Pavel K. Baev
Russian President Vladimir Putin announced neither surprising nor radical revisions in Russia’s nuclear doctrine on September 25 (Kremlin.ru, September 25). He committed to revising the government’s vague document back in June. In the ensuing months, many “patriotic” pundits have advocated various drastic changes, from formalizing the “escalate-to-deescalate” proposition to breaking the non-proliferation regime (see EDM, June 3; Kommersant, September 11). Putin opted for very modest revisions and tried to compensate for this moderation with staged gravitas at his Security Council’s so-called “standing conference on nuclear deterrence.” The conference had never been known to exist before but this time was covered on prime-time television (Kommersant, September 25; Meduza, September 26). The announced shifts in the justifications for Russia hypothetically resorting to using its vast nuclear arsenal have already been scrutinized minutely, but the timing of Putin’s heavy hints and direct threats is indicative of his real intent.
Typically, Putin’s attempts at brinkmanship are aimed at influencing key decisions in the US-led coalition on expanding support to Ukraine and providing weapon systems of higher capacity, such as Leopard main battle tanks or M142 HIMARS multiple rocket launchers. The physical arrival of these arms, such as the deployment of the first squadron of F-16 fighters in early August, is invariably ignored, even when equipped with the JSOW glide bombs (Izvestiya, September 26).
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