19 August 2024

The Historical Forces Behind the Student Rebellion in Bangladesh


Last week, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina, was forced to resign from her position and flee the country. Throughout July, she had been cracking down on mass protests, led largely by college students, against her increasingly authoritarian rule. More than three hundred people were killed, and thousands were jailed. The protests continued to intensify, and Hasina soon lost the support of the country’s military and left for India. An interim government has been sworn in. It is led by Muhammad Yunus, an economist who, in 2006, won the Nobel Peace Prize, and includes some of the student protesters who had risen up to oppose Hasina; many of these same students can be seen directing traffic on the streets of Dhaka, the capital.

Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan, achieved independence in 1971, after a bloody war during which the Pakistani military killed hundreds of thousands of Bengalis, who eventually prevailed with help from India. Prior to Hasina’s downfall, she had ruled Bangladesh for fifteen years. Her father, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (known as Mujib), was the most prominent leader of the country’s independence movement, and became Bangladesh’s first Prime Minister, and then its first President.

I recently spoke by phone with Subho Basu, an associate professor of history and classical studies at McGill University, and the author of the book “Intimation of Revolution: Global Sixties and the Making of Bangladesh.” (He is currently writing a biography of Mujib.) During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed what led to Hasina’s ouster, the complicated religious and political dynamics behind the latest uprising, and Yunus’s vision for Bangladesh’s future.

Why was Sheikh Hasina overthrown now? What was the breaking point?

Chinese Hackers Hit Russia in Cyberattack

Micah McCartney

Dozens of systems used by government bodies and IT companies in Russia have reportedly become the targets of Chinese hackers.

Moscow-based cybersecurity provider Kaspersky Lab, revealed that the backdoor malware used to gain access to the systems was "GrewApacha," a Trojan used since at least 2021 by the Chinese cyber-espionage group known as APT31 (Advanced Peristent Threat 31).

APT31 is believed to have ties to China's civilian spy agency, the Ministry of State Security (MSS). Earlier this year, the United States Justice department indicted several Chinese nationals and one company for allegedly carrying out APT31 operations.

"During these attacks, attackers infected devices using phishing emails with attachments containing malicious shortcut files," read an August 8 report by Kaspersky Lab-managed website SecureList. Kaspersky has dubbed the Russia-centered hacking campaign "EastWind."

Clicking on these files prompts the installation of the malware, which receives commands from the Dropbox cloud storage.


Why China is becoming a top choice mediator for global conflicts

Wang Huiyao

As global conflicts simmer, China’s role as a mediator is gaining prominence, with its economic influence and diplomatic connections helping it to foster dialogue. Last month, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba met his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi in Guangzhou. During their talks, Wang reiterated China’s commitment to promoting a political resolution to the Russian war on Ukraine, a stance that received a positive response from Kuleba.

China’s significant influence largely stems from its economic connections with the conflicting parties. During the Guangzhou talks, Wang emphasised China’s role as Ukraine’s largest trading partner. According to Chinese customs, bilateral trade was at US$6.81 billion last year. Wang also pointed out China’s position as the primary importer of Ukrainian agricultural products and underscored Ukraine’s early participation in the Belt and Road Initiative.

On his part, Kuleba acknowledged the importance of the bilateral relationship, calling the two not just strategic partners but also important economic and trade partners. As the conflict in Ukraine grinds on, Kyiv appears to see Beijing’s influence as increasingly vital. China, with its infrastructure expertise, could play a significant role in Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction.

At the same time, China’s position as Russia’s top trading partner, with bilateral trade rising to US$240.1 billion last year, further solidifies its unique role as a potential neutral mediator. This economic interdependence with both nations gives China leverage that few other countries can match.

China’s economic diplomacy scored a notable success a year ago when it brokered the restoration of ties between long-standing rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia. As a major trading partner and the largest oil customer of both nations, China wielded significant influence. This economic leverage was bolstered by major bilateral agreements: a 25-year cooperation deal with Iran reached in 2021 and a strengthening of its comprehensive strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia in 2022.

China’s deep economic ties with these Middle Eastern powers provided both the means and the motivation to push for their reconciliation. As Israel’s third-largest trading partner, and with bilateral trade volume reaching US$14.5 billion last year, China can also – I have reason to believe – play a significant role in promoting a peaceful resolution to the Gaza crisis, potentially offering a path to dialogue where traditional diplomacy has faltered.

Iran’s electronic confrontation with Israe


The two adversaries are engaged in an intense cyber struggle, with Israel still a click ahead

ZIV HOSPITAL is nestled at the bottom of Safed, the highest city in Israel, not far from the border with Syria and Lebanon. In November the hospital acknowledged that hackers had penetrated its computer systems. An Iran-backed hacking group would later claim to have gained access to 500 gigabytes of patient data, including 100,000 medical records linked to Israeli soldiers. That is hardly unusual. Hackers regularly target and breach hospitals, usually to extort ransoms.

What’s Ukraine’s endgame in Kursk?

Matthew Sussex

Ukrainians have long become used to grim news reports from their besieged lands. But that’s suddenly changed. Following its remarkably successful incursion of Russia’s Kursk region, cheerful Ukrainian journalists are now covering the war from captured Russian territory.

Ukraine’s surprise counterpunch, taking the fight into Russia for the first time, shows no signs yet of having reached a high-water mark. Unlike previous pinprick raids by the anti-Putin Freedom of Russia Legion militia group, Ukraine’s armed forces are using some of their most seasoned units.

Having punched through a thinly defended portion of its border near the Russian city of Kursk – itself famous as a scene of one of the Soviet Union’s greatest victories against Germany in the Second World War – Ukraine’s forces reportedly have captured up to 70 settlements.

In the process, they’ve taken control of a piece of land encompassing some 1,000 square kilometers, up to 30 kilometers deep inside Russia.

There are numerous theories about what Ukraine wants to achieve. One is that it seeks a sizeable foothold in Russia as currency to trade for captured Ukrainian territory in future peace talks. Recent signs that its forces are digging in might support that claim.

The Future Faces of Irregular Warfare: Great Power Competition in the 21st Century

Varsha Koduvayur James Kiras, PhD Richard Newton, PhD

Introduction

In October 2022, Congress created the Irregular Warfare Center (IW Center) to serve as a central mechanism for developing the irregular warfare knowledge of the Department of Defense (DoD) and to advance the understanding of irregular warfare (IW) concepts, and doctrine, in collaboration with key partners and allies.4 Two of the five tasks assigned to the Center addressed facilitating whole-of-government and whole-of-society research related to the non-military aspects of irregular conflict. More importantly, though, Congress made the point that the DoD would occupy a supporting (emphasis added) role when it came to interagency activities related to strategic competition short of war, a significant reorientation of emphasis that should help the department prioritize resources and direct efforts related to strategic competition.5 This book is the IW Center’s first research contribution to assist that effort and to tackle the first of DoD’s responsibilities toward IW: “make permanent the mindset and capabilities necessary to succeed in its current irregular warfare mission sets.”

It should be expected that after two exhausting decades of counterinsurgency in South Asia and the Middle East and a global counterterrorism campaign, our nation’s security establishment is aching to do something different. Something different, it should be noted, that is more in line with the “business as usual” approach and institutional preferences of its Armed Service components.7 Readers who can recall the decade after the Vietnam War ended, 1975-1985, will remember a similar strategic reorientation. Then, the United States shifted its defensive focus to AirLand Battle, and that doctrine’s near-singular emphasis on deterring war with the Soviet Union.8 Meanwhile, in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, the Balkans, and across Asia, “small wars,” often proxy wars sponsored by the two superpowers competing for influence, sprang up like mushrooms after a spring rain.

Houthi Media: A Study in Ideological Warfare

Burhan Ahmed

Introduction

In April 2023, a Saudi delegation was invited to visit the Houthi-held capital of Sana’a. Over the next couple of days, the media arm of the Houthi group (Ansar Allah) distributed a series of photographs to international and local media outlets featuring Mahdi al-Mashat, head of the Houthi Supreme Political Council, smiling warmly in a stately reception hall and shaking the hand of Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to Yemen, Mohammed bin Saeed al-Jaber.[1] These photos were extensively reprinted, appearing on NBC,[2] Reuters,[3] BBC,[4] and Al-Arabiya,[5] as well as in local outlets from the Baltics[6] to Beijing.[7] This sleek image of Houthi diplomacy is far from the militant and adversarial rhetoric circulated by founder Hussein al-Houthi and the outrage voiced by insurgent forces over his killing in 2004. Understanding this radical revision is essential to grasping the dynamics of the complex conflict in Yemen.

This paper seeks to correct the larger trend of analysis focusing predominantly on Houthi military actions or political machinations while overlooking their media strategies. Interviews conducted in Yemen from 2020 to 2021 appear to show that Houthi propaganda can be surprisingly effective: around 80 percent of respondents living in Houthi-held territory in Hudaydah and Ibb said in one survey that they trust their local officials and believe that Houthi-run media, such as television network Al-Masirah, would not publish disinformation.[8] While such figures may reflect respondents’ fear of retaliation, they may also show the success of the Houthis’ long-term propaganda efforts.


Technological and Economic Threats to the U.S. Financial System

Tobias Sytsma, James V. Marrone, Anton Shenk, Gabriel Leonard, Lydia Grek, Joshua Steier

This report provides an exploratory assessment of foreign threats to the U.S. financial system, focusing on emerging risks posed by artificial intelligence (AI), social media, and changes in the geopolitical landscape. Specifically, we study attacks on financial trading models, bond dumping, deepfakes, and memetic engineering. These threats were selected based on discussions with focus groups and subject-matter experts, as well as a detailed literature review. The box on this page summarizes the risks posed by each threat, as well as our primary methods of analysis. For each threat, we discuss prior similar events (to the extent they exist), the potential economic costs of an attack, and factors that contribute to the likelihood of an attack.

This report is meant to be an initial assessment of these threats with the aim of informing policymakers, financial institutions, and relevant stakeholders on the emerging risks and the possible courses of action to enhance the resilience of the U.S. financial system.

ME THODS USED TO IDENTIFY THREATS 

Our goal was to focus on threats to the U.S. financial system that are new, poorly understood, or for which the risks might be changing because of recent technological and geopolitical events. To identify relevant and emerging threats, we first developed a framework to describe all threats. We started by conducting an environmental scan of the literature.

Who would fight Europe's war against Russia?

Abby Wilson

With no end in sight for Russia's war in Ukraine, Western leaders are warning of a potential escalation on the global stage.

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk has suggested Europe is currently in a "pre-war era". Joe Biden alluded to the "price of unchecked tyranny" as he backed US support for Ukraine. "But checking tyranny comes at a price and, alas, the West’s young seemingly aren’t prepared to pay," said Jamie Dettmer for Politico.

Nato nations, including those who share a border with Ukraine, are struggling to recruit and retain armies. "We cannot do anything without people – if we modernise equipment and don't have enough competent people and motivated people, that is all wasted money," Czech armed forces head General Karel Rehka told Reuters.

All manner of recruitment strategies – from talk of reinstating conscription in Romania to a military-themed TV show that will air in Hungary by the end of the year – have been employed across the region.

Ukraine’s Kursk offensive marks Putin’s third major humiliation of the war

Brian Whitmore

We now live in a world in which Ukraine has invaded Russia. And we now live in a world in which Ukraine, as of the time of this writing, is occupying a slice of Russian territory roughly the size of New York City.

We still don’t know the military significance of Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast, which marks the first time that foreign troops have occupied Russian territory since World War II. But judging from the Kremlin’s whiny initial response—in which Russian President Vladimir Putin and other top officials decried and downplayed the offensive as a “terrorist attack” and an “armed provocation”—the political fallout promises to be enormous.

This is because the invasion and occupation of parts of Kursk Oblast marks the third major military humiliation the Kremlin leader has suffered since launching his full-scale assault on Ukraine in February 2022.

The first humiliation: February-September 2022

First, of course, there was the routing of Russian forces in the battle of Kyiv in the early phase of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. The embarrassing withdrawal of Russian forces from near the Ukrainian capital in March 2022 was quickly followed by more military humiliations for the Kremlin, including Ukraine’s April 2022 sinking of the Moskva, the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.

The Kursk Gamble: Ukraine’s High-Stakes Play to Force Russia's Hand

Monte Erfourth

Introduction

The strategic landscape of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict has dramatically shifted with Ukraine's unexpected invasion of Russia's Kursk region. This operation marks a significant turning point in the war regarding military gains and the broader strategic implications for both nations and the international community.

The Objective: A Gamble for Leverage

Ukrainian Gen. Oleksandr Syrskyi announced Monday that Kyiv controls 1,000 square kilometers (386 square miles) of Russian territory, far exceeding Russian estimates. Russian officials claim Ukrainian forces have advanced 12 kilometers (7.5 miles) into the Kursk region along a 40-kilometer (25-mile) front, capturing 28 settlements. Despite this, Ukrainian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Heorhiy Tykhyi stated that Kyiv has no interest in "taking over" the region. Ukraine has since expanded its control of the region.

The Dangerous Decline in Israeli Strategy

Stephen M. Walt

Israel is in serious trouble. Its citizens are deeply divided, and this situation is unlikely to improve. It is bogged down in an unwinnable war in Gaza, its military is showing signs of strain, and a wider war with Hezbollah or Iran remains a possibility. The Israeli economy is suffering mightily, and the Times of Israel recently reported that as many as 60,000 businesses may close this year.

Will Ukraine’s Kursk Offensive Turn the Tide?

Emma Ashford & Matthew Kroenig

Matt Kroenig: Hi Emma, Washington is usually pretty quiet in August, with many people on vacation, and I know I’m enjoying the downtime. Are you relaxing during the last few weeks of summer?

What Does Zelensky Want in Kursk?

John R. Deni

Ukraine’s incursion into Russia’s Kursk region has raised many questions. Why send thousands of forces north when Ukrainian territory is being lost elsewhere? Why incentivize Moscow to reinforce a border region that has been relatively quiet, hence creating a longer-term security dilemma for Ukraine? Why not wait until Ukrainian units in the east and south were robust enough to leverage any siphoning of Russian forces resulting from an operation in the north?

The case for an independent U.S. Cyber Force

Daniel Van Wagenen and Kim Irving

The idea of an independent U.S. Cyber Force has been in the news of late due to the National Defense Authorization Act amendment calling for a feasibility study of such a service. In the last few weeks, there have been several articles urging caution, or coming straight out against, creating a Cyber Force, without any one of the author’s ever having sat on mission behind a keyboard. We’re here to tell you that they’re wrong. Dead wrong. These are individuals who, had they been in a command position a century ago, would have dispatched horse cavalry forces against tanks and machine gun emplacements, demonstrating their inability to adapt to evolving natures of warfare. And their folly will lead to considerable American casualties in the next war should the country not have an independent cyber warfighting capability.

The rapid evolution of technology and the digital landscape has fundamentally altered the nature of warfare. Cyber has become the fifth domain along with land, sea, air and space. As cyber threats continue to grow in sophistication and frequency, the United States must adapt its defense posture to meet these challenges head-on. Our current distributed approach leaves gaps in capabilities, training, recruiting and innovation, leaving us vulnerable to digital attack. An independent U.S. Cyber Force is not just a strategic necessity but an inevitable progression in the evolution of military operations.

Cyber warfare has become a critical component of modern conflicts. Adversaries such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea have developed formidable cyber capabilities, launching attacks that target both governmental and civilian infrastructure. The 2020 SolarWinds cyberattack, which compromised multiple U.S. federal agencies, and the persistent ransomware attacks on critical infrastructure underscore the urgent need for a dedicated and specialized cyber force. According to a 2021 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the frequency and severity of cyberattacks have increased exponentially, with nation-states being the primary actors. The report highlights that traditional military structures are ill-equipped to deal with the unique challenges posed by cyber threats, necessitating a distinct and independent cyber force.

Putin Is Vulnerable: Western Policy Masks Russian Weakness

Nataliya Bugayova

Russia has vulnerabilities that the West has simply not been exploiting. On the contrary, US incrementalism has helped the Kremlin offset and mask its weaknesses. The Kremlin’s weaknesses include its inability to rapidly pivot, dependence on others for Russia’s capability to sustain the war, and years of risk accumulation that Russian President Vladimir Putin is yet to reckon with. The Kremlin is vulnerable to an adversary who can generate momentum against Russia and deny the Kremlin opportunities to regroup and adapt. A serious US strategy on Ukraine would prioritize achieving such momentum. It would include removing Western-granted safe havens for Russia’s war machine. It would also include not only imposing multiple dilemmas on the Kremlin but the most painful ones, such as helping Ukraine make Russia fail on the battlefield faster and dismantling Russian narratives in the West. While it is premature to draw conclusions about Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast, the operation clearly has the potential to generate momentum. If it does, the United States should help Ukraine build on rather than dampen this momentum to regain control over the tempo of the war.

Russia’s Vulnerability to Sustained Pressure

Russia adapts if given time. Russia does not pivot rapidly, however, in part because of Putin’s risk aversion. It took Putin months to adapt after his failed three-day invasion in 2022. He continued to pursue his maximalist objectives in Ukraine with insufficient force and ordered a mobilization only after a rout of the Russian forces from the Kharkiv region in September 2022.[1] It took Putin a year to start moving the Russian economy to a full war footing.[2] Likewise, the Kremlin has been slow to react to Ukraine’s Kursk offensive. The Kremlin waited days after the start of Ukraine’s incursion to announce a counterterrorism operation in Russia’s border regions.[3] Putin has yet to implement martial law despite repeated calls from the Russian nationalist community to do so.[4]

Deception and a Gamble: How Ukrainian Troops Invaded Russia

Kim Barker, Anton Troianovski, Andrew E. Kramer, Constant Mรฉheut, Alina LobzinaEric Schmitt and Sanjana Varghese

The scenes were decidedly Russian. A Gazprom facility. Flags with the country’s signature three horizontal stripes of white, blue and red. A Pyatyorochka supermarket.

The soldiers posting the videos, verified by The New York Times, were Ukrainian, almost giddily showing off just how easily they had pushed over the border and through Russian lines of defense in the past week.

In the Russian town of Sverdlikovo, a Ukrainian soldier climbed onto another’s shoulders, broke off the wooden post anchored to a town council building and threw the Russian flag to the ground. In Daryino, a town five miles to the west, other soldiers also grabbed a Russian flag. “Just throw it away,” a Ukrainian soldier said, grinning, as another flexed his muscles.

On Aug. 6, Ukraine launched an audacious military offensive, planned and executed in secrecy, with the aim of upending the dynamics of a war it has appeared to be losing, town by town, as Russian troops have ground forward in the east. The operation surprised even Kyiv’s closest allies, including the United States, and has pushed the limits of how Western military equipment would be permitted to be used inside Russian territory.

For Russia, it was a moment nearly as shocking as the mercenary Yevgeny V. Prigozhin’s march on Moscow in June 2023: the vaunted security state that President Vladimir V. Putin had built crumbled in the face of the surprise attack, failing in its basic task of protecting its citizens. And the unwritten social contract that has largely accompanied Mr. Putin’s 30-month campaign — that most Russians could get on with their normal lives even as he waged war — was cast into question anew.

Mostly on the defensive since a failed counteroffensive last year, Ukraine has pushed seven miles into Russia along a 25-mile front and taken dozens of Russian soldiers as prisoners, analysts and Russian officials say. The governor of Russia’s Kursk region said on Monday that Ukraine controls 28 towns and villages there. More than 132,000 people have been evacuated from nearby areas, Russian officials said.

Africa CDC Declares Mpox Emergency, Moving to Lead Response

Linda Nordling

The Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has declared a "public health emergency of continental security" over mpox as a deadly strain of the virus previously found only in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) spreads to neighboring countries.

Jean Kaseya, Africa CDC's director general, made the declaration on Tuesday, August 13 after consulting with health experts and African leaders, the first time the body has invoked this new mandate since adopting the designation last year.

According to Kaseya, the declaration will enable Africa to lead and coordinate its response and promote the continent's role in global maneuvers. It will also promote "international solidarity," he said, to prevent what happened during the COVID-19 pandemic, when wealthier countries prioritized vaccines and treatments for themselves.

Kaseya made the announcement less than a week after telling journalists that he was mulling the declaration. "We don't want to be abandoned again. We are deciding when there is an emergency, and we are speaking with one voice," Kaseya said during an August 8 media briefing, convened a day after World Health Organization (WHO) Director General Tedros Ghebreyesus stated his agency was consulting on whether to declare mpox a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC).

Experts say that the timing of Kaseya's statement signals that Africa is looking for a more prominent role in the fight against the outbreak than in previous public health emergencies.

"There has been some tension between Geneva and African states over whether the region should declare its own health emergency," said Lawrence Gostin, the faculty director of O'Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University in Washington, DC.

In Gaza, Israel’s Military Has Reached the End of the Line, U.S. Officials Say

Helene Cooper, Julian E. Barnes, Eric Schmitt and Adam Rasgon

Israel has achieved all that it can militarily in Gaza, according to senior American officials, who say continued bombings are only increasing risks to civilians while the possibility of further weakening Hamas has diminished.

With the Biden administration racing to get cease-fire negotiations back on track, a growing number of national security officials across the government said that the Israeli military had severely set back Hamas but would never be able to completely eliminate the group.

In many respects, Israel’s military operation has done far more damage against Hamas than U.S. officials had predicted when the war began in October.

Israeli forces can now move freely throughout Gaza, the officials said, and Hamas is bloodied and damaged. Israel has destroyed or seized crucial supply routes from Egypt into Gaza. About 14,000 combatants in Gaza have been killed or captured, the Israeli military said last month. (The U.S. intelligence agencies use different, more conservative methodologies to estimate Hamas casualties, though the precise number remains classified.)

The Israeli military also asserted that it had eliminated half the leadership of the Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, including the top leaders Muhammad Deif and Marwan Issa.

But one of Israel’s biggest remaining goals — the return of the roughly 115 living and dead hostages still held in Gaza after being seized in the Oct. 7 Hamas attacks — cannot be achieved militarily, according to current and former American and Israeli officials.

Announcing Issuance of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) FIPS 203, Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard, FIPS 204, Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard, and FIPS 205, Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard

National Institute of Standards and Technology

This document has been published in the Federal Register. Use the PDF linked in the document sidebar for the official electronic format.
Document Headings

Document headings vary by document type but may contain the following:the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document
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This notice announces the Secretary of Commerce's approval of three Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS): FIPS 203, Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard; FIPS 204, Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard; and FIPS 205, Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard. These standards specify key establishment and digital signature schemes that are designed to resist future attacks by quantum computers, which threaten the security of current standards. The three algorithms specified in these standards are each derived from different submissions in the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization project (see https://csrc.nist.gov/​pqc-standardization).

FIPS 203, FIPS 204, and FIPS 205 are available electronically on the NIST Computer Security Resource Center website at https://csrc.nist.gov. Comments that were received on the proposed changes are published electronically at https://www.regulations.gov and the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization project website at https://csrc.nist.gov/​pqc-standardization.

Ukraine’s Kursk Raid Echoes the Past and Offers a Glimpse of the Future

Eugene Rumer

Emissary harnesses Carnegie’s global scholars to deliver incisive, nuanced analysis on the most pressing international affairs challenges.Learn More

“Just when I thought I was out, they pulled me back in,” President Vladimir Putin, echoing Michael Corleone’s famous line from The Godfather Part III, probably thought in recent days. Until a week ago, the war in Ukraine was going well for the Russian leader: his troops were making small but steady territorial gains, the West was growing tired of the war, and Kyiv’s uncompromising refusal to negotiate an end to the conflict was softening. And then, on August 6, the Ukrainian army launched its offensive into the Kursk region of Russia.

It is hard to imagine a more humiliating setback for Putin and his generals than the Ukrainian army seizing some 800 square kilometers of Russian territory in that particular region. To most Russians, the very mention of Kursk invokes the memory of the battle of July–August of 1943. In Soviet and Russian historiography, the Soviet army’s victory in that epic clash paved the way for, in Putin’s own words, “the imminent and inevitable collapse” of Nazi Germany. With countless articles devoted to it in Russian military publications and generations of Soviet and Russian military officers schooled in its lessons, the Battle of Kursk has long been held up by Soviet and Russian military science as the pinnacle of the art of war. On August 23, 2023, Putin personally traveled to the old battlefield to commemorate the eightieth anniversary of that victory, to unveil the Battle of Kursk memorial, and to present awards to soldiers who distinguished themselves in the “special military operation” against Ukraine.

What a difference a year makes! Photographs released by the Kremlin from Putin’s August 12 meeting with his security chiefs to discuss the Ukrainian offensive show little jubilation on their part. The Second Battle of Kursk—if that is what the Ukrainian offensive into Russia will be called—is testimony to both Ukrainian bravery, daring, and resolve and the historic blunder Putin committed by launching a full-scale assault on Ukraine two and a half years ago.

Antitrust Ruling Is Bad News for Google

Cameron Abadi

In 2021, Google paid $18 billion to Apple to become the default search engine on Apple’s Safari internet browser. Those payments were at the center of a landmark decision issued recently by Judge Amit Mehta in the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia that declared Google had abused its monopoly over the search business.

The Root Causes of Failure for Artificial Intelligence Projects and How They Can Succeed

James Ryseff, Brandon De Bruhl, Sydne J. Newberry

To investigate why artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) projects fail, the authors interviewed 65 data scientists and engineers with at least five years of experience in building AI/ML models in industry or academia. The authors identified five leading root causes for the failure of AI projects and synthesized the experts' experiences to develop recommendations to make AI projects more likely to succeed in industry settings and in academia.

By some estimates, more than 80 percent of AI projects fail — twice the rate of failure for information technology projects that do not involve AI. Thus, understanding how to translate AI's enormous potential into concrete results remains an urgent challenge. The findings and recommendations of this report should be of interest to the U.S. Department of Defense, which has been actively looking for ways to use AI, along with other leaders in government and the private sector who are considering using AI/ML. The lessons from earlier efforts to build and apply AI/ML will help others avoid the same pitfalls.
Key Findings

Five leading root causes of the failure of AI projects were identifiedFirst, industry stakeholders often misunderstand — or miscommunicate — what problem needs to be solved using AI.
Second, many AI projects fail because the organization lacks the necessary data to adequately train an effective AI model.

Third, in some cases, AI projects fail because the organization focuses more on using the latest and greatest technology than on solving real problems for their intended users.

Fourth, organizations might not have adequate infrastructure to manage their data and deploy completed AI models, which increases the likelihood of project failure.

Finally, in some cases, AI projects fail because the technology is applied to problems that are too difficult for AI to solve.

“Google is a Monopolist, and…Has Acted…to Maintain its Monopoly”

Daniel Pereira

The Federal Ruling against Google is finally part of the tipping point, as many have been waiting for a much-needed wave of judicial and legislative activity to begin strengthening the U.S. cognitive infrastructure and cleaning up the information ecosystem. Details of the ruling can be found in this post.

tldrA federal judge said Google’s search engine deals violated antitrust laws. Those deals are big moneymakers.

Judge Amit Mehta’s ruling has triggered a potentially yearslong process to decide how to punish the company.

For users, it could mean a future in which Google isn’t front and center everywhere.
Nvidia’s market dominance has [also] begun to attract scrutiny from antitrust authorities. The semiconductor giant now faces multiple antitrust probes, raising questions about whether its acquisitions and competitive practices have been fair.

[Last week], Google lost the biggest tech antitrust lawsuit since the late 90s. The federal judge Amit Mehta said in his 277-page ruling that Google is a monopolist and that it broke U.S. antitrust laws in its quest to dominate the search engine market. That has major implications for Google’s business, potentially putting 15% of parent company Alphabet’s revenue on the chopping block.

Google’s search engine is the core of its business. Google Search made up more than half of Google’s total revenue during the second quarter. Search revenue totaled $48.5 billion; total revenue hit $84.7 billion — a 14% increase from last year, which CEO Sundar Pichai attributed mainly to the growth of Google’s search engine. In 2020, nearly 90% of all search queries went through Google. Google dominates search, and Search dominates Google.

Military mimicry: the art of concealment, deception, and imitation

Ron Matthews & Thomas J. Matthews

Introduction

The focus of this paper is on mimicry. It is a concept that has attracted substantial academic enquiry in the biological world, leading to a wealth of scholarship. Examination of the fascinating biomimicry processes provides the taxonomy for this study on the applied subject of military mimicry. There are, we posit, three elements to military mimicry: firstly, concealment – normally reflected through camouflage to conceal military assets; secondly, deception – reflecting the evolution of “dummy” military assets, often to encourage the enemy to attack, reveal their positions, and quickly be destroyed as a consequence; and, thirdly, imitation. The final element in this taxonomy is the most complex, as it can be decomposed into three further subfields of analysis. To begin, there is animal imitation of military tasks, such as WWI pigeons replacing the role of military runners. In reverse, there is also military emulation of animal performance through bioengineering, including the adaption of cockroaches and ants for military purposes. Finally, as armed forces become immersed in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and robotics, there is the unfolding phenomenon of these technologies, including swarms, avatars, neuroscience, and genomics, mimicking military forces and assets in the pursuit of twenty-first Century warfare. These three imitative pathways are illustrated.

Structurally, the paper begins with the identification, explanation, and analysis of the role of mimicry and camouflage in the natural world. The remainder of the paper concentrates on a critical discourse of military mimicry as per concealment, deception, and the three imitative pathways depicted in Figure 1. The third pathway of military mimicry is novel, reflecting the world’s rapid transition to a higher technological stage in what is often termed the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). The principal change driver is AI. Thus, whilst the use of animals in military settings will not disappear, their involvement will diminish, to be replaced by robotics and software-intensive systems that will herald dramatic transformational change in the nature of war. The paper closes by offering conclusions on mimicry’s contribution to the conduct of war. The imperative here is to achieve the elusive trifecta of strategic benefits, namely optimisation of cost-effective military capability, reduction in systems complexity and minimisation of manned-asset attrition and military casualties.b Senior Research Fellow