Emily Harding and Aosheng Pusztaszeri
From the beginning, Russian president Vladimir Putin believed he would win this war. Russian soldiers brought parade uniforms to the fight, not winter gear. He believed they would be in Kyiv in three days, greeted by all the Ukrainians who always wanted to be Russian.
It has been three years, not three days, but Putin still believes he can win on the battlefield. That belief will severely slow potential negotiations—as long as Putin thinks fighting benefits him, he has little incentive to make a deal. U.S. and European allies must change this calculus and change it quickly. Specifically, Western nations must signal that military assistance will accelerate in volume and capability the longer the fighting goes on. This will raise the cost side of Putin’s equation to the point that Russia comes to the table with an incentive to negotiate.
When Negotiations Work
Historically, wars end with either a complete military victory, a ceasefire, or a negotiated peace settlement. According to The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, only 16 percent of wars between 1946 and 2005 have ended in a negotiated solution. Among these peace settlements, 37 percent led to renewed conflict, often within just two years. Negotiations tend to be most successful when parties successfully establish a baseline of trust, address the root causes of the conflict, or provide a framework for future nonviolent resolution. Further, measures such as publicizing aspects of the negotiation process and involving trusted mediators can increase transparency and help insulate the peace process from potential external disruptions, increasing the likelihood of reaching an agreement.
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