Mike Coté
Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February of 2022, significant existing fractures, especially on the right, have been exposed in American foreign policy. Democrats have largely aligned behind the policy of the Biden Administration, which has been one of strong rhetorical support though with often-lackluster material aid and an inordinate fear of “escalation.” That term has been the bugbear of the political right when it comes to this conflict, dividing traditionally hawkish Republicans from populist isolationists, who seek a much more limited American role abroad. Both groups criticize Biden’s Ukraine policy but for vastly divergent rationales: one because it is too weak and the other because it is too strong.
While the hawks complain that the White House has failed to deliver military aid in a timely and efficient manner, other Republicans are concerned that supporting Ukraine, in addition to dragging the U.S. into an unnecessary conflict, could potentially spark WWIII. This line of rhetoric, particularly with an impending second Trump Administration, may come to increasingly shape foreign policy.
Escalation is not a one-way street, yet these critics ignore the bigger half of the issue – constant Russian aggression – to focus narrowly and unfairly on Ukraine. This approach is detached from the reality of warfare in general, ignores the specific path of this conflict, lends undue credence to nuclear saber-rattling, and blames America for the belligerence of our enemies.
First, this inordinate fear of World War III and nuclear exchange is disconnected from how escalation dynamics actually work in modern conflict. For a conflict to de-escalate to a point where it is stable enough to reach a sustainable endgame, both sides must be deterred from further escalation. If one side sees it as in their interest to continue fighting, peace will not be reached. Counterintuitively, this often requires greater escalation (escalation dominance) to create a deterrent effect; each belligerent must understand that unacceptable costs will be imposed by continuing. But that escalation – or threat thereof – must be credible to the opposing faction to be successful. Warfare, particularly the existential kind in which Ukraine is currently embroiled, is not something that can be carefully micromanaged. Restrictions on warfighting are counterproductive, only serving to disadvantage the restricted side by reducing the credibility of its threats of escalation. And that prolongs wars and increases their potential to broaden, not the reverse.
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