Andrew Radin, Alyssa Demus, Alexandra T. Evans
Escalation is an important consideration in U.S. military activities, but U.S. Army and joint planning doctrine and manuals do not provide focused guidance on how to account for escalation risks across the competition-conflict spectrum. The academic literature on escalation does offer useful frameworks, and many of the concepts are applicable to concrete military problems at the tactical and operational levels. This report contains insights from four prominent academic schools of thought on the actions, attributes, and dilemmas that characterize escalation and deescalation processes and provides military planners and staff officers a vocabulary to describe the benefits, costs, and risks of potential military options.
Academic theories of escalation offer ways to think about when, why, and how escalation may unfold.
These theories offer additional considerations for military officers to incorporate when they develop potential courses of action or advise on military options. However, the theories are often incomplete, are difficult to apply, and suggest contradictory implications for practitioners.
The literature on the offense-defense balance suggests that the challenges in distinguishing offensive and defensive capabilities may reduce the deterrent value of deploying offensive capabilities and lead an adversary to undertake undesired actions.
The literature on bargaining highlights the importance of the information and signaling. Costlier military actions that reveal a state's capability and commitment can help that state prevail without conflict, for example.
The literature on emerging domains highlights the new opportunities in such areas as cyber and space. However, because operational effects in these domains vary in scale, kind, and target, it may be difficult to calibrate proportionality or accurately convey intent. The resulting ambiguity can encourage escalation.
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