Erik Green & Meia Nouwens
China’s 13 October announcement that the Joint Sword-2024B military exercise had begun raised alarm bells in Taipei and Western capitals alike. Coming three days after Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s address for Taiwan’s National Day, the Central Military Commission’s promotional video declared that the exercise would ‘deter separatist extremists’ and involve all branches of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the China Coast Guard (CCG). The announcement gave little warning and raised expectations of further escalation across the Taiwan Strait.
The exercise, however, appeared less escalatory than expected. Beginning at 5am, the PLA Ground Force, Navy, Air Force and Rocket Force as well as the CCG conducted drills that lasted 13 hours. The PLA deployed 153 aircraft, with 111 crossing the median line. This is the most recorded in a single day and significantly greater than the 111 aircraft deployed during the Joint Sword-2024A exercise that took place between 23 and 24 May.
Fourteen PLA Navy ships (including the Liaoning carrier strike group), 17 CCG and 12 government vessels also participated in the exercise, representing a smaller naval presence than the 46 vessels the PLA deployed during 2024A. In contrast, the CCG’s contribution increased to 17 vessels from 9. Its activities were also less conservative than in 2024A, with the vessels encircling the entire island rather than primarily focusing their efforts around eastern Taiwan. No vessels, however, entered Taiwan’s territorial waters, although activity took place in the restricted waters around Matsu and Dongyin islands (but notably not around Kinmen, despite a spate of incursions around it in recent months). In addition, no live-fire activity was discernible as a direct part of the drills.
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