Indian Strategic Studies: 08/28/24

28 August 2024

It can’t be a dialogue of the deaf: How Zelensky chiding India for buying Russian oil is plain hypocrisy - Opinion

Anil Trigunayat

It appears that two hugs by Prime Minister Narendra Modi to President Volodymyr Zelensky in Apulia and Kyiv have been weighed lightly compared to the one given to Russian President Vladimir Putin. President Zelensky had invited and hosted PM Modi and has been asking India, along with other Western leaders, to leverage its influence with President Putin to end the conflict. Hence PM Modi used his personal diplomacy and credit with Putin in July to find a reasonable solution through dialogue, diplomacy, and respect for the UN Charter.

Logical triad of meetings on the sidelines of the G7 and Moscow was to head to Kyiv even if it entailed 20 hours of train ride for the Indian leader. The cause of peace and diplomacy was important. The visit has no doubt repaired the misplaced deficit in the bilateral context, as the four MoUs and agreements were signed and a detailed joint statement was issued on the way forward.

PM Modi became the first Indian Prime Minister to visit Poland and Ukraine, both of whom are antagonistic to Russia. While empathising with Zelensky, PM Modi urged that both sides should sit together to find a way out of this crisis. “I want to assure you that India is ready to play an active role in any efforts towards peace," the Indian PM said, assuring that he personally was ready to play his part.

Indian Army To Strengthen Anti-Drone Arsenal Amid Growing Threats of Unmanned Aerial Systems

Akash Sharma

The Indian Army is stepping up its defences against the increasing threat posed by Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) with a range of new countermeasures. While it has already deployed various radars, Integrated Drone Detection Systems, and advanced weaponry, the military is now seeking to bolster its defences further with the acquisition of sophisticated Anti-UAS High Power Microwave (AUHPM) systems.

The latest Request For Information (RFI) issued by the Indian Army indicates an upgrade in their counter-UAS strategy. The RFI calls for the procurement of the Anti-UAS High Power Microwave (Mk II) System, which is expected to offer advanced surveillance, detection, and tracking capabilities. The system will feature a microprocessor for precise targeting solutions and a High Power Microwave weapon system capable of either “hard kill” (destruction) or “soft kill” (disruption) operations.

The document specifies that the army seeks systems with at least 50 per cent indigenous content, also reflecting a push towards aatmanirbharta (self dependence) in defence technology.

UAS, A Bigger Threat

Recent global events have highlighted the growing importance of UAS in modern warfare.

China seeks to ‘wear down Taiwan’s reliance’ with covert economic and cyber operations, US wargamers say

Matt Demczyk

Over the next few years, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will continue to target democratic, self-ruled Taiwan with “gray zone” tactics and an “anaconda” strategy—slow-strangulation efforts that seek to force Taipei to bow to Beijing without drastic measures such as an invasion.

Experts say China will escalate its efforts to disrupt the island’s economy by targeting critical industries and infrastructure and scale-up covert cyberwar operations that provide Beijing with just enough cover to maintain plausible deniability.

A recent U.S. wargame team from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), a nonpartisan research institute, visited Taiwan in early August to hold the first-ever tabletop exercise focusing on economic and cybercoercion from China against Taiwan. The FDD team pointed out that the cost of launching a cyberattack, for example, is significantly lower than the cost of defending against it. This asymmetry allows China to exert considerable pressure on Taiwan without triggering a direct U.S. military response.

Unmasking the Narrative: Is China’s Debt Trap Diplomacy Fact or Fiction?

Devyansh Dullar

Debt Trap Diplomacy (DTD) refers to a scenario in International Relations where countries with a powerful economic position and enormous finances provide loans to relatively less endowed developing countries for inefficient or vanity projects. Subsequently, this traps the less endowed country in huge debts and holds leverage over them if they are unable to repay that debt (Onyango, 2021). DTD has gained considerable notoriety in international politics as a tool of Chinese foreign policy under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to arm-twist nations into giving forced sovereign concessions. This narrative is in part forwarded by the USA and other Western Countries as they see Chinese loans as a challenge to the current world order dominated by Western financial institutions and rules. For instance, in November 2023, US President Joe Biden hosted the America Partnership for Economic Prosperity Leaders’ Summit, and he declared that the US would provide “a real alternative to Chinese DTD with high-quality infrastructure development” (Eric Martin and Justin Sink, 2023). Meanwhile, the Philippines and Italy, the only G-7 members to participate in BRI, have recently withdrawn from the initiative out of fear of a Chinese debt trap (Times Now, 2023).

As DTD has become an international issue, this essay aims to analyse the underlying assumptions being made to dub Chinese loans “debt traps” or “predatory”. Further, the essay will use empirical examples to argue that the DTD is fiction. The mere gaining of favourable terms for investment in exchange for financial assistance cannot be dubbed DTD. The essay will analyse two case countries that were chosen based on their participation in BRI and the high share of foreign debt owed to China. These are Pakistan and Sri Lanka (Buchholz, 2023). To ascertain if the Chinese DTD is fact or fiction, the loans made by China will be analysed using criteria that are loosely based on conditions used by Michael Himmer & Zdenek Rod (Himmer and Rod, 2023, p. 254). But unlike their four criteria, this essay will narrowly define them into the following three questions: 1) Is there a clear “intent” present in Chinese debt conditions that point to an eventual debt-for-equity exchange? 2) If a debt-for-equity swap has taken place, what conditionalities govern it? 3) Has China restructured the debt of its borrower country regardless of its economic health?

The Paradox of China’s Globalization

ARVIND SUBRAMANIAN

China’s trading partners are once again fretting about the country’s supposedly unfair economic practices. This time, the focus is on China’s alleged attempt to export its excess capacity, especially in emerging sectors such as electric vehicles (EVs), and to undermine domestic industries in the United States and Europe.

The cracks are appearing in Putin’s relationship with China

Ian Williams

Relations between China and Russia are going from strength to strength – or so they say. In reality, the strain is beginning to show. ‘Against the backdrop of accelerating changes unseen in a century, China is willing to further strengthen multilateral coordination with Russia,’ said Xinhua, the Chinese state news agency after a meeting on Wednesday in Moscow between premier Li Qiang and Vladimir Putin. Far more intriguing, though, was what wasn’t said, and which suggests a growing tensions in their ‘no limits’ partnership.

First there were the cyber spies. A few days before Li arrived in Russia, Kaspersky, a Moscow-based cyber security company, suggested that Chinese state-linked hackers had targeted dozens of computers belonging to Russian tech companies and state agencies. Kaspersky dubbed the espionage campaign EastWind, and while not explicitly blaming China (precise attribution is always tricky), it said that the tools used were associated with Chinese groups. The US has suggested that Kaspersky is linked to Russian intelligence, which the company strongly denies, but the timing of the report – indeed its very existence – is intriguing, given Putin’s increasingly dictatorial control of Russia.

Then there is the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline project, once hailed as a centrepiece of their burgeoning economic relationship and designed to carry 50 billion cubic metres of natural gas a year from the Yamal region in northern Russia to China, by way of Mongolia. Although conceived more than a decade ago, it has taken on a new urgency for Moscow after the invasion of Ukraine, with the Kremlin eager to double gas sales to China. It wants to compensate for the loss of sales to Europe, which used to take around 80 per cent of Russian gas exports. The pipeline project has been bogged down in bickering over the price of the gas and who will pay for construction, with Beijing taking a very hard line. It was not mentioned in the bland communique this week and now appears to be dead.

Military Might - United States vs. China

Monte Erfourth

THE COMPETITION REPORT SERIES

The Strategy Central Great Power Competition report series details the United States and China’s great power competition in the first half 2024. It offers an analysis to help strategists grasp the current rivalry between these two superpowers regarding national power, economics, military power, and diplomacy. This is the third of five segments covering each aspect of great power competition and will focus on military competition.

This article focuses on the military dynamics that have shaped U.S.-China relations throughout the first half of 2024. The article examines the strategic maneuvers by both nations in key areas across the Asian-Pacific such as the South China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and East China Sea, highlighting their efforts to assert dominance and deter each other's influence. It explores how the U.S. has intensified its military presence and alliances to counter China's growing capabilities. It details China's aggressive posturing and strategic partnerships with Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Through a nuanced exploration of military engagements, defense strategies, and geopolitical implications, the report underscores the deep rivalry and persistent mistrust that define U.S.-China relations.

How the US Can Avoid War in the South China Sea - Opinion

James Stavridis

Summer may be fading, but things are heating up in the South China Sea. With China claiming essentially the entire water space — which is half the size of the continental US — many of the nations around the littoral have been pushing back, using their coast guards and merchant ships.

In June, a scuffle involving vessels from China and the Philippines near the disputed Second Thomas Shoal resulted in a Filipino seaman losing his thumb, crushed under the keel of a Chinese ship being maneuvered aggressively against his small craft.

Democrats’ Gaza Policy Is Repelling Arab American Voters

Abdelhalim Abdelrahman

During the Democratic primary election in Michigan in February, the Uncommitted Movement had a simple message for President Joe Biden: Implement an arms embargo on Israel, or we will not vote for you—potentially causing you to lose a key swing state in November. They were not bluffing; more than 100,000 Michigan Democrats—close to 13 percent of those who voted—chose uncommitted.

The Kamala Harris Doctrin

Now that U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris has seemingly all but locked up the Democratic nomination for the 2024 presidential race, one of the biggest questions swirling around Washington and foreign capitals is what a Harris foreign-policy doctrine would look like if she is elected in November.

Central Asia: The Last Stronghold of a Declining Russia?

Otabek Akromov

Sitting next to Vladimir Putin at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in June 2022, the President of Kazakhstan, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, declared that Kazakhstan does not recognise any quasi-state territories, including Taiwan, Kosovo, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Lugansk and Donetsk. At the Astana Summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States in October of the same year, the president of Tajikistan, Emomali Rahmon, addressing Vladimir Putin directly, said, “we have always respected the interests of our main strategic partner, [Russia]. We want respect, too.” What explains this audacity of leaders from the Central Asian region, which has always been considered Russia’s backyard? One of the main reasons behind the weakening of Moscow’s authority in the region lies in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. However, an underlying cause that has nurtured distrust and triggered the decline of Russia’s authority is how Moscow has systematically used and abused its great power status in the region.

Realist scholars such as Kenneth Waltz (1979) and John Mearsheimer (2001) define great powers as states that possess and are capable of using military, economic, and political power to influence international affairs. That being said, they often overlook the societal aspect of great powers, placing paramount – and sometimes exclusive – importance on crude power. Great powers, however, become and remain as such as long as they are recognised by others as having special rights and duties in international society (Bull 1977). This recognition is earned when major powers protect international society by maintaining the balance of power and safeguarding the sovereignty of smaller states. Russia’s abuse of its dominant position in Central Asia and its subsequent invasion of Ukraine demonstrate how the misuse of crude power in the contemporary international system undermines great power status and leads to its decline.

Omens for the South Caucasus in the 2024 US Presidential Election

Intigam Mamedov

The debates around the coming US election mainly focus on its domestic implications or consequences for big issues in global politics, such as the Russia-Ukraine war, NATO’s future, and the China-Taiwan or Palestine-Israel conflicts. However, the outcome of the US election may influence a variety of other vulnerable areas. A case in point is the South Caucasus, with its currently transforming order, internal tensions, and a number of foreign interests involved. The latest survey conducted by the Pew Research Centre shows wide partisan gaps in determining the US top foreign policy priorities. The public attitude of Americans is divided over issues like strengthening NATO and the UN, promoting human rights abroad and maintaining US military advantage. Similarly, conflicting perceptions can be observed among US politicians. As Jordan Tama argues, the increased polarisation and collapse of the consensus on liberal internationalism mean a bipartisan compact on America’s global role is unlikely to happen.

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the South Caucasus (also referred to as Transcaucasus) is largely comprised of today’s nation-states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The US strategy in the South Caucasus has gone through different stages. At the beginning of the 1990s, any aspirations about expanding the US reach in the region were hampered by ethnic conflicts, the rise of nationalist forces and the generally destabilised political environment in the three Transcaucasian states. From the early 2000s, US expectations in the region were given impetus by some efforts for democratic transition in Georgia, resulted in the so-called Rose Revolution. Later, the Russia-Georgia war in 2008 made further expansion of Western institutions and values difficult. Rumer et al. write that since that moment, US politics there became declaratory with diminished expectations. Until now, the US attitude towards the Transcaucasus was indeed inertial. Though, the transition of power in Armenia in 2018, the new regional order after the 2020 Karabakh war and further escalations in 2022-2023 might have made the US decision-makers reconsider their interests and expectations.

How NATO Can Help End the Ukraine War

ROGER MYERSON, TIMOTHY MYLOVANOV, and KONSTANTIN SONIN

Last month, yet another NATO summit concluded with a vague statement that Ukraine will, at some point, be a member of the alliance. But while it is impossible to provide a precise date for Ukraine’s accession while the country is at war, the event that should trigger it should be clear: the United States and its NATO allies should stand ready to provide full protection to Ukraine as soon as a peace deal is reached. This would enable and encourage Ukraine’s government to make the difficult choices that are needed to bring an end to the fighting.

Could Kamala Harris Be the Next Richard Nixon?

STEPHEN S. ROACH

Fifty years ago this month, Richard Nixon resigned as US president. With all eyes on November’s presidential election, the anniversary provides an occasion to consider the inherent contradictions of American political leadership.

After a failed attack, Hezbollah’s propaganda seeks to prevent a wider war with Israel

David Daoud

For almost a month, the Middle East and the international community waited on edge for Hezbollah’s retaliation for Israel’s assassination of its military commander Fuad Shukr in Beirut on July 31. Its promised vengeance finally materialized on the morning of August 25. Hezbollah’s attack appears to have largely been a failure, and it remains unclear if it will engage in follow-up strikes. But what the group’s rockets failed to do, its propaganda organs will fill, giving the image to Hezbollah’s base that it is capable of settling scores with the Israelis.

The delay in Hezbollah’s retaliation for Shukr wasn’t caused by its relative weakness to Israel or fear of Israel’s response alone. When the group began attacking Israel on October 8, 2023, it intended to become a full “part of the battle,” in Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah’s words, that erupted the day prior when Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups attacked southern Israel, dubbed “Al-Aqsa Flood.” The purpose of this “support front,” laid out clearly by Nasrallah on November 3, 2023, was to burden Israel—militarily, economically, and societally—with a two-front war to slow its campaign in the Gaza Strip and ensure that “the Palestinian resistance in Gaza, and Hamas, in particular, emerge victorious.”

Committed as Hezbollah is to saving its Gaza-based allies, the group does not currently want a full war with Israel. The conditions for Hezbollah and its broader allies in the Iranian-led Resistance Axis are simply not optimal. On October 8, 2023, as now, the group was burdened with navigating Lebanese domestic woes: an economy and currency that collapsed almost five years ago, Gulf and Western foreign backers cutting aid, a presidential vacuum, and the resulting political stagnation. Compounding Lebanon’s problems with provoking a war with Israel for the sake of Palestine—important as the cause may be for the average Lebanese—risked a backlash that Hezbollah would prefer to avoid.

Ukraine Is Now Dominating The Drone And Electronic Warfare Domains

Vikram Mittal

During their initial invasion of Crimea in 2014, the Russian military skillfully integrated drones and electronic warfare into their operations. Their electronic warfare systems caused chaos on Ukrainian communication networks and pinpointed the locations of Ukrainian units. Drones would then fly in and target the Ukrainian positions. This tactic proved highly effective, prompting many militaries to adapt their technologies and strategies. At the time, Russia was the leader in military drone and electronic warfare technology, particularly those employed at the tactical level. However, over the thirty months since they launched their full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has lost their edge in these technical areas.

Rather, Ukraine has emerged as a world leader in these fields as their defense industries are developing increasingly advanced systems for their warfighters. Indeed, both the Russian and Ukrainian industrial bases have been competing to innovate, develop, and deploy better technologies that can provide their soldiers with an advantage on the battlefield. This has been especially the case for drones and electronic warfare systems, as both technology domains rapidly evolved over the course of the war. In the ensuing cat-and-mouse game, Ukraine was able to outpace Russia in their development processes, allowing them to field more advanced systems faster, achieving an edge in these technical areas.

Israel Strikes Hezbollah in Lebanon and Says It Thwarted Major Attack

Aaron Boxerman, Isabel Kershner, Euan Ward and Julian E. Barne

Here are the latest developments.

Israeli warplanes bombarded dozens of targets in southern Lebanon early Sunday against the powerful militia Hezbollah, which then fired a barrage of missiles and drones toward Israel in one of the largest exchanges of cross-border fire since the war in the Gaza Strip began.

Both Israel and Hezbollah’s leaders declared their operations a success: Israel said its attack was a pre-emptive defense against Hezbollah rockets, and Hezbollah said it had retaliated for the killing of a senior commander in the Beirut suburbs last month.

Within hours of the predawn back-and-forth, the two sides were using the language of containment. Hezbollah said its military operation had “finished for the day” with its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, denying that Israel had disrupted its attack.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that while Israel had successfully intercepted the Hezbollah attack, “what happened today is not the final word,” and the Israeli military said it was still carrying out air attacks against Hezbollah targets.

Snap Insight: Israel and Hezbollah exchange heavy fire, but all eyes are on Ira

Stefan Wolff

The early hours of Sunday (Aug 25) saw one of the biggest clashes between Hezbollah and Israel since the start of the Israel-Hamas war. Reactions in the coming hours and days will determine whether the long-feared full-scale escalation towards a regional war is now under way.

The Iranian-backed, Lebanon-based militia group launched a barrage of more than 320 Katyusha rockets which it claims hit 11 military targets in Israel. Just prior to that, the Israeli military carried out strikes against alleged Hezbollah missile launch sites in southern Lebanon, which it said was to pre-empt a more deadly attack.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has already vowed a tough response. The pre-emptive strike against Hezbollah on Sunday morning certainly indicates that, for now, Israel has both the intelligence and military capabilities to rein in its adversaries in the region.

TIMING OF HEZBOLLAH STRIKES

The timing of the Hezbollah strikes – especially the thwarted larger missile attacks – is telling.

It comes after yet another visit by United States Secretary of State Antony Blinken – his ninth since the start of the Gaza war – to the region that ended without any breakthrough on a ceasefire deal. While negotiations on a ceasefire, mediated by the US, Egypt and Qatar, have resumed in Cairo, an agreement remains elusive.

The Circle of Life: The Four-Year National Policy and Strategy Cycle

Elections serve as a fundamental mechanism in shaping the national strategy of the United States, significantly influencing the trajectory of policies that govern national security and defense. As new administrations assume office, they are charged with the intricate task of developing comprehensive strategies that address the multifaceted and evolving threats confronting the nation. This process unfolds in a cyclical manner, wherein each electoral cycle catalyzes the formulation of critical strategic documents. This article examines the interplay between electoral outcomes and the development of national security strategies, elucidating the interconnectedness of political leadership and national defense, as well as the broader implications for practitioners of strategy..

The Presidential Election as a Driver of Policy and Strategy

The United States conducts presidential elections every four years, a pivotal event that determines the occupant of the White House. Following the election, the newly elected administration embarks on the complex endeavor of implementing its policy platform, managing national affairs, and addressing emergent crises.

The new Asian order

Sam Roggeveen

What vision of Asian order underpins AUKUS?

Some people will regard this question as a category error. AUKUS is a technology program and nothing more. As defence minister Richard Marles said in April 2024, “AUKUS is not a security alliance. That’s not what it is. AUKUS is a technology-sharing agreement.”

Marles is narrowly correct: AUKUS, in and of itself, is not a security treaty. But prime ministers and presidents wouldn’t typically fly around the world to attend a launch event in San Diego for a mere technology-sharing agreement, as Rishi Sunak, Anthony Albanese and Joe Biden did in March last year.

AUKUS is far from anodyne and apolitical. Right down to its highly enriched uranium reactor core, it is about geopolitics and about the US–Australia alliance. In fact, it’s the most important thing to happen to ANZUS since it was founded in 1951. Australian nuclear-powered submarines are the most prominent feature of the agreement, but we shouldn’t forget the basing arrangements: HMAS Stirling in Western Australia will host up to five American and British submarines, while the Tindal air force base will be expanded to accommodate US bombers including the B-52 and B-2. If the United States goes to war with China, operations will be conducted from these bases, and several others.

“Operation Unsinkable:” The Army’s Ambitious Plan to Stay Afloat in the Pacific

As the U.S. Military eagerly prepares for a war it wants to avoid while manifestly ignoring the competition it claims is necessary to avoid it, the Navy has found itself thrust back into the budgetary limelight. “Given all the water in the Pacific Ocean, we’re counting on a large set-piece battle against China to be a real fiscal winner,” said the excited Navy CNO Admiral Lisa Franchetti. After slogging through decades of war in inconveniently land-locked desert countries, the Navy is relishing the opportunity to finally divest its tan uniforms and fight over countries with beachfront property.

The Defense Department seems to agree. Secretary Lloyd Austin said, “America has been throwing money at a land war for two decades, and look where that’s gotten us. Now it’s time for a strategic shift. So we’re going to instead throw a ton of money at whatever shiny new stuff the two remaining shipbuilders not yet owned by the Chinese say we should buy. That’s how America can dominate a fight in the Pacific. Against China.”

Suddenly feeling left out of the party, Army Chief of Staff General Randy George has “floated” an audacious plan to ensure its participation in a fight in the Taiwan Strait. Called OPERATION UNSINKABLE, it is an initiative to retrofit tanks to allow large-scale division armored maneuvers in the Pacific and ensure continued budgetary relevance for the Army. “Gentlemen,” General George said in a press conference, “great power competition is now the name of the game… competition for dollars against the Navy, that is. And we’re gonna win!”

Ukraine’s Special Operations Troops Sow Destruction in Russia

Doug Livermore

War is never a happy experience, but these must be satisfying days for Ukraine’s special operations forces soldiers. After the war stagnated into a largely static conflict, their role was restricted. Now they’re off the leash.

Kursk Oblast, just across the Ukrainian border, provided near-perfect territory for the cloak-and-dagger work of Ukraine’s veteran elite units. It is a key logistical hub and base of operations for Russian military activities in eastern Ukraine, is thinly defended by a Russian army that didn’t see the sucker punch coming, and houses vital railways, supply routes, and military installations.

By targeting Kursk, Ukrainian forces aim to stretch Russian defenses, forcing the diversion of resources from the frontlines in Ukraine to protect rear areas. This strategic pressure could weaken Russian positions, creating further exploitable vulnerabilities for Ukrainian forces.

From cybercrime to terrorism, FBI director says America faces many elevated threats ‘all at once’

MICHAEL GOLDBERG

The country is facing heightened threats from many corners at a time when law enforcement agencies are struggling, FBI Director Christopher Wray said in an exclusive interview, adding that he is “hard pressed to think of a time in my career where so many different kinds of threats are all elevated at once.”

Wray spoke Wednesday with The Associated Press while visiting the Minneapolis field office to talk about partnerships between law enforcement agencies and also with other entities. His remarks come as the FBI confronts heightened concerns over terrorism, both domestic and international, as well as Chinese espionage and intellectual property theft and foreign election interference.

“I worry about the combination of that many threats being elevated at once, with the challenges facing the men and women in law enforcement more generally,” Wray said at the office in the suburb of Brooklyn Center. “And the one thing that I think helps bridge those two challenges is partnerships. That’s how we get through. It is by all working together.”

NASA Has More Disappointing News for Its Stranded Astronauts

Jeffrey Kluger

The two NASA astronauts stuck aboard the International Space Station (ISS), Butch Wilmore and Suni Williams, won’t be coming home anytime soon. During a press conference at the Kennedy Space Center on Saturday, Aug. 24, NASA administrator Bill Nelson announced that the space agency was giving up on the idea of bringing Wilmore and Williams home aboard their balky Boeing Starliner spacecraft—which has been experiencing thruster problems since its launch on June 5. Instead, the Starliner will be flown home uncrewed, and Wilmore and Williams will hitch a ride back to Earth aboard a SpaceX Crew Dragon spacecraft, which will launch to the ISS in September for a five-month station stay, returning in February. This extends what was supposed to be an eight-day ISS rotation for Wilmore and Williams to a whopping eight months.

“NASA has worked very hard with Boeing to reach this decision,” Nelson said. “The decision is a result of a commitment to safety.”

The ruling rested on what NASA calls a flight readiness review (FRR). As agency brass explained at an Aug. 14 news conference, FRR’s are typically held before launch, when officials gather for a final go or no-go on the planned mission.

“We bring in representatives from all of the related centers, the technical authorities, the NASA engineering, and safety center flight operations,” explained Ken Bowersox, a former astronaut and an associate administrator for NASA’s space operations mission directorate. “We listen to the status of the mission, go through some special topics, and then we poll everybody at the end on whether or not they think we're ready to undertake the mission.”

To Google or Not to Google?

KATHARINA PISTOR

When confronting the choice between truth and power, Shakespeare’s Hamlet poses his famous existential question: “To be or not to be?” The search for an answer will confront heroes and villains alike with the prospect of death or despair.

Like Shakespeare’s tragedy, battles over the infrastructure that everyone uses to search the internet are also steeped in intrigue and abuse of power. The villain is Google, which is not only a search engine, a company, and a brand, but also a verb. “To search is to Google,” noted a witness in the recent antitrust case brought by the US government and 38 state attorneys general against Google.

On August 5, a federal judge handed down a verdict of “liable.” Google was found to have engaged in unlawful conduct as a monopoly in two markets, including – most critically – the one for general-search services. The remedies have yet to be announced, but commentators are already speculating that the case will reshape internet search.