William Barry , Aaron "Blair" WIlcox
In the months before Russia’s expanded invasion into Ukraine in 2022, six planners meeting in a nondescript room in the headquarters of U.S. Army Europe-Africa (USAREUR-AF) frantically developed various options for the employment and positioning of forces across NATO’s eastern flank to avert, or at least limit the harm resulting from, the impending calamity. The commanding general of USAREUR-AF wanted options that would assure allies of continued U.S. support and deter any hostile actions into NATO territory. The job of developing these options fell to four graduates of the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), one army strategist (Functional Area 59), and a logistics planner. With little time for research or to seek outside expertise, the six planners had to make the best use of available tools—sometimes just a map and whatever knowledge they had gained from education, experience, or self-development—to develop military options that would achieve the commanding general’s intent; this was a daunting task as it required assessing the feasibility of complex movements of large numbers of troops and equipment to achieve difficult-to-measure objectives in a dynamic operational environment. The initial recommendations on these consequential matters often came down to the “best guess” informed estimates made by a small number of talented, well-educated but, in the end, mid-grade officers. As seasoned military planners can attest, this experience is hardly unique. It is a frequent occurrence created by the too-familiar demands of limited time and personnel common to crises.
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