Evan A. Laksmana
China and the Philippines have been trading barbs and engaging in dangerous brinkmanship in the South China Sea for the better part of two years. In late August 2024, the Philippines reported that a China Coast Guard vessel manoeuvred dangerously and repeatedly rammed a Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) vessel in Sabina Shoal, located in the Spratly Islands and claimed by both countries; China accused the PCG of deliberately approaching and ramming its vessel. In that month alone, there were at least six confrontations between China and the Philippines at sea and in the air in the South China Sea.
These dangerous episodes obscure a deeper diplomatic decoupling that has been taking place over the past few years on three levels: firstly, between the Philippines and China; secondly, within the Philippines’ domestic strategic-policy establishment; and thirdly, between the Philippines and other Southeast Asia states. Changing the strategic equation between China and the Philippines requires a broad diplomatic reassessment and re-engagement on all of these levels, over and above moving the tactical needle in the South China Sea. After all, there is a hard ceiling in the ladder of escalation that should discourage the parties from ultimately fighting a war neither truly wants.
Hanging onto the ladderSince early 2023, Manila and Beijing have carefully sought to control the ladder of escalation during a cycle of alarming encounters around Second Thomas Shoal and other sites in the Spratly Islands. Manila, believing it has international law and its alliance with the United States on its side, has pursued a campaign of ‘active transparency’, spotlighting and publicising Beijing’s grey-zone tactics.
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