George Friedman
Last week, I wrote an article on the two wars raging in Eurasia. It was “idiosyncratic” in that, unlike other columns circling the mediasphere, it focused on how ground combat in the Middle East evolves into conventional war, and how a conventional war demands the movement of forces that could implicate other nations, particularly Russia. The crux of my argument was that airstrikes, however intense, rarely result in capitulation. Even in World War II, intense, coordinated airstrikes against Germany did not, on the whole, reduce Nazi resistance. It cleared the table for ground attacks by the Western allies and the Soviets, who eventually overran Germany. Air power mattered, but when it came to ending the war, ground operations mattered more.
Over the past week, as the conflict reached the one-year mark, Israel has overwhelmingly used aerial operations, hammering Lebanon and testing Iranian intentions. (Iran responded with an aerial bombardment in kind.) Here again: All of this has value, but none of it is able to eliminate an enemy or overtake cities that contain command centers, intelligence and weapons. Destroying what remains of Hamas or Hezbollah by air will not cripple their ability to wage war. If it didn’t work against Nazi Germany, it certainly won’t work against a decentralized insurgent force.
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