Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen
From an Israeli strategic calculus, the unexpected and precipitous fall of Assad at the hands of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is a simultaneous cause for cautious optimism and concern. Assad’s fall removes the final keystone of Iran’s arc of proxy and allied resistance through which it was able to engage Israel across its borders. With Hezbollah decapitated and depleted in Lebanon, and Iran’s resupply land route through Syria gone, Israel has removed a significant threat to its security.
However, what comes next from Syria is unknown. In keeping with the pragmatism that has characterized his messaging to the outside world, Syria’s de facto new leader Ahmed al-Sharaa (more popularly known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Jolani) reportedly told Palestinian factions in Syria that they must disarm, and has stated that they are not seeking conflict “whether with Israel or anyone else and … will not let Syria be used as a launchpad for attacks.”
These words and Jolani’s vow to uphold the 1974 disengagement agreement that saw a buffer zone established between Israel and Syria may be cautiously welcomed by Israel. But its experience of being blindsided by Hamas on October 7 will keep it skeptical of the largely untested al-Qaida offshoot. These calculations prompted Israel to take rapid military action — within days destroying Syria’s military capabilities, seeking to neutralize the capacity for HTS or other groups to pose a military threat. Al-Jolani has accused Israel of using “false pretexts” to justify their actions, given the exit of Iran and Hezbollah from the scene.
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