Greg Priddy
With Iran’s decision to mount a major missile strike against Israel on October 1 in retaliation for Israel’s strike on Hezbollah’s headquarters near Beirut, which killed longtime leader Hassan Nasrallah on September 27, the regime has chosen to cross the Rubicon into direct conflict with Israel. This is very unlike the Iranian missile strike in April, which was intentionally telegraphed and resulted in only a small Israeli strike against an Iranian air defense site. Now, Israel is considering a much broader list of retaliatory options, reportedly including strikes on the IRGC, Iran’s leadership, nuclear program sites, and oil infrastructure. President Biden has already publicly opposed striking Iran’s nuclear program, concerned that it could tilt Iran toward pursuing immediate weaponization.
Oil might seem to be a logical pressure point against the Iranian regime, given its importance to the country’s economy. Iran’s oil exports have been up in 2024, contributing to restoring modest economic growth. It is arguably a problematic target for U.S. interests, though, with a high potential for blowback. In a scenario in which Iran continues to exchange blows with Israel for an extended period—which now seems likely—or even ends up clashing directly with U.S. forces in the region, Iran would still have a powerful incentive to avoid striking Saudi, Emirati, or other GCC oil and gas infrastructure. The Gulf kingdoms can field superior air forces that could damage Iran’s oil infrastructure in a manner that would take years to repair.
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