Indian Strategic Studies: 08/14/24

14 August 2024

India, Russia and the Ukraine Crisis

Sumit Ganguly

As a post-colonial state, India has long zealously guarded its sovereignty, both in the region and in the world. Indeed, it was only after much internal debate that it decided to intervene in East Pakistan during the 1971 crisis, as this required violating the sovereignty of its neighbor, Pakistan.1 Not surprisingly, it has also been quite circumspect about wholeheartedly embracing the UN’s doctrine of the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) on the grounds that that it could undermine India’s devotion to the principle of state sovereignty.2 Underlying this opposition is an unspoken fear: that the R2P could at some point be applied to India itself, thanks to its many lapses in protecting human rights, especially when dealing with domestic insurgencies.

Despite this commitment to upholding sovereignty, in the wake of Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, India scrupulously avoided criticizing Moscow in the UN Security Council (UNSC) and abstained from the UNSC resolution condemning the Russian invasion. At their strongest, India’s statements simply called on Russia to respect international law without elaborating on what this might mean.4 Months after the invasion and as the crisis continued to unfold, Prime Minister Modi went so far as to tell President Vladimir Putin at a security summit in Uzbekistan: “This is not an era of war.” 5 Beyond this veiled criticism, India has issued a series of carefully-worded statements in various forums about the invasion, but has maintained normal diplomatic relations with Russia and abstained on multiple UNGA resolutions that have censured Russia.6 Most recently, on a December 2023 visit to Moscow, India’s Minister for External Afffairs, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, met with his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov, as well as President Putin, and publicly referred to Russia as a “valued and time-tested partner” while reaffirming plans to jointly produce a range of weaponry with Russia.

Why Bangladesh didn’t go the Sri Lanka way - Opinion

Gurjit Singh

Recent events in Bangladesh — protests, violence and the ouster of an elected government — bear an eerie resemblance to what happened in Sri Lanka in 2022. However, the results of the Sri Lankan protests and subsequent actions vary from the path Bangladesh has chosen.

What are the similarities? The Sri Lankan protests, emanating from economic distress, were led by a people’s movement, the Aragalaya. This seemed spontaneous and acquired traction, including quiet support from political parties. In Bangladesh, too, economic issues related to reservation in employment lit the spark. The diminishing economic resilience of Bangladesh was part of the problem. The student-led protests were not violent. As it was in Sri Lanka, they received support from parties and groups inimical to the ruling dispensation.

In Sri Lanka, the protests turned violent when the ruling party’s youth cadres were unleashed on the protesters. Similarly, in Bangladesh, the protests turned violent when the youth wing of the ruling party started attacking the protesters. Thereafter in Sri Lanka, the protest became one against all political parties and politicians. In Bangladesh, the assault was mainly on the ruling Awami League, its supporters, and minority groups. The ransacking of the leaders’ mansions was common in both countries. And, in both cases, an elected leader fled the country.

Desertification was supposed to be the ‘greatest environmental challenge of our time.’ Why are experts now worried about greening?

Fred Pearce

Southeast Australia has been getting hotter and drier. Droughts have lengthened, and temperatures regularly soar above 95 degrees F (35 degrees C). Bush fires abound. But somehow, its woodlands keep growing. One of the more extreme and volatile ecosystems on the planet is defying meteorology and becoming greener.

And Australia is far from alone. From Africa’s Sahel to arid western India, and the deserts of northern China to southern Africa, the story is the same. “Greening is happening in most of the drylands globally, despite increasing aridity,” says Jason Evans, a water-cycle researcher at the Climate Change Research Centre of the University of New South Wales in Sydney, Australia.

What is going on? The primary reason, most recent studies conclude, is the 50-percent rise in carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere since preindustrial times. This increased C02 is not just driving climate change, but also fast-tracking photosynthesis in plants. By allowing them to use scarce water more efficiently, the CO2-rich air fertilizes vegetation growth in even some of the driest places.

Kamala Harris’ VP pick has a long history with China. But Beijing may not be happy about it

Nectar Gan, Eric Cheung, Isaac Yee and Will Ripley

Presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Kamala Harris’ running mate has a decades-long connection with China. But in the eyes of Beijing, that may not necessarily be good news.

Tim Walz moved to China fresh out of college in 1989 to teach high school for a year, and then frequently returned to the country during a decade of taking American students on summer cultural exchanges.

The 60-year-old Minnesota governor has spoken fondly of his time in China and the people he met there, and his familiarity with the country and empathy for its people bring a personal, nuanced perspective on the United States’ biggest strategic rival that is rare among his political peers.

Some Republican opponents have seized on that experience to accuse Walz of being “pro-China,” but the Democratic vice-presidential nominee has a long history of criticizing authoritarian Chinese leadership.

Russia’s Becoming More Digitally Isolated—and Dependent on China

Justin Sherman

The U.S. Commerce Department recently banned Russian cybersecurity firm Kaspersky from providing certain antivirus and cybersecurity products and services in the United States on national security grounds. American businesses have until September 29 to remove covered Kaspersky products from their systems and replace them.

But this is hardly the first blow for Russia’s global tech connectedness. Over the last several years, and especially since 2022, Russia has become more digitally isolated—and increasingly dependent on China—with significant ramifications for human rights in Russia, cybersecurity, and the international community. The United States and its partners should seize the policy opportunities created by Russia’s growing isolation and dependence on Chinese technology.

After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, there was something of a digital technology boom in Russia. Scientifically and technically talented individuals moved abroad to seek economic opportunities, started outsourcing programming for Fortune 1000 firms, and founded Russian companies such as Yandex (a search engine launched in 1997, one year ahead of Google). Some even turned to the fast-growing world of cybercrime. Into the early 2000s, Russia’s digital tech sphere was also fairly connected with other countries. Non-Russian technology from Intel, AMD, Samsung, Apple, Microsoft, and other companies was found all throughout Russia. Business and university partnerships were fairly common, too.

Power Politics - United States vs. China

Monte Erfourth

The Strategy Central Great Power Competition report details the United States and China’s great power competition in the first half of 2024. It offers an analysis to help strategists grasp the current rivalry between these two superpowers regarding power, economics, military power, and diplomacy. This is the first of five segments covering each aspect of great power competition.

The first topic for this report on great power competition is titled Power Politics. It will be an effort to explain what great power competition functions and its relationship to national power. It will then focus on the Indo-Pacific region, which stands at the epicenter of great power competition. While Europe remains a significant competitive landscape, the Indo-Pacific is where the strategic aspirations of China and the United States’ deeply intertwined power dynamics are most evident. This report leverages the Lowy Institute's Asia Power Index 2023 to reveal the power levels between nations in this pivotal region. For roughly the last decade, China's quest for regional hegemony has challenged the established order backed by the United States. The analysis extends beyond the dominant players to encompass the roles of lesser regional powers and small island states, whose geopolitical significance, though often underestimated, can significantly influence regional stability. By examining the nations ranked on the Total Power Index, this report aims to elucidate the strategic calculations and perceptions of power that shape the Indo-Pacific's complex and evolving security landscape.

China’s Nightmare: A Second Trade War With Trump

Jason Douglas

China was bruised by its trade war with the U.S. under President Donald Trump, but ultimately bounced back. If Trump wins the White House in November, round two will be much tougher.

The Republican nominee has said he would raise tariffs on Chinese imports to 60% or more if he wins this year’s presidential election. The economic damage to China would be much steeper than in Trump’s first term because the tariffs would be higher and China’s economy is much more vulnerable.

Trump “will be putting his elbow into the Chinese economy as it deflates,” said Matthew Gertken, chief geopolitical strategist at BCA Research. “They are more vulnerable.”

The trade war erupted in 2018 when Trump placed tariffs of up to 25% on $350 billion of imports from China—65% of the 2018 total—including solar panels, washing machines, steel and aluminum. China retaliated with tariffs of its own on U.S. goods.

How China Views the US Presidential Election

Ian Bremmer

How will the Communist Party of China (CPC) react to America’s highly unpredictable election in November? China is convinced that the desire to stunt its natural growth and contain its legitimate exercise of global influence is one of the few points of agreement between Democrats and Republicans. Their only disagreement, Chinese leaders believe, is about which economic and political weapons to use to contain China, and how and when to use them.

This view should come as no surprise in Washington. After all, US President Joe Biden followed the Trump administration in imposing new tariffs and restrictions on technology exports, while also expanding anti-China alliances with partners like Japan, South Korea, Australia, and even India.

But this is not to suggest that China views the two parties as effectively the same. On the contrary, it appears to be preparing to meet the challenges that would come with a second Donald Trump presidency. Trump remains a slight favorite to win, and China’s leaders believe it is more important to prepare early for a new Trump administration than for a victory by the Democrats’ presumptive nominee, Vice President Kamala Harris.

Why China Continues to Purchase Russian Mi-171 Helicopters Despite Its Technological Advances - Analysis

Amid rapid modernization of its military, China continues to purchase Mi-171 helicopters from Russia, despite having developed its own aircraft. This decision raises questions about why China, capable of producing modern helicopters, still invests in this Russian platform. The Mi-171, with its proven capabilities and reliability in extreme conditions, continues to appeal to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)

The Mi-171 is an evolution of the well-known Soviet Mi-8 helicopter, developed by Russia in the 1990s. Designed to be versatile, this helicopter can perform a wide range of missions, from troop and material transport to rescue operations in challenging environments. Its VK-2500 engine, known for its reliability, provides the power needed for high-altitude operations and harsh climates. The helicopter is also equipped with advanced protection systems, such as electronic countermeasures and reinforced armor, making it suitable for operations in hostile environments.

Review – Rebel Governance in the Middle East

Francis O'Connor

Unlike some other overlapping fields, such as social movement studies, which are characterised by historical western-centricity, the field of rebel governance was originally pioneered in non-western cases (Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015; Mampilly 2011). However, with some notable exceptions, including some contributors to this volume (Schwab 2018; Furlan 2022), the Middle East has been somewhat underrepresented in the field. Accordingly, Fraihat and Alijla’s edited volume is a most welcome and original effort to address this geographical gap in the field, particularly in light of the significant presence of multiple armed groups of varying ideological orientation across the region.

The volume begins with a well put together introduction by the two co-editors, although the first page argument that rebel governance is an understudied topic seems difficult to justify. Recent years have seen multiple monographs in the most high-profile university presses and special issues and individual articles in highly prestigious journals. While one could query the theoretical ambition and creativity of this broader output, rebel governance has undoubtedly taken root in the mainstream study of conflict (see Teiner 2022). Commendably, the volume includes multiple authors from the region and, even more importantly, contributions from research institutions in the region, adding locally informed expertise to the field often absent in external western analysis of conflict in the Middle East.

Iran’s frightening new playbook for war

THE SUBURBS south of Beirut are emptying as residents flee to the mountains. Airlines are cancelling flights to Beirut, Tehran and Tel Aviv. Civilians in Lebanon are filling their cars with petrol; stressed-out Israelis are ordering more fast food. The Middle East has been on tenterhooks for more than a week, awaiting the latest escalation in ten months of fighting between Israel, Iran and its militant allies. As The Economist went to press, that escalation had yet to happen—but much of the region expects it will in the coming days.

Haniyeh’s Killing Could Boomerang and Help Iran

Binar FK

At an emergency summit Wednesday in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation issued a robust statement condemning the assassination of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran the previous week.

The statement by the 57-member group held “Israel, the illegal occupying power, fully responsible for this heinous attack” and called it “a serious infringement” of Iran’s sovereignty.

Iran has often been at odds with its fellow Muslim-majority countries — particularly the wealthy Sunni Arab states across the Persian Gulf – for interfering in their internal affairs. But Iran has also shown that it can benefit from chaos. Thus, the killing of Haniyeh – in a government guesthouse just hours after the Hamas leader had attended the inauguration of Iran’s new president – could allow Iran to increase its regional influence by harnessing Arab outrage at Israel and fostering Sunni-Shi’ite convergence.

How Everything Became National Security

Daniel W. Drezner

In American politics, labeling something a matter of “national security” automatically elevates its importance. In the language of foreign policy observers, national security questions, such as regulating weapons of mass destruction, are matters of “high politics,” whereas other issues, such as human rights, are “low politics.”

Of course, not everyone agrees on which issues fall into the national security bucket. And the American definition of national security has fluctuated wildly over time. The term was used by both George Washington and Alexander Hamilton during the Revolutionary era without being precisely defined. At the start of the Cold War, the federal government greatly expanded the size of the bucket after the passage of the 1947 National Security Act, but that law never defined the term itself. As tensions with Moscow eased at the end of the 1960s, the scope of national security began to shrink a bit, but that ended when the 1973 oil embargo triggered new fears about energy security. In the 1980s, the definition widened until the Cold War ended.

Mapping the Growing U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East

Jonathan Masters and Will Merrow

The United States maintains a considerable military presence in the Middle East, with forces in more than a dozen countries and on ships throughout the region’s waters. That presence has expanded in 2024 as the United States focuses on deterring and defeating threats from Iran and its network of armed affiliates in the region, including Hamas (Gaza Strip), Hezbollah (Lebanon), the Houthis (Yemen), and several Iraq- and Syria-based militant groups.

Since the October 2023 outbreak of war between Hamas and Israel, a U.S. ally and defense partner, U.S. forces in the Middle East have been increasingly targeted by some of these groups—and have regularly responded with counterstrikes. Hostilities between Israel and Iran and its proxies have flared over the last several months, and many foreign policy experts warn of the growing prospects for a wider war, which would likely involve U.S. forces. Meanwhile, U.S. and coalition ships have been protecting merchant shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, defending against near-daily Houthi drone and missile attacks.

As of June, the United States had several thousand service members stationed in the Middle East, and several thousand more on ships at sea in the region, although the numbers fluctuate. In total, the United States has military facilities across at least nineteen sites—eight of them considered to be permanent by many regional analysts —in countries including Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates. The U.S. military also uses large bases in Djibouti and Turkey, which are part of other regional commands but often contribute significantly to U.S. operations in the Middle East.

Backstopping Ukraine’s Long-Term Security: An Alternative to NATO Membership

Lise Morjé Howard & Michael O’Hanlon

Ukraine faces serious immediate challenges on the battlefield today; in-mid May, Putin declared that Russian forces are “improving their positions each day, on all fronts, according to plan.” The Russian wartime economy is gathering steam while Western resolve remains uncertain. Ukrainians will continue to fight fiercely, but Russia’s war machine is taking its toll. Thus, Ukraine’s first order of business is to defend itself and its territory and people.

Yet even so, other big questions loom, and it is not too soon to think about how the war might be ended and Ukraine’s long-term security shored up. NATO’s security could also very well be directly affected by how this war ends. In particular, were Russia to defeat Ukraine comprehensively, it could then be in a position to threaten the Baltic states and beyond (Putin has claimed the right to “protect” Russian speakers in neighboring states and suggested that NATO should be rolled back to its 1997 membership.) These realities are reason enough for deep gratitude to the Ukrainians, who are doing the hard fighting to fend off Russian troops in an imperial-minded conflict that could easily extend further into Europe if not checked in Ukraine first.1 They are also an argument for increased US agency. After all, security in Europe is very much Washington’s business, as the United States discovered belatedly—and the hard way—twice in the 20th century.

As Ukrainian Forces Grab Russian Territory, the Kremlin Maintains It’s No Big Deal

Yaroslav Trofimov and Thomas Grove

In the five days since Ukrainian forces pushed into Russia’s Kursk region, at least 76,000 Russian civilians have fled the fighting—some seen racing away in shrapnel-peppered cars. A tent city for refugees is being set up in the regional capital.

The first major foreign military invasion of Russian territory since World War II, the Ukrainian incursion caught Moscow by surprise. Kyiv’s forces have advanced at least 20 miles in from the border and raised a Ukrainian flag in the town of Sudzha.

Videos posted online show a column of Russian reinforcements taking heavy losses Friday near another town in the area, Rylsk, and Ukrainian troops released footage with well over a hundred Russian prisoners. At least three Russian combat helicopters have been shot down, according to Russian military analysts.

Still, on Russian TV—and in the Kremlin’s pronouncements—the tumultuous events of recent days are presented as nearly routine, with Ukrainian forces usually referred to as “saboteurs” who are “attempting” an incursion. President Vladimir Putin described the advance of Ukrainian armored units as “yet another large-scale provocation.”

Trump Campaign Says It Was Hacked

Dustin Volz and Vivian Salama

The Trump campaign said Saturday that some of its internal communications had been hacked and suggested Iran was responsible and seeking to undermine the former president’s prospects in the November election.

Documents belonging to the campaign “were obtained illegally from foreign sources hostile to the United States, intended to interfere with the 2024 election and sow chaos throughout our Democratic process,” Steven Cheung, a Trump campaign spokesman, said in a statement.

He cited recent statements from the U.S. government that accused Iran of seeking ways to prevent Trump from returning to the White House, including an alleged assassination plot. Cyber-threat research published Friday by Microsoft has also detailed Iran’s election hacking operations.

How Ukraine’s incursion into Russia could change the war

The August surprise came from Ukraine. Beginning on Tuesday, as many as a thousand Ukrainian troops reportedly crossed the border into the Kursk region in Russia, capturing an estimated seventeen square miles of territory. Russian President Vladimir Putin called the move a “major provocation,” while the Ukrainian government has largely declined to comment. The size and depth of the incursion adds a significant new dimension to the ongoing conflict. Below, our experts share their insights on the thinking in Kyiv and what could come next.

The element of surprise

“In a war where battlefield transparency is supposedly universal, the Ukrainians achieved surprise, demonstrating a Russian failure of intelligence and weakness along its border,” says Dan. “The attack thus upends the Kremlin narrative of inevitable Russian victory,” which “Kremlin propaganda deploys in Europe and the United States to advance its argument that Ukrainian resistance is useless and support for Ukraine futile.”
“Even if Ukrainian forces are soon forced out of Kursk, this is a clear shot in the arm for Ukraine,” John tells us. In recent weeks, Russia has made advances in eastern Ukraine, but this incursion may now “force the Kremlin to relieve its current pressure on Ukrainian positions in the Donbas or north of Kharkiv.” If Ukrainian forces do establish defensible positions on Russian territory, then “Moscow will have to consider even more adjustments of its forces in Ukraine” and “a ceasefire in place” would be “less attractive to the Putin clique.”

Wartime need for drones would outstrip US production. There’s a way to fix that

SAM SKOVE

If the U.S. Army found itself at war, American manufacturers would struggle to produce the large number of high-quality small drones that the service would likely need—unless the Pentagon increases its support for drone producers, and soon.

Army leaders at all levels are racing to incorporate small drones into operations, drawing on lessons from Ukrainian battlefields where small quadcopter-type aircraft are being used to great effect and in extraordinary numbers.

Some two years into Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukrainian companies are building one million first-person-view drones a year for use as loitering munitions—and that’s not counting other types like the thousands of reconnaissance quadcopters that the military has bought or received. In May 2023, Ukrainian forces were reported to be expending some 10,000 drones a month.

In Secret Talks, U.S. Offers Amnesty to Venezuela’s Maduro for Ceding Power

Juan Forero, Patricia Garip and Kejal Vyas

The U.S. is pursuing a long-shot bid to push Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro to give up power in exchange for amnesty as overwhelming evidence emerges that the strongman lost last month’s election, people familiar with the matter said.

The U.S. has discussed pardons for Maduro and top lieutenants of his who face Justice Department indictments, said three people familiar with the Biden administration deliberation. One of the people said the U.S. has put “everything on the table” to persuade Maduro to leave before his term ends in January.

Another person familiar with the talks said the U.S. would be open to providing guarantees not to pursue those regime figures for extradition. The U.S. in 2020 placed a $15 million bounty for information leading to Maduro’s arrest on charges of conspiring with his allies to flood the U.S. with cocaine.

The talks represent a flicker of hope for a Venezuelan political opposition that meticulously collected voter tallies showing its candidate, little-known former diplomat Edmundo González, defeated Maduro in a landslide in the July 28 election. Over the past two weeks, Maduro has jailed thousands of dissidents, maintained the military’s loyalty and tasked the Supreme Court, stacked with his handpicked allies, with resolving the election impasse, buying him time.

Managing the Sino-American AI Race

Karman Lucero

Central to the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union was a rivalry to develop the technologies of the future. First came the race to deploy nuclear weapons on intercontinental missiles. Then came the space race. Then came US President Ronald Reagan’s “Star Wars” program, which seemed to launch a new race to build missile-defense systems. But it soon became clear that the Soviet economy had fallen decisively behind.

The mediators struggle to keep a lid on a blood feud - Opinion

David Ignatius

The United States is a superpower. Yet for nine months it has been unable to broker a cease-fire between Israel and Hamas. Now, with the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh on Wednesday, the blood feud between the two appeared to deepen, with American peacemakers standing on the sidelines.

Israel didn’t comment on the death of Haniyeh in Tehran, but it didn’t need to. Since the Israel-Gaza war began, it’s been clear that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would take unilateral measures, regardless of American advice, to repay Hamas for its ghastly Oct. 7 attack on Israel. His goal isn’t making peace with Hamas, but destroying it. And most Israelis probably agree with him.

That left Biden administration officials scrambling once again Wednesday to keep the lid on a dangerous situation, stressing that nobody wants a regional cataclysm and that hopes for a durable cease-fire remain alive. White House officials believe the key channels to Hamas leadership were inside Gaza, not Haniyeh from his outside base in Qatar. And perhaps, they hope, the death of the nominal Hamas leader will give Netanyahu more space to negotiate.

As Ukraine Pushes Deeper Into Russia, Moscow Sends Reinforcements

Constant Méheut

Ukrainian forces pressed deeper into Russia on Friday, trying to capitalize on their surprise cross-border offensive, as Moscow moved quickly to shore up its defenses against the largest assault on Russian soil since the war began.

After capturing several small settlements the last few days, Ukraine was battling to take full control of a town near the border and sending small units to conduct raids farther into the southwestern Russian region of Kursk.

At the same time, the Russian military announced it was sending more troops and armored vehicles to try to repel the attack. Russian television released videos of columns of military trucks carrying artillery pieces, heavy machine guns and tanks.

Ukraine surprises with a high-stakes raid into Russia

THREE DAYS in, Ukraine’s unexpected cross-border raid into Russia’s Kursk region to the north-east shows no signs of abating. Since the start of the operation on the morning of August 6th, Russia has lost full control of at least 350 sq km of its territory. Scores of its soldiers have been killed or captured. A race is on to halt the advance—and prevent the Ukrainians from digging in.

Four Warnings About the “Dark Quad”

Dr. Christopher Ford

It would probably be difficult to overstate the potential challenges that the “Dark Quad” presents to international peace and security – not to mention to our own country’s national security interests and those of our allies and partners, and indeed all who prize peace and wish to preserve their political autonomy as sovereign peoples. Time being short, I’ll mention just four big ones.

These remarks offer only my personal opinions, of course, and don’t necessarily represent the views of anyone else. They’re also pretty depressing, I suppose. But let me offer what insights I can.

My four warnings are all related to the fact that the military quasi-alliance of the Dark Quad includes both the world’s only two nuclear-armed revisionist great powers and the world’s two most prominent nuclear proliferators.

Of the two proliferators, North Korea, of course, pursued nuclear weapons for years, signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in bad faith, immediately violated it, got caught, obtained a concessionary deal with the West in return for supposedly freezing its nuclear weapons work, violated that promise too, then pulled out of the NPT, and has since built itself a rapidly-growing and ever more sophisticated nuclear arsenal.
For its part, Iran pursued nuclear weapons for years, got caught, faced international sanctions, obtained a concessionary deal with the West in return for temporarily delaying its nuclear progress, but is today busily at work enriching uranium and cementing its status as a so-called “latent” or “virtual” nuclear weapons possessor able to sprint toward weaponization at the drop of a hat.