12 July 2024

Why the Himalayan Region Is Integral to a Rules-Based Order in the Indo-Pacific

Jagannath Panda, Ryohei Kasai, and Eerishika Pankaj

In June 2024, former U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi minced no words in criticizing the Chinese government and President Xi Jinping for the persecution of Tibetans, including attempts to erase their culture. Pelosi was part of a U.S. delegation that met with the 14th Dalai Lama in Dharamshala, India, where he has been living in exile since he was forced to flee Tibet in 1959 after an uprising against China’s repressive rule was brutally suppressed. China considers the Dalai Lama a dangerous separatist, and seeks to prevent all diplomatic contact with him.

Pelosi’s acrimony went beyond empty rhetoric. Building on the U.S. Congress’ “Resolve Tibet Act,” passed only days before her visit to Dharamshala, she heralded stronger U.S. support for the Himalayan region, which China is trying to rebrand as “Xizang,” the Mandarin term for Tibet. Her remarks have yet again brought to the forefront the fact that Chinese militarization in Tibet remains a perennial concern not just for India, but for the United States – and its Indo-Pacific allies and partners.

For China, Tibet is perhaps the most critical, but not the only, aspect of its growing Himalayan troubles. Most notably, China has a long-standing border dispute with India, which has kept getting more hostile since Xi Jinping came into power – recall the 2017 Doklam stand-off, the defining 2020 Galwan Clash, and the 2022 Tawang skirmish, to name but a few prominent contentions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Marine Corps revives in-demand attack helicopter unit scrapped in 2022

CAITLYN BURCHETT

An ongoing need for attack helicopter squadrons led the Marine Corps to revive a unit this week, less than two years after it was deactivated, service officials said.

The Marine Corps bid farewell to its Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 269, known as the “Gunrunners,” in December 2022 as part of a service-wide overhaul. But the farewell was not so final, lasting just 18 months.

The squadron, which is part of North Carolina-based II Marine Aircraft Wing, was reactivated Monday, July 1 after the Marine Corps conducted an analysis on force management. The analysis found there was a need for an additional attack helicopter squadron on the East Coast to support the II Marine Expeditionary Force, one of three Marine air-ground task forces meant to deploy overseas in response to conflict and crises. The second expeditionary force is based at Marine Corps Air Station New River, and the first and third are at Camp Pendleton and Okinawa, Japan, respectively.

“With persistent demand for light attack and utility aviation support, the [light attack helicopter] remains effective in crisis response and contingency missions while proving exceptional relevance in a peer-adversary maritime conflict,” said Cathleen Close, spokesperson for Marine Corps Combat Development and Integration.

China's Unique Challenge to the West

David P. Goldman

In his lead forum essay, Captain Jerry Hendrix addresses the challenges of a multipolar world by envisioning “a broad alliance structure made up of self-determined democracies pursuing free market economies” in opposition to the “new authoritarian bloc” of Russia and China. He has done a great service by resituating America’s strategic position in the face of great power competition’s return. Hendrix, however, maintains that today’s multipolar world is a return to business as usual. I argue, instead, that today’s great power competition is unlike anything we have seen in the past because China is a competitor unlike any we have encountered.

Imperial powers of the past filled the world and pursued conquest for the sake of, among other things, scarce resources. Roman soldiers were stationed from Mesopotamia to the Hibernian border, sending 100,000 or more slaves a year back to Rome. The “far-flung battle line” of the British Empire included large parts of Asia and Africa. Britain financed its trade deficit during most of the nineteenth century by growing opium in India and selling it to China. The empires of Spain and Portugal extracted bullion from the New World and spent most of it on luxury imports from China—this bullion in turn paid for China’s nineteenth-century opium imports. The French and British fought their eighteenth-century wars over control of colonies, the slave trade, and the East Indian trade. Even the world wars of the twentieth century were fought because of territory. France in 1914 wanted the return of Alsace and Lorraine; Serbia wanted Bosnia-Herzegovina. The frontier of German expansion into Slavic lands defined the conflict between Moscow, Vienna, and Berlin. Hitler, for his part, demanded Lebensraum.

What the China-Russia alliance means for the West - OPINION

ANDREAS UMLAND AND HUGO VON ESSEN

Over the years, Beijing and Moscow have slowly created what now appears to be an anti-American and anti-liberal global front, bound together by their desire to revise not only the status of Ukraine and Taiwan but the current world order.

Russia may thus continue receiving considerable — and possibly even greater — help from China, which could keep its economy afloat and its war against Ukraine going for many years to come.

To be sure, Beijing’s interests still differ from Moscow’s in several respects. Greater Chinese support for Russia is risky for its already crisis-prone economy, should the West extend sanctions against its banks and companies. And for the first time since mid-2022, in March and April of this year, Chinese exports to Russia fell compared to the same months the year before, reflecting growing caution — as well as the payment problems faced by Russian importers due to increasing pressure from the U.S.

Notwithstanding such developments, however, we should all be skeptical of Beijing’s official would-be pacifist rhetoric. The country’s long-running systematic support for Russia indicates an interest in keeping the confrontation going — and reaping the economic and geopolitical advantages.

China’s Self-Imposed Isolation

Michael Schuman

In late June, a Chinese man stabbed a woman from Japan and her child at a bus stop for a Japanese school in the eastern city of Suzhou. Two weeks earlier, four foreign teachers from a U.S. college were attacked by a knife-wielding local as they strolled through a park in the northeastern town of Jilin. In a country where violence against foreigners has been practically unheard-of in recent years, the assaults have led to some uncomfortable soul-searching among a shocked Chinese public.

Are hard economic times fueling a dangerous spike in nationalism? some ask in online debates. Has the Chinese school system, with its focus on patriotism, fed people bad ideas? they wonder. Occasionally, a bold voice risks angering China’s censors by posing an even more sensitive possibility: Could the government be to blame?

Chinese state media bombard the public with warnings about foreign spies, plots, and threats, as well as deluging them with negative portrayals of the United States, Japan, and other countries. “What impact,” one commenter on the social-media platform Zhihu asked, will this “false and one-sided content have on ordinary people’s cognition and social trends?”

The Hunter and the Hunted: A Review of Hunting the Caliphate

Kier M. Elmonairy

I. Two Heads are Better than One

Hunting the Caliphate, a co-authored book detailing the authors’ firsthand experiences of fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) from the summer of 2014 until the fall of 2015, provides a remarkably personal first draft of history. Dana J.H. Pittard, the commander of the U.S. forces fighting ISIS in 2014 and 2015 and an Army Major General (MG) at the time, [3] provides a bird’s eye view of U.S. efforts in Iraq and Syria.[4] Wes J. Bryant, then the senior Special Forces (SF) Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) and an Air Force Master Sergeant (MSgt),[5] gives readers an up-close look at the fight against ISIS.[6] Each author provides his own point of view, and the book clearly marks where one perspective end and the next begins.[7] Rather than becoming a distraction, this passing of the narrative from general to non-commissioned officer creates a dynamic tension that not only drives the book forward, but serves to set it apart from other books about the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Few of the leading books concerning ISIS feature a first-person perspective.[8] Additionally, as the authors point out, Hunting the Caliphate is “the first major book written by a JTAC),”[9] a remarkable fact given the key role of airpower in the fight against ISIS.[10] This pairing creates an account of the fight against ISIS that is equally at ease discussing meetings with senators[11] and speeches to foreign generals on the one hand, and the inner workings of a strike cell on the other.[12]

Normalization with Saudi Arabia is a golden opportunity for Israel

YOEL GUZANSKY

Notwithstanding the ongoing war between Israel and Hamas, and perhaps even because of it, diplomatic contacts aimed at advancing a normalization agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia have continued. The fundamental motivations of the United States and Saudi Arabia in this context have not changed since before October 7.

Normalization will lead to the establishment of a regional security alliance and the reversal of the negative strategic trends for Israel since October 7. The moderate alliance will stand up against Iran and the resistance camp and open the door to PA participation while establishing a governing alternative to Hamas in the Gaza Strip and renewing a political process in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict arena.

The United States wants to forge a new regional order, which will make it easier for itself and for Middle Eastern nations to deal with Iran—and also to indicate that it is not abandoning the region. Saudi Arabia wants to cement its regional standing and bolster its status and security, particularly vis-à-vis Iran, by strengthening its ties and a defense alliance with Washington.

Iran: Reformer Pezeshkian On The Path To Reforms? – Analysis


Reformer Masoud Pezeshkian, who advocates for greater openness towards the West, was elected President of the Islamic Republic of Iran in a decisive second round of presidential elections held on 5 July 2024. He faced hardline conservative candidate Saeed Jalili, succeeding President Ebrahim Raisi, who died in a helicopter crash in May 2024. Pezeshkian, a 69-year-old cardiac surgeon, secured over 16 million votes (53.6%) out of a total of 30.5 million voters, while his opponent received 44.3%.

The Iranian Electoral Commission announced that voter turnout in the second round of the presidential election rose to 49.8%, marking a 10% increase compared to the first round held on 28 June 2024, which saw a turnout of around 40%. Participation in the second round also surpassed the 2021 presidential election, where Ebrahim Raisi won with a turnout of 45.8%. Consequently, conservatives have lost the fourteenth presidential election to reformists, who have regained power after their departure in 2005 following the victory of conservative President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Pezeshkian had previously run twice in Iranian presidential elections, withdrawing his candidacy in 2013, and failing to secure a candidacy in the 2021 elections after the Constitutional Council rejected his eligibility to participate.

Ukraine bets on land robots for next phase of war

SAM SKOVE

Ukraine is betting on land robots and seeking billions more in investment to boost its domestic weapons manufacturing, Ukraine’s top official in charge of defense production efforts said Tuesday during a briefing to reporters on the sidelines of the NATO summit.

“This year will be the year of [unmanned] land systems,” said Oleksandr Kamyshin, Ukraine’s minister for strategic industries of Ukraine. “You’ll see more of them on the frontline” over the next 12 months, he said.

Land systems would be used for medical evacuation, logistics, de-mining, and mining, as well as other combat tasks, Kamyshin said.

As Ukraine seeks to use ever more sophisticated weapons to counter Russia, it first needs to find the investments necessary to ramp up production, Kamyshin added.

Kamyshin, speaking at the opening of the U.S. office of the state-owned defense conglomerate Ukrainian Defense Industry, said he is seeking a further $10 to 15 billion in investments in the Ukrainian weapons industry.

All eyes on Biden, but can they see how close we are to war? - ANALYSIS

REP. WARREN DAVIDSON

Since the start of U.S. involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War, the Biden administration established a series of clear red lines intended to limit the war's escalation and avoid direct confrontation with Russia.

However, at every juncture, President Biden has buckled in the face of outside pressure and crossed each of these lines. The last frontier he has yet to reach is putting U.S. service members on the ground in Ukraine, but unfortunately, we seem to be halfway there.

Initially, the Biden administration was firm in its refusal to send certain military assistance to Ukraine. For instance, President Biden said early on in the war that the U.S. would not send American M1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine because they were too complex for Ukrainian troops to operate. But in January 2023, the Department of Defense announced it would be supplying the tanks to Ukraine after all.

Following this shift, in May 2023, President Biden had another change of heart regarding F-16 fighter jets. For months, the president and senior U.S. officials opposed sending the aircraft to Ukraine, citing their sophistication and the need for pilots to have a strong command of English. Nevertheless, President Biden last year yielded to pressure from President Zelensky and European allies and authorized the transfer of dozens of warplanes from Western allies. The U.S. is currently training Ukrainian pilots.

Army Advocates Use of Generative Artificial Intelligence by Soldiers as Other Services Are Hesitant

Steve Beynon

The Army wants its leaders to tout the use of generative artificial intelligence to the rank and file as a means to make work easier for soldiers, according to a new memo, even as other services have been hesitant to approve those tools for regular use.

The service, not typically known for embracing the bleeding edge of new technology, appears to be the first military branch to encourage the use of commercial AI such as ChatGPT, though troops may already be leaning on it to write memos, award recommendations and, most notably, complete evaluations, among other time-consuming administrative tasks.

But services such as the Space Force and Navy have urged caution or outright barred use of the tools, citing security concerns, as AI has swept through the internet and consumer technology in the U.S. and around the world, promising to automate many tasks that have so far been performed only by people.

Combing the desert: 'Spaceballs' and the Hamas tunnel quagmire - analysis

YONAH JEREMY BOB

As the IDF comes close to concluding its second invasion of Shejaia in northern Gaza and starts its reinvasion of Gaza City – the fifth reinvasion of a part of Gaza – many are asking why didn’t the IDF destroy all of the Hamas tunnels during its first run-through?

Weren’t tens of thousands of soldiers and thousands upon thousands of airstrikes from October to January enough to do the job?

Clearly, the answer is no – the explanation of why: Spaceballs.

This is not a random explanation by The Jerusalem Post but an analogy used to define the challenge by a high-level defense source with some of the most intimate and up-close knowledge of the challenges of Hamas’s tunnels in multiple areas of northern and southern Gaza.

What does Spaceballs, an off-color 1987 cinematic comedy spoofing Star Wars, have to do with understanding tunnel warfare and the immense challenge and quagmire the IDF is confronting in eliminating the Gazan terror group’s greatest tool for hiding its leadership, hiding hostages, ambushing IDF forces, and avoiding aerial detection?

France’s elections showed a polarized country

Ellen Ioanes

In Sunday’s French parliamentary elections, voters delivered a serious shake-up of the status quo, one that now means that, in France, there’s no longer a strong center, but rather a politics increasingly dominated by extremes.

The election saw the highest turnout since 1981, as well as a sharp rebuke to the far-right National Rally (RN) which came out on top in the first round of the contest and saw a major victory in June’s European Parliament elections. However, President Emmanuel Macron and his center-right Renaissance party aligned with the brand new left-wing coalition, the New Popular Front (NFP) in an electoral tactic that prevented RN from taking power.

The victory of the resurgent left reflects a new, highly polarized political reality for France.

Although Macron’s centrists won second place behind the NFP, it will not be able to form a government without appealing to the left. And that will not be easy; some members of the NFP have publicly refused to go into coalition with Macron’s party.

Nasrallah exhausted, desperate: Hezbollah's options after nine months of war – opinion

PROF. AMATSIA BARAM

On June 19, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah threatened that if Israel starts an all-out war against it, Hezbollah will conquer the Galilee, flatten the rest of Israel, and attack Cyprus. On June 29, Iran threatened that if Israel escalates the situation, "a war of extermination will begin."

These threats do not indicate self-confidence but rather hysteria. Even nine months after the start of the war, Tehran still estimates that in an all-out war, Israel will deal a fatal blow to Hezbollah, its most important ally. But no less important than that, in several months, there has been a dramatic change in Iran's position towards the war, and to understand where Iran and Hezbollah stand today, it is necessary to return to the beginning.

The massacre on October 7 was initiated by Yahya Sinwar without coordination with Beirut and Tehran. Khamenei and Nasrallah financed, trained, and armed Hamas, but that morning, they were as surprised as Israel. Sinwar decided to attack without coordination because he knew they would forbid him. First, because Israel was still too firm, and it could eliminate Hamas and Hezbollah. Second, as long as Israel did not attack the Iranian nuclear facilities, Tehran was not eager to endanger Hezbollah.

Putin’s New War Economy

Andrei Kolesnikov

In Russia, the tradition of making fun of Soviet economic planning is almost as old as attempts to improve the economic system. “What would happen if socialism were built in the Sahara?” an old joke asks. The answer: “At first, except for plans, there will be nothing. Then there will be sand shortages.” According to another—one that former U.S. Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan liked very much—in the Brezhnev era, a group of people are walking in a military parade in Moscow’s Red Square, except that they are wearing baggy formal suits instead of military uniforms. An aide runs up to the Soviet leader: “Leonid Ilyich, we don’t know who these people are!” Brezhnev replies: “Calm down, comrade, these are our most destructive weapons—Soviet economists.”

After more than two years and six months of Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be undeterred by the reputation of his country’s economic planners. The most striking outcome of his government reshuffle this spring was undoubtedly his replacement of longtime defense minister Sergei Shoigu with Andrei Belousov—a state economist with no military experience. A man not in a baggy suit but in an expensive and well-fitting one, Belousov previously served as minister of economic development, assistant to the president for economics, and vice prime minister. But there is a reason for his appointment: Russia’s military spending has now reached such gargantuan proportions—according to some estimates, nearly one-third of the 2024 budget is devoted to defense, reaching a higher portion of GDP than any other year in post-Soviet Russian history—that only an economist can make it efficient.

Micro-Militarism and the Emerging Shoots of a Multipolar World - OPINION

William J. Jones

The first US presidential debate took place on June 27, and the entire world looked on in 50 shades of wonderment, shock, shame and horror. Regardless of one’s feelings towards the United States or the candidates, two facts came across crystal clear to the entire globe – something is terribly wrong at the top of the US political system and reliable and responsible US world leadership is not to be found.

The following will try and explain the seemingly erratic foreign policy of one of the world’s superpowers, the United States, in Eastern Europe and how this can be explained through the lens of micro-militarism.

NATO Expansion and Support for the Ukraine War

After the election of President Donald Trump in 2016 commentators the world over rang warning bells, fearing that Trump would end ‘the liberal world order’, ‘the American Era’, and ‘American Exceptionalism’. All the dire warnings were off the mark. In fact, all of the above trends have their genesis during earlier presidencies, the culmination point being the current presidency of Joe Biden.

In a Dangerous World, NATO Must Restore Deterrence | Opinion

Ariel Cohen

In a time when the United States and the Western allies appear weak on the international scene, restoring deterrence needs to be Job One as the NATO 75th anniversary summit begins today in Washington, D.C.

In the recent presidential debate, more energy went into bickering over who deserves to be president, and even their golf scores, than about what America and the West should do next to secure our collective democratic capitalist future against challengers like China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran.

There is nothing more important than the security and defense of the realm. The president of the United States has the unenviable position of serving as commander-in-chief, often without having the appropriate background and experience, while simultaneously addressing a myriad of other pressing political, economic, and social issues.

President Joe Biden's continuation of Barack Obama's foreign policy approach, "leading from behind," has harmed the U.S. and NATO both. Those who lead from behind do not win; and America has not been trying to win. Not in Afghanistan, not in the Middle East, and not even in Ukraine, where Biden actually deserves high marks for supporting a victim of Russian aggression but has badly failed to effectively deter Moscow.

How Macron Broke the French Political System

PHILIPPE LEMOINE

It is my pleasure to introduce my readers to Philippe Lemoine. Philippe is a philosopher by training who writes about politics, science, and philosophy, foreign policy, and various other issues interesting to him. I encourage you to follow him on Twitter or here on Substack.

The French election results are a huge mess. A grasp of the basics is available anywhere, but readers who enjoy our deep-dive editions will want more. Here at Restoration, we try to provide that kind of in-depth analysis whenever possible. We are extremely grateful to Philippe for providing that to our readers. Enjoy!

—Ayaan)

Three days ago, French voters surprised most observers by giving the National Rally, Marine Le Pen’s nationalist party, only a quarter of the seats. Yet, 38% of French voters voted for them, significantly more than any other party. The left and the center only got a quarter of the vote each, but each ended up with more seats than the right. What happened was complicated; the consequences are more complicated still. In short, the alliance of left and center was enough to keep power out of the hands of the right, but it will not be enough to govern. France is now in political terra incognita and nobody knows what is going to happen next.

Doubts On The Origins Of World War II, On The 80th Anniversary Of D-Day – OpEd

Jonathan Power

It is a common trait in mankind to apply to ourselves a generosity of interpretation which we do not extend to others. We find proofs of wickedness, using evidence that we would not use against our own. We play down the sins of ourselves, our own country and our leaders, past and present.

In the days of the Nazi government in Germany there was an inbuilt tendency in the Allies’ reporting to distort what Hitler was doing. For example, they wanted to pin on him the fact that in the early days of the war that he had started the indiscriminating bombing of civilians. In fact, it was begun by the directors of British strategy, as some of the more honest of them later boasted.

The true record is there for anyone who wishes to study these events dispassionately. In a sober study, “Germany’s Economic Preparations for War” published in 1959 by Burton H. Klein, an economist with the Rand Corporation which is, in effect, the research arm of the Pentagon, there is a true account of both sides’ bombing and rearmament policies.

During the war Klein was a member of the US’s Strategic Bombing Survey. Later, he was a member of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers and was a special assistant to the Secretary of Defence. He concluded that until the spring of 1936 German rearmament was largely a myth.

Implications Of NATO-South Korea Defense Cooperation – Analysis

Zhou Chao

In mid-June this year, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited North Korea and signed the “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty” with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Putin emphasized the importance of this document as a foundation for further development in bilateral relations. He stressed that according to the treaty between Russia and North Korea, each party would provide assistance to the other in case of aggression by a third party. He also hinted at the possibility of military technology cooperation with North Korea. Kim Jong-un, assessing the signing of the treaty, stated that the agreement between North Korea and Russia “accelerates the building of a new multi-polar world”, raising bilateral relations to an alliance level.

Since then, rumors have surfaced about North Korea officially sending troops to the Donetsk region. South Korea’s TV Chosun channel reported on June 21, citing an anonymous South Korean government official, that North Korea plans to deploy active-duty soldiers to assist in the “rebuilding” of cities destroyed by fighting in Russian-controlled Donetsk. According to the report, the anonymous source suggested that North Korea expects to send troops to Ukraine as early as next month, viewing it as a means to earn foreign currency. On June 24, Reuters published an article quoting North Korean military officials condemning the United States for allowing Ukraine to use American-made weapons to retaliate against Russian targets, referencing the earlier report by TV Chosun.

Regional Power Ventures And Friendshoring – Analysis

Collins Chong Yew Keat

Regional moves to expand power influence and friendshoring efforts have been intensifying, and reflected in the array of manoeuvrings amidst the volatile hard power and security tussles.

RIMPAC

The US Pacific Fleet started to host the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) starting early this month, the world’s largest international maritime exercise in Hawaii, which will last until August.

Held every other year, RIMPAC brings together the armed forces of 29 countries for five weeks of training for this year, with the goal of strengthening a free and open Indo-Pacific, with the participation of more than 25,000 personnel.

Established in 1971 by Australia, Canada and the US, this year’s drills include the militaries of South Korea, Japan and India, as well as countries in Southeast and South Asia, Latin America and seven European nations.

Military leaders say RIMPAC allows greater interoperability capacities and readiness to combat future traditional and non traditional threats, but also is intended to foster deeper trust and understanding.

Russia, North Korea And The East Asian Security Order – Analysis

Abhishek Sharma and Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash

On June 12, Kim Jong Un, the North Korean leader, penned a special message for President Putin for Russia Day, characterising their bilateral relations as a ‘far-reaching strategic relationship’. This description of ties between Pyongyang and Moscow symbolised a new bonhomie between the two leaders and marked a paradigm shift in Northeast Asian geopolitics. The exchange was soon followed by President Putin’s visit to Pyongyang, marking his first state visit to North Korea in 24 years.

During the visit, the leaders signed a Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. This treaty lists new areas of cooperation in North Korean and Russian ties. Most importantly, the treaty emphasises mutual security guarantees in the event of an attack, increasing the threat perceptions in Northeast Asia, especially in the security calculus of the United States (US), Japan, and South Korea.

Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty: What changes after the Treaty?

The recent signing of a Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the two countries replaces the 1961 and 2000 treaties and the 2000 and 2001 Moscow and Pyongyang declarations. The 2024 Treatymarks a crucial moment in the diplomatic ties between both states, reflecting a rapprochement in the relations and re-emergence of DPRK from its strategic isolation phase. In addition, this treaty elevates the relations between the two countries beyond the earlier areas of engagement (as seen in Table 1 below). Following the meeting, Kim Jong Un called it a ‘great event’ and said that ‘the conclusion of the treaty puts the relations of the two countries on a new higher stage.’ For Moscow, this treaty is the manifestation of the evolution of Russian foreign policy and a clear portrayal of its defence ties with Pyongyang.

U.S. Navy Confirms SM-6 Air Launched Configuration Is ‘Operationally Deployed’

Carter Johnston

This week, U.S. Navy F/A-18E/F Super Hornets participating in RIMPAC 2024 revealed to the public what was already seen in the shadows; an air-launched variant of the Standard Missile 6 (SM-6). The adapted missile broke cover in 2021 on a VX-31 Test and Evaluation F/A-18F. It was the first glimpse of a secretive U.S. Navy program to integrate the SM-6 onto the Super Hornet. Further tests earlier this year, with Super Hornets from the VX-9 Test and Evaluation squadron, supported the effort to integrate SM-6 onto the U.S. Navy’s F/A-18E/F fleet.

Now, Naval News has received confirmation from the U.S. Navy about crucial details of the air-launched SM-6 program, including its program name and operational status. Most importantly, the U.S. Navy has officially acknowledged the existence of an air-launched SM-6 variant for the first time.

SM-6 Air Launched Configuration / AIM-174

‘Air Launched Configuration’ is the U.S. Navy’s nomenclature for the SM-6 and AIM-174 relationship, and the official title for SM-6 missiles used for air-to-air purposes. The U.S. Navy also disclosed that the AIM-174 is ‘operationally’ deployed in the U.S. Navy, a significant step from previous sightings of the missile which showed inert, captive carry, and ground training variants only. The U.S. Navy declined to comment further.

Flawed Wargames Imperil National Security

Paul K. Van Riper

The Marine Corps’ current use of wargames is incomplete, faulty and commandeered by recent military leaders to justify their foregone decisions about how to structure the Corps.

With decades of experience supervising the conduct of wargames, as well as participating in a multitude of games, I am troubled that military leaders make critical decisions on the structure and equipping of operational forces based on games that ignored critical warfighting functions.

In an article published in the Marine Corps Times this March, writer Irene Loewenson reported that personnel who ran the Marine Corps Force Design 2030 (Force Design) wargames admit they did not test all seven Marine Corps warfighting functions, including logistics and command and control. Nonetheless, former Commandant General David Berger cited the results of these wargames as support for a fundamental overhaul of the Marine Corps.

I know of no other case where the Marine Corps made important decisions on its future force structure without fully examining the effect on all seven warfighting functions: command and control; fires; force protection; information; intelligence; logistics; and maneuver.

A Third Continental Missile Interceptor Site?

Benjamin Giltner

Recently, the House of Representatives approved a bill for the Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), with the bill allocating a total of $895 billion in discretionary funds. Congress announced this staggering amount amid the Congressional Budget Office’s report that the U.S. is expected to reach a $1.9 trillion budget deficit by the end of 2024. It’s clear that something needs to change with federal spending, and making changes to defense spending is an obvious way at achieving this goal. In this NDAA, the House of Armed Services Committee One of the programs mentioned in this defense budget proposal is the creation of a third continental missile interceptor site. Not only should policymakers look to drop this proposed third continental missile interceptor site on America’s east coast, but they should cut a majority of America’s continental missile interceptor system—the Ground-based Midcourse Defense System (GMD), the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System, and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD).

Theoretically, continental missile defense systems should defend the U.S. from ballistic missile attacks. However, they fail on this account. These defense systems tend make a security competition between two countries more unstable. In this case, a defensive weapon actually increases offensive capabilities. A country’s ability to retaliate is the best form of deterrence, especially when it comes to nuclear weapons. Continental missile interceptors reduce this ability to retaliate. Robert Jervis explained this conundrum, stating that a country “would be able to alter the status quo” if it were to protect its military capabilities and population from a retaliatory attack. In other words, the side with continental missile defense capabilities does not fear retaliation if it were to strike first. During the Cold War, for instance, the Soviets feared that the development of the Reagan Administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative would give America a first-strike advantage.