Tom Zaja
The full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 by the Russian Armed Forces was an undertaking not seen in Europe since WWII. It proceeded from three directions, several axes, and created a frontline more than 1,000km long. The invasion failed to achieve most of its strategic goals, the principal of which was the capture of Kyiv and overthrow of the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. While much commentary has explicated the reasons for the failure of Russia’s northern incursion into Ukraine, there has been little discussion of the hypothetical alternatives that might have brought the Russians success.
The Battle of Kyiv, led by General Aleksandr Chaiko, attempted a coup de main fixed on the Ukrainian capital. The two main vectors proceeded from Gomel (Belarus) and Bryansk (Russia) toward the western and eastern outskirts of Kyiv, respectively. Russian forces from the Sumy axis joined the effort from the east.
Though succeeding with the element of surprise, Russian forces were soon hampered by unpreparedness, logistical breakdown, and poor motivation. After just 42 days, the Russians made a full retreat from northern Ukraine, ostensibly as a good-will gesture pursuant to the Istanbul Peace Initiative. President Putin would later say: “Russian troops were near Kyiv in March 2022 [however] …There was no political decision to storm the three-million-strong city; it was a coercive operation to establish peace.” Such a face-saving statement was a deflection from what was the intended goal of encircling Kyiv and placing it under siege.
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