Antonio Graceffo
China is collaborating with the Myanmar military junta to establish a joint security company to protect Chinese investments and personnel in Myanmar. On October 22, 2024, the junta formed a working committee to draft a memorandum of understanding (MoU) for the initiative, reflecting China’s growing concerns over the security of its projects, particularly those under the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor.
As a key part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), CMEC comprises highways, railways, pipelines, and economic zones connecting China’s Kunming province to the deep-sea Kyaukpyu Port in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. The economic corridor is vital to Beijing, providing direct access to the Indian Ocean and bypassing the strategically vulnerable Malacca Strait, a chokepoint critical to China’s energy and trade supply lines, particularly in the event of a conflict with the United States. Yet unfortunately for Beijing, many CMEC projects pass through some of Myanmar’s most volatile conflict zones.
Since pro-democracy opposition armies declared a “people’s defensive war” in 2021, Chinese projects, including oil and gas pipelines, have come under increasing threat. Notably, in January 2022, a local People’s Defense Force attacked the $800 million Tagaung Taung nickel processing plant. More recently, the Chinese consulate in Mandalay was damaged in a bombing attack last month. While no group has claimed responsibility, both the People’s Defense Forces and the National Unity Government (NUG) have condemned the incident.
The announcement of a joint security company has sparked controversy in Myanmar, with many arguing that it could be perceived as a breach of the country’s sovereignty. Myanmar’s 2008 constitution prohibits the deployment of foreign troops on its soil, and the framing of this initiative as a Chinese “company” in a joint venture appears to be a strategic move to deflect accusations of a foreign military intervention. By structuring the company as private and partially Burmese, Beijing can claim arm’s-length deniability, distancing itself from direct involvement while potentially directing the security force to carry out state-derived foreign policy objectives.
No comments:
Post a Comment