Toby Dalton and Anna Bartoux
Whether 2025 marks the beginning of a first Harris administration or a second term for former President Trump, it is almost assured that the United States (US) government will pursue geopolitical competition with China through an “Indo-Pacific Strategy.” Although the tone has varied across the last three US administrations, a shared underlying characterization of interests and associated principles have driven a significant degree of continuity in American foreign policy toward the Indo-Pacific. Behind this continuity, there is a mainstream assumption that sustaining these policies—whether they are fully implemented or not—preserves the status quo in the region, despite the significant geopolitical and geoeconomic changes underway.
The logic driving the Indo-Pacific focus is understandable given the mounting threats in the region. And busy government officials can be forgiven for leaning on policies and programs that are well-established and seemingly uncontroversial, versus asking politically difficult (and perhaps career-risking) questions about the wisdom of sustaining the default approach. Nevertheless, an US Indo-Pacific strategy on autopilot seems increasingly blind to the consequences of continuity, namely the ways in which it is exacerbating dangers of crisis or conflict. The next US administration likely will feel constrained in its choices, but it should carefully assess the efficacy of the existing approach and the challenges to its implementation and consider more seriously policy alternatives that could arrest the slide toward insecurity in the region.
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