Yezid Sayigh
On Thursday, the United States, European Union, and ten other countries called for an immediate twenty-one-day ceasefire “to provide space for diplomacy” to end the ongoing violence between Israel and Hezbollah. The fact that the signatories have gone this far toward putting together a joint diplomatic initiative is significant, but it will not bring even a temporary halt to hostilities without a sustained effort backed by meaningful political leverage. Until then, political calculations on both sides dictate that neither Israel nor Hezbollah will cease fire.
That Hezbollah is on the back foot militarily is evident. No less evident is Iran’s unwillingness to step in to relieve the military pressure on Hezbollah: It may have invested in building up the party’s military capabilities over the past four decades in order to reinforce Iranian strategic deterrence against Israel, but Tehran appears resigned to the necessity of absorbing its losses rather than risking a wider war with Israel.
These facts doubtless encourage the Israeli government to press its advantage. But this is not the foremost reason why it is unlikely to accept a ceasefire. For nearly a whole year, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has used the threat of launching a full-scale offensive against Hezbollah and triggering a regional war with Iran to reassert his personal dominance in domestic politics and to gain leverage in relation to the U.S. administration. Being on the brink of a larger war has served Netanyahu’s purposes, whereas actually waging a larger war is a major gamble entailing risks that he has seen no need to take.
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