Saheb Singh Chadha
Introduction
In April 2020, a standoff commenced between India and China when the latter diverted its troops from an exercise in Tibet to near the border with India.5 These troops then proceeded to move toward the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh and also “sought to change the status quo” in several locations.6 The Indian side maintained that these actions by China were “in complete disregard of all mutually agreed norms,” and reciprocated with the induction of forces to the border in eastern Ladakh.7 The crisis reached a tipping point when troops clashed in the Galwan Valley on the night of June 15, leading to the first fatalities on the India-China border since 1975. India’s EAM, S. Jaishankar, stated at the time that the “unprecedented development will have a serious impact on the bilateral relationship.”8
The past four years have been characterized by tensions between the two nuclear-armed neighbors and the substantial augmentation of troops and equipment on their shared border. The period has also seen clashes that carry the risk of escalation, such as in Galwan in June 2020 and Yangtse in December 2022.9 This paper argues that it is possible to divide the past four years of the standoff into three phases based on the negotiating positions of both sides. Between April and September 2020, both sides sought to manage the crisis, reduce tensions, and avoid a clash akin to the Galwan incident. Between September 2020 and September 2022, both sides negotiated disengagement in four friction points in eastern Ladakh. These were Patrol Point (PP)-15, PP-17, and PP-17A in the Gogra-Hot Springs area, and the northern and southern banks of Pangong Tso.10 After September 2022, the gaps in the two sides’ positions widened. China signaled unwillingness to disengage in the two remaining friction points—Depsang and Demchok. It wanted both sides to move past the border standoff and for the broader bilateral relationship to continue unencumbered. India doubled down on its demand for complete disengagement and de-escalation of troops before broader bilateral exchanges could deepen. In October 2024, both sides came to an agreement on patrolling in Depsang and Demchok.11 In December 2024, it was announced that disengagement had been “achieved in full,” and broader bilateral exchanges were being discussed.12
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