Mark S. Cogan
While at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar commented that New Delhi will not decouple from the US dollar, noting that it was not in his country’s economic interests. While noting that New Delhi was pursuing other means as well, he said: “[India has] never actively targeted the dollar. That’s not part of our economic, political, or strategic policy. Some others may have done so. What I will say is that we have a natural concern.”
Even if the US dollar’s retreat is based on economics and global trade concerns, India can’t escape the fact that the endorsement of de-dollarization by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping risks impacting India’s growth and strengthening China’s grip across the globe.
When the 2024 BRICS Summit is held from October 22-24 in the Russian city of Kazan, India now has no choice but to join Vladimir Putin in welcoming Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) into the fold.
Defenders of BRICS expansion have suggested that India’s association would ultimately benefit New Delhi in the long-term, but that is suspect. For example, India signed a deal to develop the Chabahar Port, which could have the benefit of pumping as much as $1 trillion of Indian exports into the Gulf region and Central Asia. However, the project has no direct association with BRICS and was achieved bilaterally. Second, BRICS-related trade growth is lopsided in China’s favor, as China’s size and foreign policy aggression signal it intends to influence other BRICS members rather than be more cooperative with its regional rival.
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