Samuel Charap & Miranda Priebe
In the spring of 2024, Western leaders began issuing dire warnings about the threat posed by Russia to NATO allies.1 During his 2024 State of the Union speech, President Joe Biden addressed the assembled lawmakers: “If anybody in this room thinks Putin will stop at Ukraine, I assure you, he will not.” 2 Biden was far from alone. “It cannot be ruled out that within a three- to five-year period, Russia will test Article 5 and NATO’s solidarity,” said Denmark Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen.3 German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius echoed this assessment: “we have to take into account that Vladimir Putin might even attack a NATO country one day.” While a Russian attack is not likely “for now,” the minister added: “Our experts expect a period of five to eight years in which this could be possible.” Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk went one step further, arguing Europe was in a “pre-war era.”
Some might dismiss these statements about the Russia threat as rhetorical flourishes that have scant direct impact on policy. Others may see them as attempts to spur complacent Western political systems—and sluggish Western military industries—into action to counter Russia that have little downside. But the leaders’ assertions reflect four increasingly widespread and influential assumptions in the transatlantic community: first, that Russian reconstitution is proceeding rapidly, giving it the capability to attack NATO in the near future; second, that NATO’s deterrent against a risk-acceptant Russia is inadequate; third, that the organizing principle for the alliance’s military planning and broader strategy should be to counter opportunistic Russian aggression; and finally, that a Russian “win” in Ukraine will embolden the Kremlin and imperil NATO’s security. These assumptions are now motivating proposals to take a hardline approach toward Russia after the Ukraine war ends.
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