Ron Gurantz
A central concern for American policymakers during the Cold War was crisis strategy. In this context, crisis refers to a period when countries are on the verge of military conflict, but a state of war does not yet exist. The United States repeatedly confronted the Soviet Union in episodes like the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Berlin Blockade, in some cases facing a serious risk of military conflict. The United States had to navigate these showdowns without either yielding to aggression or stumbling into a nuclear war. As competition intensifies with China and Russia, these kinds of crises are likely to return. The preinvasion crisis in Ukraine may have been a preview of future showdowns in Taiwan and elsewhere.
The main goals of crisis strategy are usually understood to be deterring aggression and managing escalation. Less well studied is the goal of counterjustification. Crises are often used as opportunities to justify war. States make efforts to gain public and allied support for possible military action, and aggressors often engage in deceptive activities to create pretexts for war. Before the Ukraine invasion, Russia made outrageous claims and unrealistic demands to shift blame for the crisis and tried to provoke or stage incidents that would justify a military response. Countering efforts like these and denying the adversary casus belli is an important, and underappreciated, objective in crisis strategy.
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