27 July 2024

India–China relations under the Modi 3.0 government

Antoine Levesques

On 4 June, Narendra Modi was re-elected as prime minister of India for a third consecutive term – unprecedented in 62 years. By reappointing his foreign minister and national security advisor, Modi has signalled his desire for continuity in India’s statecraft.

However, among India’s key bilateral ties, those with China will merit significant attention and possibly adaptation. As the relationship between Asia’s largest nuclear-armed militaries and economies by 2025 appears increasingly distant and tense, where is it headed?

Mutually exclusive prosperity and security

India–China ties are troubled by an unsettled border, an unequal trade relationship, China’s strategic ties to Pakistan, and a broadening political-strategic disagreement over each other’s perceived rightful place in Asia and beyond. The relationship has suffered from a lack of strategic trust since a June 2020 border clash, which unmade much of the letter and spirit of the border-management regime that had been patiently negotiated, designed and agreed to over a generation. The war in Ukraine has brought China closer to Russia, India’s historic defence partner.

The result is a complex relationship which tends towards tension over cooperation. This has not always been the case. During the course of the 1990s and until 2013, India and China agreed to set aside their differences on the border and focus on their economic development, each involving the other on secondary issues such as terrorism or Afghanistan.

Indian-Made Weapons In Ukraine: What Are The Implications For New Delhi – OpEd

Alan Callow
Source Link

The appearance of Indian-made ammunition in Ukraine has caused a heated discussion in the expert community, creating a ground for speculations regarding India’s political course. A number of expert assessments boil down to the fact that India made a mistake by trusting the importing countries, which did not miss the opportunity to supply Indian ammunition to Ukraine. Some experts believe that New Delhi deliberately provoked Russia for excessive rapprochement with China. Each point of view has its place, but in this material we will try to give our assessment of this decision and its consequences.

For India, indirect involvement in the conflict in Ukraine will have far-reaching consequences for the country’s foreign policy, economy and regional status. Although the Indian government claims that the weapons were not directly supplied to Ukraine, the consequences of this decision are likely to be felt in various sectors.

Tense relations with Russia

One of the most serious consequences is the potential deterioration of relations with Russia, a long-standing strategic partner and a major arms supplier to the Indian Army. By supplying arms to Ukraine, even indirectly through third countries, India could be perceived as a party to the conflict, which could irritate Russia and affect their bilateral relations. This is particularly worrisome for India as Russia is a crucial partner in areas such as defence, energy and space exploration. India may face difficulties in procuring critical defence systems such as the S-400 missile defence system, which is a critical component of its national security architecture.

Beyond Doha: Why The West Engages With The Taliban – Analysis

Anant Mishra and Prof. Dr. Christian Kaunert

With Taliban completing almost three years of rule (since they first took control of Afghanistan in 2021), global economies continue to struggle on how to best deal with the group. The contention (among scholars) not only rest on nation’s employing varying diplomatic means to engage with the group, but varying mechanisms even to approach the group, one which was visible during series of engagements initiated by the United Nations in Doha, which concluded recently on June 30.

The meeting witnessed participation from the official spokesperson of the Taliban, but Afghan women among other key representatives of the Afghan community, local humanitarian aid institutions and key political actors, were simply absent. Hosting a meeting with such a composition (without a legitimate entity representing local Afghans), reflects some form of compliance from the Western community to reconcile with the Taliban (on their terms), making it difficult for immediate neighbours to formulate an Afghan policy (instead forcing them to streamline their Taliban approach) without throwing regional stability into disarray.

The Limits of the China Chip Ban

Hanna Dohmen, Jacob Feldgoise, and Charles Kupchan

In 2022, amid rising U.S.-Chinese tensions, the Biden administration rolled out export controls to prevent Beijing from obtaining advanced semiconductors and the equipment to produce them domestically. The stated objective of these restrictions was to deny China the cutting-edge AI capabilities it could use to modernize its nuclear and conventional weapons. U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo insisted that the controls were “laser-focused” on impeding Beijing’s military development. But these measures may also protect the United States’ technological and economic edge over China. Although leadership in AI is not officially stipulated as an aim of the restrictions, U.S. officials, including Raimondo and U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, have regularly asserted that it is central to the country’s competitive economic advantage, which in turn advances its national security.

But the chip controls will probably fall short of achieving either outcome. They are unlikely to substantially slow Beijing’s military modernization, much of which can be accomplished using older legacy chips. Where cutting-edge AI chips are needed, the Chinese military can use previously imported chips, smuggled chips, and domestically designed and produced chips. The controls will likely be more consequential when it comes to enabling the United States to maintain its technological edge. By impeding China’s ability to develop and deploy AI throughout its economy, the export restrictions could slow China’s growth and curb its competitiveness, thereby helping the United States stay ahead.

US warns Chinese banks over Russian shipments

JEFF PAO

China has vowed to take necessary measures to safeguard its rights after American officials said the United States may sanction Chinese banks for facilitating transactions related to shipments to the Russian defense sector.

The US is preparing a new round of sanctions against Chinese entities that supplied dual-use items to Russia’s war machine in Ukraine, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said at the Aspen Security Forum in Colorado on July 19.

Sullivan said the US side had seen Beijing respond to its concern that some Chinese banks are facilitating problematic transactions. However, he added that “the picture is not pretty” as China continues to be a major supplier of dual-use items to Russia’s war machine.

“There are targeted ways in which they are responsive, but the larger picture continues to travel in the wrong direction,” he said, adding that people can expect to see additional sanctions measures in the coming weeks.


U.S. Gears-Up To Deploy ‘Remote Modular Terminals’ To Block Chinese, Russian Satellite Communication During Conflict

Shubhangi Palve

The United States Space Force is poised to introduce a new ground-based jamming system designed to disrupt adversary satellite communications during conflicts.

According to the Space Force, the US is preparing to deploy a new ground-based jammer known as Remote Modular Terminals (RMT). This jammer is designed to prevent Chinese or Russian satellites from transmitting information about US forces during a conflict.

The initial batch of Remote Modular Terminals (RMT) jammers is scheduled for installation later this year following several successful tests. For security reasons, 11 out of 24 jammers will be deployed at undisclosed locations by December 31.

The devices are not intended to shield US satellites from Chinese or Russian jamming but rather to “responsibly counter adversary satellite communications capabilities that enable attacks,” the Space Force said in a statement to ‘Bloomberg News.

Remote Modular Terminals (RMT)

The US Space Force highlights that the Remote Modular Terminals (RMT) are compact, portable, and cost-effective satellite communications jammers designed for deployment in challenging environments to safeguard US forces. “We intentionally created a small, modular system utilizing commercial off-the-shelf components,” stated the Space Force.


A neoclassical solution for China

FRANCESCO SISCI

China’s recently concluded Party Plenum took inspiration from ancient philosophers to solve its modernization drive. It is a bold and ambitious move that could change the country and the world. Will it work?

Last week, the 2024 Party Plenum issued its decisions concentrating on the economy. In a nutshell, the plan was to unify the internal market, better protect property rights, improve the fiscal system and clarify responsibilities between central and local administrations.

Then, it called on Chinese Communist Party (CCP) members to implement decisions proactively and creatively. The Party bets that these changes will help stimulate the economy’s sagging performance. Indeed, there is much room for improvement and even a marginal enhancement could give China’s massive productive capacity breathing room.

Yet, the Third Plenum was not just about the economy. A few hours earlier, it issued a far more innovative communiqué. China is thinking big – the Communist Party is pushing for a massive organizational drive.

In China, Hamas announces 'national unity' deal with Palestinian rivals

Matthew Walsh and Isabel Kua

Hamas announced Tuesday it had signed an agreement in Beijing with other Palestinian organisations including rivals Fatah to work together for "national unity", with China describing it as a deal to rule Gaza together once the war ends.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who hosted senior Hamas official Musa Abu Marzuk, Fatah envoy Mahmud al-Aloul and emissaries from 12 other Palestinian groups, said they had agreed to set up an "interim national reconciliation government" to govern post-war Gaza.

"Today we sign an agreement for national unity and we say that the path to completing this journey is national unity. We are committed to national unity and we call for it," Abu Marzuk said after meeting Wang and the other envoys.

The announcement comes more than nine months into a war sparked by Hamas's October attack on southern Israel, which resulted in the deaths of 1,197 people, mostly civilians, according to an AFP tally based on Israeli figures.


To Secure the Red Sea, Sink Iran’s Navy - OPINION

Shay Khatiri

Three consecutive U.S. administrations have failed to resolve the problem of Iranian-backed Houthi militia in Yemen—a failure demonstrated by the Iran-made drone that killed an Israeli in Tel Aviv this month, striking near the U.S. Consulate. The main cause of this American failure has been a lack of will, arising from fear that Iran would unleash its proxies on the U.S. It’s time to cut supply lines to the Houthis by imitating the Reagan administration, which sank roughly half of Iran’s navy in 1988, ending Iran’s assaults on oil tankers and convincing it to end the war with Iraq.

The U.S. has tried several strategies to defeat the Houthis. In 2015, Washington began to provide support for a Saudi-Emirati campaign against the militia. After six years, the campaign had made little progress and was a humanitarian catastrophe, leading the Biden administration to end support for the Arab partners in 2021. The recent drone attack shows the failure of the campaign to reopen the Red Sea and America’s broader Yemen policy.

The U.S. and its partners haven’t been able to degrade Houthi assets faster than Iran supplies them. The halting of the Saudi-Emirati assault, combined with the de facto lifting of U.S. sanctions on Iran, allowed the Houthis to grow stronger between 2021 and 2024. Following Hamas’s attack on Israel in October, the Houthis rushed to assist the Palestinians. They began by targeting the Israeli homeland and contributing to Iran’s missile and drone barrage against Israel in April. No missile launched from Yemen landed in Israel, thanks to Israeli air defense and assistance from American, European and Arab governments. But another Houthi strategy has been more successful: targeting commercial shipping through the Red Sea.

Russia’s Hybrid Warfare Against NATO

Joe Varner

Vladimir Putin stung by two and a half years failures and stalemate on the Ukrainian battlefield has tried everything for a decisive win and has now turned to a dual strategy of conventional war against Kyiv and hybrid war against NATO. NATO has warned for months in the run up to this year’s 75th Anniversary of NATO and European elections that Russia is out for revenge and out to destabilize western countries with hybrid warfare. NATO’s support for Ukraine in terms of training, treasure, and equipment has angered the Kremlin, and from Moscow’s point of view the West is using Ukraine as a proxy in war with Vladimir Putin. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of Russia's Security Council and Vladimir Putin’s close ally has called for Russians to mobilise to inflict "maximum harm" on Western societies and infrastructure. In response to the Russian hybrid warfare threat, NATO Secretary General Jen Stoltenberg held a Defence Ministers meeting in Brussels to counter the "Russian campaign of hostile activities against NATO allies."

Hybrid Warfare

Hybrid Warfare is an amalgam of political, unconventional, and conventional actions geared to subvert and destroy a target state without crossing the threshold to open war. In hybrid warfare, the lines between war and peace are blurred and used against the target state. Russian attacks in Europe have come in diverse ways including arson and sabotage, assassination, cyber attacks, disinformation, GPS jamming, migration, and potentially disruptions of power and energy flow and undersea cables. All hybrid attacks are geared to destabilize NATO democracies and distract their attention from Ukraine War and even to dissuade them from their continued support of Ukraine. Poland, the Baltic States, Germany, the UK, and the Czech Republic have all reported incidents of hybrid warfare in the last year and Russia is ratcheting up its campaign against NATO Countries as a quick review of Moscow-linked attacks show.

Russia’s Cyber Campaign Shifts to Ukraine’s Frontlines

Dan Black

Russian intelligence services have now adapted their thinking about how to optimally integrate cyber and conventional capabilities.

With the main thrust of Russia's anticipated summer offensive underway, it is an opportune moment to take stock of the significant and underappreciated changes that have taken hold in Moscow’s approach to cyber operations in Ukraine.

Much Western analysis to date has fixated on Russia’s highly visible opening cyber offensive, the merits of its approach, and the potential for a renewed destructive campaign of a similar nature against Ukrainian critical infrastructure. This focus is misplaced, however, and has anchored Western understanding of the war’s cyber dimensions to Russia’s countervalue strategy to amass societal pressure via the widespread sabotage of computer networks – an approach that has not seen primacy since the invasion’s first year when assumptions about a short war still guided Russia’s theory of victory.

The harsher reality is that Russia’s intelligence services have adapted their posture in cyberspace to the demands of a long war. Mounting evidence, stretching back to the months preceding Ukraine’s counteroffensive in 2023, indicates that multiple Russian cyber units have shifted their sights away from strategic civilian targets toward soldiers’ computers and mobiles endpoints in order to enable tactical military objectives on Ukraine’s frontlines. This change in operational focus has been cross-cutting, with Russian military intelligence (GRU) and the domestic security service (FSB) – long renowned for rivalry and mistrust – unifying their earlier disjointed cyber efforts and systematising a series of tradecraft adaptations intended to increase their military effectiveness.

America’s Dilemma in Kenya

Michelle Gavin

In June, Kenyans took to the streets to oppose government proposals to hike taxes. In doing so, they were also airing their bitter disappointment with President William Ruto, who swept into power two years ago after a tight electoral victory. Ruto had promised to lower the cost of living and increase job opportunities for young Kenyans. Instead, Kenyans watched as he pivoted outward, positioning himself as a mediator in regional conflicts and giving major speeches at international forums—and allying with the United States.

U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration made a show of embracing Ruto, too, inviting him for a rare state visit in May. U.S. and Kenyan officials stressed the fact that Ruto was the first African leader to receive such a welcome since Ghana’s President John Kufuor in 2008 and the first Kenyan leader to make a state visit to Washington in more than two decades. The U.S. government announced that it would designate Kenya as the United States’ first major non-NATO ally in sub-Saharan Africa, a designation that puts it in company with the likes of Australia and Japan. Yet just one month later, images of smoke rose from Kenya’s parliament, as popular protests against the government turned violent. Over 30 people were killed, many at the hands of police, prompting the U.S. embassy and other diplomatic missions to express shock and call for restraint.

Can Hamas Be Left to Defeat Itself?

Ophir Falk & Audrey Kurth Cronin

Hamas will end, but Audrey Kurth Cronin (“How Hamas Ends,” July/August 2024) is mistaken in asserting that the group will end if simply left to “defeat itself.” It will take more than that. After Hamas invaded Israel on October 7, murdering 1,200 people and taking 250 hostages, Israel’s war cabinet directed the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to destroy Hamas’s military and governing capabilities, free all hostages, and ensure that Gaza would no longer pose a threat to Israel. Limiting the goal to merely preventing another October 7 is not enough. No sovereign state would allow a genocidal terrorist organization to exist on its border.

Numerous studies, including my own, have shown that targeted killing is effective in mitigating Palestinian terrorism. Targeted killing against Hamas, however, is necessary but insufficient. Applying military pressure—or “military repression,” as Cronin refers to it—is also required. That is what Israel is doing, and it is doing so carefully and precisely. “Israel has done more to prevent civilian casualties in war than any military in history,” John Spencer, the chair of urban warfare studies at West Point, has observed, “setting a standard that will be both hard and potentially problematic to repeat.”

Israel seeks to minimize civilian casualties. That is an integral part of its counterterrorism policy. Hamas seeks to maximize civilian casualties. That is an integral part of its propaganda strategy, and too many people are falling for it. The war in Gaza might have ended long ago had Israel applied indiscriminate force, akin to the force the Allies applied in Dresden during World War II or the force Russia applied in Chechnya in the first decade of this century. And of course, this war could end immediately if Hamas laid down its arms, agreed to an unconditional surrender, and released the hostages.

Biden Drops Out, the Dangers of a Lame-Duck President Emerge - OPINION

John Bolton

Joe Biden’s decision to withdraw from the presidential race effectively makes him a lame duck. The odds favored his achieving this status on Nov. 5 anyway, but America now faces a nearly 100-day longer interregnum than in prior transition periods. We may focus on the election campaign, but the wider world worries what Washington’s global role will be for the next six months.

History affords no clear answer. The constitutional rule that we have only one president at a time is often hard for Americans, let alone foreigners, to grasp. The dangers posed by uncertainty about who’s in charge even in normal transitions are exacerbated by a weak incumbent no longer seeking re-election. U.S. adversaries, and even some allies, will see opportunities to advance their interests. Nor can we rule out what an otherwise responsible, but disappointed and possibly bitter lame duck might consider doing as his tenure in office dwindles.

The national-security risks and opportunities facing lame-duck presidents vary with the international environment and their own beliefs and proclivities. This year, the length of Mr. Biden’s lame-duckery offers unique complexities. Given the 22nd Amendment’s two-term limit, one could argue that presidents become lame ducks on their second Inauguration Day, but that obscures the key differences between how the Reagan, George W. Bush and Obama administrations ended versus the “defeated” Lyndon Johnson, Carter and Biden presidencies.

Clueless at the Secret Service - OPINION


Everyone with a video screen knows about the failure to protect Donald Trump from a would-be assassin in Butler, Pa. But don’t look to Secret Service director Kimberly Cheatle for answers because she doesn’t have any.

That was the bottom line from a House Oversight Committee hearing on Monday. Ms. Cheatle said the agency failed in protecting the former President—no kidding—but did little to explain the staggering operational mistakes. She couldn’t illuminate even basic facts about how a young shooter, apparently acting alone, was able to get an AR-15 style rifle within a few hundred feet of the former President.

We know law enforcement noticed the alleged gunman, Thomas Matthew Crooks, before the rally began and designated him as suspicious. Local police alerted the Secret Service because of the man’s behavior near the magnetometers. Around 5:30 p.m. the shooter was spotted again looking through a rangefinder, a device shooters use to calculate distance to a target.

US shouldn't learn the wrong lessons about Ukraine’s drones, expert says

SAM SKOVE

Ukraine’s innovative use of technology is playing a vital role in the war—but not necessarily in the ways shown on social media, said one analyst who travels frequently to the region.

The plentiful social-media videos of Ukrainian drones destroying tanks, for example, give viewers the impression that the units flying the drones are more successful than they actually are, said Michael Kofman, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

“The problem is that you get into huge issues with sample bias,” said Kofman, speaking at Army Application Laboratory's VERTEX event. “The least successful units are going to show you probably their most successful strikes."

Meanwhile, Ukraine is increasingly using drones to sow mines and haul supplies, which draws less attention than the flashier strike missions, he said.

“Defensive mining missions have become one of their primary tasks, very commonly employed with magnetic influence mines,” Kofman said. Units record the mines’ locations, allowing them to disrupt enemy logistics without affecting their own operations.

Israel Risks All-Out War With Hezbollah. A Truce in Gaza May Reduce That Threat.

Patrick Kingsley and Euan Ward

For nine months, Israel and Hezbollah, an Iran-backed militia that dominates southern Lebanon, have fought a low-level conflict that has edged closer to an all-out war. Since October, both sides have fired thousands of missiles across the Israel-Lebanon border, wrecking towns, killing hundreds, displacing hundreds of thousands and leading both to threaten to invade the other.

Now, mediators between the two sides hope that a truce in Gaza could provide the impetus for a similar drawdown along the Israel-Lebanon border, even as the risk of escalation there remains higher than ever.

An ally of Hamas, Hezbollah has said it will stop firing rockets if Israel halts its war with Hamas in Gaza. If that happens, both Israel and Hezbollah have signaled to interlocutors that they would be prepared to begin negotiations for a formal truce, according to three Western officials briefed on the sides’ positions and an Israeli official. The officials all spoke on the condition of anonymity in order to speak more freely.

Those negotiations would focus on the withdrawal of Hezbollah fighters from the southernmost areas of Lebanon and the deployment of more soldiers from Lebanon’s official military, according to the officials. The talks would also focus on how to demarcate the westernmost parts of the border between the two countries, the officials said; the border has never formally been delineated because the two countries have no diplomatic relationship.

Biden's decision

Dana Allin

On Sunday, Joe Biden became the first sitting United States president since Lyndon B. Johnson to decline his party’s nomination for a second term in office. There are other significant echoes from LBJ in the Biden presidency half a century later. Both men were creatures of the US Senate – its ‘master’, famously, in LBJ’s case. Both were tapped as vice president by younger, less experienced and more glamorous presidential candidates for purposes of balancing the ticket. Both became president as a consequence of national trauma: for LBJ, the John F. Kennedy assassination; for Biden, the long nightmare of the national soul that Donald Trump’s election and presidency constituted for liberals. And both saw major progressive accomplishments in domestic policy.

For Johnson, those accomplishments were overshadowed by Vietnam, a war that ripped the country – and his Democratic Party – apart and the reason he chose not to run again. For Biden, the reason is more prosaic, albeit a profound consequence of the human condition: he is old and getting older. That reality was hardly a surprise, but just over three weeks ago his abysmal debate performance – the performance of an old man – sparked panic among Democrats and Donald Trump-fearing foreign allies. And although the American support for Israel’s war with Hamas has caused considerable dissension on the American Left, the hours since Sunday afternoon show that the Democratic Party is far more united than it was in 1968.

Fellow Democrats have lauded Biden as a hero for putting the country’s future above his ego and political ambitions. Vice President Kamala Harris looks likely to unite the party easily behind the goal of preventing Trump’s return to the White House. Although an open Democratic convention with multiple candidates remains a possibility, it does not look probable.

Who Could Challenge Harris As A Presidential Candidate, And Who Could Be The VP Pick? – Analysis

Pete Baumgartner

U.S. President Joe Biden’s endorsement of his vice president, Kamala Harris, to replace him as the Democratic Party’s candidate for president has given her a strong position as the front-runner — but it does not officially make her the candidate.

Harris has garnered many endorsements from Democratic members of Congress, former politicians, and major donors in the hours since Biden’s announcement on July 21 that he was withdrawing from the presidential race.

They include former President Bill Clinton and his wife — former Secretary of State and 2016 Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton — along with more than half of the Democrats in the Senate and dozens of Democratic members of the House of Representatives.

But several major Democratic Party figures have not yet endorsed her — including ex-President Barack Obama, former House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi, House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries, and Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer — to challenge Republican nominee Donald Trump in the November 5 election.

Home alone: Germany’s security and defence policy when its closest allies are gone

Ulrike Fran & Jana Puglierin

When the extreme right and outspokenly Germanophobe party National Rally (RN) did not win the most seats in the French parliament, a sigh of relief could be heard in Berlin. The next French government – whoever will form it – in all likelihood won’t immediately end all Franco-German defence cooperation, or leave NATO’s integrated military command, as RN contemplated.

But the German government cannot afford to relax. Alarm bells should be ringing given the number of times Germany has recently had to hold its breath, fearing the election results of its closest allies. It has been reasonably lucky so far: Joe Biden won the US presidency in 2020. Emmanuel Macron won the French presidency in 2022, and did not lose this month’s legislative election as spectacularly as many feared. But clouds are darkening fast, and there is a danger that these near-misses obfuscate a fundamental problem: Germany is increasingly left home alone, without its closest allies.

US Strategy in Europe

George Friedman

One of the most important outcomes of the U.S. presidential race may be how it affects the United States’ relationship with Europe. Donald Trump has clearly stated that he wants Europe to pay more of the cost of NATO – a perennial point of contention between the U.S. and the alliance. Either way, the crux of the issue is the strategic relationship between the United States and Europe.

The U.S. has gone to war – or near to war – three times with European powers that had sought to take control of the Continent. The first occurred in 1917, when the United States deployed forces to France to fight Germany. The intervention was ostensibly triggered by German submarines that had sunk British and French ships before turning on U.S. vessels en route to Europe. But it was more fundamentally driven by the fact that U.S. trade with Europe had continued profitably through the first phase of World War I; the German attempt to attack shipping was an attempt to cut the supply line between Britain and the United States. German forces were being weakened on land, so Berlin hoped that intercepting ships from the U.S. would hurt the British war effort and, in turn, relieve its troops.

For Washington, it was more than a matter of losing vessels. The U.S. and Europe formed the economic heart of the world. Whereas the French and the British were fighting for their lives, the Americans were fighting to preserve the economic relationship that was the backbone of the U.S. economy.

Hamas's smuggling collapses: IDF's tactics and goals in fighting Gaza terror - analysis

AMIR BOHBOT

With nine and a half months of fighting in the Gaza Strip, the IDF is refining its instructions and objectives coming from the office of Major General Yaron Finkelman, commander of the Southern Command.

According to findings from Division 162 along the Philadelphi Corridor, specifically in identifying and destroying tunnels underneath the route, the IDF is dismantling Hamas's smuggling arm. It has come to light that Hamas is attempting to smuggle money into Gaza to fund governance activities and pay salaries to its operatives.

The primary concern in the Southern Command is that Hamas will restore its military capabilities through the smuggling of weapons, ammunition, dual-use components, and materials and the reconstruction or concealment of sites for producing rockets, mortar shells, and explosive devices.

According to command sources, the working assumption is that Hamas will focus all its efforts on restoring its capabilities.

Therefore, the main emphasis is on potential smuggling routes: the Kerem Shalom crossing, tunnels along the Philadelphi Corridor, the maritime arena, and from Sinai.

Netanyahu goes to Washington in the shadow of Middle East disaster

Ishaan Tharoor

The last time Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu came to Washington, hopes were high for peace — or, at least, one particular vision of it. It was September 2020, and Netanyahu appeared at a White House then home to Donald Trump. Through a pact brokered by the Trump administration, Israel was normalizing ties with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, two Arab monarchies that shared Israel’s antipathy toward Iran.

The diplomatic feat was grandiosely titled the “Abraham Accords” and its promoters cast it as a civilizational breakthrough and the beginning of a new age — no matter that the two Gulf states had never been at war with Israel and already had substantial clandestine dealings with the Jewish state. “This day is a pivot of history,” Netanyahu proclaimed, alongside Trump and top officials from the UAE and Bahrain. “It heralds a new dawn of peace. For thousands of years, the Jewish people have prayed for peace. For decades, the Jewish state has prayed for peace. And this is why, today, we’re filled with such profound gratitude.”

The deals generated some lucrative business links between Israel and the monarchies, and were padded by major U.S. arms sales to the Arab kingdoms. But even as more Arab countries warmed to the prospect of normalization with Israel, the new understandings did little to build peace in the context where it was needed most: The Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Israel’s Next War

Amos Harel

More than nine months into its war with Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Israel now appears closer than ever to a second, even larger war with Hezbollah on its northern border. In June, the Israel Defense Forces announced that plans for a full-scale attack in southern Lebanon had been approved. And in mid-July, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah said that the Iranian-backed Shiite group was prepared to broaden its rocket attacks to a wider range of Israeli towns.

Although the possibility has received relatively little scrutiny in the international media, a full-scale war between Israel and Hezbollah would have consequences that dwarf the current Gaza conflict. A major Israeli air and ground assault against Hezbollah, the most heavily armed group in the Middle East, would likely cause turmoil across the entire region, and could prove particularly destabilizing as the United States enters a crucial stage of its presidential election season. It is also far from clear that such a war could be ended quickly, or that there is a clear path to a decisive victory.

The implications for Israel itself could be stark. Although Israeli air defense systems have been extremely successful thus far against missile attacks from Gaza, Lebanon, Iran, and Yemen, a total war with Hezbollah would be a whole different ballgame. According to Israeli intelligence estimates, Hezbollah’s weapons stockpile is more than seven times as large as Hamas’s and includes far more lethal weapons. Along with hundreds of attack drones, it includes some 130,000–150,000 rockets and missiles, including hundreds of ballistic missiles that could reach targets in Tel Aviv and even further south—indeed, every point in the country.

The Most Misunderstood – and Important – Factor in the AI Arms Race

Hadley Spadaccini

On July 10, 2024, NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners announced four new joint projects, one of which is dedicated to artificial intelligence (AI). This collaboration marks a stronger effort to counter China’s AI advancements and underscores growing concerns about perceived threats posed by Chinese AI. In Washington, developing advanced AI algorithms to confront those threats has emerged as a strategic priority.

AI competition with China hinges on state-of-the-art, massive data centers that can house immense computational resources – i.e., advanced semiconductors and processors – to support advanced AI model development. The increasing scarcity of these resources is now defining China-U.S. AI competition more than algorithmic superiority.

Unfortunately, U.S. attempts to exclude China from the most advanced chips are proving costly and ineffective. The United States must either prepare for an endless and costly battle for AI resources with China or shift toward cooperation rather than pure competition.