Sri Lanka’s Efforts from the Viewpoint of New Approach for Counterinsurgency (COIN)

Yoshimasa Adachi

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Introduction

Counterinsurgency (COIN) is defined by comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency while addressing its root causes. During the Fourth Eelam War (July 2006 – May 2009) under President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s administration (November 19, 2005 – January 9, 2015), the Sri Lankan government achieved a decisive military victory over the LTTE, quelling the rebellion. The Rajapaksa administration’s efforts to eliminate the LTTE drew attention as a successful example of crushing a rebel force through decisive military action in counterinsurgency (COIN). Because the LTTE was ultimately crushed with many civilian casualties, the thorough use of force tends to be emphasized. However, this view does not capture the full picture of the Rajapaksa administration’s COIN.

Traditionally, COIN strategies are categorized into two primary approaches: the population-centric approach and the enemy-centric approach. These approaches have influenced COIN in various countries, yet both come with inherent challenges. The population-centric approach emphasizes focusing COIN efforts on the civilian population rather than the insurgents. By safeguarding the population, providing essential services, and securing their support, this approach aims to isolate the insurgents from the populace, ultimately leading to the suppression of the rebellion. However, this approach is often based on idealistic theories and untested assumptions, making it difficult to apply effectively in real-world conflict scenarios. Conversely, the enemy-centric approach prioritizes targeting insurgents directly, often employing fear and coercive force to suppress rebellions, including exerting pressure on the population. This method tends to overlook the protection of civilians, which can fuel further rebellion and lacks a nuanced political perspective.