Russia Increases Ties With Iran’s Axis Of Resistance – Analysis

Dr. Emil Avdaliani

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On November 19, Israel announced it found a large cache of Russian arms at the hand of Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon. Reports show that many of the weapons were initially owned by the Syrian military, to which Russia has supplied weapons for years (Times of Israel, November 19). This indicates growing cooperation between Russia and the militias across the Middle East (see EDM, September 18).

While Russia has been opportunistic in the Middle East, it does not have a blueprint for an overarching peace in the region, nor does it genuinely strive to achieve it by portraying itself as a substitute for the United States (see EDM, October 7). Russia seeks a measured increase in its geopolitical influence via bilateral deals with key Middle East actors. These are enhanced through close military, security, and economic ties and are especially valuable in the age of Russia-West rivalry following the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Russia turned to the Middle East and wider Asia to withstand the pressure of sanctions by seeking alternative trade routes and sources of foreign investments.

One such enhanced relationship is Russia’s ties with Iran in the international consequences of the war in Ukraine (see EDM, November 4). Yet what largely fell out of focus is how this alignment allowed Moscow to deepen relations with Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance,” a network of militias across the Middle East that the Islamic Republic operates. From Houthis to Hezbollah to Hamas, Russia has increased its diplomacy and, in some cases, military cooperation over the past couple of years (see EDM, August 8).

Russia has been actively engaged in expanding security and military ties with the Houthis, including providing weapons to the organization. Media reports indicate that Russian intelligence officers were spotted in the Houthis-held territory, and Moscow has even considered sending significant military support to the Iran-backed militia (Iran International, September 25). Moreover, political contacts became more common, with Houthi and Russian officials holding regular meetings (TASS, July 2).