Michael Rubin
On December 13, 2018, National Security Advisor John Bolton announced the Trump administration’s new Africa strategy. “Great power competitors, namely China and Russia, are rapidly expanding their financial and political influence across Africa,” he said, adding, “China uses bribes, opaque agreements, and the strategic use of debt to hold states in Africa captive to Beijing’s wishes and demands.” He cited Djibouti, whose debt to China was nearly half the country’s gross domestic product, and noted that after China inaugurated its first overseas naval base in Djibouti, it began blinding U.S. pilots landing nearby with lasers.
While President Joe Biden sought to define his administration in opposition to Donald Trump, he accepted the Trump team’s concern about China in Africa. “The People’s Republic of China…sees the region as an important arena to challenge the rules-based international order, advance its own narrow commercial and geopolitical interests, undermine transparency and openness, and weaken U.S. relations with African peoples and governments,” Biden’s own Africa strategy declared, even as the Biden team chose to emphasize global problems like climate change and global health.
It is easy to voice an agenda and policy priorities; it is harder to implement them. Absent continuous effort from the National Security Council, institutional inertia triumphs, and individual biases overshadow the national interest. This has been the case with the Horn of Africa, where shortsighted agendas and ham-handed implementation have empowered China at the expense of U.S. national interests, counterterrorism, and democracy.
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