Dr. Chotani Vindu Mai
Introduction
In 1998, India’s defense minister, George Fernandes, publicly stated that “China, not Pakistan, is India’s ‘potential threat No. 1.’”1 Over two decades later, in 2021, India’s defense chief stated that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the “biggest security threat.”2 Japan, by contrast, has since the 1970s exercised more restraint when it comes to expressing its concerns over China’s actions. A study by Oren and Brummer shows that Japan’s three key documents (Defense of Japan, National Defense Policy Guidelines, and the Diplomatic Bluebook) have referred to China as a “concern.”3 Indeed, the caution exercised in not referring to China as a “threat” was captured in a 2013 mishap, when then–Minister of Foreign Affairs Kishida Fumio on a Sunday Japan Broadcasting Corporation appearance called China’s military expansionism a “threat.” However, two days later, he stated that, “in my remarks, I meant to say ‘concern,’ not ‘threat.’”4 Tokyo continues to use this term.
Language indicates a certain degree of change,5 and these statements, in their respective capacities and differing intensities, are significant speech acts that enable us to put two things in perspective. First, notwithstanding the use of different terminologies, they demonstrate that both countries were/are feeling threatened by Chinese actions. Second, despite this, Japan and India in the Indo-Pacific region have still gone on to take starkly differing policy actions regarding certain Chinese policies and initiatives in the region.
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