Indian Strategic Studies: 07/31/24

31 July 2024

India’s Partnership with ASEAN

Shristi Pukhrem

On July 26, 2024, in Vientiane, Laos, the foreign ministers from the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and India will meet, marking a significant landmark in their relationship. This gathering highlights the increasing significance of their partnership and emphasizes India’s role in enhancing its connections with ASEAN countries while maintaining ASEAN centrality in the Indo-Pacific region.

The relationship between India and ASEAN is not new. Both regions have interacted for centuries. These relations have been well established and upgraded in the last few decades. The ASEAN-India Strategic Partnership is setting the course for integration in trade, security, and investment and establishing educational and cultural exchanges.

The year 2024 has seen a major transformation in the Indo-Pacific region’s geopolitics. China’s rise in the region and its assertive behavior in the South China Sea have triggered regional tensions, underlining the imperative for a rule-based order. In light of this, the ASEAN centrality cannot be dismissed since it is the primary driver for regional dialogue and cooperation.

Forget the bear hug: India’s gradual turn from Russia, towards the West

James Crabtree

Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Russia was greeted with predictable disappointment in European capitals. The trip marked the Indian prime minister’s first international foray following his re-election in June, and his first to Moscow in nearly a decade. The sight of Modi in a bear hug with Vladimir Putin rekindled old worries about India’s enduring Russian ties and the sincerity of more recent pledges to build new partnerships in the West. Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy was especially blunt, describing Modi’s choice of destination as “a huge disappointment and a devastating blow to peace efforts.”

European and north American leaders should not draw the wrong conclusions about India’s long-term trajectory, however. Modi’s move is a reminder of his unwillingness to abandon Russia. But he is also trying to strike a delicate balance of managing India’s historic links with Moscow while not obviously deepening them. In fact, embracing the world’s advanced industrial democracies is now a greater Indian strategic priority – and one that presents geopolitical opportunities for Europe.

Moscow ended up on Modi’s itinerary for three broad reasons. Political priorities were one, providing a high-profile and domestically popular international platform following a relatively disappointing election result for Modi. Second were more regular and practical issues relating to the energy and weapons that Russia supplies to India. Finally, and most importantly, were ever-growing worries about China, which Indian security leaders now view as the country’s primary security threat.

India-China warming pops US pipe dream

Spengler

India’s Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman on July 25 endorsed her economic advisor’s proposal to open the country to direct investment from China, effectively frozen since the Sino-Indian border clashes of 2020.

Earlier this week, Reuters reported, “India’s Chief Economic Adviser V Anantha Nageswaran said…that to boost its global exports New Delhi can either integrate into China’s supply chain or promote foreign direct investment (FDI) from China.

“Among these choices, focusing on FDI from China seems more promising for boosting India’s exports to the US, similar to how East Asian economies did in the past,’” Nageswaran said according to Reuters.

The proposed opening to China—a rebuke to American diplomacy in the region—followed Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to New Delhi earlier this month.

Asia Times’ newsletter Global Risk-Reward Monitor reported exclusively July 11, “Modi asked Putin to help India resolve its longstanding border dispute with China. This is the most important military conflict in Asia, limited as it is, because it puts the region’s two largest countries at odds. Russian mediation, however informal, would entail a diplomatic revolution, and make a mockery of America’s hope of rallying Asian countries against China.”

India's Maritime Imperative | Opinion

Shivani Sharma

The results from India's massive, multi-month election are in, and the verdict is a somewhat-constricted mandate for sitting Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Despite this electoral uncertainty, one thing remains indisputable—New Delhi's view of its primary security threat. Across the political spectrum, Indian voters have made clear that they see China as posing a growing challenge in political, economic, and strategic terms.

Nowhere is this more evident than in the maritime domain, where New Delhi and Beijing are locked in a contest for dominance—one with profound regional and global implications.

In recent months, the Indian Navy has distinguished itself through anti-piracy operations in the Red Sea, Indian Ocean, and Gulf of Aden, taking the lead against regional threats like resurgent Somali piracy. This stepped-up activism isn't simply a reflection of India's strategic ambition. It also represents a crucial component of a larger geostrategic puzzle, because a stronger Indian Navy is directly aligned with U.S. national security interests, providing a bulwark against China's assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific.

Can India Rise Without South Asia?

Chietigj Bajpaee

Much of the discussion surrounding Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Russia was about its implications for India’s relations with the West, given the optics of Modi hugging Vladimir Putin as Moscow conducted airstrikes on Ukraine and Western leaders were meeting in Washington, D.C. for the NATO Summit. However, overlooked in this discussion is the fact that Modi stepped away from the standard practice of Indian leaders making their first overseas state visits to a neighboring country.

The first overseas visits of Modi’s first two terms in 2014 and 2019 were to Bhutan, and Maldives and then Sri Lanka, respectively. In 2024, following the start of Modi’s third term, he paid a visit first to Italy in June for the G-7 Summit and then, in July, traveled to Russia.

This alludes to an emerging facet of Indian foreign policy: As the country continues its rise as an increasingly consequential global power, its regional role is being eclipsed. This is a far cry from Modi’s initial commitment to the neighborhood when he assumed power in 2014 by inviting the leaders of all South Asian countries to his inauguration and his government announcing a “Neighborhood First” policy. Modi’s surprise visit to Pakistan in December 2015 to meet then-counterpart Nawaz Sharif on his birthday also raised hopes of a rapprochement in the perennially difficult India-Pakistan relationship.

India Must Embrace Security Coalitions – Analysis

Rahul Jaybhay

June 15, 2024 marks the fourth year since China’s deadly escalation at the Galwan Valley. Since they began in 2020, negotiations and dialogue are yet to deliver any resolution to the border dispute. As such, India’s multi-alignment strategy, precisely implemented to ‘manage’ China, has run its course and requires recalibration.

The multi-alignment strategy is conceptually synonymous with the non-alignment approach that India followed post-independence. India avoided alliance entanglements, renounced bloc politics and raised collective consciousness in post-colonial independent nations.

In the same vein, the multi-alignment strategy stipulates maintaining ties with all the great powers without commitment to any of them, straddling multiple global institutions and pushing the voices of the Global South foreward.

Both non-alignment and multi-alignment embrace employing India’s defence capabilities to push back against powers that encroach on India’s sovereignty. But both approaches also shy away from prescribing security coalitions or alliances to manage India’s security relations with a more powerful revisionist actor — China.

New Extremist Groups — At Least In Name — Enter Pakistan’s Militant Scene – Analysis

Daud Khattak

Suicide bombers and gunmen penetrated a military base in northwestern Pakistan last week, killing eight soldiers.

It was just the latest in a string of deadly attacks to hit the South Asian country, where militant violence has surged in recent years.

But what was significant about the July 15 attack in the city of Bannu was the group that claimed responsibility — Jaish Fursan-e Muhammad (JFM) — a previously unknown militant outfit.

JFM is among several new militant groups that have announced their arrival on the crowded militant scene in Pakistan in recent months.

But experts believe the new actors are in fact fronts for existing groups, including the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the most lethal militant organization waging war against Islamabad.

The Intensifying Impacts of Upstream Dams on the Mekong

Nguyen Minh Quang, Nguyen Phuong Nguyen, Le Minh Hieu, and James Borton

This year marked another record-setting dry season for the Mekong basin. Mekong Environment Forum, an NGO based in Can Tho City, has assisted the Mekong Dam Monitor project team in translating weekly updates on the operation of hydropower dams observed in the upstream Mekong over the last few years. We synthesized the updates in the first half of 2024 to map and provide insights into the updated impacts of dam operations on the downstream hydro- and eco-systems.

The evidence supports our understanding on the likelihood of a double water crisis when upstream dams’ operations intersect with downstream climate change effects. These findings reaffirm recent experts and public concerns over the transboundary impacts of overinvestment in damming the Mekong.

We call for cross-border collaboration and coordination to promote responsible, transparent, and sustainable use of the shared water resources in the Mekong basin. As a downstream victim, the Mekong Delta of Vietnam, like many Cambodian riverine communities and wetlands, stands to be most in danger in the time of accelerating climate change and hydropower impacts.

Risk to resilience: China’s economic security strategy

Wenjing Wang

In 2014, at the inaugural meeting of the National Security Commission, China officially introduced the concept of “comprehensive national security,” framing economic security as its basis.

Safeguarding economic security, under this framework, entails improving China’s economic strength while controlling financial risks and fostering economic resilience. However, the unforeseen Covid-19 pandemic exposed China’s economic vulnerabilities, leading to a post-pandemic recovery more sluggish than many observers had anticipated.

With challenges from the external environment, theories such as “peak China” predict a pessimistic future for the Chinese economy and warn of a more aggressive Beijing if it loses its legitimacy rooted in decades of remarkable economic growth.

Domestically, China faces challenges on two fronts: demographic shift and financial risks concentrated in the property sector and local governments (LGs). The long-term effects of the one-child policy (1979-2015) and increasing life expectancy are straining China’s shrinking labor force and fragile social safety net.

Integrated Deterrence and China's Strategic Insights: Lessons from Ukraine & Asian Pacific Deterrence

Monte Erfourth

Introduction

The United States' inability to deter Russia from invading Ukraine in 2022 can be attributed to a series of historical errors, insufficient signaling of consequences, and a lack of consistent and credible deterrence measures across multiple administrations. From President George W. Bush’s weak response to the 2008 invasion of Georgia to the Biden administration’s hesitant gestures of support for Ukraine, U.S. policies created the impression that the United States was not willing to make an assault on Ukraine painful for Russia. The result was a tremendously costly war that could have been avoided.

The failures of U.S. deterrence leading up to Russia's invasion of Ukraine highlight a series of historical missteps, inconsistent policies, and insufficient signaling of consequences. Over multiple administrations, the U.S. demonstrated a pattern of weak responses to Russian aggression, from the Bush administration’s limited reaction to the 2008 invasion of Georgia to the Obama administration’s reluctance to provide lethal aid during the 2014 Crimea crisis and Trump’s mixed messages regarding NATO commitments. The botched withdrawal from Afghanistan further contributed to the perception of U.S. weakness and war-weariness, undermining its deterrence credibility. This cumulative display of indecision and limited action failed to create a credible deterrent effect, ultimately emboldening Russia to invade Ukraine in 2022.

Will Gaza Ceasefire End Hezbollah Attacks? – OpEd

Neville Teller

The possibility of full-scale conflict in northern Israel hangs like a dark cloud over the nation. If, as Shakespeare has it, the dogs of war are indeed let slip, the armory of sophisticated Iranian-supplied weapons held by Hezbollah could inflict massive damage across the country. Equally, if forced into war, the IDF could decimate Hezbollah’s armed forces while Lebanon and its people, already enduring privation and distress, would inevitably suffer further unnecessary misery.

There are, however, reasons to believe that Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader, does not want a full-scale war with Israel. The country’s economy and its people are under extraordinary pressure. A nationwide poll conducted by Arab Barometer between February and April 2024 showed that around 80% of citizens find accessing food supplies, to say nothing of its cost, a problem. Many run out of food before they can afford to buy more. The provision of water, internet access and health care are patchy, while 92% of respondents to the poll reported constant electricity outages.

Two further findings from the Arab Barometer survey explain reluctance on Nasrallah’s part for a new all-out war with Israel.

Ukraine Military Situation: Russia Secures Advances On Multiple Fronts, But Incurres High Casualties – Analysis

Can Kasapoğlu

1. Battlefield Assessment

Last week, Russia maintained its strong push on the Kharkiv front. The Kremlin continued to incur rising casualties in that effort: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced that at least 20,000 Russian servicemen have been killed or injured since the large-scale Kharkiv campaign began in May 2024. Meanwhile, Russian forces launched an aerial strike apparently intending to destroy a crossing over the Oskil River.

Intense fighting and air strikes continued in eastern and southern Ukraine, particularly around Toretsk, Robotyne, Vovchansk, Chasiv Yar, and the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Dnipro River near Krynky. Russian ground warfare formations advanced toward a chemical plant in Toretsk that hosts Ukrainian defenses, while the Russian Aerospace Forces (VDV) pounded Ukraine’s defensive supply routes. Russian combat formations also continued their offensive in areas adjacent to the occupied city of Avdiivka, while several flashpoints near Pokrovsk saw heavy combat action.

Something WICKED This Way Comes: The Future Singularity of Asymmetric Warfare Innovations

Robert J. Bunker

The modern world and dominance of conventional (symmetric) warfighting systems operated by human combatants—main battle tanks, capital warships, fighters and strategic bombers—is rapidly approaching its twilight. This ‘gold standard’ of military innovation and technology is completing its functional weapons systems life cycle as it transitions from institutionalized to ritualized usage on the more advanced mid-21st century battlefield. This battlefield has disparate elements now readily recognizable and the mosaic forming portends a form of conflict inherently alien to our modern comprehension of state-on-state warfighting.

Asymmetric Warfare Innovations

While asymmetric warfare is typically viewed as unorthodox and even insurgent in approach—leveraging weakness against a superior force using innovative applications of technology and tactics—it also possesses an advanced warfighting component. This is the circumstance behind the contemporary suite of asymmetric warfare innovations, derived from a synthesis of technology and CONOPS (concepts of operations), now forming. However, the disruptive innovation taking place is a level of magnitude above that of 1920s-1930s revolution in military affairs (RMA) perceptions. That level of operational change, resulting in blitzkrieg tactics, carrier operations, et al., existed within the modern paradigm of warfare. The level of disruptive change we are now witnessing is out-of-paradigm change equivalent to the shift from the Classical to Medieval or Medieval to Modern epochs of Western civilization. These shifts have been characterized respectively as ‘The Dark Ages’ and ‘The Renaissance’ in their societal, state institutional, and military impacts. We are within a post-Modern shift that will witness modern (legacy) nation-state mass industrial force structures becoming ineffective on the battlefield as asymmetric warfare innovations mature and are increasingly fielded by states and non-state entities.

Tech and talent are the keys to defense modernization

Michael Bloomberg

The world we know today would not exist without the close ties that bound the Defense Department, academia, and industry throughout the Cold War. The Internet and GPS grew out of those public-private partnerships and became part of the foundation for U.S. leadership in the global economy.

Now the same kinds of partnerships can again help make the Defense Department more innovative and effective — and Americans safer. Military leaders recognize the imperative of forming these partnerships, but clearing away the bureaucratic roadblocks is far easier said than done.

The Pentagon established the Defense Innovation Board, which I have the honor of chairing, to help the department build its relationships outside of government and beyond the existing defense industry. Our role is to conduct independent research and interviews, and then offer recommendations for change to Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and other senior leaders. In many cases, the capabilities that the department needs already exist. The difficulty lies in adopting and scaling them.

Pentagon to test whether counter-drone systems can operate effectively under electronic attack

Jon Harper

The Defense Department wants to see whether industry’s drone killers can get the job done while operating in a contested electromagnetic environment.

The technical demonstration, slated to be conducted early next year, will be overseen by the Joint Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office (JCO), according to a new sources-sought notice.

The event is being planned as concerns grow about the threats posed by enemy drones and electronic warfare arsenals. While the U.S. military has its own EW weapons and other tools to defeat adversaries’ uncrewed aerial platforms, it also recognizes that American defensive systems could also be jammed.

“The JCO is interested to understand industry’s C-sUAS capabilities that can operate in a contested electromagnetic environment,” per the RFI.

The Forgotten War in Congo

Jason K. Stearns

Last year, the conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo turned 30. It is a grim milestone, and one that received almost no global attention. The silence isn’t a surprise. Since its inception, the war in Congo has excelled at evading international recognition. Few people noticed when the M23 Movement, the region’s biggest militia, rounded up and executed 171 civilians, in November 2022. The world was quiet when Doctors Without Borders declared that they had treated 25,000 survivors of sexual violence in Congo last year.

Armenia and Azerbaijan Hold Peace Talks

Mark Temnycky

Following a tense spring, it appears that Armenian and Azerbaijani officials are making progress on a peace agreement. Earlier this month, foreign ministers from both countries gathered in Washington to discuss the peace process in further detail. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with his Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts, where he stated that “both countries are very close to being able to reach a final agreement.”

Two weeks later, Reuters reported that Azerbaijan had proposed a document to Armenia that highlighted “basic principles of a future peace treaty as an interim measure.” The U.S. Department of State then announced that the two countries had made further progress in their quest for a peace agreement. The United States has also provided aid assistance to the region throughout the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Meanwhile, the European Union (EU) has also increased its efforts to try and help with the situation. Earlier this year, the European body “pledged to give €12 million in humanitarian aid to Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh.” This assistance will help refugees impacted by the brutal attack on the region last year. It may also help them assimilate in their new areas of residence as they recover from the Azerbaijani incursion last year.

Hezbollah Doesn’t Want a War With Israel

Mohanad Hage Ali

Over the past few weeks, an all-out conflict between Israel and the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah has begun to appear more likely. In May, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant suggested that the country might use expanded “military means” to quash Hezbollah, and according to media reports, the Israeli military has drawn up plans for a limited ground assault to enforce a buffer zone at its northern border with Lebanon. Both Israel’s far-right finance minister, Bezalel Smotrich, and national security minister, Itamar Ben-Gvir, have openly called for an invasion of Lebanon. Outside leaders and analysts tend to focus on Israel as the actor whose policies provoke or avoid war. But given Washington’s limited success in influencing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s strategy in the war with Hamas in the Gaza Strip, those seeking a route to de-escalation must look more closely at Hezbollah’s calculations.

The organization faces a dilemma that limits its choices. On the one hand, it must restore its ability to deter Israel. It lost some of that capacity in the months following Hamas’s October 7 attack. Soon after the offensive, Hezbollah lobbed missiles at Israel in a restrained show of support for Hamas, and Israel responded with an assassination campaign across Lebanon, including in the organization’s stronghold in Beirut’s southern suburbs. Owing to Lebanon’s fragility, however, Hezbollah still wants to avoid a full-blown conflict with Israel.

Do Europeans Support NATO?

James Holmes

Do Europeans support NATO? They certainly fret a lot about the future of the Atlantic Alliance. To hear them tell it, a return of Donald Trump to the White House next January would augur cataclysm. “The anxiety is massive” according to a typical statement from European elites relayed by The Atlantic’s McKay Coppins. They fear the United States, the dominant member of the alliance, might throttle back its support for European security—retreating into isolationism, enacting soft-on-Russia policies, shifting military resources and policy energy to the Indo-Pacific to confront a domineering China, or some alloy of these. And Trump would almost certainly resume lambasting allies for free-riding on American-supplied defense. He would hector them publicly, early, and often to spend more—much as he did during his last tenure as president.

Europe stands to be the biggest loser from this fall’s U.S. elections.

But rather than concentrate on what Trump says, or what Europeans say about what he might do, why don’t we look at what Europe—and for that matter Canada, another laggard—does in the defense sphere. Communiques and public statements out of the recent 75th-anniversary summit in Washington DC put the accent on the positive. Quoth the official statement from allied capitals: “We welcome that more than two-thirds of Allies have fulfilled their commitment of at least 2% of GDP annual defence spending and commend those Allies who have exceeded it.” Flip that upbeat statement around. It means that a substantial minority of allies still are not spending 2 percent or more of GDP on their armed forces a decade after allied leaders resolved that all members would meet that standard within a decade.

Europe Is in Danger of Regulating Its Tech Market Out of Existence

Jeremiah Johnson

In June, Apple announced a new product called Apple Intelligence. It’s being sold as a new suite of features for the iPhone, iPad, and Mac that will use artificial intelligence to help you write and edit emails, create new pictures and emojis, and generally accomplish all kinds of tasks. There’s just one problem if you’re a European user eager to get your hands on it: Apple won’t be releasing it in Europe.

Ukraine’s Other Problem: Spiraling Debt

Cameron Abadi

Ukraine owes billions of dollars to private creditors, and the bill for some of those debts will come due on Aug. 1, when a two-year suspension of Ukraine’s debt payments is scheduled to expire. Even after a restructuring deal was agreed to this week, Ukraine could still find itself in default, adding significant legal and economic troubles at a time of war.

The Kamala Harris Doctrine

Now that U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris has seemingly all but locked up the Democratic nomination for the 2024 presidential race, one of the biggest questions swirling around Washington and foreign capitals is what a Harris foreign-policy doctrine would look like if she is elected in November.

Iran Orchestrating Online Campaign of Threats Against Israeli Olympic Athletes

The Israel National Cyber Directorate announced on July 25 that Iran was behind an online intimidation campaign targeting Israeli athletes competing in the Paris Olympics. Hackers posing as the French far-right student organization Groupe Union Défense sent threatening messages and created online channels to disseminate personal information about the athletes. One such message, sent to Israeli swimmer Meiron Amir Cheruti, read: “You are welcome to attend the funeral of Meiron Amir Cheruti, born on October 19, 1997, died on July 27, 2024.” Another message sent to athletes warned: “The fate of the Zionists will be like that of the Palestinians in Gaza if the Zionists continue to terrorize everyone.”

For its part, International Olympic Committee (IOC) President Thomas Bach expressed his “full confidence” in the French authorities’ ability to ensure the safety of Israeli athletes. Bach noted that the IOC is working closely with “180 other international intelligence agencies collecting all information” to create a safe and secure environment for the games, which formally opened on July 26. In the hours immediately prior to the opening ceremony, unidentified saboteurs carried out arson attacks at five separate junctions of the French national railway network, causing severe delays. “Everything points us to these fires being deliberate — the timing, the vans that have been recovered after people have fled, the incendiary agents found on the scene,” Transport Minister Patrice Vergriete commented.

Steve Jobs Knew the Moment the Future Had Arrived. It's Calling Again

Steven Levy

Steve Jobs is 28 years old, and seems a little nervous as he starts his speech to a group of designers gathered under a large tent in Aspen, Colorado. He fiddles with his bow tie and soon removes his suit jacket, dropping it to the floor when he finds no other place to set it down. It is 1983, and he’s about to ask designers for their help in improving the look of the coming wave of personal computers. But first he will tell them that those computers will shatter the lives they have led to date.

“How many of you are 36 years … older than 36?” he asks. That’s how old the computer is, he says. But even the younger people in the room, including himself, are sort of “precomputer,” members of the television generation. A distinct new generation, he says, is emerging: “In their lifetimes, the computer will be the predominant medium of communication.”

Quite a statement at the time, considering that very few of the audience, according to Jobs’ impromptu polling, owns a personal computer or has even seen one. Jobs tells the designers that they not only will soon use one, but it will be indispensable, and deeply woven into the fabric of their lives.

The Perils of 'Open Source' AI, According to Experts

Monica Sager

The debate over whether increasingly advanced software code should be treated as a trade secret or openly available to anyone who wants it took a turn this week when Mark Zuckerberg, the CEO of Meta, called for an open-source approach to artificial intelligence development — then put his money where his mouth is by launching an open-sourced AI app that the company claims can compete with the best closed AI models, like OpenAI's ChatGPT.

"It's a fundamentally different move than the companies who are taking responsibility for how they're using their models and are making sure their models are do certain things and won't do other certain things," Anthony Aguirre, the executive director of the nonprofit Future of Life Institute, told Newsweek.

"Safety regulation is just not compatible with open release of those models."