Chart Westcott
Following a week-long visit to Taiwan, I have reassessed my perspective on U.S. foreign policy toward Taiwan. My initial belief was that the U.S. should prioritize strengthening Taiwan’s defensive capabilities, primarily by transforming it into a “porcupine” through increased arms sales and constructing an anti-hegemonic coalition in the region. While I continue to support these objectives, my visit has revealed that military support alone is insufficient. A comprehensive strategy must also include a robust soft power component aimed at fostering political unity, morale, and military readiness in Taiwan.
From the outset of my trip, it became clear that Taiwanese society and politics are more nuanced than I expected, and these complexities limit the effectiveness of purely military assistance. The ongoing rivalry between Taiwan’s two main political parties, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT), has led to political disunity that hampers the full use of defense capabilities. This political fragmentation contributes to a weakened sense of national morale and readiness.
Although there is widespread agreement that avoiding war is desirable, there is no consensus on whether deterrence through militarization is the best path forward. Even if militarization were universally supported, Taiwan’s aging population and relatively comfortable lifestyle pose challenges. Conscription, currently set at a year, is far from adequate in preparing Taiwan’s youth for the type of civic and military readiness found in nations like Israel or South Korea. Compounding this is the belief that Taiwan’s geographic defenses, particularly the formidable Taiwan Strait, provide a sufficient buffer against invasion, giving many Taiwanese a false sense of security.
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