Julian Spencer-Churchill, Ulysse Oliveira Baptista & Maximilien Hachiya
The last two years of fighting in Ukraine have humbled the overly confident and shown that, without countermeasures and with optimal flying conditions, an attack drone can disable any tanks through a shaped charge, top-attack, or mobility kill, including the Leopard II, M1 Abrams, or Challenger II, and even armored helicopters. However, assessing a weapon’s ability to inflict losses does not have the same effect as shifting warfare to defense dominance and the attendant requirement of attrition to achieve victory. Once the net effect of drones and their countermeasures, as well as precision artillery and anti-tank missiles, are accounted for, tanks remain the most powerful single combat system on the battlefield. Eventually, the Ukrainians should be able to resume concentrated offensive armored attacks.
Thoughtful tactical and operational analyses from the U.S. Army, the Marine Corps intellectuals, U.S. Special Forces members, CSIS, IISS, and the Institute for the Study of War all agree (with some variations) that drones are having a transformational impact on the war, especially on the attacker. The offensive is required for eventual victory, and the Ukrainians are in serious need of retraining if they are to apply the necessary combined arms tactics for any phase of the war. These analyses mostly reflect on the failure of the NATO-trained and equipped Ukrainian army in its summer 2023 attempt to conduct an armored offensive to the Sea of Azov. Due to deep Russian defense and flexible reserves, Ukraine could never achieve the concentration of force necessary to realize a breakthrough. Fortunately, Ukraine’s deliberate control over its operations ensured that losses were moderate and reflected a normal exchange rate of attrition.
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