Indian Strategic Studies: 09/02/24

2 September 2024

How the Tigers Got Their Stripes: A Case Study of the LTTE’s Rise to Power

Kate Cronin-Furman & Mario Arulthas

Crossing into LTTE-controlled territory in 2005 presented a stark contrast with the inefficient operations on the Sri Lankan side of the border. LTTE immigration officials checked passports, issued travel passes, and confirmed payment of customs duties in a matter of minutes.Footnote1 Once approved, the visitor entered Tamil Eelam, where the full-blown border service was matched by a courts system, police force, and civil administration.

Along with their operation of a remarkably robust proto-state, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, often referred to as the Tamil Tigers) are known for their sophisticated military operation, which included an effective naval wing as well as a nascent air force, and for their innovative use of violence, including both suicide bombings and cyber-attacks. The Tigers’ stunning success as an insurgent organization (until their equally stunning defeat) encourages a teleological story of their origins, which is reinforced by scholarly accounts of the era. As Sharika Thiranagama observes: “The sparse literature on the period treats popular militancy through discussions of the LTTE, which has led to accounts treating the period only as part of the LTTE’s rise to power and equating the LTTE with popular militancy and with Tamils at large.”Footnote2 But in fact, Tamil militancy in the 1980s was characterized by a profusion of competing organizations, of which the LTTE was neither the biggest nor the best armed.

In the following pages, we trace the LTTE’s emergence as the dominant Tamil militant group. On its face, the question “how did the LTTE consolidate power over its rivals” is a straightforward one. But in any context marked by intense political violence, establishing a historical record is contentious enough, never mind attempting to uncover the reasons events unfolded the way they did. And as the Tamil polity, both in Sri Lanka and the diaspora, continues to grapple with what nationalism looks like after military defeat, the question of the Tigers’ legacy is a vexed one.b Department of P

THE NEW WAY OF LIMITED WARFARE: The Value of the Afghan Model of Warfare After the Fight Against ISIS

Captain Tijs Althuizen, MA, and Professor Martijn Kitzen, PhD

INTRODUCTION

Today’s international security environment confronts the United States and its partners with unprecedented challenges. Escalating competition with China and Russia, growing assertiveness of regional powers like Iran and North Korea, the persevering threat of violent non-state actors, and even a major war on European soil present multiple dilemmas that can only be faced with the help of a versatile strategic toolkit. Current military operations rely heavily on traditional deterrence strategy. China’s military buildup and the conventional nature of much of the fighting in Ukraine as of 2024 reinforces this posture. Yet this covers only one side of the multifaceted threats we are facing. This fact especially reverberates in the special operations community, which finds itself engaged in both countering gray zone activities and the enduring fight against violent extremist organizations. This monograph seeks to contribute to the development of a broader strategic palette by analyzing the importance and utility of the so-called Afghan model (AM) as a way for achieving political ends through the employment of limited means.

Kursk Incursion Draws Delayed Response From Beijing

Arran Hope

On August 6, Ukrainian forces invaded Kursk Oblast inside the borders of the Russian Federation (Institute for the Study of War [ISW], August 6). This marked the first time that Ukraine has launched an offensive campaign into Russian territory. The operation was at first a closely guarded secret, leading to uncertainty about the nature and scale of the incursion, as well as about its objectives. Over two weeks later, a clearer picture has emerged. While the operation is still ongoing, by August 20, Ukrainian troops had advanced 17–22 miles into Kursk and taken control of hundreds of square miles of Russian territory. Over 120,000 civilians have been evacuated from the Kursk region, though bridges and transport links have been destroyed, severing supply lines for Russian combatants. So far, the operation has been fairly successful, with large numbers of Russian combat units surrendering to the advancing Ukrainian forces (Comment is Freed, August 21). Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has now stated that the operation aims to create a “buffer zone” within Russia, with the hopes of using this as part of any future negotiations (People’s Daily Online, August 19). For its part, Russia is yet to formulate a clear response. State media continues to downplay the invasion, and despite Putin’s rhetoric about responding “decisively,” its forces are apparently continuing to focus on the main battlegrounds in Eastern Ukraine. This might slowly be changing however, as senior officials begin to articulate a stance. For instance, Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council Dmitry Medvedev wrote on Telegram this week, “There will be NO MORE NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL THE COMPLETE DEFEAT OF THE ENEMY!” (Tass, August 21; Telegram/Medvedev, August 21).

Washington and Beijing Don’t Understand Each Other’s Fentanyl Positions

Yanzhong Huang and Marcel Arsenault

The United States is grappling with a major fentanyl crisis. Of the more than 100,000 drug-related deaths recorded in 2023, approximately 70 percent are attributed to fentanyl and other synthetic opioids. This staggering number of deaths far exceeds the annual fatalities from car accidents (almost 41,000) and gun-related violence (roughly 43,000). The amount of powdered fentanyl seized has increased by about 100 percent in the last two years. Fentanyl misuse has emerged as a top election issue, with 80 percent of swing-state voters considering it important in their voting decisions, outranking topics such as abortion, climate change, and international conflicts.

The Future Faces of Irregular Warfare: Great Power Competition in the 21st Century

Varsha Koduvayur, James Kiras, PhD & Richard Newton, PhD

Introduction

In October 2022, Congress created the Irregular Warfare Center (IW Center) to serve as a central mechanism for developing the irregular warfare knowledge of the Department of Defense (DoD) and to advance the understanding of irregular warfare (IW) concepts, and doctrine, in collaboration with key partners and allies.4 Two of the five tasks assigned to the Center addressed facilitating whole-of-government and whole-of-society research related to the non-military aspects of irregular conflict. More importantly, though, Congress made the point that the DoD would occupy a supporting (emphasis added) role when it came to interagency activities related to strategic competition short of war, a significant reorientation of emphasis that should help the department prioritize resources and direct efforts related to strategic competition.5 This book is the IW Center’s first research contribution to assist that effort and to tackle the first of DoD’s responsibilities toward IW: “make permanent the mindset and capabilities necessary to succeed in its current irregular warfare mission sets.”6

It should be expected that after two exhausting decades of counterinsurgency in South Asia and the Middle East and a global counterterrorism campaign, our nation’s security establishment is aching to do something different. Something different, it should be noted, that is more in line with the “business as usual” approach and institutional preferences of its Armed Service components.7 Readers who can recall the decade after the Vietnam War ended, 1975-1985, will remember a similar strategic reorientation. Then, the United States shifted its defensive focus to AirLand Battle, and that doctrine’s near-singular emphasis on deterring war with the Soviet Union.8 Meanwhile, in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, the Balkans, and across Asia, “small wars,” often proxy wars sponsored by the two superpowers competing for influence, sprang up like mushrooms after a spring rain.

Chinese hackers break into American government and military accounts

Brittany Chain For Dailymail.Com

Chinese hackers believed to be backed by the government have gained access to American government and military accounts, according to a new report.

These attacks are 'unusually aggressive and sophisticated' and have allowed hackers to gain access to at least two major internet service providers with a combined reach of millions of customers, The Washington Post reports.

The revelation comes as the United States and China take steps toward repairing their damaged relationship, with Jake Sullivan, U.S. national security adviser, travelling to the northern outskirts of Beijing for a two day meeting with Wang Yi, a senior foreign policy official for Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

'President Biden has been very clear in his conversations with President Xi that he is committed to managing this important relationship responsibly,' Sullivan told Wang before the talks got underway.

Meanwhile back home, it is understood Chinese-backed hackers have been spying on Americans via their internet service providers.

Top Biden Aide Visits China to Reinforce U.S. Strategy

David Pierson

Making another heavy push to work with China in the waning months of the Biden administration, Jake Sullivan arrived in Beijing on Tuesday for talks aimed at showing that the United States and China can manage their differences.

The U.S. national security adviser began his fifth meeting in less than 18 months with China’s top foreign policy official, Wang Yi, as the Biden administration seeks to reinforce its strategy on China despite uncertainty over the future of American foreign policy.

There is much to talk about — but probably little on which they will agree.

Mr. Sullivan plans to discuss working with China on limiting the spread of fentanyl and expanding high-level military contacts. He will also stress the United States’ position on Taiwan and its concerns about China’s support of Russia.

China indicated it would raise its own objections during the talks — including over America’s support for Taiwan, the island democracy Beijing claims, and U.S. controls on exports of technology to China.

Yemen's Houthis will let salvage crews access oil tanker they set ablaze in Red Sea

Michelle Nichols and Mohamed Ghobari

Yemen's Houthi group has agreed to allow tugboats and rescue ships to reach a damaged crude oil tanker in the Red Sea, Iran's mission to the United Nations said on Wednesday, after the Iran-aligned militants attacked the Greek-flagged vessel last week.

The Sounion tanker is carrying 150,000 tonnes, or 1 million barrels, of crude oil and poses an environmental hazard, shipping officials said. Any spill has the potential to be among the largest from a ship in recorded history.

"Several countries have reached out to ask Ansarullah (the Houthis), requesting a temporary truce for the entry of tugboats and rescue ships into the incident area," Iran's U.N. mission in New York said.

"In consideration of humanitarian and environmental concerns, Ansarullah has consented to this request," it said.

Yemen's Houthis spokesperson Mohammed Abdulsalam told Reuters on Wednesday there is no temporary truce and the group only agreed to allow the towing of oil tanker Sounion after several international parties contacted the group.

The Sounion was targeted last week by multiple projectiles off Yemen's port city of Hodeidah. There have been seemingly conflicting reports about oil escaping from the ship. Reuters has not independently confirmed if the oil is leaking or spilling from the vessel.

A Wagner Group Delivery to Hezbollah: Russia and Iran Reaffirm Mutual Objectives via Proxy Groups

Brittany Carroll

As the Israel-Hamas War continues, questions loom as to whether Hezbollah, a strong ally of Hamas and Iran, will enter the fight against Israel. Both regional and international actors remain concerned of escalation as assistance provided by countries like Iran and Russia arrives in the Levant. On 3 November 2023, The Wall Street Journal reported that, according to U.S. intelligence, Russia’s Wagner Group is planning to provide the Pantsir-S1 system to Hezbollah. This comes as Hezbollah’s leading figure, Syed Hassan Nasrallah, gave a public speech the same day, praising the organization’s fallen fighters, asserting support for Palestinian efforts in the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict, and blaming the United States for the war. Since then, Nasrallah’s speeches have not given strong indication of Hezbollah fully joining the conflict or receiving any Pantsir system. However, Nasrallah affirmed there are ongoing responses against Israel after the killing of senior Hamas member Saleh al Arouri and senior Hezbollah commander Wissam al-Tawil. So far in 2024, Nasrallah has regularly scrutinized Israeli actions, given warnings of vengeance and retaliation, and claims Hezbollah is ready to escalate if Israel escalates first. Violence and cross border attacks between Hezbollah and Israel continue, with at least 4,733 attacks in the area from October 7, 2023, and mid-March of 2024. Despite these events, both Israel and Hezbollah appear to want to avoid further escalation but vocalize their readiness in the event escalation happens.

Wagner does not seem to have already provided the Pantsir-S1 to Hezbollah as of mid-April 2024, according to publicly available information. However, the system is still expected to enter Hezbollah’s arsenal via Iran or Syria soon. In January 2024, an article from Alma Research and Education Center, an Israeli non-profit think tank, highlighted strikes against Hezbollah-affiliated structures near the border that could have potentially concealed the Pantsir system, if it was delivered. The Kremlin quickly dismissed The Wall Street Journal’s reporting on the delivery, and yet has not condemned the Hamas attacks of 7 October publicly. At the same time, the Wagner Group, now supposedly dissolved and under full Kremlin control, has yet to reply to journalist requests for comment, or make any public statements about any plans to distribute the Pantsir S-1.

Kamala Harris’ Unserious Foreign Policy Is A National Security Threat

Chuck DeVore

This week marked the third solemn anniversary of the botched, deadly pullout from Afghanistan. Vice President Kamala Harris was nowhere to be seen. President Joe Biden was on his second vacation. The families of the 13 servicemembers who died in Kabul — none of whom have heard from either Biden or Harris — asked former President Donald Trump to lay a wreath in Arlington National Cemetery to mark their sacrifice.

Harris is said to have been “the last person in the room” as the fateful decision was made to evacuate Afghanistan, even as the Taliban violated Trump’s conditions-based withdrawal agreement. Yet leading is about more than making decisions — it’s about leadership — and leadership, it may be elementary to note, is about leading people. When leading those in uniform, that includes interacting with those in uniform and their families, in time of victory and of loss.

Yet during her acceptance speech at the Democratic National Convention, Harris dismissed former Trump an “unserious man.”

But it is Harris that stands as the de facto leader of an administration that has shown itself to be entirely unserious on national security. Her position as Biden’s second-in-command has been one of presiding over a series of disastrous decisions. Harris is fully complicit in the administration’s manifold national security failures, including the most dangerous threat — covering up the extent of Biden’s mental decline.

The other proliferation

Richard Haass

Mention ‘proliferation’ and most people will assume that you are talking about the spread of nuclear weapons. For good reason. Nine countries—China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the United States and the Britain—possess them. But many more have the ability and conceivably the motive to produce them. There is also the danger that terrorist groups could obtain one or more of these weapons, enabling them to inflict horrific damage.

This sort of proliferation is often described as ‘horizontal’. The biggest immediate focus remains Iran, which has dramatically reduced the time it would require to develop one or more nuclear devices. An Iran with nuclear weapons might use them. Even if not, it might calculate that it could safely coerce or attack Israel or one or more of its Arab neighbours directly, or thorough one of its proxies, with non-nuclear, conventional weapons.

A nuclear-armed Iran would likely trigger a regional arms race. Several of its neighbours, particularly Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey, might well develop or acquire nuclear weapons of their own. Such a dynamic would further destabilise the world’s most troubled and volatile region.

Putin as protector punctured at Kursk

Lena Surzhko Harned

In the quarter-century of Vladimir Putin’s rule – he has served as prime minister or president since August 1999 – the former KGB man has attempted to sell to the public the image of strongman, savior and defender of the Russian people.

Indeed, the “special military operation” in Ukraine, as the Kremlin has described the invasion, was presented as a humanitarian project to save ethnic Russians in Ukraine.

Yet, the reality is rather different. Since the start of the Ukraine war in February 2022, Putin’s inability to protect the Russian population has been shown time and again.

Numerous towns in Russia, including Moscow, have been subject to drone attacks. In June 2023, Wagner Group chief Yevgeny Prigozhin led a short-lived mutiny that saw rebel troops turn from Ukraine and march though Russian towns, causing casualties.

Perhaps most humiliating for Putin has been Ukraine’s speedy and sustained incursion into Russia’s Kursk region. Since August 6, 2024, Ukrainian forces have taken over 490 square miles of Russian territory, resulting in the evacuation or fleeing of over 100,000 Russians, some of whom reported feeling “left under fire” and frustrated by media downplaying the severity of the situation.

Why Israel’s Iron Dome Does Not Win Wars

Ari Sacher

I remember January 17, 1991 vividly. Saddam Hussein had just invaded Kuwait. After repeatedly ignoring demands to withdraw his troops, the U.S. attacked Iraq, igniting the First Gulf War. Israel was not part of the allied coalition, but Hussein made repeated threats to fire at the Jewish nation if the U.S. attacked. He kept his promise, and Iraq opened fire on Tel Aviv and Haifa.

One week earlier was my friend’s wedding. He was a major in the Israel Air Force (IAF) and many high-ranking IAF officers were in attendance. Everyone agreed, “Hussein will never fire on us and if he does, then we will reduce Iraq to rubble.” They fired, and we did nothing.

This was a watershed moment. The Iraqi attacks made it clear that the Israel home front and infrastructure were under threat and must be protected. Until then, every shekel spent on defense was one less spent on an offensive weapon. One of the critical lessons learned was that Israel must invest in missile defense.

Today, Israel is the only country in the world protected by a multi-layer missile defense system consisting of Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow-2, and Arrow-3. Soon, these systems will be joined by Arrow-4 and the Iron Beam laser. Having played a part in developing these systems that have intercepted thousands of missiles and saved countless lives, this is a source of pride for me.

4,000 years of conflict over water: a timeline

Morgan Shimabuku

On June 6, 2023, bombs hit and destroyed the Kakhovka Dam in southern Ukraine and eliminated its hydropower generation, draining the massive reservoir behind the dam and flooding four cities and several dozen villages downstream (Gleick et al. 2023). The flooding left at least 50 people dead and hundreds missing—perhaps dead (Kullab and Novikov 2023). It caused contamination from pollutants picked up from sites along the river such as wastewater treatment plants and landfills, as well as contaminants that had been locked up in waters and soils behind the dam (Vyshnevskyi et al. 2023). Losing the reservoir, which had been the largest on the Dnipro River, also cut off the cooling source for the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and the water supply for 580,00 hectares of crops—about 2,239 square miles, or an area larger than the state of Delaware (Gleick et al. 2023). It was also the drinking water source for an estimated 700,000 people (Mirovalev and Mirovalev 2023). The repercussions of this attack are likely to last from years to decades.

Attacks on water infrastructure and water supplies are not new. Records of water-related conflicts go back 4,000 years to Sumeria, where the neighboring city-states of Umma and Lagash fought over water and irrigated lands. In that instance, the attacks went back and forth for a century. (See Figure at top of page, or click here for the interactive version.)

In more recent history, water has been part of many international conflicts. In May 2023, a water-rights dispute triggered a violent clash along the Helmand River between Iran and Afghanistan (Gambrell 2023). In Israel and Palestine, even before the current war that’s left water and wastewater systems destroyed in Gaza (UN-OCHA 2023), there have been more than 100 documented violent incidents between the two sides, with attacks on water wells, water pipes, and water treatment plants and violence over water allocations and access.

Neutrality After 1989: New Paths in the Post-Cold War World

Naman Habtom-Desta

Introduction

In the popular imagination, neutrality is understood as a policy of refraining from joining wars and/or preferring not to choose one bloc or another. This perception, particularly in Western countries, is heavily informed by the experiences of the Second World War (1939–45) and the subsequent Cold War (1947–91), especially as it manifested itself in Europe. In reality, neutrality is a complex and dynamic phenomenon. It ranges from ‘active’ to ‘passive’ forms, permanent to non-permanent, as well as various shades that technically are not neutrality but often grouped with it, such as military nonalignment.

The end of the Cold War, and the emergence of the prospect of American unipolarity, led countries around the world to reconsider what neutrality meant, as well as its necessity. For some, this meant a diminished significance and a gradual abandonment of the idea, since neutrality had previously been underpinned by a bipolar world that no longer existed. Following the start of the full-scale Russia-Ukraine conflict in February 2022, the non-aligned (yet often still incorrectly called ‘neutral’) Sweden and Finland applied to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – and later completed their accessions – signalling yet another decline in neutrality’s role in the twenty-first century.

When Everything Shuts Off – Future Cyber War Could Plunge America Into Chaos

Dale Hurd

If war ever reaches the American home front, most people might expect to hear an air raid siren. But what they may actually hear is silence, when many of the things they rely upon each day stop working.

The Commission on the National Defense Strategy recently warned senators the United States is "unprepared" for a "devastating" cyber war that will bring life in towns and cities across America to a standstill.

Former Congresswoman Jane Harman, Co-Chair of the Commission on the National Defense Strategy told senators, "The public is essentially clueless about the massive cyber-attacks that could be launched any day by our adversaries. Not just nation states but rogue actors as well."

Experts see the next war beginning with a keyboard attack on America's critical infrastructure, threatening to cut off the internet, electricity, water, transportation, and financial systems. It would mean almost everything, from phones to gas pumps to cash machines to traffic lights suddenly stops working.

Cyber security expert Dr. Samantha Ravich of The Foundation for Defense of Democracies said, "We're very vulnerable."

The Murky Meaning of Ukraine’s Kursk Offensive

Stephen M. Walt

Is Ukraine’s surprise counteroffensive into Russia a critical turning point in the war, a meaningless sideshow, or a strategic misstep on Kyiv’s part? It has been mostly a success in the short term, but it’s the medium to long term that matters. Does it have broader implications for Western policy toward Russia in general and the war in Ukraine in particular?

Rising Global South Discontent Amid Strategic Competition in the Indo-Pacific and Beyond

Prashanth Parameswaran

Introduction

The past few years have seen intensifying Global South discontent intersecting with rising major power competition in the world and the Indo-Pacific region in particular. Key developing countries are seeking to carve out an independent path. China and Russia are shaping the agenda to blunt US power. Washington and its allies are trying to respond to a contested, shifting landscape. The intersection between Global South contestation and strategic competition is critical to the world’s trajectory and US interests. The emerging balance of power will shape the contours of competition and cooperation across geopolitical and geoeconomic domains as well as the world’s most serious shared challenges for decades to come. The stakes are particularly great in the Indo-Pacific, the primary theater of major power competition that encompasses around two-thirds of the world economy, more than half its people and seven of its largest militaries.

This policy brief explores the intersection between Global South contestation and strategic competition and the opportunities and challenges therein. It is informed by conversations with policymakers and experts across key Global South capitals and trips to Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Pacific over the past few years. The brief makes three arguments. First, there are five important common objectives embedded in Global South contestation despite divergences and definitional issues. Second, Global South contestation is already showing signs of intersecting with strategic competition across four key domains: the diplomatic, informational, military and economic realms. Third, actors, including regional states as well as the US and its partners, can help shape evolving dynamics within this intersection and better manage North-South divides.

National Cybersecurity Governance: Ukraine

Andrii Davydiuk & Oleksandr Potii

Digital public services

In Ukraine, to digitise the state and implement digital services, the Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine (MODT) was established. 11 MODT is a central executive body whose activities are directed and coordinated by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (CMU).

MODT is the main body within the system of central executive authorities that ensures the formation and implementation of state policy in the areas of: digitisation, digital development, digital economy, digital innovations and technologies, e-governance and e-democracy, development of the information society, informatisation; implementing electronic document management; in the area of developing digital skills and digital rights of citizens; open data, public electronic registries, development of national electronic information resources and interoperability, development of broadband Internet access infrastructure, e-commerce and e-business; providing electronic and administrative services; electronic trust services and electronic identification; IT industry development; in the area of development and operation of the Diia City legal regime.

In its activities, the MODT is guided by the Regulation the MODT.12

The MODT implements its powers by the Order. Cab. of Ministers of Ukraine dated February 17, 2021 No. 365-r 13 and Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers. of the Ministers of Ukraine dated January 30, 2019 No. 56. 14

At the same time, the CMU approved the Strategy of Digital Transformation of the Social Sphere 15 and the Strategy for Implementation of Digital Development, Digital Transformations and Digitalisation of the State Finance Management System for the period until 2025. 16

Why Whataboutism Works

Wilfred M. Chow and Dov H. Levin

On March 25, 2024, the U.S. embassy in Budapest took aim at Hungary. In a video posted to Facebook, embassy officials decried the country’s government for continuing to purchase Russian oil and gas when most of Europe was weaning itself off Moscow. “The Hungarian government has chosen to augment its reliance on Russian energy . . . at any expense,” the video declared. “Only the Hungarian political leadership has decided to keep the country dependent on Russian energy.”

What Google’s Antitrust Defeat Means for AI

Jack Corrigan

Google has officially been named a monopoly. On Aug. 5, a federal judge charged the tech giant with illegally using its market power to harm rival search engines, marking the first antitrust defeat for a major internet platform in more than 20 years—and thereby calling into question the business practices of Silicon Valley’s most powerful companies.

Many experts have speculated the landmark decision will make judges more receptive to antitrust action in other ongoing cases against the Big Tech platforms, especially with regards to the burgeoning AI industry. Today, the AI ecosystem is dominated by many of the same companies that the government is challenging in court, and those companies are using the same tactics to entrench their power in AI markets.

Judge Amit Mehta’s ruling in the Google case centered on the massive sums of money the company paid firms like Apple and Samsung to make its search engine the default on their smartphones and browsers. These “exclusive agreements” offered Google “access to scale that its rivals cannot match” and left other search engines “at a persistent competitive disadvantage,” Judge Mehta wrote. By effectively “freezing” the existing search ecosystem in place, the payments “reduced the incentive to invest and innovate in search.”

Who on Earth Is Using Generative AI?

Yan Liu & He Wang

Introduction

Generative AI (GenAI) holds the potential to transform economies and societies. Taking traditional AI’s predictive power one step further, generative AI is capable of creating new content in all forms of media - text, code, images, audio, video, and more. Generative AI tools like ChatGPT, Co-Pilot, and Midjourney are expected to revolutionize how certain tasks are performed, leading to significant efficiency gains and new opportunities for innovation (Eloundou, Manning, Mishkin, and Rock 2023; Humlum and Vestergaard 2024). Since the debut of ChatGPT in November 2022, various types of generative AI tools have proliferated and many have amassed a huge user base within record time. The widespread use of generative AI offers the possibility to transform economic development, social structures, and global competitiveness. Despite extensive discussions about the applications and potentials of generative AI on societies (Korinek 2023; Chui, Hazan, Roberts, Singla, and Smaje 2023; Brynjolfsson, Li, and Raymond 2023; Jha, Qian, Weber, and Yang 2024; Kim, Muhn, and Nikolaev 2024), research on the scale of generative AI usage is rare. This paper seeks to unveil the real-time global scale of generative AI usage, including its demographic and country distribution, and to explore the barriers to and impacts of its adoption. As these technologies continue to evolve, understanding their adoption patterns, both in advanced and developing economies, becomes crucial for policymakers, businesses, and researchers.

To measure AI adoption globally, several organizations have been publishing AI indexes and reports, tracking trends in AI development, and focusing on assessing countries’ readiness for AI integration. Since 2017, Stanford University has been publishing the AI Index Report (Maslej, Fattorini, Perrault, et al. 2024) annually, providing a comprehensive overview of developments in AI research, investment, technology performance, education, and governance.

Small Satellites: Answering the Call for Space Superiority

Kamilla Gunzinger

The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies is pleased to announce a new entry in its Policy Paper series, Small Satellites: Answering the Call for Space Superiority by Col (Ret.) Charles Galbreath, Senior Fellow for Space Studies at the Mitchell Institute Spacepower Advantage Center of Excellence, with Aidan Poling, Senior Research Analyst.

To face growing threats in space, the United States must have the tools to achieve space superiority and deliver on the tenets of Competitive Endurance—Avoid Operational Surprise, Deny First Mover Advantage, and Conduct Responsible Counterspace Campaigning. The combination of mature technologies, lower launch costs, and increasing threats create a fleeting window of opportunity for the United States to field an architecture with SmallSats to achieve the necessary capabilities to gain and maintain space superiority.

The Space Force, Congress, and the industrial base must adjust old paradigms built around large, legacy space systems with long and costly development timelines and move toward a hybrid approach that includes both SmallSats and large, exquisite satellite systems that balance mission requirements, resilience, and the ability to operate in a contested space domain. Failing to operationalize SmallSats will thwart the Space Force’s mandate of achieving space superiority and undermine U.S. deterrence. Given the adversary threat and the critical role that space plays for the United States and its allies, this is a critical juncture the nation must navigate wisely.

Blind Sided: A Reconceptualization of the Role of Emerging Technologies in Shaping Information Operations in the Gray Zone

Ashley Mattheis, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Varsha Koduvayur, Cody Wilson

Introduction

In June 2022, Facebook and Twitter accounts suddenly focused their wrath on Australian company Lynas. The previous year, Lynas—the largest rare earths mining and processing company outside China—had inked a deal with the U.S. Department of Defense to build a processing facility for rare earth elements in Texas. Over a year after the deal was signed, concerned Texas residents began taking to social media to loudly voice opposition to the deal. They claimed the facility would create pollution and toxic waste, endangering the local population. Residents disparaged Lynas’s environmental record, and called for protests against the construction of the processing facility and a boycott of the company.

Only these posts weren’t coming from Texas residents at all. The lead voices on the topic weren’t even real identities. The campaign was led by fake accounts set up and maintained by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in an information operation (IO) aimed at smearing the image of China’s competitors in the field of rare earths—metals critical to producing advanced electronics, electric vehicles, batteries, and renewable energy systems. China is a behemoth in this field, controlling over 80% of global production of rare earths, and is eager to maintain its supply chain dominance.[i]

This PRC-led campaign against a rival in the rare earths field was discovered by cybersecurity firm Mandiant, which has also unearthed past PRC-led IOs aimed at promoting “narratives in support of the political interests of” Beijing.[ii] Nor was Lynas the only company that China targeted in its attempts to use the information space to ensure continued rare earths dominance. In June 2022, the same PRC-led campaign targeted both Appia Rare Earths & Uranium Corporation, a Canadian rare earths mining company, and the American rare earths manufacturer USA Rare Earth. Both companies were bombarded by “negative messaging in response to potential or planned rare earths production activities,” Mandiant noted.[iii]

Special operators hope AI can reduce civilian deaths in combat

PATRICK TUCKER

While much has been said about the danger of allowing AI into military operations in a way that would allow AI to kill people, there has been far less discussion about using AI to make war safer for civilians. But that's what U.S. special operations are starting to look at now, Christopher Maier, the assistant defense secretary for special operations and low-intensity conflict, told reporters Friday.

Part of the reason for this, Maier said, is that preventing civilian harm in a large-scale conflict—such as a potential war with China—would be far more difficult than in the counter-terrorism missions that special forces are engaged in around the globe.

“As we've started to exercise this and build the emphasis on [reducing] civilian harm into large-scale exercises, it becomes particularly daunting when you think of the, if you will, the scale of that type of conflict, where…we've talked openly about thousands of strikes in an hour. This boggles the mind,” he told the Defense Writers Group.

U.S. special operations forces are “going to need the automation and aspects of artificial intelligence and machine learning and all those things that we talk about all the time on the targeting side and the operational side…built in and baked into that with a focus on civilian harm.”