Lawrence Freedman
Until a year ago the consensus view inside Israel’s security establishment was that Lebanon-based Hezbollah was a much greater threat than Gaza-based Hamas. Hamas was fenced in, launching the occasional barrage of rockets in Israel’s general direction without truly testing its defences. There was even some hope that, frustrated by its impotence, it might be resigned to concentrating on governing the territory it controlled.
Hezbollah, by contrast, was altogether more capable, claiming up to 100,000 soldiers and with an estimated inventory of rockets and missiles normally put at around 150,000, many with precision guidance. The group was only likely to get stronger, as Iran provided it with progressively better equipment. Here the hope was that Hezbollah did not want a new war with Israel. It respected Israeli firepower, particularly after the two had clashed in 2006. In addition, Lebanon was in a fragile state, aggravated by the terrible port explosion that ripped across Beirut in 2020, for which Hezbollah is widely blamed. It currently has a caretaker government as the country’s political parties, including Hezbollah, are divided on a new government. The other potential source of Hezbollah’s restraint was that as an agent of Iranian foreign policy, its military strength was being held in reserve to remind Israel, and also the US, of the risks of going to war with Iran.
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