Lawrence Freedman
The concept of ‘deterrence’ has dominated strategic discourse in the West for some 75 years. It describes the supreme quality that western governments expect from their military establishments, and in particular from their continuing investments in nuclear capabilities. The fixation with deterrence began during the Cold War when it was hard to think of any other role for nuclear weapons. It now continues because it was judged to be successful then, only with the expectation that somehow it can be made to work on a wide range of contemporary security threats that may be quite unrelated.
It is also discussed as an effect that can largely be achieved simply by being strong enough. The result is that when things happen that we don’t like this is described as a failure of deterrence even if nobody had previously suggested that there was anything that needed deterring. This encourages a relatively passive approach as if sufficient strength and a demonstrated readiness to use it will mean that deterrence occurs naturally.
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