What we disagree about when we disagree about doctrine

Søren Sjøgren

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Introduction

It is generally accepted that sound doctrine is a critical component of military efficiency. Its purpose to standardise the thoughts of officers who ‘have to think along the same lines to get the machinery to work well’.Footnote1 But when it comes to its subsequent application, the consensus stops. What is at stake is more than disagreement about a word. It concerns the role of doctrine in the planning of, justification for, and ultimately conduct of military operations. For example, Lieutenant General Michael C. Short, who commanded NATO’s air forces in the campaign against Serbia in 1999, was frustrated with how the political leadership interfered in target selection. Air power was used to hit tactical-level Serbian forces in Kosovo and not strategic targets in Serbia, as contemporary doctrine suggested.Footnote2 Another example is the bombing campaign against Iraq in 1991. Scholars have argued that doctrine and not strategy drove operations.Footnote3 In the spirit of this article, these could also be understood as two very different ways of conceptualising what doctrine is and how it should be applied; something to adhere to or depart from. These underlying beliefs about doctrine, its relations to operations and its intended role in the planning and conduct of operations are what I label ‘imaginaries’ in this article.