Kamala Harris, who explained on CNN last night that she’s not opposed to fracking? Or Donald Trump, who seemed to suggest that he’ll vote to support abortion rights in Florida?

Harris isn’t catching much flak for her shape-shifting, other than a few feeble questions from Dana Bash on Thursday evening. Still, Trump is stirring outrage among certain precincts of the right that are bemoaning his lack of avidity for crushing what’s left of abortion rights. “I’m going to be voting that we need more than six weeks,” he said about Amendment 4.

His campaign then unsaid it. Karoline Leavitt, his press secretary, said, “President Trump has not yet said how he will vote on the ballot initiative in Florida, he simply said that he believes six weeks is too short.” Say what? In trying to walk back his remark, the Trump team underscored that the issue of abortion continues to give his campaign fits.

Harris, by contrast, enjoyed a no-harm, no-foul session during an interview with CNN. But she didn’t need to hit a grand slam. What she needed to do was to avoid a blunder, which she did. Essentially, the interview was batting practice for the big game—her debate with Trump on September 10, when the two will face off for the first and probably only time.

The Fall and Fall of Mahmoud Abbas

Khaled Elgindy

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For nearly two decades, Palestinian leadership has been fractured. Along with a basic division between Hamas in Gaza and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, numerous other groups have competed for influence. In late July, leaders of all 14 Palestinian political factions, including Fatah and Hamas, met in Beijing to issue a call for national unity. The agreement they signed, known as the Beijing Declaration, promised to create a consensus government presiding over both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, to reform and expand the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and to hold national elections.

Ukraine's Kursk Offensive: No Turning Point, But a Problem for Putin

Piotr Śledź

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Ukrainian Kursk Offensive – Not a Turning Point but Still a Major Upheaval: 

The 1995 Budyonnovsk raid, amid the pursued Russian offensive in Chechnya, turned the course of the First Chechen War and underpinned Russia’s subsequent defeat. The current Kursk offensive by Ukraine will presumably not be equally decisive but one cannot ignore the operational and strategic advantages it has already brought. For the first time since last year’s failed counteroffensive, Ukraine took the initiative on the ground. If sustained, this operation can improve Ukraine’s standing against the aggressor.

Among Russia’s slow but steady advances in the Donbas Oblast, Ukrainian forces managed to repel the offensive in the Kharkiv region and make a major incursion into the Kursk Oblast. This warzone has been extended onto Russian soil. Despite some persistent risks for Ukraine, the overall push seems to have been a game-changer.

This has dramatically increased the war costs for Russia since they were forced to evacuate the local civilians, withdraw 30,000 troops already inside Ukraine, and mobilize more conscripts for defensive purposes only. This could also lead to the release of more Ukrainian prisoners of war, as almost 600 Russians have been captured.

As Europeans are arrested for what they say, how ‘free’ is Europe’s speech?

Anthony J. Constantini

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While America and Europe are two parts of one West, they have always treated the idea of “rights” differently. The former has long put a premium on individual liberties – the right to bear arms, for example – whilst the latter has long put a premium on collective rights, such as the right to healthcare. But both have always, in the modern age at least, claimed to have the individual right to the freedom of speech. However, across the continent of Europe, genuinely frightening cases of speech restrictions are becoming increasingly commonplace.

A 16-year-old was recently removed from her high school by police in Germany. Her crime? Reposting a pro-AfD video on TikTok involving the Smurfs (the populist-right party’s colour is blue). A woman in the United Kingdom was detained for silently praying outside of an abortion clinic: the land of George Orwell had someone arrested for a literal thought crime.

An Austrian woman was arrested for calling Muhammad, who married a nine-year-old girl, a paedophile. Another woman, this time in Germany, was fined €80,000 for making a Nazi salute. Again in Germany, an AfD politician was arrested and fined for claiming that migrants commit more gang rapes than German citizens do (the court did not dispute her facts, but said she was inciting hatred). The German government also recently shut down a popular right-wing news source over claims that it was extremist. And to top it off, Germany sought information from a popular social media website about a user who had anonymously posted a satirical image insulting a German politician by, among other things, calling her fat.

The National Interest Is What the President Says It Is - Opinion

Phillips Payson O’Brien

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Leaders around the world justify their foreign-policy decisions in the name of the “national interest.” Joe Biden and his aides, for example, have used the phrase to defend the administration’s approach to cybersecurity, refugee admissions, the Afghan War, and growing tensions with China. National interest is a serious notion, pregnant with ideas about collective aspirations. It evokes geopolitical goals—such as territorial expansion, military hegemony, and regional harmony—that transcend individual politicians and are pursued over the course of decades or centuries.

This view of national interest is stirring. It is also divorced from reality in most cases. As American voters prepare to elect a new president, they should take note: Although broad perceptions about what is good for a nation do play a role in shaping its foreign policy, its geopolitical strategy—even in a democracy—is determined mainly by the personal preferences of its leader.

Meta is accused of “bullying” the open-source communit

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IMAGINE A beach where for decades people have enjoyed sunbathing in the buff. Suddenly one of the world’s biggest corporations takes it over and invites anyone in, declaring that thongs and mankinis are the new nudity. The naturists object, but sun-worshippers flock in anyway. That, by and large, is the situation in the world’s open-source community, where bare-it-all purists are confronting Meta, the social-media giant controlled by a mankini-clad Mark Zuckerberg.

Survey: How Do Elite Chinese Students Feel About the Risks of AI?

Nick Corvino and Boshen Li

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Transformative artificial intelligence (AI) poses many potential benefits for humanity’s future, but it also poses many risks. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) will likely play a prominent role in shaping this trajectory. As the recent decision (决定) document from the Third Plenum meetings in July made clear, AI is one of eight technologies that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership sees as critical for achieving “Chinese-style modernization (中国式现代化),” and is central to the strategy of centering the country’s economic future around breakthroughs in frontier science (People’s Daily, July 22). Beyond the level of national economic strategy, AI is also seen as crucial for gaining military advantage. AI technology is already being integrated into air defense systems, while large language models (LLMs) are being put to use in Cognitive Domain Operations around the world (China Brief; June 21; September 22, 2023). The PRC also seeks to shape international norms on AI, including on AI risks. In October 2023, Xi Jinping announced a “Global AI Governance Initiative (全球人工智能治理倡议)” (CAC, October 18, 2023).Despite the potential revolutionary significance of AI, for either good or ill, and its increasing importance in the eyes of the CCP leadership, publicly accessible survey data on what people in the PRC think about this technology is rare. To gain insights into this question, the authors conducted a survey to assess how students at Tsinghua University and Peking University (PKU) view the frontier risks of developing AI. Tsinghua and PKU are the two preeminent academic institutions in the PRC, many of whose graduates will be very influential in shaping the country’s future. These students may also be some of China’s most informed citizens on the societal implications of AI, with both schools housing prominent generative AI and safe AI development programs.